tft-UNIVERto 


S3 


4.      V 

'  *    '  *•  ** 

*   *    *     ' 


GREAT  INVASION 

OF  1863; 


OR, 


General  i^ee  117  / 


EMBRACING   AN   ACCOUNT   OF 

The  Strength  and  Organization  of  the  Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  Northern  Virginia;  Their 

Daily  Marches  with  the  Routes  of  Travel,  and  General  Orders  Issued  ;  The  Three 

Days  of  Battle  ;  The  Retreat  of  the  Confederates  and  Pursuit  by  the 

Federals  ;  Analytical  Indei,  Maps,  Portraits,  and  a  large 

number  of  Illustrations  of  the  Battle-field. 


Witij  an 


Containing  an  Account  of  the  Burning  of  Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania,  A  Statement  of  the 
General  Sickles  Controversy,  and  other  Valuable  Historic  Papers. 


BY 

JACOB  HOKE, 


DAYTON,   OHIO: 
"W.  J.  SHUEY,  PUBLISHER. 

1887. 


Copyright,  1887, 

BY    W.    J.     SHUEY. 


£ 


TO    THE 
SURVIVING  MEMBERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

AND   TO   THE 
MEMORY  OF  THOSE  WHO  HAVE  DEPARTED, 

AS  WELL  AS 

TO  ALL  THE   HF.ROIC   MEN,    BOTH   LIVING   AND    DEAD,   WHO 

HASTENED  TO  THE  RESCUE  OF  THEIR  IMPERJLED 

COUNTRY  IN  THE  HOUR  OF  HER  NEED, 

THIS  VOLUME, 

WHICH  RECORDS  THE  EVENTS  OF  ONE  OF  THE  GREATEST  AND  MOST 

DECISIVE  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  WAR  OF  THE  REBELLION, 

IS    MOST    RESPECTFULLY    DEDICATED 

BY  THE  AUTHOR. 


3014521 


PUBLISHER'S  ACKNOWLEDGMENT. 


THE  Publisher  wishes  to  acknowledge  his  indebtedness  to  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral M.  R.  Patrick,  Provost-Marshal-General  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  at  present  Governor  of  the  National  Home  for  Disabled  Volunteer 
Soldiers  at  Dayton,  Ohio,  who  kindly  loaned  the  originals  from  which 
the  "gravures"  of  Generals  Meade,  Hancock,  and  Lee  were  made.  The 
kindness  is  all  the  more  appreciated  from  the  fact  that  the  originals  are 
souvenirs,  presented  to  General  Patrick  by  the  distinguished  personages 
themselves,  and  have  never  before  been  given  to  the  public.  The  pen  and 
ink  sketch  of  General  Meade,  on  page  241,  was  made  by  Colonel  C.  H.  T. 
Collis,  just  before  the  Wilderness  campaign,  and  was  pronounced  by  Gen- 
eral Meade  the  best  likeness  of  himself  yet  made. 

W.  J.  SHUEY. 


xii 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

The  Armies  of  the  Potomac,  and  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Page. 
Number  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  —  Testimony  of  General  George 

G.  Meade  —  Strength  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — State- 
ment of  Hon.  Edward  Everett,  General  James  Longstreet,  Colonel 
W.  H.  Taylor,  and  the  Count  of  Paris —  Confirmatory  Testimony  of 
Eye -Witnesses  —  Organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  —  Of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — Purposes  and  Objects  of  the  Inva- 
sion—  Statement  of  Generals  A.  I,.  Long,  James  Longstreet,  and 
Abner  Doubleday — Jefferson  Davis'  Confidence  in  Lee's  success  in 
Pennsylvania — Hon.  A.  H.  Stephens  sent  to  Washington  to  propose 
Peace  upon  the  Recognition  of  the  Southern  Confederacy — Copy 
of  Davis'  Letter  of  Instructions  to  Stephens  —  Turned  back  at  Fort- 
ress Monroe  —  The  Victories  at  Vicksburg  and  Gettysburg  Interfere 
with  Davis'  Plans  —  Lee's  Strategical  Plans  and  Purposes — Arrival 
of  Longstreet's  Scout  and  Change  of  Plan  and  Purposes — Harmon- 
izing the  Contradictory  Statements  as  to  the  Time  of  this  Scout's 
Arrival  —  Confidence  of  the  Confederates  —  Lee's  Plans  and  Strat- 
egy Foiled  by  General  Hooker  —  Stuart's  Forced  March  around  the 
Federal  Army — Lee's  Ignorance  of  Hooker's  Movements  —  Depar- 
ture of  the  Confederate  Commmander  from  a  "Strategical  Offensive 
but  Tactical  Defensive  " —  Longstreet's  Objections  to  this  Change — 
Opposed  to  an  Attack  upon  the  Federal  Position  at  Gettysburg — 
Counsels  a  Flank  Movement  —  Remarks  of  the  Count  of  Paris  upon 
Lee's  alternatives 33 

CHAPTER  II. 
The  Armies  in  Motion;  Rout  of  General  Milroy  at  Winchester. 

Positions  Occupied  by  the  Federal  and  Confederate  Armies  —  Indica- 
tions of  an  Aggressive  Movement  by  the  Confederates  —  General 
Hooker  wide  awake  to  the  Emergency  —  Informs  the  Government 
of  the  Threatened  Invasion  —  Withdrawal  of  Lee's  Army  from 

xiii 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

Page. 
Fredericksburg  and  Concentration  at  Culpeper  —  Reconnoissance 

in  force  by  the  Federal  Cavalry  under  General  Pleasanton  —  Desper- 
ate Engagement  at  Beverly  Ford  or  Brandy  Station  —  Capture  of 
General  Stuart's  Head -quarters'  Chest  containing  Lee's  Plans  — 
Prompt  Measures  by  General  Hooker  to  Defeat  Lee's  Purpose^  — 
Lee  Forced  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley  instead  of  moving  North- 
ward and  East  of  the  Mountain  as  he  Intended — Daily  Marches  of 
the  Two  Armies  —  Exposed  Condition  of  General  Milroy  at  Win- 
*  Chester — Warned  of  his  Danger  he  Declares  his  Ability  to  Main- 
tain his  Position —  Reconnoissances  made  and  Skirmishes  with  the 
Advancing  Enemy  —  Arrival  of  Early's  and  Johnson's  Divisions 
before  Winchester — Rodes'  Division  drives  Colonel  McReynolds 
from  Berryville  —  His  Wagon  -  train  Flees  to  the  Potomac  at  Wil- 
liamsport  —  Pursued  by  Jenkins'  Cavalry — Capture  of  Martinsburg 
by  General  Rodes  —  Severe  Fighting  at  Winchester  —  Milroy  aban- 
dons Winchester  in  the  night  and  flees  toward  Harper's  Ferry — 
Intercepted  by  the  Confederates — His  Forces  Defeated  and  many 
Slain  and  Captured — Escape  of  part  of  his  Force  to  Maryland 
Heights,  and  others  to  Everett  or  Bloody  Run  in  Southern  Pennsyl- 
vania— Jenkins  crosses  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport 66 

CHAPTER  III. 
Preparations  for  the  Reception  of  the  Enemy.     Advance  of  General  Jenkins. 

Description  of  Southern  Pennsylvania  —  Preparations  made  to  Repel 
the  Threatened  Invasion  —  Departments  of  the  Monongahela  and 
Susquehanna  ordered  —  The  Militia  called  out  —  Intense  Excite- 
ment along  the  Southern  Border — Graphic  Description  by  Rev. 
Dr.  Philip  Schaff — Excitement  in  Chambersburg,  and  the  contents 
of  the  Bank,  stores,  and  Court  House  secreted  or  sent  away — Flight 
of  the  Farmers  with  their  Horses  and  Cattle  —  McReynolds'  Wagon- 
train  Flees  down  the  Valley — Tremendous  Panic  of  the  Teamsters 
—  Dashes  through  Chambersburg — Jenkins'  Cavalry  in  Pursuit 
enters  Chambersburg — Capture  of  Lieutenant  Smith  and  George 
Hawkins  in  the  Public  Square  — Perilous  Escape  of  their  Captors — 
Desperate  Strait  of  Mr.  J.  S.  Brand  —  Reprisals  made  upon  the 
Town  for  Captured  Horses  and  Accouterments  —  Shirk's  Hill  occu- 
pied— Scouring  the  Country  for  Plunder — Horses  and  Negroes 
taken — Narrow  Escape'  of  Hon.  Thaddeus  Stevens — Jenkins  orders 
the  Stores  and  Shops  to  be  Opened  — Alarm  of  the  Confederates 
and  Hasty  Falling  Back — Jenkins  Plunders  the  Southern  part  of 
Franklin  County — Fulton  and  Adams  County  Visited  and  Plun- 
dered. 89 


CONTENTS.  XV 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Invasion. 

Page. 
Stuart's  Cavalry  leaves  its  Encampment  on  the  South  bank  of  the  Rap- 

pahannock  and  moves  Northward  —  Precautionary  Movements  of 
the  Federal  Army  —  The  Safety  of  the  National  Capital,  General 
Hooker's  Paramount  Object —  Magnificent  Strategy,  and  the  Ap- 
proaches to  Washington  all  Covered  —  Cavalry  Engagement  at  Aldie 
and  Upperville — 'General  Stuart  Sealed  Up  in  the  Valley — Advance 
of  General  Knipe  from  Harrisburg  —  General  I<ee  issues  a  General 
Order  at  Berryville  Relating  to  the  Conduct  of  his  Troops,  and  the 
taking  of  Supplies  —  New  York  Militia  in  Camp  a  mile  South  of 
Chambersburg  —  A  Suspicious  Person  visits  the  Camp  —  Rodes' 
Division  Advances  from  Williamsport — Jenkins'  cavalry  Advance 
to  Marion  —  Surprised  and  Fall  Back,  Pursued  by  a  Company  of 
Federal  Cavalry  —  First  Battle  of  the  War  upon  Pennsylvania  Soil 

—  Observations  from  a  Tree  Top,  and  the  Confederate  Advance  Re- 
ported to  General  Knipe  —  Panic  Among  the  New  York  Militia-men 

—  Cowardly  Flight  —  A  Federal  Officer  Shoots  his  Horse  —  Slander- 
ous Stories  told  by  these  Panic-stricken  Men  —  General  Order  issued 
by  Lieutenant  General  Ewell — Johnson  and  Early  cross  the  Poto- 
mac and  Advance  to  Hagerstown  —  Early  Deflects  to  the  East  and 
passes  down  the  Valley  by  way  of  Waynesborough,  Quincy,  and 
Funkstown   to   Greenwood — Jenkins   Re-enters   Chambersburg — 
Requisition  made  for  Supplies  —  Requisitions  upon  Greencastle  by 
General  Ewell — Rodes'  Division  Enters  and  Passes  Through  Cham- 
bersburg— Arrival  of  General  Ewell  —  General  Order  Relating  to 
the  Disposition  of  I,iquor — Requisition  upon  Chambersburg  for 
Supplies — Examination  of  Stores — Immense  Bosses  of  the  Citizens 
of  Chambersburg  —  Printing  done  for  the  Confederates  —  Shrewd 
Financiering  —  Occupation  of  Shirk's  Hill  and  Cannon  Planted  — 
Stewart's  Brigade  of  Infantry  marches  from  Greencastle  to  McCon- 
nellsburg — Battle  of  North  Mountain — Undue  Importance  Attached 
to  this  Affair — Hill's  and  lyongstreet's  Corps  cross  the  Potomac 
and  Advance  down  the  Valley — Confederate  Court-Martial — Addi- 
tional Requisitions  for  Supplies  —  Passage  of  Johnson's  Division  — 
General  Early  visits  Ewell  near  Chambersburg — Method  of  Send- 
ing Information  to  the  Authorities  at  Harrisburg — Perilous  Escape 
of  some  of  our  Dispatch  Bearers  —  Arrival  of  Hill's  Corps  —  De- 
scription of  General  Hill  —  I<ee  and  his  Staff  in  the  Public  Square 

—  Council  between  L,ee  and  Hill  —  Immense  Importance  of  this 
Council  —  A  Historic  Scene  —  Eagerness  to  see  which  way  the  Con- 
federate Commander  and  his  Staff  would  take — Turns  Eastward — 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

Page. 
Immediate    Dispatch   of  this    Fact  to  Harrisburg  —  Benjamin   S. 

Huber,  the  Heroic  Dispatch  Bearer  —  Interesting  Account  of  his 
Trip  —  Closeted  with  the  Governor  of  Pennsylvania  and  the  Mili- 
tary Authorities  —  Lee's  whereabouts  known  at  Washington  early 
in  the  day  following  his  Entrance  into  Chambersburg  —  Descrip- 
tion of  General  Lee  and  his  Brilliant  Staff —  British  Officers  with 
the  Grand  Cavalcade  —  Lee  makes  his  Head-Quarters  upon  the 
Eastern  Outskirts  of  Chambersburg — Destruction  of  Hon.  Thad- 
deus  Stevens'  Iron  Works  by  General  Early  —  Early  crosses  the 
South  Mountain  and  marches  upon  Gettysburg  —  Requisitions  upon 
Gettysburg  —  General  Imboden  crosses  the  Potomac  and  Enters 
Pennsylvania  —  Plundering  by  the  Way — Jenkins'  Cavalry  pass 
through  Carlisle  —  Falling  Back  of  the  Federal  Troops  under  Gen- 
eral Knipe  —  Arrival  of  Longstreet's  Corps  —  General  Order  by  Lee 

—  Humanity  of  the  Confederate  Chieftain  —  Commendable  Behavior 
of  the  Confederates  —  Lee's   Orders  generally   Observed  —  A  few 
Outrages  only  by  Stragglers  —  Citizens  Caught  in  out  of  the  way 
places  Robbed  —  Hats,  Boots,  and  Watches  taken  —  Mr.  Strite  Mur- 
dered and  his  body  Secreted  —  Scouring  the  Country  for  Supplies 

—  Precautionary  Measures  in  some   Localities  —  Mountain   Passes 
Fortified  by  the  Farmers  to  Secure  their  Horses  —  Brilliant  Dash 
by  Captain  Dahlgreen  upon  the  Confederate  Communications  at 
Greencastle  — •  Prisoners  and  Confederate  Mail  Captured  and  Hur- 
ried Across  the  Mountain  to  the  Union  Head-Quarters  —  Rodes'  In- 
fantry passes  through  Carlisle  —  Requisitions  upon  Mechanicsburg 
by  General  Jenkins -^-Early's  Division  Enters  York  —  Requisitions 
made  upon  the  Town  —  A  ransom  of  One  Hundred  Thousand  Dol- 
lars Demanded  —  Part  of  this  Amount  Paid  Over  —  Insolent  Order, 
or  Address  to  the  People  —  General  Gordon  with  his  Brigade  Ad- 
vances to  Wrightsville  on  the  Susquehanna  —  Object  of  this  Move- 
ment—  Immense  Importance  of  Preventing  the  Confederates  from 
Seizing  the  Columbia  Bridge  crossing  the  River  at  that  place  — 
Hurried  Concentration  of  Militia  under  Colonel  Frick  —  Breast- 
works thrown  up  on  the  Western  Bank  of  the  River — Resistance 
made  at  this  Place  —  Threatened  to  be  out-flanked,  the  small  Federal 
force  Recrosses  the  River  to  Columbia —  Order  from  General  Couch 
to  Destroy  the  Bridge  when  it  could  no  longer  be  held  —  The  Torch 
Applied  —  Official  Account  by  Colonel  Frick  —  An  Unusual  Sun- 
day's Occurrence  in  Chambersburg — Breaking  Open  of  Stores  and 
Cellars  —  Colonel    Freemantle's  Account  of  this    Day's    Work  — 
Disposition  of  Confederate  Scrip  —  Another  Clerical  Financier  — 
Visit  to  General  Lee  in  his  Camp  by  Mrs.  Ellen  McClellan  —  Inter- 
esting Account  of  the  Interview  —  Skirmish  at  Oyster's  Point  — 


.'•*  t 


*    '•>:•<§•• 

. 


GffiEAT  INVASION" 

:-  :  -       OF  1863; 

OR, 

General  Ixee  ir; 


EMBRACING  AN  ACCOUNT  OF 

The  Strength  and  Organization  of  the  Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  Northern  Virginia  ;  Their 

Daily  Marches  with  the  Routes  of  Travel,  and  General  Orders  Issued  ;  The  Three 

Days  of  Battle  ;  The  Retreat  of  the  Confederates  and  Pursuit  by  the 

Federals  ;  Analytical  Index,  Maps,  Portraits,  and  a  large 

number  of  Illustrations  of  the  Battle-field. 


Witty  an 


Containing  an  Account  of  the  Burning  of  Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania,  A  Statement  of  the 
General  Sickles  Controversy,  and  other  Valuable  Historic  Papers. 


BY 

JACOB  HOKE. 


DAYTON,    OHIO: 
J.  SHUEY,  PUBLJSHEJR. 

1887. 


Copyright,  1887, 

BV    W.    J.     SHUEY. 


TO    THE 
SURVIVING  MEMBERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

AND   TO   THE 
MEMORY  OF  THOSE  WHO  HAVE  DEPARTED, 

AS  WELL  AS 

TO  ALL  THE   HEROIC   MEN,    BOTH   LIVING   AND    DEAD,   WHO 

HASTENED  TO  THE  RESCUE  OF  THEIR  IMPERILED 

COUNTRY  IN  THE  HOUR  OF  HER  NEED, 

THIS  VOLUME, 

WHICH  RECORDS  THE  EVENTS  OF  ONE  OF  THE  GREATEST  AND  MOST 

DECISIVE  CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  WAR  OF  THE  REBELLION, 

IS    MOST    RESPECTFULLY    DEDICATED 

BY  THE  AUTHOR. 


PUBLISHER'S  ACKNOWLEDGMENT. 


THE  Publisher  wishes  to  acknowledge  his  indebtedness  to  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral M.  R.  Patrick,  Provost-Marshal-General  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  at  present  Governor  of  the  National  Home  for  Disabled  Volunteer 
Soldiers  at  Dayton,  Ohio,  who  kindly  loaned  the  originals  from  which 
the  "gravures"  of  Generals  Meade,  Hancock,  and  I,ee  were  made.  The 
kindness  is  all  the  more  appreciated  from  the  fadl  that  the  originals  are 
souvenirs,  presented  to  General  Patrick  by  the  distinguished  personages 
themselves,  and  have  never  before  been  given  to  the  public.  The  pen  and 
ink  sketch  of  General  Meade,  on  page  241,  was  made  by  Colonel  0.  H.  T. 
Collis,  just  before  the  Wilderness  campaign,  and  was  pronounced  by  Gen- 
eral Meade  the  best  likeness  of  himself  yet  made. 

W.  J.  SHUEY. 

xii 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Armies  of  the  Potomac,  and  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Page* 
Number  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  —  Testimony  of  General  George 

G.  Meade  —  Strength  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — State- 
ment of  Hon.  Edward  Everett,  General  James  Longstreet,  Colonel 
W.  H.  Taylor,  and  the  Count  of  Paris — Confirmatory  Testimony  of 
Eye -Witnesses  —  Organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  —  Of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — Purposes  and  Objects  of  the  Inva- 
sion —  Statement  of  Generals  A.  I,.  Long,  James  Longstreet,  and 
Abner  Doubleday — Jefferson  Davis'  Confidence  in  Lee's  success  in 
Pennsylvania — Hon.  A.  H.  Stephens  sent  to  Washington  to  propose 
Peace  upon  the  Recognition  of  the  Southern  Confederacy — Copy 
of  Davis'  Letter  of  Instructions  to  Stephens — Turned  back  at  Fort- 
ress Monroe  —  The  Victories  at  Vicksburg  and  Gettysburg  Interfere 
with  Davis'  Plans  —  Lee's  Strategical  Plans  and  Purposes — Arrival 
of  Longstreet's  Scout  and  Change  of  Plan  and  Purposes — Harmon- 
izing the  Contradictory  Statements  as  to  the  Time  of  this  Scout's 
Arrival  —  Confidence  of  the  Confederates  —  Lee's  Plans  and  Strat- 
egy Foiled  by  General  Hooker — Stuart's  Forced  March  around  the 
Federal  Army — Lee's  Ignorance  of  Hooker's  Movements  —  Depar- 
ture of  the  Confederate  Commmander  from  a  "Strategical  Offensive 
but  Tactical  Defensive  " —  Longstreet's  Objections  to  this  Change — 
Opposed  to  an  Attack  upon  the  Federal  Position  at  Gettysburg — 
Counsels  a  Flank  Movement  —  Remarks  of  the  Count  of  Paris  upon 
Lee's  alternatives 33 

CHAPTER   II. 
The  Armies  in  Motion;  Rout  of  General  Milroy  at  Winchester. 

Positions  Occupied  by  the  Federal  and  Confederate  Armies  —  Indica- 
tions of  an  Aggressive  Movement  by  the  Confederates  —  General 
Hooker  wide  awake  to  the  Emergency  —  Informs  the  Government 
of  the  Threatened  Invasion  —  Withdrawal  of  Lee's  Army  from 

xiii 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

Page. 
Fredericksburg  and  Concentration  at  Culpeper  —  Reconnoissance 

in  force  by  the  Federal  Cavalry  under  General  Pleasanton  —  Desper- 
ate Engagement  at  Beverly  Ford  or  Brandy  Station  —  Capture  of 
General  Stuart's  Head -quarters'  Chest  containing  Lee's  Plans — 
Prompt  Measures  by  General  Hooker  to  Defeat  Lee's  Purposes  — 
l,ee  Forced  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley  instead  of  moving  North- 
ward and  East  of  the  Mountain  as  he  Intended — Daily  Marches  of 
the  Two  Armies  —  Exposed  Condition  of  General  Milroy  at  Win- 
chester—  Warned  of  his  Danger  he  Declares  his  Ability  to  Main- 
tain his  Position — Reconnoissances  made  and  Skirmishes  with  the 
Advancing  Enemy  —  Arrival  of  Early's  and  Johnson's  Divisions 
before  Winchester — Rodes'  Division  drives  Colonel  McReynolds 
from  Berryville  —  His  Wagon  -  train  Flees  to  the  Potomac  at  Wil- 
liamsport  —  Pursued  by  Jenkins'  Cavalry — Capture  of  Martinsburg 
by  General  Rodes  —  Severe  Fighting  at  Winchester  —  Milroy  aban- 
dons Winchester  in  the  night  and  flees  toward  Harper's  Ferry — 
Intercepted  by  the  Confederates — His  Forces  Defeated  and  many 
Slain  and  Captured — Escape  of  part  of  his  Force  to  Maryland 
Heights,  and  others  to  Everett  or  Bloody  Run  in  Southern  Pennsyl- 
vania— Jenkins  crosses  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport 66 

CHAPTER  III. 
Preparations  for  the  Reception  of  the  Enemy.     Advance  of  General  Jenkins. 

Description  of  Southern  Pennsylvania  —  Preparations  made  to  Repel 
the  Threatened  Invasion  —  Departments  of  the  Monongahela  and 
Susquehanna  ordered  —  The  Militia  called  out  —  Intense  Excite- 
ment along  the  Southern  Border — Graphic  Description  by  Rev. 
Dr.  Philip  Schaff — Excitement  in  Chambersburg,  and  the  contents 
of  the  Bank,  stores,  and  Court  House  secreted  or  sent  away — Flight 
of  the  Farmers  with  their  Horses  and  Cattle  —  McReynolds'  Wagon- 
train  Flees  down  the  Valley — Tremendous  Panic  of  the  Teamsters 
—  Dashes  through  Chambersburg — Jenkins'  Cavalry  in  Pursuit 
enters  Chambersburg — Capture  of  Lieutenant  Smith  and  George 
Hawkins  in  the  Public  Square — Perilous  Escape  of  their  Captors — 
Desperate  Strait  of  Mr.  J.  S.  Brand — Reprisals  made  upon  the 
Town  for  Captured  Horses  and  Accouterments  —  Shirk's  Hill  occu- 
pied— Scouring  the  Country  for  Plunder — Horses  and  Negroes 
taken — Narrow  Escape  of  Hon.  Thaddeus  Stevens — Jenkins  orders 
the  Stores  and  Shops  to  be  Opened  — Alarm  of  the  Confederates 
and  Hasty  Falling  Back — Jenkins  Plunders  the  Southern  part  of 
Franklin  County — Fulton  and  Adams  County  Visited  and  Plun- 
dered. 8e 


CONTENTS.  XV 

CHAPTER   IV. 

The  Invasion. 

Page. 
Stuart's  Cavalry  leaves  its  Encampment  on  the  South  bank  of  the  Rap- 

pahannock  and  moves  Northward  —  Precautionary  Movements  of 
the  Federal  Army  —  The  Safety  of  the  National  Capital,  General 
Hooker's  Paramount  Object  —  Magnificent  Strategy,  and  the  Ap- 
proaches to  Washington  all  Covered  —  Cavalry  Engagement  at  Aldie 
and  Upperville  — General  Stuart  Sealed  Up  in  the  Valley — Advance 
of  General  Knipe  from  Harrisburg — General  I^ee  issues  a  General 
Order  at  Berryville  Relating  to  the  Conduct  of  his  Troops,  and  the 
taking  of  Supplies  —  New  York  Militia  in  Camp  a  mile  South  of 
Chambersburg  —  A  Suspicious  Person  visits  the  Camp  —  Rodes' 
Division  Advances  from  Williamsport — Jenkins'  cavalry  Advance 
to  Marion  —  Surprised  and  Fall  Back,  Pursued  by  a  Company  of 
Federal  Cavalry  —  First  Battle  of  the  War  upon  Pennsylvania  Soil 

—  Observations  from  a  Tree  Top,  and  the  Confederate  Advance  Re- 
ported to  General  Knipe  —  Panic  Among  the  New  York  Militia-men 

—  Cowardly  Flight — A  Federal  Officer  Shoots  his  Horse  —  Slander- 
ous Stories  told  by  these  Panic-stricken  Men  —  General  Order  issued 
by  lieutenant  General  Ewell  — Johnson  and  Early  cross  the  Poto- 
mac and  Advance  to  Hagerstown  —  Early  Deflects  to  the  East  and 
passes  down  the  Valley  by  way  of  Waynesborough,  Quincy,  and 
Funkstown   to   Greenwood — Jenkins   Re-enters   Chambersburg  — 
Requisition  made  for  Supplies  —  Requisitions  upon  Greencastle  by 
General  Ewell — Rodes'  Division  Enters  and  Passes  Through  Cham- 
bersburg— Arrival  of  General  Ewell — General  Order  Relating  to 
the  Disposition  of  Liquor  —  Requisition  upon  Chambersburg  for 
Supplies — Examination  of  Stores — Immense  L,ossesof  the  Citizens 
of  Chambersburg  —  Printing  done  for  the  Confederates  —  Shrewd 
Financiering — Occupation  of  Shirk's  Hill  and  Cannon  Planted  — 
Stewart's  Brigade  of  Infantry  marches  from  Greencastle  to  McCon- 
nellsburg — Battle  of  North  Mountain — Undue  Importance  Attached 
to  this  Affair — Hill's  and  I^ongstreet's  Corps  cross  the  Potomac 
and  Advance  down  the  Valley — Confederate  Court-Martial — Addi- 
tional Requisitions  for  Supplies  —  Passage  of  Johnson's  Division  — 
General  Early  visits  Ewell  near  Chambersburg  —  Method  of  Send- 
ing Information  to  the  Authorities  at  Harrisburg  —  Perilous  Escape 
of  some  of  our  Dispatch  Bearers  —  Arrival  of  Hill's  Corps  —  De- 
scription of  General  Hill  —  I,ee  and  his  Staff  in  the  Public  Square 

—  Council  between  I<ee  and  Hill  —  Immense  Importance  of  this 
Council  —  A  Historic  Scene  —  Eagerness  to  see  which  way  the  Con- 
federate Commander  and  his  Staff  would  take — Turns  Eastward — 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

Page. 
Immediate    Dispatch   of  this    Fa<5l  to  Harrisburg  —  Benjamin   S. 

Huber,  the  Heroic  Dispatch  Bearer — Interesting  Account  of  his 
Trip  —  Closeted  with  the  Governor  of  Pennsylvania  and  the  Mili- 
tary Authorities —  I,ee's  whereabouts  known  at  Washington  early 
in  the  day  following  his  Entrance  into  Chambersburg  —  Descrip- 
tion of  General  I,ee  and  his  Brilliant  Staff —  British  Officers  with 
the  Grand  Cavalcade  —  I<ee  makes  his  Head-Quarters  upon  the 
Eastern  Outskirts  of  Chambersburg  —  Destruction  of  Hon.  Thad- 
deus  Stevens'  Iron  Works  by  General  Early — Early  crosses  the 
South  Mountain  and  marches  upon  Gettysburg  —  Requisitions  upon 
Gettysburg  —  General  Imboden  crosses  the  Potomac  and  Enters 
Pennsylvania  —  Plundering  by  the  Way — Jenkins'  Cavalry  pass 
through  Carlisle  —  Falling  Back  of  the  Federal  Troops  under  Gen- 
eral Knipe  —  Arrival  of  Longstreet's  Corps — General  Order  by  I<ee 

—  Humanity  of  the  Confederate  Chieftain  —  Commendable  Behavior 
of  the  Confederates — -L,ee's   Orders  generally   Observed  —  A  few 
Outrages  only  by  Stragglers  —  Citizens  Caught  in  out  of  the  way 
places  Robbed  —  Hats,  Boots,  and  Watches  taken  —  Mr.  Strite  Mur- 
dered and  his  body  Secreted  —  Scouring  the  Country  for  Supplies 

—  Precautionary  Measures  in  some   Localities  —  Mountain   Passes 
Fortified  by  the  Farmers  to  Secure  their  Horses  —  Brilliant  Dash 
by  Captain  Dahlgreen  upon* the  Confederate  Communications  at 
Greencastle  —  Prisoners  and  Confederate  Mail  Captured  and  Hur- 
ried Across  the  Mountain  to  the  Union  Head-Quarters  —  Rodes'  In- 
fantry passes  through  Carlisle  —  Requisitions  upon  Mechanicsburg 
by  General  Jenkins  —  Early's  Division  Enters  York  —  Requisitions 
made  upon  the  Town  —  A  ransom  of  One  Hundred  Thousand  Dol- 
lars Demanded  —  Part  of  this  Amount  Paid  Over  —  Insolent  Order, 
or  Address  to  the  People  —  General  Gordon  with  his  Brigade  Ad- 
vances to  Wrightsville  on  the  Susquehanna  —  Object  of  this  Move- 
ment—  Immense  Importance  of  Preventing  the  Confederates  from 
Seizing  the  Columbia  Bridge' crossing  the  River  at  that  place  — 
Hurried  Concentration  of  Militia  under  Colonel  Frick  —  Breast- 
works thrown  up  on  the  Western  Bank  of  the  River  —  Resistance 
made  at  this  Place  —  Threatened  to  be  out-flanked,  the  small  Federal 
force  Recrosses  the  River  to  Columbia  —  Order  from  General  Couch 
to  Destroy  the  Bridge  when  it  could  no  longer  be  held  —  The  Torch 

j  Applied —  Official  Account  by  Colonel  Frick  —  An  Unusual  Sun- 
day's Occurrence  in  Chambersburg  —  Breaking  Open  of  Stores  and 
Cellars  —  Colonel  Freemantle's  Account  of  this  Day's  Work  — 
Disposition  of  Confederate  Scrip  —  Another  Clerical  Financier  — 
Visit  to  General  I<ee  in  his  Camp  by  Mrs.  Ellen  McClellan  —  Inter- 
esting Account  of  the  Interview  —  Skirmish  at  Oyster's  Point  — 


CONTENTS.  XV11 

Page. 
Collision  between  Federal  Cavalry  and  part  of  Imboden's  force 

upon  the  North  Mountain  —  Defeat  of  Confederate  Cavalry  in  Mc- 
Connellsburg  by  Captain  Jones  —  Ignominious  Flight  of  Pennsyl- 
vania Militia  —  Heth's  Division  of  Hill's  Corps  crosses  the  South 
Mountain  and  Encamps  about  Cashtown  —  Advance  of  the  Divis- 
ions of  Generals  Hood  and  McLaws  —  Pickett's  Division  Remains 
near  Chambersburg  and  Destroys  the  Railroad  —  Visit  of  Dr.  J.  I,. 
Suesserott  to  General  Lee's  Head-Quarters  —  Lee's  Nervousness  — 
Description  of  the  Confederate  Army  —  Manner  of  Marching  —  Per- 
fect Discipline  —  Behavior  of  the  Men  —  Laughable  Occurrences  — 
Depression  and  Discouragement  of  Some  —  Cases  of  Desertion  — 
Surprise  at  our  Magnificent  Country — Ignorance  of  what  was  going 
on  while  under  Confederate  Rule  —  Richmond  Papers  our  only 
Source  of  Information  —  Depressing  Stories  of  Confederate  Victories 
told  us  —  Patriotic  Feelings  and  Expressions  of  our  People  —  Im- 
menseness  of  Lee's  Army — Its  Probable  Length  —  Observations 
from  a  Church  Steeple  —  Return  of  Swell's  Great  Wagon  Train  and 
its  Rapid  Passage  Eastward  —  Significance  of  this  Movement  and 
Report  of  the  same  sent  to  Harrisburg  —  Perilous  Adventures  of 
Rev.  S.  W.  Pomeroy  while  bearing  this  Dispatch  —  Information  of 
this  Concentration  Forwarded  to  the  Head-Quarters  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  General  Meade  put  in  Possession  of  it  Before 
Daylight — Cause  of  this  Concentration — Arrival  of  General  Long- 
street's  Scout  —  The  Federal  Army  heard  from  —  The  Order  to 
Attack  Harrisburg  Countermanded,  and  a  Concentration  about  Cash- 
town  Ordered  —  Places  Occupied  by  the  Different  Corps  and  Divis- 
ions of  Lee's  Army  when  this  Order  for  Concentration  was  issued  — 
Routes  taken  by  each  —  Early  marches  from  York  by  way  of  East 
Berlin,  and  passes  the  night  near  Heidlersburg  —  Rodes  marches 
from  the  Vicinity  of  Carlisle,  and  crosses  the  South  Mountain  by 
Mt.  Holly  Gap,  and  unites  with  Early  —  Longstreet  and  Lee  ride 
together  from  the  vicinity  of  Chambersburg  and  Encamp  together 
over  night  at  Greenwood  —  Fender's  and  Anderson's  Divisions  of 
Hill's  Corps  march  from  Fayetteville  and  Greenwood  and  join 
Heth  at  Cashtown — Johnson's  Division  of  Swell's  Corps  Retraces 
its  Steps  from  the  Vicinity  of  Shippensburg  to  Greenvillage,  and 
passes  directly  across  to  Greenwood  by  way  of  Scotland,  where  it 
remains  over  night — Jenkins'  Cavalry  crosses  the  South  Mountain 
by  Mt.  Holly  Gap,  and  enters  into  and  Plunders  Petersburg  — •  Re- 
ceives Dispatches  and  hurries  on  to  Gettysburg  —  The  Cavalry  Bri- 
gades of  Generals  Beverly  Robertson  and  William  E.  Jones  cover 
the  Withdrawal  of  Rodes  from  the  Valley  —  Imboden's  Cavalry 
Occupies  Chambersburg  —  Ordered  by  Lee  they  Advance  to  Green- 


XV111  CONTENTS. 

Page 
wood  to  Prevent  his  Communications  from  being  Interrupted  by 

any  Federal  Advance  by  way  of  the  Pine  Grove  Road  —  The  Cav- 
alry Brigades  of  Robertson  and  Jones  Return  from  down  the  Valley 
and  passing  through  Chambersburg  go  on  to  Gettysburg — Con- 
federate Advance  from  Cashtown  under  General  Pettigrew  upon  a 
Reconnoissance  to  near  Gettysburg  —  They  Fall  Back  to  Marsh 
Creek,  where  they  Remain  over  night  —  Arrival  of  the  Divisions  of 
Hood  and  McLaws  at  Marsh  Creek  —  Location  of  each  Corps  and 
Division  of  the  Confederate  Army  during  the  Night  Before  the 
First  Day's  Engagement 114 

CHAPTER  V. 
The  Advance  of  the  Federal  Army. 

General  Hooker,  advised  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  Confederate  Army, 
crosses  the  Potomac  and  marches  Northward — Daily  Movements 
of  each  Corps  of  the  Federal  Army —  Left  Wing  thrown  across  the 
Potomac  —  Crampton's  and  Turner's  Passes  Covered  —  Thorough- 
fare Gap  Uncovered  and  Stuart  emerges  from  the  Valley — Com- 
pelled to  pass  around  to  the  East  of  the  Federal  Army  —  Right 
Wing  crosses  the  Potomac  —  The  Twelfth  Corps  moves  to  the  Point 
of  Rocks  to  unite  with  General  French  at  Maryland  Heights  with 
the  view  to  fall  upon  Lee's  rear — Disagreement  of  General  Halleck 
with  this  Plan  —  Correspondence  between  Generals  Halleck  and 
Hooker — Hooker  Resigns  the  Command  and  General  Meade  put 
in  his  place  —  A  Dark  Sabbath-day  in  the  Nation's  History —  Com- 
munications with  Washington  cut  by  Stuart — His  Cavalry  ad- 
vance Creates  Intense  Excitement  in  Baltimore  and  Washington  — 
Supreme  Patriotism  of  the  Army  and  Willing  Acceptance  of  the 
Change  of  Commanders — Meade  and  Reynolds  in  Council — Gen- 
eral Kilpatrick  Supersedes  General  Stahl  in  Command  of  his 
Cavalry  Division  —  Custer,  Merritt,  and  Farnsworth  made  Brigadier 
Generals  of  Cavalry — The  Army  passes  through  Frederick  City  — 
That  place  its  point  of  divergence  —  Erratic  Movements  of  General 
Stuart — Intercepted  by  Kilpatrick  at  Hanover,  a  Severe  Engagement 
is  the  Result  —  Ignorant  of  Early's  Departure  from  York,  Stuart 
continues  on  toward  that  place — Crosses  Early's  and  White's  routes, 
but  ignorant  of  the  course  they  went — Deceived  by  a  False  Report 
he  crosses  over  to  Carlisle — Steady  and  Cautious  Advance  of  the 
Federal  Army  —  Explorations  of  the  Country  made,  and  the  Line 
of  Pipe  Creek  chosen  for  the  expedled  Battle  —  Instructions  Issued 
to  the  Corps  Commanders,  and  an  Order  or  Address  to  the  Army  — 
Reynolds  sent  by  way  of  Emmittsburg  toward  Gettysburg — Buford's 
Cavalry  passes  through  Gettysburg,  and  encamps  over  night  tw» 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

Page. 
miles  west  of  the  town  — .Positions  occupied  by  the  various  Corps 

of  the  Army  during  the  night  before  the  Opening  Engagement — 
The  Two  Armies  almost  Face  to  Face — The  Distance  of  each  Corps 
and  Division  of  each  Army  from  the  Field  of  Strife 234 

CHAPTER   VI. 
The  First  Day's  Engagement. 

Buford's  Cavalry  engages  Heth's  Division  of  Hill's  Corps  —  Buford 
sends  word  of  the  Presence  of  the  Enemy  to  Reynolds  —  Reynolds 
leaves  Doubleday  to  bring  up  the  balance  of  his  Corps  and  presses 
forward  with  Wadsworth's  Division  —  Reynolds  in  advance  of  his 
men  dashes  into  and  through  Gettysburg — Forms  his  Lines  and  is 
Killed  by  a  Sharp-shooter  —  Desperate  Fighting  —  Howard  reaches 
the  Field  and  takes  Observations  from  the  College  Cupola  — 
Cemetery  Hill  Chosen  as  the  Place  to  make  a  Stand,  and  Stein- 
wehr's  Division  Ordered  into  Position  there  —  Contradictory  Claims 
to  the  Discovery  and  Selection  of  Cemetery  Hill  —  The  Body  of 
Reynolds  borne  from  the  Field  and  sent  to  Lancaster,  Pennsyl- 
vania—  Capture  of  Archer's  Brigade  —  Arrival  of  Howard's  Corps 
and  the  Federal  Line  extended  to  the  Right  —  Arrival  of  Rodes' 
and  Early 's  Divisions  from  Heidlersburg  —  Slocum,  who  was  at 
Two  Taverns,  but  Five  Miles  away,  repeatedly  Solicited  to  come 
to  the  Rescue,  but  Refuses —  Meade's  Order  to  Concentrate  at  Pipe 
Creek  in  the  way  —  Sickles  receives  Howard's  Dispatch,  and  with 
part  of  his  Corps  rushes  to  the  Rescue  —  Buford's  Dispatch  to  Gen- 
eral Meade  —  General  Hancock  sent  to  take  Command  and  report 
as  to  the  Advisability  of  making  a  stand  at  Gettysburg — Reaches 
Cemetery  Hill  just  as  the  Broken  Ranks  of  the  Federals  reach 
it — Perceives  the  Value  of  the  Position  and  Assists  in  Rallying 
and  Placing  the  Troops  —  Arrival  of  Slocum  and  Sickles  —  Han- 
cock leaves  Slocum  in  Command  and  hurries  to  Taneytown  to 
Report  to  General  Meade  —  The  order  to  concentrate  at  Pipe  Creek 
rescinded,  and  instructions  sent  to  all  the  Corps  Commanders  to 
move  to  Gettysburg  —  Arrival  of  the  Commander-in-Chief — The 
night  spent  in  Preparations  for  a  Renewal  of  the  Battle  —  Failure 
of  the  Confederates  to  follow  up  the  advantages  of  the  First  Day's 
Engagement  by  seizing  Cemetery  Hill  —  Reasons  assigned  by 
Southern  Writers  —  Advance  of  General  Smith  from  Harrisburg 
to  Carlisle — Stuart's  Cavalry  comes  upon  the  scene  at  the  latter 
place  —  Demand  upon  Smith  to  Surrender  —  Demand  refused,  and 
•Carlisle  shelled  and  the  United  States  Barracks  burned  —  Stuart 
falls  back  toward  Gettysburg 259 


XX  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

The  Second  Day's  Engagement. 

Page. 
The  Position  taken  by  the  Federals  —  Position  of  the  Confederates  — 

Superiority  of  the  former  —  Arrival  of  Troops,  and  their  Positions 
assigned  them — Contemplated  Attack  upon  the  Confederate  Left — • 
Generals  Slocum  and  Warren  oppose  it  and  the  purpose  abandoned, 
and  a  defensive  attitude  determined  upon  —  Both  sides  Preparing 
fora  Renewal  of  the  Conflict  —  Silence  along  the  Lines — Confed- 
erates Less  Sanguine  and  Boastful  —  Providential  Inactivity  of  the 
Confederates — Their  Failure  to  make  an  Early  Attack  gives  Time 
for  all  the  Federal  Troops  to  Arrive  —  Lee  Confronted  by  Difficul- 
ties, abandons  his  Purpose  of  a  Tactical  Defensive,  and  resolves  to 
attack  Meade  —  Reconnoitering  the  Federal  Position  and  Consult- 
ing with  his  Generals —  A  Simultaneous  Attack  upon  both  Flanks 
determined  upon,  and  Orders  Issued  accordingly  —  Inexplicable 
Delay  of  General  Longstreet  in  Opening  the  Battle  —  Expected  to 
make  an  Earlier  Attack — Statements  of  several  distinguished 
Southern  Officers  *—  Advanced  and  Exposed  Position  taken  by  Gen- 
eral Sickles — Furious  Attack  upon  him  by  Longstreet  —  Meade, 
seeing  that  Sickles  could  not  hold  his  Position,  posts  the  Fifth 
Corps  upon  the  Line  originally  intended  —  Desperate  Fighting  and 
Fearful  Slaughter  —  The  Historic  Peach  Orchard  and  the  Wheat 
Field  —  Sickles'  Line  Broken  at  the  Angle  and  Driven  Back — Hum- 
phreys Driven  and  the  Federal  main  Line  Pierced — Failure  of  Hill 
to  Support  this  Charge  and  Hold  the  Position  Gained  —  Large  Cap- 
tures of  Federal  Artillery — Stannard's  Vermont  Brigade  to  the 
Rescue  —  The  Enemy  Driven  Back  and  Guns  Recaptured  —  Efforts 
of  the  Enemy  to  Out-flank  Sickles'  Left  and  Seize  Little  Round 
Top  —  Strange  Oversight  of  the  Federals  in  failing  to  perceive  the 
Importance  of  this  Key  to  the  whole  Field  —  Its  Value  accidentally 
Discovered  —  Troops  and  Cannon  rushed  up  to  its  Summit,  and  a 
Determination  to  Hold  it  at  all  Hazards  —  Terrific  Fighting  and 
Great  Slaughter — Eminent  and  Distinguished  Officers  Slain  —  De- 
scription of  the  Terrific  Struggle,  by  a  Confederate  Participant — 
Brilliant  Charge  by  Barnes'  Division  and  by  the  Regulars  under 
Ayers  in  Front  of  Round  Top  —  The  Ground  in  front  a  Seething 
Whirlpool  of  Blood  and  Fire — The  Enemy  Penetrates  between  Big 
and  Little  Round  Top  and  Attacks  the  Federal  Rear — Heroic  Re- 
sistance by  the  Twentieth  Maine  under  Colonel  Chamberlain  — 
Reinforcements  from  the  Sixth  and  Twelfth  Corps  Ordered  —  Gal- 
lant Charge  by  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  and  Repulse  of  the 
Enemy  —  Longstreet  seeing  part  of  the  Sixth  Corps  in  Line,  be- 


CONTENTS.  xxj 

Page. 
comes  Discouraged  and  Withdraws  his  Men  —  Numbers  Engaged 

upon  the  Federal  side  —  Confederate  Estimates  Considered — At- 
tack of  Early  upon  the  Confederate  Center — Terrific  Hand  to  Hand 
Fighting  —  Temporary  Success  of  the  Confederates  —  Their  final 
Repulse  with  Great  Slaughter — The  Louisiana  Tigers  meet  their 
Match — Great  Numbers  of  them  Slain — Attack  of  Johnson's  Di- 
vision upon  the  Federal  Right  —  The  Line  having  been  Weakened 
to  Reinforce  the  Sorely-pressed  Left,  is  Pierced  and  Occupied  dur- 
ing the  Night — Ignorant  of  the  Importance  of  the  Position  gained, 
the  Confederates  fail  to  take  Advantage  of  it — Results  of  this 
Day's  Engagements  —  Positions  of  the  Respective  Armies  at  the 
Close  of  this  Day — Errors  of  the  Confederates  —  Errors  of  the 
Federals  —  Scene  in  General  Meade's  Head-Quarters  —  A  Council 
of  War  Held  —  Decided  to  Remain  and  Fight  the  Battle  Here  — 
Scene  in  General  Lee's  Head-Quarters 295 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
The  Third  Day's  Engagement. 

Readjustments  of  the  Lines  during  the  Night  —  Pickett's  Division, 
which  had  only  Reached  the  Field  during  the  Afternoon  before, 
Placed  in  Position  —  The  Twelfth  Corps  Returned  toils  Position, 
and  Preparations  made  to  drive  Johnson  from  the  Position  within 
the  Federal  Line  he  had  gained  —  Shaler's  and  Wheaton's  Brigades 
of  the  Sixth  Corps  and  Lockwood's  Maryland  Brigade  sent  to  As- 
sist Slocum — Johnson  Reinforced  by  Daniels'  and  O'Neill's  Bri- 
gades of  Rodes'  Division  —  Opening  of  the  Engagement  at  Early 
Dawn  —  Terrific  Fighting  and  Fearful  Slaughter  —  The  Enemy 
finally  driven  out  and  the  Federal  Line  Re-established  after  six 
hours'  Desperate  Fighting  —  Lee's  Plans  again  Defeated  —  The  At- 
tack upon  the  Federal  Left  Center  to  have  been  Simultaneous  with 
the  Attack  upon  the  Right — Longstreet  again  not  Ready  —  Ominous 
Silence  Reigns  for  Two  Hours  —  Both  sides  Preparing  for  the  Last 
Desperate  Effort— Renewal  of  the  Fight — Terrific  Artillery  Prelude 

—  Great  Destruction  of  Life  in  both  Armies  —  Graphic  Descriptions 
by  both  Federals  and  Confederates — Cessation 'of  the  Firing — The 
Assaulting  Columns  Appear  —  Imposing  Appearance  and  Admira- 
tion of  the  Federals  —  Statement  by  a  Confederate  Officer  as  to  the 
Length  and  Depth  of  this  Great  Assaulting  Column,  and  the  Distance 
by  Actual  Measurement  it  had  to  Traverse  to  reach  the  Federal 
Line — Opening  of  the  Federal  Artillery  upon  the  Advancing  Troops 

—  Their  Lines  Ploughed  Through  and  Through  —  Still  Pressing 
Forward  until  within  Reach  when  the  Infantry  Fire  upon  Them  — 
The  Federal  Lines  a  Sheet  of  Flame  —  Their  Line  Pierced  —  Des- 


XX11  CONTENTS. 


• 


Page. 
perate  Fighting  —  Stannard's  Vermonters  again  to  the    Front  — 

Deeds  of  Heroism  —  The  Attack  Repulsed  —  Large  Captures  of 
Prisoners  —  Retreat  of  a  Few  Survivors — Graphic  Description  of 
the  Memorable  Assault  by  Eye-witnesses  and  Participants,  Feder- 
als and  Confederates  —  Stuart's  Attempt  to  get  into  the  Federal 
Rear — Great  Cavalry  Engagement  Simultaneously  with  the  Assault 
in  Front  —  Graphic  and  Thrilling  Account  by  Colonel  William 
Brooke  Rawle  —  Repulse  of  Stuart — Numbers  Engaged  in  this 
Cavalry  Fight — Estimate  by  the  Count  of  Paris  —  Cavalry  Engage- 
ment upon  the  Federal  Left —  The  Fall  of  General  Farnsworth  — 
Brilliant  Charge  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  and  close  of  the 
Battle  of  Gettysburg  —  Failures  of  the  Confederates  this  Day  — 
Tree's  Plans  not  Carried  Out  —  Somebody  to  Blame  —  Remarks  of 
Colonel  Taylor,  Lee's  Chief  of  Staff —  Longstreet's  Defense  and 
Reply  to  Colonel  Taylor  —  Longstreet  Expresses  his  Disapproval  of 
the  Plans  of  Lee  and  his  Reluctance  in  Executing  Them — Import- 
ant Historical  Papers  Relating  to  this  Subject  —  Condition  of 
things  within  the  Confederate  Lines  after  the  Failure  of  Pickett's 
Great  Assault  —  Descriptions  by  Colonel  Freemantle  of  the  British 
Army  and  Captain  Owen  of  the  Confederate  —  Should  General 
Meade  have  followed  up  Pickett's  Repulse  by  a  Grand  Counter 
Charge  —  Opinions  of  Distinguished  Confederate  and  Federal  Offi- 
cers— The  Rebellion  receives  its  most  Damaging  Blows  in  the  East 
and  West  at  the  same  time,  for  about  the  time  Lee  received  his 
Crushing  Defeat  at  Gettysburg,  General  Pemberton  was  negotiating 
with  Grant  at  Vicksburg  for  the  Surrender  of  his  Army  —  Federal 
and  Confederate  Losses  during  the  Three  Days  of  Battle 357 

\ 
CHAPTER  IX. 

Retreat  of  the  Confederate  Army. 

Relative  Strength  of  the  two  Armies  after  the  Battle  —  Federal  Troops 
Available  and  within  Reach  —  Combinations  that  could  have  been 
made  —  Why  was  it  not  Done  —  Strange  Dereliction  of  those  in  Au- 
thority—  Failure  to  Pursue  and  Attack  the  Retreating  Confederates 
Emboldens  Confederate  writers  to  Question  the  Victory  Won  — 
Statement  of  Colonel  Taylor —  Dispositions  made  by  Lee  after  night 
closed  upon  the  Scene  —  Troops  Withdrawn  and  placed  behind 
Seminary  Ridge  —  Breast- works  thrown  up  —  An  Immediate  Retreat 
to  Virginia  Decided  on  —  The  Wounded  placed  in  Wagons  and  sent 
on  their  way  —  Large  Numbers  Unable  to  be  Moved  and  Left  Be- 
hind—  Withdrawal  of  the  Army  —  Discovery  of  the  Flight  of  the 
Enemy  by  General  Birney  and  his  Desire  to  Attack  —  Is  Forbidden 


CONTENTS. 

Page, 
by  General  Meade  —  The  Sixth  Corps,  Accompanied  by  Cavalry,  in 

Pursuit  —  Overtakes  the  Confederate  Rear  at  Fairfield,  but  is  For- 
bidden to  Attack — General  Howe's  Statement — Independent  Move- 
ments Elsewhere  and  Excellent  Results  Gained  —  Turner's  Pass  of 
the  South  South  Mountain  Seized,  and  Confederate  Pontoon  over 
the  Potomac  at  Falling  Waters  Destroyed  by  General  French  — 
Daring  Dash  by  Kilpatrick  upon  the  Enemy  in  the  Mountain,  and 
Terrific  Night  Assault  —  A  Perilous  Ride  —  Description  by  a  Partici- 
pant —  The  Pursuit  of  Lee  Slowly  Conducted  by  way  of  Emmitts- 
burg,  Frederick,  Middletown,  and  Turner's  Pass  —  Daily  and 
leisurely  Movements  of  the  Federals  —  Lee  reaches  Hagerstown 
in  Two  Days  —  Incessant  Rains  cause  the  Potomac  to  Rise  —  Line 
of  Battle  Selected  and  Breast-works  thrown  up — Advance  of  Militia 
under  Generals  Dana  and  Smith  —  General  Couch  Removes  his 
Head-quarters  to  Chambersburg  —  After  an  Eight  Day's  March  the 
Federals  reach  the  Confederate  Line  —  Commanders  Anxious  to 
take  Advantage  of  Favorable  Opportunities  for  Assaulting  the  Foe 
Forbidden,  as  a  General  Engagement  was  not  Desired  —  Statement 
by  General  Howe  —  Meade  calls  together  his  Corps  Commanders 
and  Considers  the  Question  of  Attacking  Lee  in  the  Strong  Posi- 
tion he  had  taken  and  Fortified  —  The  Majority  Opposed  to  an 
Attack  —  Too  Late,  the  Opportunity  Lost  —  Urged  by  President 
Lincoln,  Meade,  on  the  following  Evening,  issues  Orders  for  an 
Attack  the  next  Morning — Daylight  appears,  but  the  Enemy  Gone 
—  Pursuit  by  Kilpatrick  —  Comes  up  with  the  Confederate  rear  at 
Falling  Waters,  and  after  a  Severe  Engagement,  the  Enemy  Suc- 
ceeds in  Escaping  after  the  Loss  of  General  Pettigrew  and  many 
others  Killed  and  Wounded,  and  a  large  number  of  Prisoners  — 
Should  General  Meade  have  Ordered  an  Attack  —  Hampered  with 
Instructions  as  to  the  Safety  of  Washington  —  Dispatch  from  General 
Halleck  —  Testimony  of  General  Meade  before  the  Congressional 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  —  Opinions  of  Thomas 
Robins,  jr.,  and  General  McLaws 446 

CHAPTER  X. 
The  Great  Wagon  Train  of  Wounded. 

Departure  of  the  Great  Wagon  Train  with  Wounded  —  The  Train  not 
less  than  Twenty-five  or  Thirty  Miles  Long — Over  Ten  Thousand 
Wounded  Men  With  and  In  It— Unparalleled  Scenes  of  Suffering- 
Description  by  General  Imboden  who  had  it  in  Charge  —  Graphic 
Descriptions  by  Eye-witnesses  who  Resided  Along  its  Route  — 
Statements  of  Jacob  C.  Snyder,  Rev.  J.  Milton  Snyder,  Rev.  J.  C. 
Smith,  and  Mr.  David  Z.  Shook  —  Losing  their  Way  in  the  Night 


XXIV  CONTENTS. 

Page 

a  Small  Part  of  this  Train  enters  Chambersburg — Scenes  of  Suffer- 
ing—  Provisions  made  for  Sufferers  —  Captain  Jones  with  Two 
Hundred  Cavalry  Dash  upon  this  Train  at  Cearfoss'  Cross-Roads — 
One  Hundred  Wagons  and  One  Thousand  Wounded  Prisoners 
Taken  —  Pursuit  by  General  Gregg  and  Captures  made  at  the  Con- 
federate Rear 477 

CHAPTER  XI. 
Phenomena  of  Battle  Sound. 

The  Sound  of  the  Cannonade  Heard  at  a  Distance  of  One  Hundred, 
One  Hundred  and  Twenty,  One  Hundred  and  Forty,  One  Hundred 
and  Fifty,  and  Two  Hundred  Miles  from  the  Field  —  Certificates  by 
Rev.  C.  Cort,  Rev.  Dr.  C.  R.  Lane,  Rev.  Bishop  J.  J.  Glossbrenner, 
Hon.  F.  M.  Kimmell,  and  Rev.  L.  W.  Stahl, — Explanatory  and 
Philosophical  Papers  by  Professors  Spencer  F.  Baird  of  the  Smith- 
sonian Institute  at  Washington  and  A.  B.  Johnson  of  the  United 
States  Light  House  Board  —  Extracts  from  the  Writings  of  Pro- 
fessor Henry , 508 

CHAPTER  XII. 
Gettysburg  —  The  Nation's  Shrine. 

The  Condition  of  the  Slain  after  the  Battle  —  Purchase  of  Ground  for 
the  Soldier's  National  Cemetery  —  Dedication  of  the  Cemetery  — 
Solemn  and  Impressive  Exercises  —  Eloquent  Prayer  by  Dr.  Stock- 
ton—  Memorable  Dedicatory  Address  of  President  Lincoln  —  Affec- 
tion of  the  People  for  Mr.  Lincoln  —  Burial  of  the  Dead  —  Beauti- 
fying of  the  Grounds  —  Memorial  Tablets  and  Monuments  — Tribute 
to  the  Heroic  Dead — Gettysburg,  Holy  Ground 520 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
A  Guide  to  the  Field  of  Battle 536 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Page. 
Portrait  of  Major -General  George  G.  Meade.     Frontispiece. 

Portrait  of  General  Robert  E.  Lee '. 32 

Portrait  of  Major -General  Joseph  Hooker 233 

Pen  Sketch  of  Major-General  George  G.  Meade 241 

Portrait  of  Major-General  W»  S.  Hancock 357 

Map  of  Maryland  and  Southern  Pennsylvania,  from  the  Potomac  to  the 

Susquehanna 91 

Map  of  the  Battle  Field  of  Gettysburg.  614 

General  Lee  and  Staff  in  the  Public  Square  of  Chambersburg,  Pennsyl- 
vania    163 

Portrait  of  the  Scout,  Benjamin  S.  Huber 166 

Portrait  of  the  Scout,  Rev.  S.  W.  Pomeroy 225 

View  from  Pennsylvania  College,  Gettysburg,  showing  the  scene  of  the 

first  day's  battle 260 

The  tree  under  which  General  Reynolds  fell 264 

East  Cemetery  Hill,  upon  which  the  Union  forces  were  rallied 278 

Culp's  Hill,  from  Evergreen  Cemetery  and  the  Baltimore  Pike 280 

Little  and  Big  Round  Top,  from  the  North-west 282 

General  Lee's  Head-Quarters 291 

View  from  the  Cupola  of  the  Theological  Seminary,  looking  East  and 

South-east,  showing  East  Cemetery  Hill  and  Ridge 296 

View  from  the  Soldier's  National  Monument,  looking  West,   showing 

Seminary  Ridge , 298 

Federal  Breast-works  upon  Culp's  Hill - 302 

Untrance  to  the  Devil's  Den 320 

Inside  the  Devil's  Den... 322 

The  Valley  of  Death 325 

The  Wheat  Field,  or  the  Scene  of  the  Whirlpool  of  the  Battle 327 

The  Assault  upon  East  Cemetery  Hill 340 

Ceneral  Meade's  Head-quarters ~ -  352 

XXV 


XXVI  LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS. 

Page. 

The    High -Water  Mark  of  the   Rebellion,   or  the   Place  where  it   Re- 
ceived its  Death  Wound 370- 

Codori's  House  and  the  Emmittsburg  Road  —  Scene  of  Pickett's  Great 

Charge 374 

Pickett's   Great  Assault - 381 

Cavalry   Shaft,  marking  the    Place  where  the    Great  Cavalry  Engage- 
ment behind  the  Federal  Right  took  Place,  July  3d,  1863 410 

Soldiers'  National  Cemetery 522 

General  Reynolds'  Monument 524 

Soldiers'  National  Monument 527 

Observatory  upon  East  Cemetery  Hill „ 538 

View  from  Little  Round  Top,  looking  North-east 543 

View  from  Little  Round  Top,  looking  West  and  North-west 545 

After  the  Fire,   a  View  of  the  Ruins  of  part  of  Chambersburg,  Penn- 
sylvania, after  its  Destruction  by  the  Confederates,  July  3oth,  1864..  588 


APPENDIX. 


A. 

Page. 

Extract  from  Hon.  A.  H.  Stephens'  celebrated  "Corner  Stone  Address."      553 

B. 
Poem.     Advice  to  the  South,  by  Maurice  Thompson 556 

C. 

Consideration  of  the  Charge  against  General  Sickles,  that  he  Disre- 
garded an  Order  from  General  Reynolds,  July  ist,  1863 558 

D. 

Did  General  Sickles  Disobey  an  Order  from  General  Meade,  July  2d, 

1863 570 

E. 

The  Burning  of  Chambersburg,   Pennsylvania,   by  the   Confederates, 

July  3oth,  1864 „ 580 

xxvii 


INTRODUCTION. 


No  battle  field  on  earth  is  so  well  preserved  and  marked  as  is  that  of 
Gettysburg.  I^ittle  and  Big  Round  Top,  East  Cemetery  Hill  and  Ridge 
Culp's  and  Wolff  Hill,  Seminary  and  Oak  Ridge,  have  become  immortal, 
and  will  endure  while  time  itself  lasts.  The  lines  of  the  two  great  armies, 
the  positions  occupied  by  the  various  corps,  divisions,  brigades,  and  regi« 
ments,  and  the  places  where  heroic  deeds  were  performed  and  where 
distinguished  men  fell,  are  being  marked  by  tablets  and  monuments  of 
enduring  marble  and  granite.  In  this  commendable  work,  it  affords  us 
pleasure  to  state,  Confederates  as  well  as  Federals  are  engaged.  The  stone 
fences  and  huge  boulders,  used  as  defenses,  and  many  of  the  breast -works 
thrown  up  at  the  time,  also  remain,  and  will  be  preserved  as  long  as  time 
and  the  elements  of  nature  will  permit.  The  various  states  whose  troops 
participated  in  the  memorable  battle  which  occurred  there,  as  well  as  bri- 
gades, regiments,  and  companies,  are  vying  with  each  other,  not  only  to 
mark  for  future  ages  where  gallant  men  fought  and  where  patriots  died, 
but  to  make  as  beautiful  as  possible  the  entire  field  where  the  life  of  our 
great  Government  was  assured.  It  is  eminently  proper,  then,  that  every 
fact  of  historic  value  connected  with  the  great  episode  which  culminated 
upon  that  field  should  not  only  be  preserved  but  placed  upon  record  in 
its  proper  connection.  This  the  survivors  of  the  period  of  those  stirring 
events  owe  to  the  generations  who  are  yet  to  come. 

The  author  of  this  work  has  attempted  to  discharge,  in  a  measure,  the 
duty  indicated  in  the  foregoing.      His  qualifications  for  the  task  he  has 

xxix 


XXX  INTRODUCTION. 

undertaken  may  be  stated  thus:  he  resided  in  Chambersburg,  Pennsyl- 
vania, during  the  entire  period  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  and  for  a 
score  of  "years  previous  and  ever  since;  he  not  only  witnessed  all  the 
armed  hosts,  Federal  and  Confederate,  which  passed  through  that  place, 
but  had  access  to  their  camps  and  hospitals;  he  preserved  important  pa- 
pers, and  kept  an  account  of  events  with  the  dates  of  their  occurrence; 
he  visited  the  field  of  battle  and  noted  facts  and  incidents;  he  has  corre- 
sponded with  others,  both  Federals  and  Confederates,  competent  to  impart 
important  information;  and  he  has  made  it  a  point  to  read  and  preserve 
everything  relating  to  the  subject,  which  has  come  under  his  notice.  The 
material  thus  carefully  gathered  he  has  compared,  classified,  and  placed 
upon  record  in  the  following  pages.  He  has  been  especially  careful  to  be 
exact  in  the  facts  stated,  and  in  the  dates  given.  Errors  may  have  crept 
into  this  record,  but  every  precaution  has  been  taken  to  secure  entire 
accuracy.  If  he  has  not  succeeded  in  giving  the  public  such  a  history  of 
the  subject  as  its  importance  demands,  he  has  at  least  rescued  from  ob- 
livion much  valuable  historical  matter,  which,  without  this'humble  effort, 
would  have  been  forever  lost. 

It  will  be  seen  in  the  perusal  of  this  work  that  the  published  statements 
of  both  Federal  and  Confederate  writers,  relating  to  the  invasion  of  Penn- 
sylvania and  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  have  been  used.  This  has  been 
done  that  the  fullest  and  fairest  history  of  the  whole  may  be  secured,  for 
both  sides  are  equally  entitled  to  a  hearing.  Besides  this,  events  which 
transpired  within  the  Confederate  lines,  and  which  Confederates  only  could 
detail,  are  of  equal  importance  in  an  impartial  and  reliable  history  with 
those  which  occurred  within  the  Federal  lines,  and  which  Federals  only 
could  narrate.  For  the  reasons  thus  stated,  as  well  as  to  preserve  in  a  per- 
manent form  some  of  the  many  excellent  and  interesting  articles,  written 
for  the  newspapers  and  magazines,  by  eye-witnesses  and  participants,  I 
have  drawn  largely  upon  this  class  of  writers. 

In  matters  of  dispute,  or  where  differences  of  opinion  have  prevailed,  I 
have  endeavored  to  be  impartial;  and  in  every  case,  where  it  was  at  all 
possible,  both  sides  have  been  accorded  a  hearing. 

The  writer  has  not  only  sought  to   be   impartial,    but  also   unpartisan, 


INTRODUCTION.  xxxi 

He  could  not,  however,  conceal  the  fact  that  he  wrote  from  the  stand- 
point of  a  Unionist,  and  that  his  sympathies  were,  and  ever  must  be,  with 
those  who  stood  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Government.  For  dose  who 
arrayed  themselves  upon  the  opposite  side,  he  has  but  feelings  of  kind- 
ness. The  time  has  come  for  all  ill  feeling  to  be  entirely  laid  aside  and 
forgotten.  In  this  spirit  this  history  has  been  written;  and  its  author  dis- 
claims any  other  reason  for  the  task  he  has  undertaken,  than  to  place 
upon  record  a  fair  and  truthful  account  of  events  in  which  both  the  late 
contestants  have  an  equal  interest.  If,  then,  in  the  following  pages,  any 
injustice  has  been  done,  or  if  a  feeling  or  expression  inconsistent  with  an 
impartial  history,  intended  for  the  whole  country,  and  for  all  time  to 
come,  has  found  place,  the  reader  will  kindly  attribute  it  to  inadvertence 
rather  than  to  any  disposition  to  perpetuate  the  bitterness  and  estrange- 
ment of  the  past. 

J.   HOKE. 
Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania*. 


THE  GREAT  INVASION; 


OR,  , 


General  Lee  in  Penngu  l^ania, 

e3 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  ARMIES   OP   THE   POTOMAC   AND   OF   NORTHERN   VIRGINIA. 


is  conceded  by  the   highest   military   authorities 
that  the  skill  displayed  in  the  Pennsylvania  cam- 
ji      paign  in  the  year  1863,  by  both  the  commander  of 
V  v     the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  and  the  general  in 
T     command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  has  never 
been  surpassed  in  any  other  campaign  in  the  annals  of 
military  history;    and  it  may  as  truthfully  be  said  that 
no  other  great  military  movement  involved  consequences 
so  momentous  and  far-reaching  as  did  that  one.     With 
the  view,  then,  to   give   the   reader  a   clear  understand- 
ing of  this  great  crisis  in  the  terrible  struggle  in  which 
not   only  the   destiny  of  the  government  was  at   stake, 
but  the  higher  and  greater  problem  whether  a  "Govern- 
ment  of  the   people,   by   the  people,   and  for  the  people" 
was  at  all  practicable,  I  will  place  upon  record  in  these 
pages  facts  and  incidents  that  occurred  during  thii  in- 

33 


34  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

vasion,  that  will  greatly '  aid  him,  as  I  believe,  in  his 
comprehension  of  that  event.  Before  proceeding,  how- 
ever, to  the  narration  of  these  events,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  have  a  correct  understanding  of  the  organization 
and  strength  of  the  two  armies,  the  designs  and  pur- 
poses of  the  invasion,  and  the  relative  positions  which 
they  occupied  when  the  great  movement  began.  These 
may  be  stated  thus: 

I.  THE  NUMBER  OF  THE  FORCES  ON  EACH  SIDE  IN  THE 
PENNSYLVANIA  CAMPAIGN. 

(1.)     The  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

There  has  been  a  disposition  by  nearly  all  historians 
upon  both  sides  in  the  great  struggle,  to  magnify  the 
strength  of  the  opposing  army,  as  well  as  to  understate 
their  own.  Historical  accuracy  as  well  as  fairness  to  both 
sides  requires  that  the  truth  only  should  be  told. 

General  Meade,  in  his  testimony  before  the  committee 
of  Congress  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  (page  337),  states 
the  strength  of  his  army  as  "  a  little  under  one  hundred 
thousand  men — probably  ninety -five  thousand  men." 
This  being  reliable  is  of  course  decisive,  and  establishes 
the  number  of  men  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the 
Pennsylvania  campaign.  This  army  was  organized  as 
follows : 
MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  G.  MEADE,  Commander- in- Chief.* 

STAFF. 

MAJOR -GENERAL  DANIEL  BUTTERFIKLD,  Chief  of  Staff. 
BRIGADIER -GENERAL  M.  R.  PATRICK,  Provost -Marshal -General 
BRIGADIER -GENERAL  SETH  WILLIAMS,  Adjutant -General. 

*  Major  -General  Joseph  Hooker  was  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac up  to  Sunday,  June  28th,  1863,  and  on  this  day,  for  causes  which  will 
hereafter  be  stated,  resigned  that  position  while  on  the  march  to  Gettysburg, 
and  was  succeeded  by  Major -General  Meade. 


THE   ARMY   OF   THE   POTOMAC.  35 

"BRIGADIER -GENERAL  EDMUND  SCHRTVER,  Inspector •  General. 
BRIGADIER -GENERAL  RUFUS  INGALLS,  Quartermaster -General. 
•COLONEL  HENRY  F.  CLARKE,  Chief  of  Commissary  of  Subsistence. 
MAJOR  JONATHAN  L.ETTERMAN,  Surgeon,  Chief  of  Medical  Department. 
BRIGADIER -GENERAL  G.  K.  WARREN,  Chief  Engineer. 
MAJOR  D.  W.  FLAGLER,  Chief  Ordnance  Officer. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  ALFRED  PLEASANTON,  Chief  of  Cavalry. 
BRIGADIER -GENERAL  HENRY  J.  HUNT,  Chief  of  Artillery. 
CAPTAIN  L..  B.  NORTON,  Chief  Signal  Officer. 

The  infantry  force  of  the  army  was  divided  into  seven 
corps,  as  follows: 

First  Corps. — Major -General  JOHN  FULTON  REYNOLDS,  Commander.  His 
division  commanders  were  —  Brigadier -General  James  S.  Wadsworth,  ist  di- 
vision; Brigadier  -  General  John  C.  Robinson,  zd  division;  Major -General 
Abner  Doubleday,  3d  division.  The  brigades  were  commanded  respectively 
by  Brigadier  -  General  Solomon  Meredith,  Brigadier-General  L,ysander  Cutler, 
Brigadier  -  General  Gabriel  R.  Paul,  Brigadier  -  General  Henry  Baxter,  Briga- 
dier-General Thomas  A.  Rowley,  Colonel  Roy  Stone,  and  Brigadier  -  General 
George  J.  Stannard.  The  first  two  belonged  to  the  ist  division,  the  next  two 
to  the  2d,  and  the  last  three  to  the  3d.  The  artillery  brigade  attached  to  this 
<:orps  was  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Charles  S.  Wainwright. 

Second  Corps. — Major -General  WINFIELD  SCOTT  HANCOCK,  Commander.* 
The  division  commanders  were  —  Brigadier-  General  John  C.  Caldwell,  ist 
division;  Brigadier  -  General  John  Gibbon,  2d  division;  Brigadier  -  General 
Alexander  Hays,  3d  division.  The  brigades  were  commanded  by  Colonel 
Edward  E.  Cross,  Colonel  Patrick  Kelly,  Brigadier -General  S.  K.  Zook, 
Colonel  John  R.  Brooke,  Brigadier -General  William  Harrow,  Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Alexander  S.  Webb,  Colonel  Norman  J.  Hall,  Colonel  Samuel  S.  Carroll, 
Colonel  Thomas  A.  Smyth,  and  Colonel  George  L.  Willard.  The  first  four 
named  belonged  to  the  ist  division,  the  succeeding  three  to  the  2d,  and  the 
last  three  to  the  3d.  The  artillery  brigade  was  commanded  by  Captain  J.  G. 
Hazard. 

Third  Corps.  —  Major-General   DANIEL  E.  SICKLES,   Commander.f    The 

*The  Second  Corps  was  commanded  by  Major -General  D.  N.  Couch  until 
June  gth,  1863,  when,  in  order  to  prepare  for  the  reception  of  the  threatened 
invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  he  was  placed  in  command  of  the  Department  of 
the  Susquehanna,  with  head  -  quarters  at  Harrisburg,  and  Major -General 
W.  S.  Hancock  succeeded  to  the  command  of  this  corps. 

fAt  the  commencement  of  the  Pennsylvania  campaign,  Major-General 
Birney  was  temporarily  in  command  of  the  Third  Corps,  but  General  Sickles 
resumed  command  on  Sunday,  June  28th. 


36  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

division  commanders  were  —  Major-General  David  B.  Birney  and  Brigadier- 
General  Andrew  A.  Humphreys.  The  brigades  were  commanded  respectively 
by  Brigadier  -  General  C.  K.  Graham,  Brigadier  -  General  J.  H.  Ward,  Colonel 
Philip  R.  De  Trobriand,  Brigadier -General  Joseph  B.  Carr,  Colonel  William 
R.  Brewster,  and  Colonel  George  C.  Buttling.  The  first  three  belonged  to  the 
ist  division,  and  the  last  three  to  the  ad.  The  artillery  brigade  of  this  corps 
was  under  the  command  of  Captain  George  E.  Randolph. 

Fifth  Corps. — Major- General  GEORGE  SYKES,  Commander.*  The  division 
commanders  were  —  Brigadier -General  James  Barnes,  ist  division;  Brigadier- 
General  Romayn  B.  Ayres,  2d  division,  and  Brigadier -General  S.  Wiley 
Crawford,  3d  division.  The  brigades  were  commanded  respectively  by  Col- 
onel W.  S.  Tilton,  Colonel  S.  B.  Sweitzer,  Colonel  Strong  Vincent,  Colonel 
Hannibal  Day,  Colonel  Sidney  Burbank,  Brigadier -General  S.  H.  Weed, 
Colonel  William  McCandless,  and  Colonel  Joseph  W.  Fisher.  The  three  first 
named  belonged  to  the  ist  division,  the  next  three  to  the  2d,  and  the  remain- 
ing two  to  the  3d.  Captain  A.  P.  Martin  commanded  the  artillery  brigade  of 
this  corps.  The  first  and  second  brigades  of  the  second  division  of  this  corps 
were  composed  of  United  States  Regulars,  and  the  two  brigades  of  the  third 
division  were  composed  of  Pennsylvania  Reserves. 

Sixth  Corps. — Major- General  JOHN  SEDGWICK,  Commander.  The  di- 
vision commanders  were  Brigadier  -  General  H.  G.  Wright,  ist  division;  Brig- 
adier-General A.  P.  Howe,  ad  division;  and  Brigadier -General  Frank 
Wheaton,  3d  division.  The  brigades  were  commanded  by  Brigadier -General 
A.  T.  A.  Torbert,  Brigadier  -  General  J.  J.  Bartlett,  Brigadier -General  D.  A. 
Russell,  Colonel  I,.  A.  Grant,  Brigadier  -  General  T.  A.  Neill,  Brigadier -Gen- 
eral Alexander  Shaler,  Colonel  H.  I,.  Eustis,  and  Colonel  David  I.  Nevin. 
The  first  three  named  belonged  to  the  ist  division,  the  next  two  to  the  ad, 
and  the  remaining  three  to  the  3d.  The  artillery  brigade  was  commanded  by 
Colonel  C.  H.  Tompkins. 

Eleventh  Corps. —  Major- General  OLIVER  O.  HOWARD,  Commander.  The 
division  commanders  were — Brigadier -General  Francis  C.  Barlow,  ist  di- 
vision; Brigadier -General  A.  Von  Steinwehr,  2d  division;  and  Major -General 
Carl  Schurz,  3d  division.  The  brigades  were  commanded  respectively  by 
Colonel  Leopold  Von  Gilsa,  Brigadier  -  General  Adelbert  Ames,  Colonel 
Charles  R.  Coster,  Colonel  Orlando  Smith,  Brigadier -General  A.  Von  Schim- 
melpfenning,  and  Colonel  William  Kryzanowski.  Thd  first  two  belonged  to 
the  1st  division,  the  following  two  to  the  2d,  and  the  remaining  two  to  the 
3d.  The  artillery  brigade  was  commanded  by  Major  Thomas  W.  Osborn. 


*  General  Meade  was  in  command  of  the  Fifth  Corps  until  Sunday,  June 
28th,  when  he  was  made  Commander  in  Chief,  and  the  command  of  his  corps 
was  given  to  General  Sykes. 


THE  ARMY   OF   NORTHERN   VIRGINIA.  37 

Twelfth  Corps.  —  Major -General  HENRY  W.  SLOCUM,  Commander.*  The 
Sivision  commanders  were  —  Brigadier  -  General  Thomas  H.  Ruger,  ist  di- 
vision, and  Brigadier-General  John  W.  Geary,  2d  division.  The  brigades 
were  respectively  commanded  by  Colonel  Archibald  I/.  McDougall,  Brigadier- 
General  Henry  H.  I,ockwood,  Colonel  Silas  Colgrove,  Colonel  Charles  Candy, 
Colonel  George  A.  Cobham,  and  Brigadier  -  General  George  S.  Greene.  The 
first  three  named  belonged  to  the  ist  division,  and  the  others  to  the  ad. 
The  artillery  brigade  was  commanded  by  lieutenant  Edward  D.  Muhlenberg. 

The  cavalry  corps  was  commanded  by  Major -General 
Pleasanton. 

It  was  composed  of  three  divisions,  commanded  respectively  by  Brigadier- 
General  John  Buford,  ist  division;  Brigadier  -  General  D.  McM.  Gregg,  ad 
division ;  and  Brigadier  -  General  Judson  Kilpatrick,  3d  division.  The  first, 
second,  and  reserve  brigades  of  the  first  division  were  commanded  respect- 
ively by  Colonel  William  Gamble,  Colonel  Thomas  C.  Devin,  and  Brigadier- 
General  Wesley  Merritt.  The  three  brigades  of  the  second  division  were 
commanded  by  Colonel  J.  B.  Mclntosh,  Colonel  Pennock  Huey,  and  Colonel 
J.  Iy.  Gregg;  and  the  two  brigades  of  the  third  division  were  commanded 
respectively  by  Brigadier  -  General  E.  J.  Farnsworth  and  Brigadier -General 
George  A.  Custer.  The  reserve  artillery,  of  which  there  were  five  brigades, 
vas  under  the  command  of  Brigadier  -  General  R.  O.  Tylef. 

(2.)     The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Hon.  Edward  Everett,  in  his  address  at  the  dedication 
of  the  Soldiers'  National  Cemetery  at  Gettysburg,  Novem- 
ber 19th,  1863,  estimated  the  Confederate  force  at  ninety 
thousand  infantry,  upwards  of  ten  thousand  cavalry,  and 
four  or  five  thousand  artillery — a  total  of  one  hundred 
and  five  thousand  men  of  all  arms.  This  estimate,  made 
so  soon  after  the  great  battle,  and  professedly  drawn  from 
oflicial  sources,  has  been  generally  accepted  by  northern 
writers.  That  the  number  is  entirely  too  high  will  ap- 
pear in  the  following  statements : 

*  General  Slocum  commanded  the  right  wing  of  the  army  on  July  2d  and 
July  3d.  His  corps,  during  that  time,  was  under  the  command  of  Brigadier- 
General  Alpheus  S.  Williams.  In  like  manner  and  at  the  same  time  General 
Hancock  commanded  the  left  center,  and  General  Reynolds,  up  to  July  ist, 
commanded  the  First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  corps,  which  composed  the  left 
wing  of  the  Union  army. 


38  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

General  Longstreet,  in  an  article  contributed  by  him  to 
the  Philadelphia  Weekly  Times,  and  since  published  in  a 
book  entitled  "  Annals  of  the  "War,"  says  that  General  Lee 
informed  him  at  Chambersburg  that  on  the  30th  of  June 
his  infantry  consisted  of  about  fifty -two  thousand  bayo- 
nets, and  his  whole  force,  including  the  detachments  which 
would  join  him  on  gthe  march,  amounted  to  a  trifle  over 
seventy  thousand.  (Annals  of  the  War,  page  621.) 

Colonel  "W.  H.  Taylor,  Lee's  Adjutant  General,  in  an 
article  contributed  to  the  same  paper,  says  on  page  318  of 
the  same  book,  that  the  whole  strength  of  their  army 
during  the  invasion  consisted  of  sixty -seven  thousand 
men  of  all  arms — fifty -three  thousand  and  five  hundred 
infantry,  nine  thousand  cavalry,  and  four  thousand  five 
hundred  artillery.  The  discrepancy  between  the  number 
stated  by  General  Lee  and  Colonel  Taylor  would  be  ac- 
counted for  in  the  supposition  that  General  Imboden's 
cavalry,  which  consisted  of  over  three  thousand  men,  and 
which  did  not  really  belong  to  the  army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia, but  acted  in  an  independent  capacity  —  subject,  how- 
ever, at  all  times  to  Lee's  orders — was  not  included  in  the 
latter's  estimate.  This  force,  with  probably  others,  was 
referred  to  by  General  Lee  as  some  of  the  commands  that 
were  to  join  him  on  his  march. 

The  foregoing  numbers  from  Confederate  sources  are 
verified  by  the  following  authorities:  The  Count  of  Paris, 
whose  impartiality  and  accuracy  are  generally  admitted,  in 
his  recently  published  history  of  the  American  conflict,, 
states  the  strength  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at 
seventy -three  thousand  five  hundred.  That  part  of  this 
army  which  passed  through  Chambersburg  was  carefully 


THE   ARMY   OF   NORTHERN   VIRGINIA.  39 

estimated  by  competent  persons  both  there  and  in  Green- 
castle,  with  the  following  concurrent  results:  Mr.  W.  A. 
Reid,  of  Greencastle,  in  an  article  contributed  to  the  Pilot 
of  that  place,  in  its  issue  of  July  28th,  1863,  says  that 
the  Confederate  force  which  passed  through  that  place 
amounted  to  about  fifty  thousand  men.  The  Franklin  Re- 
pository of  Chambersburg,  in  its  issue  of  July  8th,  1863, 
while  the  matter  was  fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  people,  and 
taking  its  figures  from  the  several  estimates  made  by  citi- 
zens as  the  army  marched  through  there,  states  the  number 
at  forty  -  seven  thousand.  Mr.  John  F.  Glosser,  at  the  time 
of  the  war  a  clerk  in  the  office  of  the  prothonotary  of  the 
county,  quoting  from  his  diary  kept  at  that  time,  says: 
"The  Confederate  army  which 'passed  through  Chambers- 
burg  was  as  follows:  Swell's  corps,  fifteen  thousand  men, 
infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry,  with  sixty  pieces  of  artil- 
lery, and  over  one  thousand  wagons;  A.  P.  Hill's  corps, 
the  same;  Longstreet's  corps,  twenty  thousand  men,  eighty 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  over  one  thousand  wagons.  The 
entire  army  did  not  number  over  forty -eight  thousand 
or  fifty  thousand  men,  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery." 
This  is  an  estimate  made  by  an  entirely  competent  person, 
from  his  own  actual  observation,  the  result  being  noted 
at  the  time.  Now,  taking  fifty  thousand — the  numbers 
generally  fixed  upon  by  all  who  estimated  them — that 
passed  through  Chambersburg,  and  add  to  them  Early's 
division,  which  passed  by  way  of  Waynesborough,  Quincy, 
Funkstown,  and  Greenwood,  and  Stuart's  cavalry,  which 
passed  around  east  of  the  Federal  army,  and  we  have 
about  seventy  thousand  to  seventy  -  five  thousand  men.  It 
may  safely  be  assumed  that  the  entire  strength  of  the  in- 
vading army  did  not  exceed  that  number. 


40  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  organized  as  fol- 
lows: 

GENERAL  ROBERT  E.  LEE,  Commander. 

STAFF. 

COLONEL  W.  H.  TAYLOR,  Adjutant -General. 
COLONEL  C.  S.  VENABLE,  Aid -de -Camp. 
COLONEL  CHARLES  MARSHALL,  Aid -de -Camp. 
COLONEL  JAMES  L.  CORLEY,  Chief  Quartermaster. 
COLONEL  R.  G.  COLE,  Chief  Commissary. 
COLONEL  B.  G.  BALDWIN,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 
COLONEL  H.  I,.  PEYTON,  Assistant  Inspector -General. 
GENERAL  W.  N.  PENDLETON,  Chief  of  Artillery. 
DOCTOR  L.  GUILD,  Medical  Director. 
COLONEL  W.  PROCTOR  SMITH,  Chief  Engineer. 
MAJOR  H.  E.  YOUNG,  Assistant  Adjutant -General. 

MAJOR  G.  B.  COOK,  Assistant  Inspector  -  General. 

• 

The  army  was  composed  of  three  corps,  as  follows :  * 

First  Corps.  — Lieutenant -General  JAMES  LONGSTREET,  Commander.  The 
division  commanders  were — Major- General  L.  McLaws,  Major-General 
George  E.  Pickett,  and  Maj or- General  J.  B.  Hood.  The  brigade  commanders 
were  —  Kershaw,  Benning,  Barksdale,  Wofford,  Garnett,  Armistead,  Kemper, 
Toombs,  Corse,  Robertson,  Laws,  Anderson,  and  Jenkins.  The  four  first 
named  belonged  to  McLaws'  division;  the  succeeding  five  to  Pickett's;  and 
the  four  last  named  to  Hood's.  The  artillery  belonging  to  this  corps  was  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  J.  B.  Walton,  and  consisted  of  eighty -three  pieces. 

Second  Corps. — Lieutenant -General  R.  S.  EWELL,  Commander.  The  di- 
vision commanders  were  —  Major-General  J.  A.  Early,  Major-General  R.  E. 
Rodes,  and  Major -General  Edward  Johnson.  The  brigade  commanders  were 
—  Hays,  Gordon,  Smith,  Hoke,  Daniels,  Dole,  Iverson,  Ramseur,  Rodes, 
Stewart,  Walker,  Jones,  and  Nichols.  Four  of  these  belonged  to  Early's  di- 
vision, five  to  Rodes',  and  the  remaining  four  to  Johnson's.  The  artillery  of 
this  corps  consisted  of  eighty -two  pieces,  and  was  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  S.  Crutchfield. 

*The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  divided  into  three  corps,  while  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  divided  into  seven.  Each  of  the  three  Confed- 
erate corps,  however,  represented  a  third  of  its  whole  force,  while  each  of 
the  seven  Federal  corps  represented  a  seventh  of  its  whole.  The  same  ratio 
extended  to  divisions  and  brigades. 


THE   ARMY   OF   NORTHERN   VIRGINIA.  41 

Third  Corps.  —  lieutenant  -General  A.  P.  Hill,  Commander.  The  division 
commanders  were  — Major -Generals  R.  H.  Anderson,  Heth,  and  Pender. 
The  brigade  commanders  were  — Wilcox,  Mahone,  Posey,  Wright,  Perry, 
Pettigrew,  Field,  Archer,  Cook,  McGowan,  Lane,  Thomas,  and  Scales.  The 
first  five  belonged  to  Anderson's  division;  the  succeeding  four  to  Heth's,  and 
the  remaining  four  to  Fender's.  The  artillery  of  this  corps  consisted  of 
eighty -three  pieces,  and  was  under  command  of  Colonel  R.  Lindsey  Walker. 

The  cavalry  corps  was  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  -  General  J.  F,.  B. 
Stuart.  His  brigade  commanders  were  Generals  Wade  Hampton,  Fitzhugh 
Lee,  W.  H.  F.  Lee,  B.  H.  Robertson,  W.  E.  Jones,  J.  D.  Imboden,  A.  G. 
Jenkins,  and  Baker. 

It  will  have  been  perceived  from  the  estimates  which 
have  been  given'  of  the  numerical  strength  of  the  two 
great  armies,  which  were  about  to  enter  upon  the  great 
and  decisive  campaign,  that  the  Federal  army-  exceeded 
the  Confederate  some  twenty  thousand  or  twenty -five 
thousand  men.  This  disparity  in  numbers,  however,  was 
in  part  offset  by  the  prestige  which  the  victories  gained  at 
Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville  had  given  the  Con- 
federates. That  these  victories  had  a  great  effect  in  elating 
the  spirits  of  the  invading  army  was  evident  in  the  confi- 
dence which  they  seemed  to  have  in  the  success  of  their 
aggressive  movement,  —  a  confidence  which  seemed  to  be 
universal,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  of  the  officers,  who 
quietly  expressed  to  some  of  the  people,  as  they  passed 
through  Chambersburg,  their  apprehension  that  they  had 
gotten  into  a  trap  from  which  they  feared  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  escape. 

Colonel  Freemantle,  of  the  British  army, who,  with  an- 
other British  officer,  accompanied  the  invading  army,  aiid 
whose  sympathy  for  the  Confederates  was  open  and  un- 
disguised, as  appears  in  his  writings,  in  an  article  con- 
tributed by  him  to  Blackwood's  Magazine  on  the  great 


42  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

invasion,  says:  "The  staff  officers  spoke  of  the  coming 
battle  as  a  certainty,  and  the  universal  feeling  was  one  of 
contempt  for  an  enemy  whom  they  had  beaten  so  con- 
stantly, and  under  so  many  disadvantages."  That  this 
contempt  for  the  Federals,  and  undue  confidence  in  them- 
selves, was  shared  by  General  Lee  himself,  is  made  clear 
from  a  statement  made  by  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  who 
said  that  General  Lee  "  was  controlled  too  far  by  the  great 
confidence  he  had  in  the  fighting  qualities  of  his  troops, 
who  begged  only  to  be  turned  loose  upon  the  Federals." 
"This  confidence,"  said  the  general,  "was  equally  shared 
by  the  officers  high  in  command."  ("Annals  of  the  War," 
pages  421,  422.)  Mr.  Edward  A.  Pollard,  in  his  -"Lost 
Cause/' page  407,  says:  " The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
was  in  an  extraordinary  state  of  efficiency;  it  was  flushed 
with  victory;  it  had  accomplished  so  many  wonders  in 
the  past  that  it  was  supposed  to  be  equal  to  anything  short 
of  a  miracle;  and  when,  on  the  morning  of  the  2dy 
General  Lee  reconnoitered  the  field,  and  scanned  the 
heights  which  looked  upon  him  through  brows  of  brass 
and  iron,  he  was  noticed  to  rise  in  his  stirrups  and  mut- 
ter an  expression  of  confidence,  and  he  decided  to  at- 
tack." 

II.  THE  PURPOSE  AND  OBJECT  OF  GENERAL  LEE  IN  THE 
INVASION  OF  MARYLAND  AND  PENNSYLVANIA. 

That  the  deliverance  of  the  Confederate^Capital  from  a 
probable  transfer  of  the  Federal  army  from  the  Rappahan- 
nock  to  the  James  and  York  rivers  and  the  Peninsula,  as 
well  as  a  diversion  for  the  relief  of  the  Confederate  forces 
then  sorely  pressed  in  Vicksburg,  was  among  the  reasons 
which  induced  General  Lee  to  abandon  the  defensive  policy 


THE   OBJECT   OF   THE   INVASION.  43 

which  he  had  so  long  pursued,  and  to  adopt  an  aggressive 
one,  will  appear  in  the  following  authorities:  General 
A.  L.  Long,  whose  intimacy  with  General  Lee  as  his  chief 
military  secretary  enahled  him  to  speak  understandingly 
upon  this  subject,  in  an  article  contributed  by  him  to 
the  Philadelphia  Weekly  Times  of  November,  1884,  says: 
"  Since  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  although  the  Federal 
army  had  been  reinforced  to  its  former  dimensions,  it  still 
retained  a  spiritless  attitude.  As  yet  no  future  plan  of 
operations  had  been  developed.  It  was  just  to  conclude 
that  General  Hooker  would  not  again  advance  on  his 
present  line,  and  that  a  change  of  base  was  in  contempla- 
tion; and  as  the  James  and  York  presented  the  most  pro- 
pitio.us  lines,  it  is  probable  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
if  left  uninterrupted,  would  move  in  that  direction.  *  *  * 
The  object  of  the  campaign  (upon  the  part  of  General  Lee) 
being  the  defense  of  Richmond,  General  Lee  could  either 
continue  on  the  defensive  and  oppose  the  Federal  advance 
as  he  had  recently  done,  or  he  might  assume  the  offensive, 
and  by  bold  maneuvering  oblige  the  Federal  army  to  re- 
cede from  its  present  line  of  operations  to  protect  its  capi- 
tal, or  oppose  the  invasion,  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania. 
The  advance  upon  Richmond  would  thus  be  frustrated, 
and  the  attack  upon  that  city  delayed  at  least  for  a  time. 
The  dispirited  condition  of  the  Federal  army  since  its  late 
defeat,  and  the  high  tone  of  that  of  the  Confederates,  in- 
duced the  adoption  of  the  latter  plan.  *  *  *  If  suc- 
cessful (in  the  invasion),  the  defeat  of  the  Federal  army 
would  be  followed  by  the  possession  of  Maryland  and 
Southern  Pennsylvania,  and  the  fall  of  "Washington  City. 
Moreover,  an  important  diverson  would  be  made  in  favor 


44  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

of  the  western  department,  where  the  affairs  of  the  Con- 
federacy were  on  the  decline.  "With  this  alluring  concep- 
tion the  hazard  of  an  invasion  would  he  fully  warranted." 
General  Longstreet,  who  was  opposed  to  the  invasion 
of  the  North,  and  only  consented  to  it  upon  a  condition 
which  will  appear  further  on,  gives  the  following  facts  in 
an  article  contributed  to  the  Philadelphia  Weekly  Times, 
and  which  will  be  found  upon  pages  416  and  417  of  the 
Annals  of  the  "War.  General  Longstreet  says  that  whLe 
in  Richmond  early  in  May,  1863,  Mr.  Seddon,  Confederate 
Secretary  of  "War,  called  his  attention  to  the  critical  con- 
dition of  General  Pemberton's  army  at  Vicksburg,  around 
which  General  Grant  was  then  decisively  drawing  his  lines, 
and  informed  him  that  he  had  under  consideration  a  plan 
for  relieving  him  by  concentrating  a  succoring  army  ft 
Jackson,  Mississippi,  under  the  command  of  General  John- 
ston, with  a  view  to  drive  Grant  from  before  Vicksbnrg 
by  a  direct  issue  at  arms.  Mr.  Seddon  also  intimated  to 
General  Longstreet  that  in  the  execution  of  this  purpose, 
it  might  be  necessary  to  send  his  (Longstreet's)  co: "  v 
there.  General  Longstreet  suggested  to  Mr.  Seddon  th;;^, 
in  his  judgment,  a  better  plan  for  relieving  General  Pem- 
berton  was  to  have  the  army  then  concentrating  at  Jack- 
son move  swiftly  to  Tullahoma,  where  General  Bragg  was 
then  located  with  a  fine  army,  confronting  an  army  of 
about  equal  strength  under  General  Rosecrans,  and  that 
at  the  same  time  two  divisions  of  his  corps  (Longstreet's) 
be  hurried  forward  to  the  same  point.  With  this  force  it 
was  expected  that  Rosecrans  could  be  crushed,  after  which 
the  whole  force  should  move  northward  through  Tennes- 
see and  Kentucky,  and  threaten  the  invasion  of  Ohio. 


THE   OBJECT   OF   THE   INVASION.  45 

General  Longstreet's  opinion  was  that,  in  the  proposed 
march  through  these  states,  no  organized  obstruction  would 
be  encountered,  and  that  the  invading  army  could  obtain 
liberal  supplies  of  provisions,  and  even  reinforcements  by 
those  friendly  to  their  cause,  and  that  General  Grant's 
army  would  be  surely  drawn  away  from  around  Vicks- 
burg  to  look  after  and  protect  its  own  territory.  Mr. 
Seddon  did  not  look  with  much  favor  upon  General  Long- 
street's  proposition,  because  of  the  difficulty  and  danger 
of  withdrawing  so  large  a  force,  at  that  time,  from  General 
Lee.  This  plan  General  Longstreet  subsequently  laid  be- 
fore Lee  himself,  and  after  a  free  interchange  of  opinions 
touching  it,  was  overruled  by  the  commander  -  in  -  chief, 
his  principal  reason  against  it  being  his  unwillingness  to 
divide  his  army.  General  Longstreet  says  that  in  this 
conference  with  Lee,  no  room  was  left  to  doubt  that  he 
entertained  the  idea  of  an  offensive  campaign,  and  he  at 
length  asked  him  if  he  did  not  think  an  invasion  of  Mary- 
land and  Pennsylvania  by  his  own  army  would  not  accom- 
plish the  same  result  as  the  proposed  threatening  of  Ohio? 
To  this  Longstreet  replied  that  he  could  not  see  how  it 
could,  that  the  movement  would  be  too  hazardous,  and 
a  campaign  in  thoroughly  Union  states  would  require 
more  time  and  greater  preparation  than  the  one  proposed 
through  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. 

"I  soon  discovered,"  says  General  Longstreet,  "that  he 
had  determined  that  he  would  make  some  forward  move- 
ment, and  I  finally  assented  that  the  Pennsylvania  cam- 
paign might  be  brought  to  a  successful  issue  if  he  could 
make  it  offensive  in  strategy,  but  defensive  in  tactics.  This 
point  was  urged  with  great  persistency.  I  suggested  that, 


46  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

after  piercing  Pennsylvania  and  menacing  "Washington, 
we  should  choose  a  strong  position,  and  force  the  Federals 
to  attack  us,  observing  that  the  popular  clamor  throughout 
the  North  would  speedily  force  the  Federal  general  to  at- 
tempt to  drive  us  out.  I  recalled  to  him  the  battle  of 
Fredericksburg  as  an  instance  of  a  defensive  battle,  when, 
with  a  few  thousand  men,  we  hurled  the  whole  Federal 
army  back,  crippling  and  demoralizing  it,  with  trifling  loss 
to  our  own  troops;  and  Chancellorsville  as  an  instance  of 
offensive  battle,  where  we  dislodged  the  Federals,  it  is  true, 
but  at  such  a  terrible  sacrifice  that  half  a  dozen  such  vic- 
tories would  have  ruined  us.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
Stonewall  Jackson  once  said  that  'we  sometimes  fail  to 
drive  the  enemy  from  a  position;  they  always  fail  to  drive 
us/  I  reminded  him,  too,  of  Napoleon's  advice  to  Mar- 
mont,  to  whom  he  said,  when  putting  him  at  the  head  of 
an  invading  army,  *  Select  your  ground,  and  make  your 
enemy  attack  you.'  I  recall  these  points  simply  because 
I  desire  to  have  it  understood  that,  while  I  first  suggested 
to  General  Lee  the  idea  of  an  offensive  campaign,  I  was 
never  persuaded  to  yield  my  argument  against  the  Gettys- 
burg campaign,  except  with  the  understanding  that  we 
were  not  to  deliver  an  offensive  battle,  but  to  so  maneuver 
that  the  enemy  should  be  forced  to  attack  us  —  or,  to  re- 
peat, that  our  campaign  should  be  one  of  offensive  strategy, 
but  defensive  tactics.  Upon  this  understanding  my  assent 
was  given,  and  General  Lee,  who  had  been  kind  enough 
to  discuss  the  matter  with  me  patiently,  gave  the  order  of 
march." 

It  will  be  perceived  further  on  in  this  record  of  the  in- 
vasion, that  General  Lee  failed  to  adhere  to  what  General 


THE   OBJECT   OF   THE   INVASION.  47 

Longstreet  claims  was  an  agreement  between  them  as  to 
the  policy  stated,  and  to  this  departure  General  Longstreet 
at  the  time  it  was  made  objected,  and  to  it  attributes  in 
part  their  defeat  at  Gettysburg. 

As  intimated  by  General  Long  in  the  article  already 
quoted,  the  discouragement  and  demoralization  which 
always  follow  defeat,  prevailed  extensively  throughout 
the  !N"orth,  and  to  a  considerable  extent  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  Then,  during  the  month  of  May,  quite  a 
depletion  of  the  rank  and  file  of  this  army  took  place  by 
the  mustering  out  of  large  numbers. of  three  months'  and 
three  years'  men.*  And  such  had  been  the  depressing 
influence  of  the  defeat  of  Chancellorsville  upon  the  coun- 
try, that  the  places  of  these  men  were  not  easily  filled. 
These  facts  were  not  only  known  to  the  military  authori- 
ties upon  the  Federal  side,  causing  much  alarm  and  anx- 
iety, but  they  were  equally  known  to  the  Confederate 
leaders,  and  afforded  them  opportunities  for  bold  and 
aggressive  schemes.  Then,  too,  a  draft  was  ordered  to 
replenish  the  Federal  ranks,  and  it  was  exceedingly  un- 
popular in  some  places,  and  resistance  was  expected, 
especially  if  the  Confederate  army  should  obtain  a  foot- 
hold upon  northern  soil.  The  probable  defeat  of  Hooker, 
the  capture  of  Washington,  the  securing  of  supplies  and 
perhaps  recruits  for  his  army,  and  foreign  recognition 
and  armed  intervention,  were  factors  in  inducing  Lee  to 
give  his  reluctant  consent  to  the  forward  movement. 
That  General  Lee  expected  to  reap  these  results, — at 

*  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  reduced  during  the  month  of  May  by  the 
expiration  of  the  term  of  enlistment,  to  the  extent  of  about  twenty -five  to 
thirty  thousand  men. 


48  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

least  that  he  would  find  a  divided  North  and  a  revolution 
in  his  favor,  with  foreign  recognition  in  case  he  succeeded 
in  capturing  the  National  Capital,  is  obscurely  hinted  at 
in  the  opening  of  his  report  on  the  Pennsylvania  cam- 
paign. After  stating  the  military  reasons  for  his  move- 
ment, he  adds,  "  In  addition  to  these  results,  it  was  hoped 
that  other  valuable  results  mip;lit  be  attained  by  military 
success."  General  Donbleday,  on  pages  76-78  of  his 
book  entitled  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  thils 
summarizes  the  reasons  for  the  invasion :  "  The  rebels  had 
obtained  a  triumph,  rather  than  a  substantial  victory,  at 
Chancellorsville.  It  was  gained,  too,  at  a  ruinous  expense 
of  life,  and  when  the  battle  was  over  they  found  them- 
selves too  weak  to  follow  up  our  retreating  forces.  "While 
the  whole  South  was  exulting,  their  great  commander, 
General  Lee,  was  profoundly  depressed.  The  resources 
of  the  Davis  Government  in  men  and  means  were  limited, 
and  it  was  evident  that  without  a  foreign  alliance,  pro- 
longed defensive  warfare  by  an  army  so  far  from  its  base, 
would  ultimately  exhaust  the  seceding  states  without  ac- 
complishing their  independence.  It  became  necessary, 
therefore,  for  General  Lee  to  choose  one  of  two  plans  of 
campaign :  either  to  fall  back  on  the  center  of  his  supplies 
at  Richmond,  and  stand  a  siege  there,  or  to  invade  the 
North.  By  retiring  on  Richmond  he  would  save  the  great 
labor  of  transporting  food  and  war  material  to  the  fron- 
tier, and  would  remove  the  northern  army  still  further 
from  its  sources  of  supply  and  its  principal  depots.  One 
circumstance,  however,  would  probably  in  any  event  have 
impelled  him  to  take  the  bolder  course.  The  situation  in 
Vicksburg  was  becoming  alarming.  It  was  evident  that 


THE   OBJECT   OF   THE   INVASION.  49 

the  town  must  fall,  and  with  its  surrender  the  Federal 
fleet  would  soon  regain  possession  of  the  Mississippi.  The 
fall  of  Vicksburg,  supplemented  by  the  retreat  of  Lee's 
army  on  Richmond,  would  dishearten  the  Southern  peo- 
ple, and  stimulate  the  North  to  renewed  efforts.  It  was 
essential,  therefore,  to  counterbalance  the  impending  dis- 
aster in  the  "West  by  some  brilliant  exploit  in  the  East. 

"There  was,  perhaps,  another  reason  for  this  great  for- 
ward movement,  founded  on  the  relation  of  the  Con- 
federacy to  the  principal  European  powers.  England  still 
made  a  pretense  of  neutrality,  but  the  aristocracy  and 
ruling  classes  sided  with  the  South,  and  a  large  association 
of  their  most  influential  men  was  established  at  Manchester 
to  aid  the  southern  cause.  The  Confederates  were  fight- 
ing us  with  English  guns  and  war  material,  furnished 
by  blockade  runners;  while  English  Shenandoahs  and  Ala- 
bamas,  manned  by  British  seamen,  under  the  Confederate 
flag,  burned  our  merchant  vessels  and  swept  our  commer- 
cial marine  from  the  ocean.  The  French  Government  was 
equally  hostile  to  us,  and  there  \vas  hardly  a  kingdom  in 
Europe  which  did  not  sympathize  with  the  South,  allied 
as  they  were  by  their  feudal  customs  to  the  deplorable  sys- 
tem of  southern  slavery.  Russia  alone  favored  our  cause, 
and  stood  ready,  if  need  be,  to  assist  us  with  her  fleet; 
probably  more  from  antagonism  to  England  and  France 
than  from  any  other  motive.  The  agents  of  the  Con- 
federate Government  stated  in  their  official  dispatches 
that  if  General  Lee  could  establish  his  army  firmly  on 
northern  soil,  England  would  at  once  acknowledge  the 
independence  of  the  South;  in  which  case  ample  loans 
could  not  only  be  obtained  on  Southern  securities,  but  a 

4 


50  THE     GREAT    INVASION. 

foreign  alliance  might  be  formed,  and  perhaps  a  fleet  fur- 
nished to  re-open  the  Southern  ports. 

"  While  thus  elated  by  hopes  of  foreign  intervention, 
the  Confederate  spies  and  sympathizers  who  thronged  the 
North  greatly  encouraged  the  Davis  government  by  their 
glowing  accounts  of  the  disaffection  there,  in  consequence 
of  the  heavy  taxation,  rendered  necessary  by  the  war,  and 
by  the  unpopularity  of  the  draft,  which  would  soon  have 
to  be  enforced  as  a  defensive  measure.  They  overrated 
the  influence  of  the  anti-war  party,  and  prophesied  that 
an  invasion  would  be  followed  by  outbreaks  in  the  prin- 
cipal cities,  which  would  paralyze  every  effort  to  reinforce 
the  Federal  forces  in  the  field. 

"  These  reasons  would  have  been  quite  sufficient  of  them- 
selves to  induce  Lee  to  make  the  movement,  but  he  him- 
self gives  an  additional  one.  He  hoped  by  this  advance 
to  draw  Hooker  out  where  he  could  strike  him  a  decisive 
blow,  and  thus  insure  the  permanent  triumph  of  the  Con- 
federacy. He  was  weary  of  all  this  marching,  campaign- 
ing, and  bloodshed,  and  was  strongly  desirous  of  settling 
the  whole  matter  at  once.  Having  been  reinforced  after 
the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  by  Longstreet's  two  divisions, 
and  a  large  body  of  conscripts,  he  determined  to  advance. 

"  On  May  31st  his  force,  according  to  Southern  state- 
ments, amounted  to  eighty -eight  thousand  seven  hundred 
and  fifty -four,  of  which  sixty -eight  thousand  three  hun- 
dred and  fifty -two  were  ready  for  duty.  Recruits,  too, 
were  constantly  coming  in  from  the  draft,  which  was  rig- 
idly enforced  in  the  Southern  states." 

The  various  reasons  thus  stated  no  doubt  entered  into 
the  consideration  which  induced  the  invasion.  The  princi- 


THE   OBJECT   OF   THE   INVASION.  51 

pal  reason,  however,  was  the  confidence  which  Jefferson 
Davis  felt  in  the  success  of  the  movement.  Indeed,  while 
yet  in  the  United  States  Senate  he  declared  that  in  the 
event  of  war  the  battles  would  be  fought  on  the  soil  of 
Pennsylvania,  and  on  its  wheat -fields  the  contest  would 
be  decided.  Mr.  Pollard  says  that  in  confident  anticipa- 
tion and  assurance  of  a  decisive  victory  in  Pennsylvania, 
Jefferson  Davis,  about  the  time  the  Confederate  army 
crossed  the  Potomac  into  Maryland,  ordered  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  vice  -  president  of  the  Confederacy,  to  proceed  to 
Washington  with  the  view  to  take  advantage  of  the  vic- 
tory and  propose  a  peace  upon  the  condition  of  the  recog- 
nition of  the  Confederate  Government.  And  with  a  view 
to  mask  his  real  intentions,  which  were  unwritten  and 
were  to  be  presented  verbally,  the  following  letter  was 
given  him: 

RICHMOND,  ad  July,  1863. 
HON.  ALEX.  H.  STEPHENS,  Richmond,  Virginia: 

Sir —  Having  accepted  your  patriotic  offer  to  proceed  as  a  military  com- 
missioner, under  flag  of  truce,  to  Washington,  you  will  herewith  receive  your 
letter  of  authority  to  the  Commander -in -Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the 
United  States. 

This  letter  is  signed  by  me  as  Commander -in -Chief  of  the  Confederate 
I^and  and  Naval  Forces. 

You  will  perceive,  from  the  terms  of  the  letter,  that  it  is  so  worded  as  to 
avoid  any  political  difficulties  in  its  reception.  Intended  exclusively  as  one 
of  those  communications  between  belligerents  which  public  law  recognizes  as 
necessary  and  proper  between  hostile  forces,  care  has  been  taken  to  give  no 
pretext  for  refusing  to  receive  it  on  the  ground  that  it  would  involve  a  tacit 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Confederacy. 

Your  mission  is  simply  one  of  humanity,  and  has  no  political  aspect. 

If  objection  is  made  to  receiving  your  letter  on  the  ground  that  it  is  not 
addressed  to  Abraham  Lincoln  as  President  instead  of  Commander -in -Chief, 
etc.,  then  you  will  present  the  duplicate  letter,  which  is  addressed  to  him  as 
President,  and  signed  by  me  as  President  To  this  letter  objection  may  be 
made  on  the  ground  that  I  am  not  recognized  to  be  President  of  the  Con- 


52  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

federacy.  In  this  event,  you  will  decline  any  further  attempt  to  confer  on  the 
subject  of  your  mission,  as  such  conference  is  admissible  only  on  a  footing 
of  perfect  equality. 

My  recent  interviews  with  you  have  put  you  so  fully  in  possession  of  my 
views  that  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  give  you  any  detailed  instructions,  even 
were  I  at  this  moment  well  enough  to  attempt  it. 

My  whole  purpose  is,  in  one  word,  to  place  this  war  on  the  footing  of  such 
as  are  waged  by  civilized  people  in  modern  times,  and  to  divest  it  of  the  sav- 
age character  which  has  been  impressed  on  it  by  our  enemies,  in  spite  of  all 
our  efforts  and  protests.  War  is  full  enough  of  unavoidable  horrors,  under  all 
aspects,  to  justify,  and  even  to  demand  of,  any  Christian  ruler  who  may  be 
unhappily  engaged  in  carrying  it  on,  to  seek  to  restrict  its  calamities,  and  to 
divest  it  of  all  unnecessary  severities.  You  will  endeavor  to  establish  the 
cartel  for  the  exchange  of  prisoners  on  such  a  basis  as  to  avoid  the  constant 
difficulties  and  complaints  which  arise,  and  to  prevent  for  the  future  what  we 
deem' the  unfair  conduct  of  our  enemies,  in  evading  the  delivery  of  prisoners 
who  fall  into  their  hands,  in  retarding  it  by  sending  them  in  circuitous  routes, 
and  by  detaining  them  sometimes  for  months  in  camps  and  prisons,  and  in 
persisting  in  taking  captive  non-combatants. 

Your  attention  is  also  called  to  the  unheard-of  conduct  of  Federal  officers 
in  driving  from  their  homes  entire  communities  of  women  and  children,  as 
well  as  of  men,  whom  they  find  in  districts  occupied  by  their  troops,  for  no 
other  reason  than  because  these  unfortunates  are  faithful  to  the  allegiance 
due  to  their  States,  and  refuse  to  take  an  oath  of  fidelity  to  their  enemies. 

The  putting  to  death  of  unarmed  prisoners  has  been  a  ground  of  just 
complaint  in  more  than  one  instance,  and  the  recent  execution  of  officers 
of  our  army  in  Kentucky,  for  the  sole  cause  that  they  were  engaged  in  re- 
cruiting-service in  a  state  which  is  claimed  as  still  one  of  the  United  States, 
but  is  also  claimed  by  us  as  one  of  the  Confederate  States,  must  be  repressed 
by  retaliation  if  not  unconditionally  abandoned,  because  it  would  justify  the 
like  execution  in  every  other  state  of  the  Confederacy,  and  the  practice  is 
barbarous,  uselessly  cruel,  and  can  only  lead  to  the  slaughter  of  prisoners  on 
both  sides,  a  result  too  horrible  to  contemplate  without  making  every  effort 
to  avoid  it. 

On  these  and  all  kindred  subjects  you  will  consider  your  authority  full 
and  ample  to  make  such  arrangements  as  will  temper  the  present  cruel  char- 
acter of  the  contest,  and  full  confidence  is  placed  in  your  judgment,  patriot- 
ism, and  discretion  that,  while  carrying  out  the  objects  of  your  mission,  you 
will  take  care  that  the  equal  rights  of  the  Confederacy  be  always  preserved. 
Very  respectfully,  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 


THE   OBJECT   OP   THE   INVASION.  53 

Mr.  Pollard  says,  "  Mr.  Stephens  proceeded  only  as  far 
as  Fortress  Monroe,  where  he  was  intercepted  by  a  dis- 
patch peremptorily  forbidding  his  access  to  the  Federal 
Capital.  Whether  the  authorities  there  were  aware  or  not 
of  the  real  nature  of  his  mission  it  is  since  ascertained 
that,  apart  from  the  written  text  which  he  bore,  he  was  to 
sound  the  "Washington  Government  on  the  question  of 
peace.  There  could  be  no  other  proper  conclusion,  judg- 
ing from  the  importance  of  the  emissary,  and  the  absurd 
futility  of  his  going  to  Washington  merely  to  protest 
against  the  enemy's  cruelties  in  conducting  the  war. 

"The  whole  explanation  of  the  affair  is  that  Mr. 
Stephens  was  fully  empowered,  in  certain  contingencies, 
to  propose  peace ;  that  President  Davis  had  sent  him  on 
this  extraordinary  visit  to  Washington,  anticipating  a 
^reat  victory  of  Lee's  army  in  Pennsylvania;  that  the 
real  design  of  the  mission  was  disconcerted  by  the  fatal 
day  of  Gettysburg,  which  occurred  when  Mr.  Stephens 
was  near  Fortress  Monroe;  and  that  it  was  in  the  insolent 
moments  of  this  Federal  success  that  he  was  sharply  re- 
buffed by  the  Washington  authorities.  Considering  the 
conjuncture  of  the  occasion  and  the  circumstances  in 
which  the  President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  sought 
•to  signalize  what  he  supposed  would  be  a  great  victory 
of  his  armies,  by  a  distinct  and  formal  proposition  of 
peace  at  Washington,  it  may  be  said  that,  notwithstand- 
ing the  disappointment  of  the  event,  and  the  jeer  of  the 
-enemy,  Mr.  Davis  occupied  a  proud  position  in  this  mat- 
ter, and  one  that  merited  the  applause  of  the  Christian 
world." 

The  particular  merit  attaching  to  Mr.  Davis  for  this 


54  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

« 

mission  to  Washington,  which,  as  Mr.  Pollard  saysr 
placed  him  in  a  "proud  position,"  and  "merited  the  ap- 
plause of  the  Christian  world,"  is  indeed  hard  to  see. 
The  time  certainly  was  inopportune,  and  the  overwhelm- 
ing Federal  victories  of  Vicksburg  and  Gettysburg  sadly 
interfered  with  his  calculations. 

III.     GENERAL  LEE'S  STRATEGICAL  PURPOSES. 

In  his  address  at  Gettysburg,  November  19th,  1863, 
Hon.  Edward  Everett,  whose  information  was  drawn  from 
the  archives  of  the  War  Department,  stated  Lee's  stra- 
tegical purposes  as  follows : 

1.  By  rapid  movements  northward,  and  by  maneuvering 
with  a  portion  of  his  army  on  the  east  side  of  the  Blue 
Ridge,  he  sought  to  tempt  General  Hooker  from  his  base  of 
operations  and  thus  uncover  the  approaches  to  Washing- 
ton, and  to  throw  it  open  to  a  raid  by  Stuart's  cavalry,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  enable  Lee  himself  to  cross  the  Po- 
tomac at  Poolsville  and  fall  upon  the  Capital  from  the 
north.  This  design  of  the  confederate  general  was 
promptly  discovered  by  General  Hooker,  who  moved 
with  great  rapidity  from  his  encampments  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  and 
preserved  unbroken  his  inner  line,  and  stationed  the  vari- 
ous corps  of  his  army  at  all  the  points  protecting  the 
approaches  to  the  Capital,  from  Centreville  up  to  Lees- 
burg.  In  the  mean  time,  by  the  vigorous  operations  of 
Pleasanton's  cavalry,  the  cavalry  of  General  Stuart  was  so 
crippled  as  to  be  unable  to  perform  the  part  assigned  to  it 
in  the  campaign.  In  this  manner  Lee's  first  object,  the 
defeat  of  Hooker  on  the  south  of  the  Potomac  and  & 
direct  march  upon  Washington,  was  baifled. 


GENERAL  LEE  S  STRATEGICAL  PURPOSES.         55 

2.  A  second  part  of  the  Confederate  plan  was  to  turn 
the  demonstration  northward  into  a  real  invasion  of 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  in  the  hope  that,  in  this  way, 
General  Hooker  would  be  drawn  to  a  distance  from  the 
Capital,  and  that  some  opportunity  would  occur  to  take 
him  at  a  disadvantage,  and  after  eluding  or  defeating  his 
army,  to  make  a  descent  upon  Baltimore  and  Washing- 
ton. This  was  substantially  the  repetition  of  the  plan  of 
the  invasion  of  Maryland  in  1862;  and  as  the  latter  was 
defeated  at  Antietam,  so  was  the  former  at  Gettysburg. 

Another  plan  which,  though  not  stated  by  Mr.  Everett, 
was  forced  upon  the  Confederate  commander  by  the 
excellent  strategy  of  General  Hooker,  was  this:  to  ad- 
vance by  way  of  the  Sheriandoah  and  Cumberland  val- 
leys upon  Harrisburg.  That  Lee's  original  purpose  was 
to  advance  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  its  continuation 
north  of  the  Potomac,  the  South  Mountain,  seems  to 
be  verified  by  General  Long  in  the  published  statement 
previously  referred  to.  General  Long  says:  "Before 
entering  upon  the  execution  of  his  plans,  General  Lee 
had  marked  out  his  line  of  operations,  which  was  to 
advance  into  Pennsylvania,  with  Gettysburg  or  York 
for  his  objective  point,  as  circumstances  might  dictate. 
It  was  his  determination  to  give  battle  at  one  or  the 
other  of  these  places."  It  will  be  perceived  that  Harris- 
burg  was  not  mentioned  by  General  Loner  as  one  of  the 
places  where  a  battle  might  be  fought,  and  yet  an  attack 
upon  that  place  was  planned  by  Lee,  not  before  he  set  out 
upon  his  expedition  northward,  nor  before  he  crossed  the 
Potomac,  but  at  Chambersburg,  after  he  was  forced  to 
cross  the  river  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge  instead  of  east  of  it, 
as  originally  intended. 


56  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

That  an  attack  upon  Harrisburg  was  arranged  by  Lee 
at  this  place,  and  that  he  held  to  that  purpose  up  to  the 
night  of  Monday,  June  29th,  will  clearly  appear  in  the 
following,  as  found  in  General  Longstreet's  own  published 
account  in  the  "Annals  of  the  Wai',"  pages  418,  419.  It 
was  on  that  night  that  General  Longstreet's  scout  brought 
him  the  information  at  his  head-quarters  near  Chambers- 
burg,  that  the  Federal  army  was  no  longer  south  of  the 
Potomac,  guarding  the  approaches  to  Washington,  as  Lee 
supposed,  but  had  crossed  the  river  and  was  marching 
northward,  parallel  with  him,  to  the  east  of  the  moun- 
tain; and  this  information  caused  him  to  change  his  plan 
and  march  eastward  across  the  South  Mountain.  The 
statement  is  as  follows : 

"While  at  Culpeper,  I  sent  a  trusty  scout  (who  had  been  sent  to  me  by 
Secretary  Seddons,  while  I  was  in  Suffolk, )  with  instructions  to  go  into  the 
Federal  lines,  discover  his  policy,  and  bring  me  all  the  information  he  could 
possibly  pick  up.  When  this  scout  asked  me,  very  significantly,  where  he 
should  report,  I  replied,  '  Find  me,  wherever  I  am,  when  you  have  the  de- 
sired information.'  I  did  this  because  I  feared  to  trust  him  with  a  knowledge 
of  our  future  movements.  I  supplied  him  with  all  the  gold  he  needed,  and 
instructed  him  to  spare  neither  pains  nor  money  to  obtain  full  and  accurate 
information.  The  information  gathered  by  this  scout  led  to  the  most  tre- 
mendous results,  as  will  be  seen.  *  *  *  I  reached  Chambersburg  on  the 
evening  of  the  2jth  (Saturday).  At  this  point,  on  the  night  of  the  2gih  (Mon- 
day), information  was  received  by  which  the  whole  plan  of  the  campaign  was 
changed.  We  had  not  heard  from  the  enemy  for  several  days,  and  General 
I/ee  was  in  doubt  as  to  where  fie  was;  indeed,  we  did  not  know  that  he  had 
yet  left  Virginia.  At  about  ten  o'clock  that  night,  Colonel  Sorrell,  my  chief 
of  staff,  was  waked  by  an  orderly,  who  reported  that  a  suspicious  person  had 
just  been  arrested  by  the  provost -marshal.  Upon  investigation,  Sorrell  dis- 
covered that  the  suspicious  person  was  the  scout,  Harrison,  that  I  had  sent 
out  at  Culpeper.  He  was  dirt -stained,  travel -worn,  and  very  much  broken 
down.  After  questioning  him  sufficiently  to  find  that  he  brought  very  im- 
portant information,  Colonel  Sorrell  brought  him  to  my  headquarters  and 
awoke  me.  He  gave  the  information  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  Po- 


GENERAL  LEE'S  STRATEGICAL  PURPOSES.         57 

tomac,  inarched  northwest,  and  that  the  head  of  his  column  was  at  Frederick 
City  on  our  right.  I  felt  that  this  information  was  exceedingly  important, 
and  might  involve  a  change  in  the  direction  of  our  march.  General  Lee  had 
already  issued  orders  that  we  were  to  advance  toward  Harrisburg.  I  at  once 
sent  the  scout  to  General  Lee's  headquarters,  and  followed  him  myself  early 
in  the  morning.  I  found  General  Lee  up,  and  asked  him  if  the  information 
brought  by  the  scout  might  not  involve  a  change  of  direction  of  the  head  of 
our  column  to  the  right.  He  immediately  acquiesced  in  the  suggestion,  pos- 
sibly saying  that  he  had  already  given  orders  to  that  effect.  The  movement 
toward  the  enemy  was  begun  at  once."  * 


*  General  Longstreet,  in  a  second  article  contributed  to  the  Annals  of  the 
War,  page  632,  says  that  he  erred  in  his  first  statement  that  this  scout  re- 
ported to  him  on  the  night  of  Monday,  Jun,e  2gth,  and  that  it  occurred  on  the 
night  of  Sunday,  June  28th.  That  he  was  right  in  his  first  statement  will  ap- 
pear in  the  following  considerations: 

1.  According  to  General  Longstreet's  own  statement,  as  well  as  the  official 
declaration  of  General  Lee,  the  order  countermanding  the  attack  upon  Har- 
risburg, and  a  rapid  concentration  of  the  scattered  Confederate  forces  in  the 
vicinity  of  Gettysburg,  was  issued  immediately  upon  the  receipt  of  the  in- 
formation brought  by  that  scout,  and  the  concentration  was  at  once  begun. 
If  the  scout  reported  on  the  evening  of  Sunday,  28th,  then  the  concentration 
must  have  taken  place  on  Monday,  whereas  the  fact  is  placed  beyond  all  ques- 
tion that  it  occurred  on  Tuesday.     This  will  unmistakably  appear  in  the  state- 
ments yet  to  follow. 

2.  General  Longstreet  says  that  early  the  next  morning  after  the  arrival  of 
the  scout,  he  went  to  Lee's  headquarters,  and,  finding  him  up,  inquired  of  him 
if  the  information  brought  would  not  necessitate  a  change  in  the  direction  of 
the  head  of  the  column,  to  which  Lee  replied  that  it  would,  and  that  orders 
to  that  effect  had  already  been  issued.     He  further  says  that  Lee  and  himself 
then  rode  together  to  Greenwood,  where  they  remained  over  night;  and  the 
Tiext  day,  after  riding  together  some  three  or  four  miles  toward  Gettysburg, 
the  sound  of  guns  was  heard,  at  which  Lee  rode  rapidly  forward  to  ascertain 
the  cause,  leaving  him  to  see  after  hurrying  forward  the  troops.     (Annals  of 
the  War,  pages  419,  420.)     The  cannonading  heard  was  that  of  the  first  day's 
battle,  Wednesday,  July  ist,  as  Longstreet  himself  admits.     This  fact  alone 
fixes  Tuesday  morning  as  the  time  Lee  and  Longstreet  left  Chambersburg  for 
Greenwood,  and,  as  a  consequence,  Monday  night,  the  29th,  as  the  time  of  the 
scout's  arrival. 

3.  General  Lee  officially  declares  that  it  was  upon  the  night  of  June  29th 
that  the  scout  reported  to  him  (Annals  of  the  War,  page  420).     This  official 
declaration  is  more  likely  to  be  correct  than  General  Longstreet's  memory, 
upon  which,  it  is  evident,  he  relies. 

4.  There  is  another  way  of  harmonizing  the  discrepancy  in  the  dates  given 
by  General  Longstreet,  which  is  that  the  scout  reported  on  the  evening  of 
Sunday,  28th,  and  the  orders  for  the  concentration  of  the  troops  were  imme- 


58  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

General  Lee  himself  in  his  official  report  says:  "Prepa- 
ration had  been  made  to  advance  upon  Harrisburg,  but, 
on  the  night  of  the  29th,  information  was  received  from  a 
scout  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  was 
advancing  northward,  and  that  the  head  of  his  column 
had  already  reached  South  Mountain.  As  our  communi- 
cations with  the  Potomac  were  thus  menaced,  it  was 


diately  issued  and  sent  to  their  respective  destinations,  but  the  concentration 
itself  did  not  commence  until  Tuesday,  3oth.  This  seems  to  be  sustained  by 
an  account  of  this  affair  given  by  Dr.  Cullen,  Medical  Director  of  Longstreet's 
corps,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  439.  Dr.  Cullen  says:  "I  distinctly  re- 
member the  appearance  in  our  headquarters  of  the  scout  who  brought  from 
Frederick  the  first  account  that  General  Lee  had  of  the  definite  whereabouts  of 
the  enemy;  of  the  excitement  at  General  Lee's  headquarters  among  couriers, 
quartermasters,  commissaries,  etc.,  all  betokening  some  early  movement  of 
the  commands  dependent  upon  the  news  brought  by  the  scout.  That  after- 
noon General  Lee  was  walking  with  some  of  us  in  the  road  in  front  of  his 
headquarters,  and  said,  '  Gentlemen,  we  will  not  move  to  Harrisburg  as  we 
expected,  but  will  go  over  to  Gettysburg  and  see  what  General  Meade  is  after.' 
Orders  had  been  issued  to  the  corps  to  move  at  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  the 
next  day,  and  promptly  at  the  time  the  corps  was  put  on  the  road."  If  Dr. 
Cullen  is  not  mistaken  in  the  statement  he  makes,  then  the  scout  reported  on 
the  evening  of  Sunday,  and  the  conversation  between  Lee  and  his  staff  oc- 
curred on  Monday,  and  the  concentration  began  on  Tuesday  morning.  This 
view  is  further  sustained  by  General  Doubleday's  assertion,  on  page  119  of  his 
' '  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg, ' :  that  General  Early  received  at  York,  where 
his  division  was  encamped,  in  the  afternoon  of  Monday,  2ot/t,  Lee's  order  to 
return  to  Gettysburg,  and  that  recalling  Gordon's  brigade  from  Wrightsville, 
whither  it  had  gone,  he  made  preparations  to  start  the  next  morning.  The 
chief  difficulty  to  this  last  explanation  is  this,  how  could  that  scout  report  to 
General  Lee  at  Chambersburg  on  Sunday  evening  that  the  head  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  had  reached  Frederick,  and  that  General  Meade  had  been 
put  in  command,  when  the  army  only  reached  that  city  that  same  day,  and 
the  change  of  commanders  only  took  place  that  morning?  Could  he  have 
made  his  way  from  Frederick  to  this  place. — a  distance  of  about  fifty  miles — 
in  six  or  eight  hours  ?  Then  the  fact  of  General  Lee's  official  declaration  fix- 
ing Monday  evening,  the  2gth,  and  Lee's  and  Longstreet's  movements  on 
Tuesday  and  Wednesday,  as  previously  referred  to,  seem  to  be  insuperable 
difficulties  in  accepting  General  Longstreet's  last  statement  as  to  Sunday,  the 
28th.  I  have  presented  both  the  dates,  with  the  reasons  for  accepting  the  first 
given,  leaving  the  reader  to  accept  whichever  he  pleases.  The  fact,  however, 
of  the  commencement  of  the  concentration  is  fixed  beyond  dispute  as  Tues- 
day morning,  June  3oth,  and  this  date  is  not  affected  by  the  adoption  of  either 
Sunday  evening  or  Monday  evening  for  the  scout's  arrival. 


PLAN  OF  THE  UNION  GENERALS.  59 

resolved  to  prevent  its  further  progress  in  that  direction 
by  concentrating  our  army  on  the  east  side  of  the  moun- 
tain." (Annals  of  the  "War,  page  420.) 

IV.  WHAT  WAS  THE  PLAN  OF  THE  COMMANDER  OF  THE 
ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  ? 

During  a  period  of  three  weeks  —  from  June  2nd,  when 
General  Lee  broke  up  his  encampment  about  Fredericks- 
burg, —  to  the  24th,  when  the  main  part  of  his  army 
crossed  the  Potomac  into  Maryland,  the  Confederate  com- 
mander so  maneuvered  his  army  as,  if  possible,  to  outwit 
and  entrap  General  Hooker;  but  in  every  case  he  utterly 
failed.  So  readily  did  the  latter  detect  his  antagonist's 
strategy,  and  so  successfully  did  he  handle  his  forces,  that 
he  not  only  defeated  Lee's  purposes  to  lure  him  into  some 
error,  but  compelled  him  to  cross  the  Potomac  at  Shep- 
herdstown  and  "VVilliamcport  west  of  the  mountain,  instead 
of  at  Poolsville  or  Edward's  Ferry  to  the  east,  as  intended, 
thus  damaging  his  entire  plan  of  campaign  north  of  the 
river  as  he  had  defeated  it  to  the  south  of  it.  Owing 
to  the  severe  handling  which  General  Pleasanton  adminis- 
tered to  the  Confederate  cavalry  at  Beverly  Ford,  Aldie, 
and  Upperville,  it  was  unable  to  perform  the  part  assigned 
it,  and  was  forced  to  cross  the  river  to  the  east  of  the  Fed- 
erals, thus  being  detached  from  its  proper  connection 
with  Lee's  army,  and  compelled  to  make  an  entire  circuit 
of  the  Federal  forces,  only  reaching  the  Confederate  lines 
on  the  evening  of  Thursday,  July  2nd.  General  Stuart's 
proper  course,  and  the  one  he  should  have  taken  — 
at  least  the  one  Lee  expected  him  to  take — had  he  not 
been  forced  to  do  otherwise,  after  Lee's  forced  route  up 
the  Cumberland  Valley,  would  have  been  somewhere  near 


60  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

the  Confederate  right,  either  to  the  west  or  east  of  the 
mountain,  guarding  its  passes,  masking  Lee's  movements, 
protecting  his  communications,  reporting  information  of 
the  Union  forces,  and  harassing  whatever  of  those  forces 
he  might  come  in  contact  with.  All  these  advantages 
which  Lee  expected  of  Stuart  were  lost  to  him  by  the  cir- 
cuitous route  which  the  great  cavalry  commander  was 
compelled  to  take.  Of  this  loss  not  only  General  Lee,  but 
General  Longstreet  and  other  subordinate  officers  have 
greatly  complained.  Lee,  in  his  report  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vania campaign,  says:  "No  report  had  been  received 
(Saturday,  27th  June,)  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  Po- 
tomac, and  the  absence  of  the  cavalry  rendered  it  impossi- 
ble to  obtain  accurate  information."  General  Longstreet 
says:  "The  army  moved  forward  as  a  man  might  walk 
over  strange  ground  with  his  eyes  shut."  Colonel  W.  H. 
Taylor,  of  Lee's  staff,  says:  "On  the  27th  of  June  (Satur- 
day) General  Lee  was  near  Chambersburg,  (his  headquar- 
ters were  in  a  grove  near  the  eastern  suburbs  of  the  town,) 
with  the  first  and  third  corps,  the  second  being  still  in  ad- 
vance, but  within  supporting  distance.  With  the  exception 
of  the  cavalry  the  army  was  well  in  hand.  The  absence 
of  that  indispensable  arm  of  the  service  was  most  seriously 
felt  by  General  Lee.  He  had  directed  General  Stuart  to 
use  his  discretion  as  to  where  and  when  to  cross  the  river 
— that  is,  he  was  to  cross  east  of  the  mountains,  or  retire 
through  the  mountain  passes  into  the  valley  and  cross  in 
the  immediate  rear  of  the  infantry,  as  the  movements  of 
the  enemy  and  his  own  judgment  should  determine;  but 
he  was  expected  to  maintain  communication  with  the  main 
column,  and  especially  directed  to  keep  the  commanding 


PLAN  OF  THE  UNION  GENERALS.  61 

general  informed  of  the  movements  of  the  Federal  army." 
(Annals  of  the  War,  pages  306,  307.) 

It  is  altogether  probable  that  if  Stuart's  cavalry  had 
maintained  communication  with  the  Confederate  com- 
mander, the  great  battle  would  not  have  been  fought  at 
Gettysburg.  The  advance  of  the  Federal  army  would 
have  been  reported,  and  another  field  less  favorable  to  the 
Federals  would  have  been  forced  upon  them.  And  it  is 
further  probable  that  the  departure  from  the  policy  agreed 
upon  before  entering  upon  the  campaign,  namely,  to  take 
a  strong  position  of  its  own  choosing,  and  compel  the  Fed- 
erals to  become  the  attacking  party,  and  in  no  case  to  at- 
tack them  in  any  position  they  might  choose,  was  owing 
to  the  absence  of  the  knowledge  of  the  whereabouts  of 
the  foe,  and  the  strength  of  the  position  he  had  taken, 
which  knowledge  would  have  been  promptly  communi- 
cated had  Stuart  been  within  communicating  distance  of 
his  chief. 

Although  General  Lee  had  been  apprised  on  Monday 
evening,  the  29th,  that  the  Federal  army  was  marching 
northward,  and  that  its  advance  had  reached  Frederick, 
he  was  nevertheless  surprised  to  meet  it  in  force  at  Gettys- 
burg. This  will  appear  in  statements  yet  to  follow.  That 
he  met  this  army  there  in  a  position  of  its  own  choosing, 
and  was  compelled  to  depart  from  the  purpose  he  had 
agreed  to  pursue  before  leaving  Virginia  —  "a  strategical 
offensive  but  tactical  defensive" — was  owing  to  the  excel- 
lent generalship  of  both  Hooker  and  Meade.  Having 
then  advanced  into  the  plain  beyond  the  fastnesses  of  the 
South  Mountain,  and  having  found  unexpectedly  the  foe 
confronting  him,  he  was  no  longer  able  to  order  the  situa- 


62 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


tion  to  his  own  choosing,  but  must  make  the  most  out  of 
that  which  was  thrust  upon  him. 

In  the  emergency  threatening  Lee  when  confronted  by 
the  Federal  army  at  Gettysburg,  the  following  four  alter- 
natives were  presented  to  him,  one  of  which  he  was  com- 
pelled to  choose:  to  retire  into  the  gaps  of  the  South 
Mountain,  and  compel  General  Meade  to  leave  the  posi- 
tion he  had  taken  and  attack  him;  or  wait  steadily  in  the 
position  he  had  taken  to  be  attacked  there;  or  to  maneuver 
so  as  to  dislodge  his  foe  from  the  position  he  occupied  by 
menacing  his  communications  by  the  right  or  left;  or  to 
attack  the  strong  position  the  Federals  had  taken,  in  the 
hope  of  carrying  it  by  main  force.  The  Count  of  Paris, 
in  his  recently  published  work  on  the  "War  of  the  Rebel- 
lion, in  considering  these  alternatives,  says  that  "the  best 
plan  would  undoubtedly  have  been  the  first,  because  by 
pursuing  the  strategic  offensive,  Lee  would  thus  secure  all 
the  advantages  of  the  tactical  defensive.''  Referring  to  these 
four  alternatives,  as  stated  by  the  Count,  with  his  strong 
endorsement  of  the  first  named,  General  Long,  in  the  arti- 
cle previously  referred  to,  says : 

"This  view  of  the  Count  suggests  the  remark  that,  though  he  may  possess  a 
profound  theoretical  knowledge  of  war,  he  lacks  the  practical  experience  that 
teaches  the  correct  application  of  rules  and  principles.  Could  the  French- 
man have  seen  the  actual  field  of  operation  and  have  known  the  circumstances 
that  governed  General  Lee,  he  would  have  probably  taken  a  different  view  of 
his  actions.  *  *  *  * 

•'  I  will  here  add  that  Gettysburg  affords  a  good  example  of  the  difficulties 
to  be  encountered  and  the  uncertainty  of  being  able  to  harmonize  the  various 
elements  of  armies  when  the  field  of  operations  is  extensive.  This  battle 
was  precipitated  by  the  absence  of  information  which  could  only  be  obtained 
by  the  active  cavalry  force.  General  I<ee  had  previously  selected  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Gettysburg  for  his  field  of  battle,  but  the  time  and  position  were 


PLAN  OF  THE  UNION  GENERALS.  63 

to  have  been  of  his  own  selection.  This  could  have  been  easily  effected  had 
not  the  cavalry  been  severed  from  its  proper  place  with  the  army.  *  *  ~* 

"During  the  evening  General  Lee  decided  on  his  plan  of  operations. 
Knowing  the  prostrate  condition  of  two  Federal  corps,  and  being  convinced 
that  General  Meade  could  not  complete  the  concentration  of  his  forces  before 
the  following  afternoon,  he  determined  to  risk  the  fate  of  the  campaign  on 
the  chance  of  an  immediate  battle.  * 

"It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  on  enterin •-  Pennsylvania  without  his  cav- 
alry General  Lee  was  unable  to  accumulate  :  upplies.  In  fact,  the  subsistence 
of  his  army  mainly  depended  on  the  provisions  thnt  could  be  collected  in  the 
vicinity  of  his  line  of  march  by  detachments  of  infantry  mounted  on  artillery 
and  wagon  horses.  Therefore,  if  General  Lee  had  adopted  the  Count's  favor- 
ite plan  of  operation  and  occupied  one  of  the  passes  of  South  Mountain,  he 
would  have  placed  his  army  in  a  trap  that  would  have,  in  the  absence  of  a 
miracle,  resulted  in  its  destruction ;  for  Meade,  with  his  superior  forces,  would 
have  enclosed  him  without  supplies  or  the  means  of  obtaining  them.  Gen- 
eral Lee  would  thus  have  been  reduced  to  the  alternative  of  laying  down  his 
arms  or  of  cutting  his  way  out  with  great  sacrifice  of  life  and  the  loss  of  his 
artillery  and  transportation.  *  *  *  * 

"The  above  objection  is  also  applicable  to  the  Count's  second  plan,  with 
the  addition  that  General  Lee's  line  was  too  much  extended  to  admit  of  a  suc- 
cessful defense  against  General  Meade's  superior  force.  In  answer  to  the 
Count's  third  plan  it  is  only  necessary  to  say  that  the  proximity  of  the  two 
armies  and  the  absence  of  cavalry  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  rendered 
maneuvering  impracticable.  The  fourth,  the  plan  least  approved  of  by  the 
Count,  is  the  only  one  that  admitted  of  the  hope  of  success  and  was  the  one 
adopted  by  General  Lee." 

General  Longstreet  urgently  pressed  upon  Lee  to  move 
around  by  the  left  of  the  Federal  position,  along  the  line 
of  the  Emmittsburg  road;  and  place  his  army  between 
General  Meade  and  Washington,  hoping  by  thus  threaten- 
ing the  Union  general's  left  and  rear  to  force  him  to  leave 
the  position  he  had  taken  and  to  attack  the  Confederates 
in  such,  a  position  as  Lee  himself  might  select.  This  plan, 
though  held  by  General  Longstreet  as  entirely  practicable, 
would  most  likely  have  resulted,  if  undertaken,  in  complete 
failure.  General  Pleasanton  says  of  it:  "As  to  General 


64 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


Lee  maneuvering  to  our  left,  the  supposition  shows  the 
ignorance  existing  of  our  position  and  the  nature  of  the 
country.  I  had  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  one  in  the  rear 
of  our  position,  and  one  on  Lee's  right  flank.  This  cav- 
alry would  have  held  Lee  in  check  in  any  such  movement, 
while  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  Cemetery  Hill  would 
have  swept  down  and  turned  Gettysburg  into  an  Auster- 
litz."  (Annals  of  the  War,  page  457.)  General  Lee  had 
the  four  alternatives  before  him  when  unexpectedly  con- 
fronted by  the  Federal  army,  and  he  chose  the  one  of  a 
direct  assault.  Probably  a  worse  fate  would  have  befallen 
him  had  he  adopted  either  of  the  others. 

On  Thursday,  June  25th,  the  day  after  the  last  of  the 
Confederate  infantry  had  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Mary- 
land, the  Federal  army  also  crossed  at  Edward's  Ferry, 
and  by  Sunday,  the  28th,  it  lay  between  Harper's  Ferry 
and  Frederick  City,  in  a  position  to  protect  Baltimore 
and  Washington  from  any  flank  movement  by  Lee,  to 
fall  upon  his  communications,  or  to  march  to  any  point 
where  he  might  show  himself.  The  strategy  of  General 
Hooker  was  as  faultless  as  it  was  successful,  but  he  was 
not  destined  to  fight  the  great  battle  so  near  at  hand.  To 
another  that  honor  was  accorded,  as  will  be  shown  here- 
after in  its  appropriate  place. 

Having  given  the  strength,  position,  purposes,  and  tac- 
tics of  the  two  great  opposing  armies,  I  will  now  proceed 
to  give  the  reader  a  view  of  the  movements  and  occur- 
rences of  each  successive  day  until  the  final  conflict  upon 
the  decisive  field  of  Gettysburg.  And  that  these  import- 
ant events  may  be  given  in  their  proper  connection,  and 
in  comparison  with  other  events  transpiring  elsewhere 


SUMMARY.  65 

within  the  lines  of  the  two  great  armies,  I  will  detail  the 
events  of  each  day  in  daily  summaries.  Let  the  reader 
follow  me  closely  through  these  details  and  mark  well 
each  occurrence  and  movement,  with  Harrisburg  as  Lee's 
objective  up  to  the  night  of  Monday,  June  29th,  and  after 
that  night,  some  position  about  Cashtown,  east  of  the 
South  Mountain,  and  he  will  be  amazed  at  the  genius  and 
skill  displayed  by  the  one  man  who  planned  and  directed 
and  controlled  the  whole.  I  will  also  detail  the  move- 
ments of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  that  the  equal  sagacity 
and  skill  of  its  commander  may  also  be  seen. 

5 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE     ARMIES     IN     MOTION  — ROUT      OP     GENERAL     MILROY    AT 

WINCHESTER. 

BEFORE  proceeding  to  detail  the  movements  of  the 
\^  two  enreat  contending  armies,  it  will  be  well  to  in- 

{^ *v  v^ 

"2.X9   form  the  reader  where  they  were  encamped  at  the 

^y 

\  time  the  movement  northward  began.  The  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  was  in  camp  on  the  south  bank  of 
the  Rappahannock  River,  about  the  city  of  Fredericks- 
burg,  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  wTas  posted  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  same  river,  among  the  Stafford  hills, 
and  opposite  to  that  city.  Its  various  corps  and  divisions 
were  placed  in  the  following  order:  The  First  Corps,  un- 
der General  Reynolds,  was  encamped  in  the  vicinity  of 
White  Oak  Church;  the  Second  (Couch's,  afterward  Han- 
cock's,) near  Falmouth;  the  Third  (Birney's,  afterward 
Sickles',)  at  Boscobel,  near  Falmouth;  the  Fifth  (Meade's, 
afterward  Sykes',)  in  the  vicinity  of  Banks',  United  States, 
and  adjacent  fords  on  the  Rappahannock;  the  Sixth  (Sedg- 
wick's)  near  White  Oak  Church,  with  the  Second  Division 
(Howe's)  thrown  forward  to  Franklin's  Crossing,  a  little  be- 
low Fredericksburg,  near  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run;  the 
Eleventh  (Howard's)  near  Brooke's  Station,  on  the  Aquia 
Creek  Railroad;  and  the  Twelfth  (Slocum's)  near  Stafford 
Court  House  and  Aquia  Landing.  The  Cavalry  Corps,  un- 
der General  Pleasauton,  had  two  divisions  in  the  vicinity 

66 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE   MOVEMENT.  67 

of  Warrenton  Junction,  and  one  division  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Brooke's  Station.  Such  was  the  disposition  of 
'General  Hooker's  army  on  June  5th,  and  such,  with  a  few 
unimportant  changes  in  some  divisions  and  brigades,  it 
remained  up  to  J  une  llth,  when  the  movement  northward 
began.* 

During  the  latter  part  of  May  General  Hooker  learned 
from  sources  which  he  deemed  reliable  that  an  invasion  of 
the  Xorth  was  under  contemplation.  Indeed  such  was  the 
confidence  of  the  Confederate  leaders  in  the  success  of  the 
movement  that  they  did  not  try  to  conceal  their  purpose. 
For  days,  and  even  weeks,  before  it  began  some  of  the 
leading  papers  in  the  South  discussed  the  question  of  an 
invasion,  the  comparative  advantages  of  the  different  routes 
by  which  their  army  might  reach  its  destination,  and  the 
great  and  glorious  results  they  expected  to  secure.  At 
length  the  evidences  of  the  intention  of  the  enemy  became 
so  convincing  to  the  Federal  commander  that,  on  May 
28th,  he  wrote  to  the  President  that  an  invasion  was  in- 
evitable, and  measures  to  meet  it  were  proposed.  Finally 
on  the  2nd  of  June  the  withdrawal  of  the  Confederates 
from  their  lines  about  Fredericksburg,  and  their  concen- 
tration about  Culpeper  Court  House,  upon  General 
Hooker's  right,  was  begun.  On  that  day  Swell's  corps, 

-'For  the  information  relating  to  the  encampments  of  the  various  corps  of 
the  Federal  army  prior  to  the  movement  northward,  as  also  the  daily  move- 
ments and  places  of  encampment  of  the  same  up  to  the  time  of  the  great 
collision  at  Gettysburg  and  afterward  until  they  re -crossed  the  Potomac  in 
pursuit  of  the  discomfited  and  retreating  foe,  I  am  indebted  to  a  pamphlet 
kindly  furnished  me  from  the  Adjutant -General's  office,  War  Department, 
Washington,  D.  C.,  entitled  "'Itinerary  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in 
the  Gettysburg  Campaign,  June  and  July,  fS6j,  compiled  tinder  the  juris 
di5lion  of  Brigadier-General  Richard  C.  Drum,  Adjutant -General,  U.  S. 
Army,  by  Joseph  W.  Kirkley,  of  the  Adjutant -General's  office." 


68  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

preceded  by  the  cavalry,  left  its  encampment  and  moved 
to  the  place  stated.  On  the  following  day,  June  3d,  Long- 
street's  corps,  accompanied  by  General  Lee,  followed,  while 
Hill  was  left  to  observe  the  movements  of  General  Hooker. 
By  the  8th  of  June  the  whole  of  the  Confederate  army, 
with  the  exception  of  the  last  named  corps,  was  concen- 
trated about  Culpeper  Court  House.  The  departure  of 
these  troops  was  soon  detected  by  the  Union  commander, 
who  promptly  directed  General  Sedgwick  to  cross  the  river 
by  his  bridges  three  miles  below  Fredericksburg,  and  as- 
certain by  a  reconnoissance  if  the  main  body  of  the  enemy 
had  not  gone.  On  the  5th  of  June  Howe's  division  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  was  sent  across  the  river,  and  the  divisions  of 
Wright  and  Newton  —  the  First  and  Third — were  moved 
from  their  encampment  at  White  Oak  Church  and  placed 
upon  the  north  bank  ready  to  support  him.  Upon  the 
appearance  of  Howe  upon  the  south  bank  of  the  river, 
Hill's  corps  left  their  intrenchments  to  meet  him.  On  the 
7th,  Wright's  division  relieved  Howe,  who  returned  to  the 
north  bank.  Some  desultory  skirmishing  took  place  be- 
tween these  troops  and  Hill's  men,  but  Sedgwick  reported, 
as  his  opinion,  that  the  greater  part  of  the  Confederate 
force  still  held  their  old  position.  General  Hooker,  not 
satisfied  with  this  statement,  determined  to  ascertain  the 
enemy's  whereabouts  more  fully,  and  on  June  7th  ordered 
General  Pleasanton  to  cross  the  river  with  all  his  available 
cavalry  and  make  a  reconnoissance  toward  Culpeper  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  the  Confederates 
were  concentrating  there.  In  obedience  to  this  order  the 
cavalry  corps  consisting  of  the  First  Division  under  Gen- 
eral Buford,  the  Second  under  General  Duffie,  the  Third 


BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FORD.  69 

under  General  D.  McM.  Gregg,  and  the  Regular  Reserve 
Brigade,  supported  by  detachments  of  infantry  under 
Generals  Adelbert  Ames  and  Daniel  A.  Russell,  moved 
to  Kelly's  and  Beverly  fords,  preparatory  to  crossing  the 
Rappahannock  on  the  following  day. 

On  the  same  day  that  the  Federal  cavalry  were  prepar- 
ing for  the  reconnoisance  south  of  the  Rappahannock,— 
Monday,  June  8th,  —  General  Lee  reviewed  his  cavalry, 
preparatory  to  their  expected  departure  the  next  day  upon 
n  raid  northward  for  the  purpose  of  interposing  between 
Hooker  and  Washington,  and  destroying  the  railroad  to 
Alexandria,  thereby  delaying  the  Federal  army  in  its  move- 
ments for  the  relief  of  the  Capital,  while  Lee  himself  was 
to  move  by  rapid  inarches  along  the  eastern  base  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  cross  the  Potomac  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Poolsville  and  the  Monocacy,  and  come  down  upon  it 
from  the  north.  These  purposes  were  ascertained  from 
papers  captured  from  General  Stuart's  head  -  quarters  the 
next  day.  After  the  review  of  the  Confederate  cavalry 
by  Lee,  the  four  batteries  of  Jones'  cavalry  brigade  moved 
down  toward  the  river  near  Beverly  Ford  to  cover  the 
proposed  crossing.  The  remainder  of  Stuart's  command 
was  not  posted  within  easy  supporting  distance  of  these 
batteries.  So  unsuspicious  were  the  Confederates  of  the 
Federal  approach  that  they  did  not  seem  to  use  the  usual 
precautions  against  a  surprise,  for  a  thin  line  of  pickets 
-only  lay  between  these  batteries  and  the  river.  During 
that  night  Pleasanton's  cavalry,  backed  by  the  two  brig- 
ades of  infantry,  stole  down  to  the  fords  and  lay  there 
during  the  night  without  fires,  ready  at  the  first  appear- 
ance of  day  to  cross.  Buford's  cavalry  and  Ames'  brigade 


70  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

of  infantry  lay  near  Beverly  Ford,  and  Duffle's  and 
Gregg's,  supported  by  Russel's  infantry,  lay  opposite 
Kelly's  Ford.  In  the  early  morning  of  Tuesday,  June  9th, 
under  cover  of  a  heavy  fog,  which  completely  shrouded 
his  movements,  Pleasanton  crossed  at  the  two  fords 
named.  These  fords  are  about  eight  miles  apart,  and 
Brandy  Station,  which  is  about  three  miles  from  the  river 
and  nearly  in  the  apex  of  the  triangle,  and  a  good  position 
from  which  to  operate  on  Culpeper  in  case  it  became 
necessary  to  move  in  that  direction,  was  chosen  as  the 
point  of  concentration  of  the  two  forces.  To  the  surprise 
of  the  Federal  commander  he  encountered  no  Confederate 
pickets  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  and  after  crossing- 
unobserved  the  enemy  were  met,  and  were  taken  com- 
pletely by  surprise.  Soon  the  conflict  became  general  and 
desperate,  and  the  Confederates  were  driven  back.  Gen- 
eral Stuart's  headquarters  were  not  more  than  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  from  the  ford,  and  were  soon  captured  with  a 
copy  of  Lee's  orders,  and  other  important  papers,  which 
revealed  the  Confederate  plans.*  After  the  battle  had 
raged  for  several  hours,  during  which  the  advantages 
were  clearly  on  the  side  of  the  Federals,  Confederate- 
infantry  began  to  arrive  by  hurried  trains  from  Culpeper,. 
when  General  Pleasanton,  having  fully  accomplished 
all  he  was  expected  to,  and  not  deeming  it  proper  to 

*The  foregoing  is  General  Pleasanton's  account  of  the  capture  of  General 
Stuart's  headquarters,  and  is  found  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  449.  Major 
H.  B.  McClellan,  of  the  Confederate  service,  says  on  page  396  of  the  same 
book:  "No  serious  loss  occurred  save  that  Major  Beckham's  desk,  in  which 
he  had  placed  the  orders  to  march  received  by  him  the  previous  night,  was 
jostled  out  of  the  wagon  in  its  hasty  retreat,  and  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands, 
thus  revealing  authoritatively  part  of  the  information  which  he  had  come  to 
obtain." 


BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FORD.  71 

tarry  longer  and  fight  nearly  the  whole  of  Lee's  army, 
withdrew  his  forces  and  returned  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  river  at  Rappahannock  Station  and  Beverly  Ford. 
On  the  following  day  the  cavalry  took  position  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Warrenton  Junction.  Its  infantry  sup- 
ports of  the  day  previous  rejoined  their  respective  com- 
mands. 

The  battle  of  Beverly  Ford,  or  the  battle  of  Fleetwood, 
or  Brandy  Station,  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  is  claimed 
by  the  Confederates  as  a  victory  for  them,  because  the 
Federals  withdrew  and  left  the  field  to  them.  General 
Lee  says  of  this  engagement :  "  On  the  9th,  a  large  force 
of  Federal  cavalry,  strongly  supported  by  infantry,  crossed 
the  Rappahannock  at  Beverly's  Ford,  and  attacked  Gen- 
eral Stuart.  A  severe  engagement  ensued,  continuing  from 
early  in  the  morning  until  late  in  the  afternoon,  when  the 
enemy  was  forced  to  recross  the  river  with  heavy  loss, 
leaving  four  hundred  prisoners,  three  pieces  of  artillery, 
and  several  colors  in  our  hands."  General  Longstreet,  in 
referring  to  this  engagement,  also  claims  victory  for  the 
Confederates,  and  says:  "The  failure  of  General  Lee  to 
follow  up  his  advantage  by  pouring  the  heavy  force  con- 
centrated at  Culpeper  Court -House  upon  this  detachment 
of  Federals,  confirmed  my  convictions  that  he  (Lee)  had 
determined  to  make  a  defensive  battle,  and  would  not 
allow  any  casual  advantage  to  precipitate  a  general  engage- 
ment. If  he  had  any  idea  of  abandoning  the  original  plan 
of  a  tactical  defensive,  then,  in  my  judgment,  was  the  time 
to  have  done  so."  (Annals  of  the  War,  page  418.)  Does 
General  Longstreet  suppose  that  in  his  zeal  to  establish 
his  favorite  idea  of  a  "strategical  offensive  but  tactical 


72  THE    GREAT  INVASION. 

» 

defensive,"  the  departure  from  which  by  Lee  at  Gettys- 
burg, as  he  alleges,  caused  their  defeat, — he  can  cover  the 
fact  that  in  this  very  battle  that  plan  was  departed  from? 
Did  not  Lee  put  forth  every  possible  effort  to  crush  the 
Federal  force  across  the  river  by  hurrying  forward  troops 
from  Culpeper  as  fast  as  the  trains  at  his  disposal  could 
carry  them?  Or  did  he  suppose  that  the  ten  or  twelve 
thousand  men,  after  they  had  succeeded  in  all  that  they 
had  been  sent  to  accomplish,  would  quietly  sit  down  and 
wait  for  the  whole  of  Lee's  infantry  to  fall  upon  them? 
Or,  perhaps,  he  meant  that  after  the  withdrawal  of  these 
men,  Lee  should  have  pursued  them,  crossing  with  his 
whole  army  to  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  and  fallen  upon 
Hooker  in  his  impregnable  works.  General  Hooker  would 
have  liked  nothing  better  than  this,  and  General  Lee  was 
too  shrewd  to  attempt  such  folly. 

That  Lee  did  hurry  forward  infantry  in  support  of  his 
cavalry  in  this  fight  is  clear  from  the  following.  In  an 
article  referred  to  in  the  previous  chapter,  General  Long 
says:  "Early  in  the  morning  of  the  9th,  Pleasanton's 
cavalry  crossed  the  Rappahaimock  and  attacked  Stuart 
in  his  position  south  of  that  river.  A  fierce  engagement 
ensued  in  which  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  roughly 
handled,  but  finally  with  the  assistance  of  Rodes'  division 
of  infantry  the  Federals  were  repulsed  and  forced  to  recross 
the  Rappahaimock."  Other  writers  say  that  while  the 
battle  was  in  progress  the  running  of  the  trains  could  be 
heard  bringing  infantry  from  Culpeper.  * 

In  determining  the  question  as  to  whether  the  Federals 
or  Confederates  were  victorious  at.  the  battle  of  Beverly 

*See  Annals  of  the  War,  page  450. 


BATTLE  OF  BEVERLY  FORD.  73 

Ford,  or  Brandy  Station,  or  whatever  name  it  may  be 
called,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  General  Pleasan- 
ton's  crossing  to  the  south  side  of  the  Rappahannock  was 
simply  a  reconnoissance  in  force  to  gain  important  inform- 
ation. His  instructions  were  to  proceed  in  the  direction 
of  Culpeper  Court  -  House,  attack  the  enemy,  if  necessary, 
and  force  him  to  display  his  infantry  in  case  any  were 
there,  and  not  to  return  without  positive  information  of 
Lee's  whereabouts.  Now  did  he  accomplish  any  or  all  of 
these  results;  or  was  he  prevented  by  the  enemy?  If  he 
did  attain  the  object  he  went  for,  then  he  undoubtedly  had 
all  the  advantages  he  expected  and  the  victory  was  his. 
If  he  was  forced  to  retire  before  his  object  was  gained,  or 
if  he  went  across  the  river  to  defeat  the  whole  Confederate 
army,  or  whatever  part  of  it  might  be  brought  against 
Trim,  arid  hold  the  position  he  gained,  then  his  purposes 
Were  frustrated  and  victory  was  with  the  enemy.  That  he 
did  succeed  in  every  object  he  sought  to  accomplish  in  the 
reconnoissance,  is  undeniable.  The  victory,  then,  was  his. 
General  Pleasanton,  in  summing  up  the  results  gained  by 
his  reconnoissance,  states  them  thus:  First,  the  fact  was 
•established  that  Lee  was  at  Culpeper  Court -House  in 
force;  second,  that  he  intended  to  invade  the  North;  third, 
that  he  was  forced  to  change  the  direction  of  his  march 
toward  the  Shenandoah  Valley  instead  of  attempting  to 
move  along  the  eastern  base  of  the  Blue  E-idge  and  cross 
the  Potomac  near  "Washington,  thereby  compelling  him  to 
operate  on  an  exterior  instead  of  an  interior  line;  fourth, 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  enabled  to  take  the  initia- 
tive, based  upon  the  knowledge  they  had  gained  of  Lee's 
intentions;  and  fifth,  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  so  much 


74  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

crippled  by  the  severe  handling  it  received  that  it  could 
not  carry  out  the  plan  assigned  to  it.  These  results  were 
undoubtedly  secured,  and  if  they  were  not  fully  up  to  the 
expectations  of  both  Generals  Hooker  and  Pleasanton,. 
then,  and  then  only, the  Confederates  may  have  some  show 
of  right  in  claiming  the  victory  in  the  great  cavalry 
engagement  of  Beverly  Ford.  * 

Possessed  of  positive  information  of  Lee's  plans  and 
purposes,  as  results  of  the  reconnoissance  by  General 
Pleasanton,  and  the  capture  of  important  papers  in  Stuart's- 
headquarters,  it  became  imperative  upon  the  Federal  com- 
mander to  take  immediate  measures  to  meet  them.  His- 
army  was  accordingly  put  in  motion,  and  day  after  day 
the  various  corps  and  divisions  were  moved  from  place  to 
place  as  the  exigencies  demanded.  And  that  the  splendid 
strategy  of  General  Hooker  may  be  seen,  I  will  place  upon, 
record  here  for  the  reader's  guidance,  the  movements  each 
day  made,  as  shown  by  the  statement  furnished  from  the 
Adjutant -General's  office  referred  to  in  the  opening  of  this- 
chapter  : 

Wednesday,  June  10.  In  order  to  prevent  the  threatened 
crossing  of  the  Rappahannock  by  General  Stuart,  and  hi& 

*The  number  of  men  on  each  side  in  the  battle  of  Brandy  Station  was  about 
as  follows :  General  Pleasanton  claims  that  the  Confederates  had  about  twelve 
thousand  cavalry  and  twelve  guns.  Major  McClellan,  of  Stuart's  staff,  puts- 
the  number  at  nine  thousand,  three  hundred  and  thirty-five  on  the  roll,  and 
twenty  guns.  He  also  claims  that  nearly  three  thousand  of  these  were  absent 
and  not  in  the  fight.  The  Union  cavalry,  according  to  General  Gregg, 
amounted  to  about  nine  thousand  men  and  six  batteries.  One  third  of  this 
force  was  detached  in  the  direction  of  Stevensburg,  and  their  operations 
had  but  little  effect  on  the  general  result.  The  batteries  were  not  brought 
forward  in  time  to  be  of  much  service,  and  the  infanty  were  only  used  to 
keep  open  communications  with  the  river.  The  numbers  on  each  side,  it 
will  be  seen,  were  about  equal.  The  arrival  of  Rodes'  infantry,  however, 
gave  the  preponderance  eventually  to  the  Confederates. 


THE    CONFEDERATE    ROUTE.  7£ 

raid  northward,  which  the  papers  captured  the  day  before 
showed  was  to  have  begun  this  day,  the  cavalry  corps  took 
a  position  in  the  neighborhood  of  Warrenton  Junction, 
guarding  the  fords  of  the  river,  and  remained  there  until 
Monday,  June  15th.  Stuart,  however,  made  no  attempt 
to  carry  out  the  part  assigned  him,  and  Lee's  purpose  to- 
make  an  effort  to  turn  Hooker's  right  by  rapid  move- 
ments along  the  eastern  base  of  the  mountain  and  inter- 
pose between  him  and  Washington  was  also  abandoned 
and  the  valley  route  was  taken.  This  route,  while  not 
the  one  chosen  by  the  Confederate  commander,  had  some 
advantages  over  the  other.  The  mountain  wall,  which 
intervened  between  the  two  armies,  was  a  sure  defense 
against  any  attack  the  Federals  might  make,  for  its  gaps 
could  easily  have  been  fortified  and  held  against  any 
possible  force.  It  was  evidently  expected  and  desired  by 
Lee  that  Hooker  would  attempt  to  assail  him  by  one  of 
these  passes,  in  which  event  one  corps  could  have  held 
him  in  check,  while  the  other  two  captured  Washington.* 
General  Long,  in  speaking  of  this  route  taken  by  the 
Confederate  army,  says  that  the  purpose  was  to  "expel 
from  that  section  (the  valley)  a  considerable  Federal  force 
and  to  create  an  impression  of  a  flank  movement,  with 
the  view  of  interrupting  Hooker's  communications."  He 
also  says  that  Lee  "by  a  series  of  bold,  strategic  move- 
ments (reaching  the  valley  with  his  army,)  removed  the 
enemy  from  his  path  and  accomplished  the  most  difficult 
step  in  his  plan  of  operations  without  opposition."  Lee 
simply  passed  through  a  gap  of  the  mountain  and  pro- 
ceeded northward  by  way  of  the  valley.  Does  it  not  seem 

*  General  Doubleday's  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,  page  88. 


76  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

that  instead  of  removing  the  enemy  from 'his  path,  he 
removed  himself  from  the  enemy?  As  for  the  danger  and 
difficulty  of  the  movement,  it  must  be  confessed  that  we 
fail  to  perceive  them.  And  if,  in  his  taking  the  valley 
route,  crossing  the  Potomac  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and 
marching  up  the  Cumberland  Valley,  Lee  was  executing 
the  plans  he  had  originally  determined  upon,  then  his 
strategy  was  successful ;  but  if  in  this  course  he  departed 
from  his  original  plans  because  of  his  enemy's  possessing 
his  secrets,  and  taking  measures  to  defeat  them,  then  his 
strategy  was  not  successful,  and  General  Long's  effort  to 
divert  attention  from  this  fact  is  more  ingenious  than 
commendable. 

Compelled  to  abandon  the  route  originally  chosen  by 
the  eastern  base  of  the  mountain,  General  Lee,  on  this  day 
(Wednesday,  June  10th,)  put  his  army  in  motion,  and 
General  Ewell  with  his  corps  left  Culpeper  Court  -  House, 
passing  through  Games'  Cross  Roads,  and  halted  near 
Flint  Hill  on  his  way  to  Chester  Gap  and  Front  Royal. 

Thursday,  June  11.  Learning  of  the  withdrawal  of 
Swell's  corps  from  Culpeper,  General  Hooker,  on  this 
day,  ordered  the  Third  Corps  to  leave  its  encampment  at 
Boscobel,  near  Falmouth,  and  march  to  Hartwood  Church, 
to  prevent  any  crossing  in  that  vicinity,  and  confine  the 
enemy  to  the  valley  route. 

Friday,  June  12.  The  First  Corps  marched  from  its 
encampment  at  Fitzlmgh's  plantation  and  White  Oak 
Church  to  Deep  Run;  the  Third  Corps  went  from  Hart- 
wood  Church,  which  it  had  reached  the  previous  evening, 
to  Bealeton,  and  with  the  Third  division  under  General 

Humphreys    advanced    to   the   Rappahannock;    and   the 

L 


THE    FEDERAL    ROUTE.  77 

Eleventh  Corps,  from  the  vicinity  of  Brooke's  Station, 
marched  to  Ilartwoocl  Church,  from  which  the'  Third 
Corps  had  departed  that  morning.  The  positions  occu- 
pied by  these  three  corps,  as  will  be  seen  by  a  glance  at 
the  map,  were  intended  to  prevent  Lee  from  crossing  the 
river  east  of  the  mountain,  compelling  him  to  pa.ss  into 
the  valley. 

Saturday,  Jane  13.  The  First  Corps  marched  from  Deep 
Run  to  Bealeton,  uniting  there  with  the  Third,  which  had 
reached  that  place  the  evening  previous;  the  Fifth  Corps 
left  its  encampment  in  the  vicinity  of  Banks'  Ford  and 
marched  by  Grove  Church  toward  Morrisville;  Wright's 
and  Newton's  divisions  (first  and  third)  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
marched  from  Franklin's  Crossing  to  Potomac  Creek;  the 
Eleventh  Corps  marched  from  Hartwood  Church,  where  it 
had  remained  over  night,  to  Catlett's  Station;  and  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  which  up  to  that  time  had  remained  in  its 
encampment  near  Stafford  Court  House  and  Aquia  Land- 
ing, started  en  route  to  Dumfries.  The  Artillery  Reserve 
moved  from  near  Falmouth  to  Stafford  Court  House. 

General  Hill,  who  had  been  left  at  Fredericksburg  to 
watch  the  Federals,  as  soon  as  he*  saw  them  leave  their 
encampment  and  march  northward,  also  left  his  position 
and  proceeded  to  Culpeper  Court  House. 

There  appears  to  be  some  discrepancy  in  the  statements 
in  regard  to  the  precise  time  when  Longstreet  and  Hill 
left  Culpeper.  General  Longstreet,  on  page  418  of  An- 
nals of  the  War,  says:  "General  A.  P.  Hill  having  left 
Fredericksburg  as  soon  as  the  enemy  retired  from  his 
front,  was  sent  to  follow  Ewell,  who  had  marched  up  the 
valley  and  cleaned  it  out  of  the  Federals.  My  corps  left 


78  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

Culpeper  on  the  15th,  and  with  a  view  of  covering  the 
march  of  Hill  and  Evvell  through  the  valley,  moved  along 
the  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  occupied  Snicker's  and 
Ashby's  gaps,  and  the  line  of  the  Blue  Ridge."  General 
Long  differs  from  Longstreet,  as  will  be  seen  in  his  state- 
ment, which  is  as  follows:  "Hill,  as  soon  as  the  enemy 
tlisappeared  from  his  front,  withdrew  from  Fredericksburg 
and  proceeded  to  close  upo.i  the  main  body  of  the  army. 
On  the  15th,  Longstreet  was  put.  in  motion  for  the  valley, 
•and  Hill  was  directed  to  follow  a  day  later."  Whether  or 
not  Hill  preceded  Longstreet  is  not  material,  but  it  would 
seem  that  from  the  route  the  latter  took,  and  the  duty 
assigned  him  of  covering  the  other  two  corps  in  the  valley, 
he  must  have  been  the  last  to  leave  Culpeper.  At  all 
•events,  by  the  16th,  both  of  these  corps  had  left — -Hill 
following  Ewell  into  the  valley,  and  Longstreet  moving 
northward  along  the  eastern  base  of  the  mountain. 

Information  of  the  purpose  of  General  Lee  to'  invade 
the  i^orth,as  revealed  by  the  papers  captured  from  General 
Stuart's  head  -  quarters,  as  well  as  the  fact  of  the  depart- 
ure of  Swell's  Corps  from  Culpeper  for  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  was  promptly  communicated  to  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  and  the  necessary  preparations  to  meet  the 
emergency  were  discussed.  One  of  the  first  of  the  Federal 
posts  that  would  most  likely  be  assailed  by  the  advancing 
foe,  was  Winchester,  in  the  valley  of  Virginia.  At  that 
place  General  Milroy  was  stationed  with  about  ten  thou- 
sand men,  of  whom  about  seven  thousand  only  were 
effective.  These  were  not  enough  to  insure  safety  in  the 
threatened  advance  of  Lee's  entire  army,  yet  too  many  to 
lose.  The  exposed  condition  of  these  men  was  foreseen, 


MOVEMENTS    ABOUT    WINCHESTER.  79 

and  it  was  deemed  best  to  withdraw  the  military  stores 
and  ammunition  from  Winchester,  and  hold  the  place 
merely  as  a  look-out,  to  give  warning  of  the  enemy's 
approach.  Accordingly  on  the  llth,  probably  before  the 
authorities  at  Washington  knew  that  Swell's  corps  had 
left  Culpeper  for  the  valley,  General  Milroy  received 
orders  through  General  Schenck,  his  department  com- 
mander, whose  head  -  quarters  were  at  Baltimore,  to  send 
his  armament  and  supplies  to  Harper's  Ferry.  General 
Milroy,  informed  only  of  the  expected  raid  by  Stuart,  and 
ignorant  of  the  approach  of  the  Confederate  army,  remon- 
strated against  the  withdrawal,  declaring  that  he  could 
hold  the  place  against  any  force  that  might  come  against 
him.  In  reply  to  this  remonstrance  General  Schenck  tele- 
graphed him  that  he  might  remain,  but  must  be  in  readi- 
ness to  fall  back  whenever  circumstances  made  it  necessary. 
Milroy  replied  to  this  that  he  could  be  ready  to  move  in 
six  hours.  General  Milroy  then  sent  a  brigade  under 
Colonel  A.  T.  McReynolds  out  upon  his  right  to  Berry  ville, 
to  observe  the  adjacent  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the 
fords  of  the  Shenandoah  river;  at  the  same  time  his  cavalry 
scouts  patrolled  the  valley  as  far  as  Front  Royal  and  Stras- 
burg.  On  Friday  the  12th,  he  sent  out  a  strong  reconnois- 
sance  on  each  road  to  ascertain  if  the  enemy  were  in 
sight.  That  on  the  Strasburg  road  went  nearly  to  Middle- 
town,  where  its  troopers  decoyed  a  Confederate  cavalry 
patrol  into  an  ambush,  and  routed  it  with  a  loss  of  fifty 
killed  and  wounded,  and  thirty -seven  prisoners.  Colonel 
Shawl  who  was  in  command  of  this  reconnoitering  party, 
returned  to  Winchester  and  reported  no  force  on  the  road 
Avhich  had  not  been  there  for  several  months.  On  the 


80  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

Front  Royal  road  the  Twelfth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
Lieutenant  -  Colonel  Moss  commanding,  with  about  four 
hundred  men,  went  only  to  Cedarville,  twelve  miles  dis- 
tant, and  returned,  reporting  that  they  had  been  stopped 
by  a  large  Rebel  force.  This  account  General  Milroy  re- 
fused to  credit,  insisting  that  they  had  been  too  easily 
frightened,  and  that  if  any  such  force  could  be  there,  he 
should  have  heard  of  its  approach  from  either  General 
Hooker,  Halleck,  or  Schenck.  He  could  not  believe  that 
an  entire  Confederate  corps  was  near  him,  for  he  supposed 
Lee's  army  was  still  at  Fredericksburg.  His  superiors  had 
failed  to  inform  him,  as  they  should  have  done  by  tele- 
graph, that  a  large  part  of  it  had  moved  to  Culpeper. 
And  he  further  supposed,  that  if  Lee  had  left  Hooker's 
front  at  Fredericksburg,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would 
have  followed  and  he  would  have  received  full  information 
thereof.  Not  entirely  oblivious  of  his  danger  he  tele- 
graphed to  General  Schenck  late  that  night  for  specific 
orders,  whether  to  hold  on  to  his  post  or  to  retreat  to 
Harper's  Ferry,  stating  that  there  appeared  to  be  a  consid- 
erable force  in  front  of  him.  As  the  enemy  soon  after  cut 
the  wires,  he  received  no  reply  to  his  message.*  Upon 
the  following  morning,  (Saturday,  13th,)  his  patrols  on 
the  Front  Royal  road  reported  the  enemy  advancing  in 
force;  whereupon  he  signaled  Colonel  McReynolds  to 
leave  Berryville  and  rejoin  him,  while  he  sent  out  a  consid- 
erable force  to  learn  what  was  impending.  These  had  not 
far  to  go,  for  Colonel  Ely,  on  the  Front  Royal  road,  was 
stopped  barely  a  mile  from  Winchester  by  a  Confederate 

*  For  many  of  the  details  of  the  affair  at  Winchester,  I  am  indebted  to  Mr. 
Greeley's  history,  and  to  General  Doubleday's  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettys- 
burg." 


MILROY'S  ROUT  AT  WINCHESTER.  81 

battery,  when  he  fell  back  after  a  slight  skirmish.  Gen- 
eral Elliott,  on  the  Strasburg  road,  advanced  a  little 
further,  and  was  halted  by  observing  the  enemy  in  force 
on  his  left;  that  is,  on  the  Front  Royal  road.  Here  some 
cannon  balls  were  exchanged,  when  the  Union  forces  fell 
back  to  Apple  -  Pie  Ridge,  next  to  the  city.  Skirmishing 
continued  throughout  the  balance  of  the  day  until  dark, 
when  a  prisoner  was  taken  who  rather  astonished  General 
Milroy  by  the  information  that  he  belonged  to  Swell's — 
formerly  Stonewrall  Jackson's  —  corps. 

On  this  same  day  (Saturday,  13th)  "  General  Ewell,  who 
had  left  Culpeper  on  "Wednesday,  June  10th,  marched 
with  Early's  and  Johnson's  divisions  directly  upon  Win- 
chester, while  he  sent  his  remaining  division,  Rodes',  to 
Berry ville.  Owing  to  the  timely  warning  Colonel  McRey- 
nolds  had  received,  his  brigade  had  gotten  off  in  time,  his 
rear  being  covered  by  Alexander's  battery  and  the  Sixth 
Maryland  cavalry.  These  detained  the  enemy  two  hours, 
and  then  caught  up  with  the  main  body.  Jenkins'  cavalry 
came  upon  the  retreating  force  at  Opequan  Creek,  where 
he  made  an  attack,  which  was  promptly  repulsed  by  the 
artillery  with  canister.  After  this  there  was  no  further 
molestation,  and  McReynolds'  command  reached  Win- 
chester at  10 : 00  P.  M.  after  a  march  of  thirty  miles. 
Rodes'  division,  after  taking  Berryville,  kept  on  toward 
Martiusburg,  and  bivouacked  at  a  place  called  Summit 
Point."  —  Doubleday. 

General  Milroy's  course  obviously  should  have  been  to 
fall  back  to  Harper's  Ferry  at  once,  when  he  found  him- 
self so  pressed  by  the  enemy.  But  he  was  confronted  by 
this  difficulty:  McReynolds'  brigade,  which  had  ju&t 

6 


82  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

arrived,  was  so  much  exhausted  by  its  long  march  of  that 
day  that  it  could  go  no  further  that  night.  To  move  with- 
out it  would  be  to  sacrifice  it.  This  Milroy  was  unwilling 
to  do.  Besides,  he  still  hoped  that  Hooker's  army  was 
following  up  Lee,  and  would  come  to  his  relief. 

Sunday,  June  14.  On  this  day  General  Hooker  moved 
his  head  -  quarters  from  Falmouth,  and  started  northward, 
encamping  that  night  at  Dumfries.  General  Reynolds 
was  put  in  command  of  the  left  wing  of  the  army,  which 
consisted  of  the  First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  corps.  Gen- 
eral Hooker  himself  accompanied  the  right  wing,  which 
consisted  of  the  Second,  Fifth,  Sixth,  and  Twelfth  corps. 
The  movements  this  day  were  as  follows:  the  First  and 
Third  corps  marched  from  Bealeton  to  Manassas  Junction ; 
the  Fifth  Corps  arrived  at  Morrisville  and  proceeded 
thence  via  Bristersburg  to  Catlett's  Station;  "Wright's 
(first)  and  Newton's  (third)  divisions  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
moved  from  Potomac  Creek  to  Stafford  Court -House; 
the  Eleventh  Corps  from  Catlett's  Station  to  Manassas 
Junction,  and  thence  toward  Centreville;  the  Twelfth 
Corps  reached  Dumfries,  and  the  Artillery  Reserve  moved 
from  Stafford  Court -House  to  "Wolf  Run  Shoals. 

During  the  early^  part  of  this  day,  an  ominous  silence 
prevailed  about  "Winchester.  The  Confederates  were  push- 
ing forward  and  working  around  so  as  to  cut  off  the  retreat 
of  the  Federal  troops.  Early  in  the  morning  Milroy  sent 
out  a  reconnoitering  force  to  ascertain  if  the  enemy  had 
established  themselves  on  the  Pughtown  or  Romney  roads. 
The  party  returned  about  2  o'clock  P.  M.  and  reported  the 
roads  clear,  but  soon  after  the  Confederates  came  in  great 
force  from  that  direction.  This  completely  cut  off  escape 


MILROY'S  ROUT  AT  WINCHESTER.  83 

"by  that  route.  At  4  o'clock  p.  M.  a  charge  was  made  up 
the  Front  Royal  road  to  the  edge  of  the  town,  but  the 
^nerny  were  repulsed.  Milroy  then  ordered  a  counter 
charge,  which  revealed  the  Confederates  in  great  force 
just  out  of  range  of  his  works.  Shortly  after  this,  fire 
was  opened  from  two  eight -gun  batteries  on  the  north- 
west, scarcely  a  mile  from  the  town;  while  at  the  same 
time  the  infantry  swept  up  to  and  over  the  Federal  breast- 
works, disregarding  the  fire  of  their  guns,  driving  out  the 
110th  Ohio  regiment  under  Colonel  Keifer  with  heavy  loss 
and  planting  their  colors  in  the  defenses.  This  attack  was 
made  by  Early's  division,  —  Johnson  operating  on  the 
eastern  side  of  the  town.  The  garrison  retreated  success- 
fully, under  cover  of  the  guns  from  the  main  works  above, 
which  were  held  by  Elliott's  and  McReynolds'  brigades. 
An  artillery  duel  ensued,  which  was  kept  up  without  any 
marked  results  until  8  o'clock  in  the  evening. 

When  night  closed  upon  the  scene  of  this  day's  eventful 
struggle,  General  Johnson,  leaving  one  brigade  to  cut  off 
Milroy's  escape  toward  the  east,  went  off  with  the  remain- 
der of  his  division  to  form  across  the  Martinsburg  pike, 
about  three  miles  north  of  Winchester,  to  intercept  him 
in  that  direction. 

General  Milroy,  at  this  juncture,  found  himself  to  be  in 
a  perilous  position,  and  shortly  after  midnight  held  a 
council  to  decide  upon  what  course  to  pursue.  His  cannon 
ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted,  and  he  had  but  one  day's 
rations  for  his  men.  The  foe  in  overwhelming  numbers 
pressed  upon  him  at  every  side,  and  all  further  attempts 
to  hold  his  position  were  abandoned.  It  was  resolved  to 
leave  the  wagon  -  train  and  artillery,  and  attempt  to  force 


84  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

their  way  out  through  the  hostile  lines  that  night.  His 
guns  were  accordingly  spiked  and  the  ammunition  thrown 
into  cisterns.  Leaving  behind  him  his  sick  and  wounded, 
at  1  o'clock  A.  M.,  he  silently  moved  out  through  a  ravine, 
and  was  not  molested  until  he  reached  the  road  leading  to 
Martinsburg,  about  four  miles  from  the  town.  At  this 
point  the  enemy  were  met  in  force,  barring  all  retreat  in 
that  direction.  But  one  thing  could  be  done,  —  make  an 
effort  to  break  through  this  line.  For  over  one  hour, 
amidst  the  darkness  of  the  night,  the  heroic  defenders  of 
the  Union  engaged  in  a  desperate  encounter  with  the  over- 
whelming numbers  of  the  foe,  who  were  strongly  posted, 
but  could  not  succeed  in  forcing  their  line.  To  add  to 
their  seemingly  hopeless  condition,  a  signal  gun  fired  at 
Winchester,  showed  that  the  enemy  there  were  aware  of 
their  flight,  and  were  in  pursuit.  At  this  critical  juncture 
General  Milroy  determined  to  try  another  expedient:  he 
ordered  his  troops  to  fall  back  a  short  distance  and  turn 
to  the  right.  In  the  darkness  and  confusion  some  mis- 
understanding occurred,  and  some  of  the  men  escaped  in 
the  way  directed,  while  the  greater  number  filed  to  the  left 
and  took  the  road  to  Bath.  It  was  impossible  to  reunite 
the  two  columns,  and  that  portion  which  took  to  the  east, 
and  were  not  pursued,  reached  Harper's  Ferry  by  way  of 
Smithfield  late  in  the  afternoon.  Those  who  moved  west- 
wardly  on  the  Bath  road,  also  made  good  their  escape,  and 
crossed  the  Potomac  at  Hancock,  rallying  at  Bloody  Run. 
General  Milroy  claims  that  about  five  thousand  of  his 
command  reported  at  the  two  places,  and  that  the  two 
thousand  paroled  by  General  Early  consisted  principally 
of  the  sick  and  wounded.  General  Lse  o.laims  as  the 


THE   DISASTER    OF   MILROY.  85- 

•capture  from  Milroy  over  four  thousand  prisoners,  twenty- 
nine  guns,  two  hundred  and  seventy  -  seven  wagons,  and 
four  hundred  horses. 

The  disaster  to  General  Milroy's  command  was  a  severe 
one  to  the  national  cause.  The  General  himself  was  a 
^good  soldier,  and  can  hardly  be  blamed  for  his  mishap. 
He  relied  upon  his  department  commander  and  the  author- 
ities at  Washington,  to  inform  him  of  the  approach  of  the 
^enemy  in  overwhelming  force.  The  latest  moment  that  a 
communication  from  either  could  have  reached  him,  was 
on  Saturday  evening,  the  13th,  when  the  telegraph  wires 
were  cut  by  the  enemy.  And  as  EwelPs  corps  only  left 
Culpeper  for  the  valley  on  "Wednesday,  the  10th,  it  may 
be  that  his  moving  in  that  direction  was  not  known  in 
Washington  in  time  to  inform  Milroy  of  his  approach.  If 
the  fact  of  his  going  in  that  direction  was  known  there  at 
any  time  up  to  Saturday  evening,  then  the  fault  was  in  not 
forwarding  at  once  this  information,  and  withdrawing  him 
from  his  perilous  position.*  General  Milroy  evidently 
held  on  one  day  too  long.  Had  he  fallen  back  to  the 
Potomac  on  Saturday  night,  instead  of  delaying  until 
Sunday  night,  he  might  have  escaped  with  comparatively 
little  loss.  But  he  was  deterred  from  doing  this  by  his 

*  Captain  James  H.  Stephenson,  in  an  article  found  in  "Annals  of  the 
War,"  pages  634-641,  entitled  "The  First  Cavalry,"  relates  the  following: 
"When  Milroy  found  he  was  surrounded  by  I^ee's  army,  he  sent  for  a  bold 
officer  and  fifty  men  to  carry  a  despatch  to  Martinsburg,  and  Major  Boyd  was 
detailed  with  his  old  company.  They  knew  every  cow-path  in  the  valley, 
and  succeeded  in  flanking  the  rebel  force  then  between  Winchester  and  Mar- 
tinsburg, and  sent  the  first  intelligence  to  Baltimore  and  Washington  that 
Lee's  army  was  at  Winchester.  That  night  a  despatch  arrived  at  Martins- 
burg  for  Milroy,  and  three  men  of  Boyd's  company  volunteered  to  take  it 
through.  Their  names  were  Oliver  lyumphries,  John  V.  Harvey,  and  George 
J.  Pitman,  all  sergeants.  After  several  hair-breadth  escapes,  they  arrived  in 
Ihe  beleagured  town  at  midnight,  and  Milroy  called  a  council  of  war."  The- 


86  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

expectation  of  receiving  orders  from  Washington,  or 
assistance  from  General  Hooker.  Then  too  he  could  only 
have  retreated  on  Saturday  night  with  the  loss  of  McRey- 
nolds'  brigade,  which,  after  their  march  of  thirty  miles 
from  Berry ville,  were  too  much  fatigued  to  go  any  fur- 
ther that  night.  Had  Milroy  been  advised  of  the  approach 
of  Ewell  twenty  -  four  hours  earlier,  and  McReynolds  been 
ordered  to  fall  back  upon  Harper's  Ferry,  and  he  himself 
had  gone  to  the  same  place,  the  disaster  of  Winchester 
would  have  been  avoided.  This  disaster,  however,  was 
not  without  some  compensation.  The  appearance  of  the 
enemy  there  in  force,  and  their  detention  for  a  day  or  two,, 
sent  a  note  of  warning  throughout  the  entire  North,  and 
afforded  time  to  raise  troops  and  organize  them  for  effec- 
tive resistance. 

As  previously  stated,  while  Early'.s  and  Johnson's  divis- 
ions were  attacking  Milroy  at  Winchester,  Rodes  marched 
upon  Berryville.  After  pursuing  for  awhile  McReynolds, 
who  had  received  timely  notice  and  had  been  ordered 
to  proceed  to  Winchester,  Rodes,  preceded  by  Jenkins^ 

cavalry  referred  to  were  part  of  the  first  cavalry  regiment  of  the  war.  It  was 
known  as  "The  First  New  York;"  and  also,  "The  Lincoln  Cavalry."  It 
was  this  same  company  under  Captain  Boyd  that  covered  the  retreat  of 
McReynolds1  wagon-train,  as  related  in  the  ensuing  chapter,  and  which  en- 
gaged Jenkins  and  the  advance  of  Rodes  near  Greencastle,  Monday,  June 
22d,  in  what  is  known  as  the  first  battle  of  the  rebellion  upon  Pennsylvania 
soil.  And  it  was  another  company  of  this  same  regiment  under  the  heroic 
and  dauntless  Captain  Jones,  that  fought  and  defeated  twice  their  number 
of  Imboden's  men  in  McConnellsburg,  Monday,  June  2gth,  capturing  as 
many  of  the  enemy  as  there  were  of  their  own  number,  besides  killing  two 
and  wounding  one,  and  putting  the  balance  to  flight.  Captain  Jones  and  his 
brave  command  figured  again  in  a  dash  upon  the  great  wagon -train  in  its 
retreat  from  Gettysburg,  which  will  be  related  in  its  appropriate  place.  This 
regiment  was  one  of  the  most  heroic  and  gallant  in  the  Federal  service,  and 
its  achievements  as  related  by  Captain  Stephenson,  will  be  read  with  great 
interest. 


THE   DISASTER   OF   MILROY.  87 

cavalry,  followed  McReynolds'  wagon -train,  which  had 
headed  for  Martinsburg  instead  of  following  on  to  Win- 
chester, arriving  at  the  former  place  late  in  the  afternoon 
of  Sunday,  June  14th.  This  place  was  held  hy  a  small 
detachment  under  Colonel  Tyler,  who  formed  his  men  in 
line  outside  of  the  place  and  resisted  Rodes'  attack  until 
darkness  set  in,-  when  his  infantry  escaped  to  Shepherds- 
town,  and  his  artillery  and  cavalry  to  Williamsport.  The 
whole  force,  after  suffering  the  loss  of  five  guns  and  five 
caissons  rejoined  the  main  body  at  Harper's  Ferry.  All 
the  troops  now  at  that  place,  because  of  its  indefensible 
position,  moved  across  the  river  to  Maryland  Heights, 
which  was  strongly  fortified. 

Immediately  upon  the  defeat  of  Milroy  at  Winchester, 
General  Ewell  advanced  the  divisions  of  Early  and  John- 
son to  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  be- 
tween Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry,  where  they  re- 
mained a  few  days  before  they  crossed  the  Potomac  into 
Maryland.  Jenkins'  cavalry  continued  the  pursuit  of 
McReynolds'  wagon  -  train,  which  crossed  the  river  at 
Williamsport,  and  made  its  way  down  the  valley  through 
Chambersburg.  Jenkins'  force  crossed  at  Williamsport 
on  the  evening  of  Sunday,  June  14th.  On  the  following 
day  ( Monday,  15th)  the  brigades  of  Ramseur,  Iverson  and 
Dole,  with  three  batteries  of  artillery,  also  crossed  at  the 
same  place;  and  on  the  following  days,  the  16th,  17th,  and 
18th,  the  balance  of  the  division  crossed  and  all  encamped 
near  the  town,  remaining  there  until  the  following  week 
when  the  advance  down  the  Cumberland  'Valley  com- 
menced. Leaving  these  troops  at  the  places  named,  with 
Hill's  corps  en  route  for  the  valley,  and  Longstreet  and 


88  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

Stuart  yet  at  Culpeper,  and  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  on  the  march  northward  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge, 
we  next  turn  our  attention  to  important  events  transpiring 
in  the  loyal  states,  and  also  to  the  advance  of  Jenkins' 
cavalry. 


CHAPTER  in. 

PREPARATIONS  FOR  THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  ENEMY  —  ADVANCE 
OF  JENKINS'  CAVALRY. 

HE  stirring  events  about  to  be  related  will  be  better 
understood  if  the  reader  is  familiar  with  the  geo- 
i ',  graphical  features  of  the  country  to  which  the  action 
A  of  the  campaign  is  now  to  be  transferred.  In  order 
T  to  supply  this  knowledge,  I  will  state  it  thus :  Com- 
mencing at  the  Susquehanna  River  at  Harrisburg,  and 
extending  down  to  the  southern  border  of  the  State  and 
through  the  States  of  Maryland,  Virginia  and  Korth 
Carolina  into  Tennessee,  is  a  large  and  beautiful  valley, 
ranging  in  width  from  fifteen  to  twenty -five  miles.  It  is 
bounded  on  the  west  by  a  range  of  mountains,  known 
as  the  I^orth  Mountain;  and  on  the  east,  by  the  South 
Mountain,  down  to  the  Potomac,  and  from  thence  down 
through  Virginia,  by  the  same  general  range,  called  the 
Blue  Ridge.  From  the  Susquehanna  to  the  Potomac 
this  valley  is  called  the  Cumberland  Valley;  and  from  the 
last  named  river  down  through  Virginia,  it  is  known  as 
the  Shenandoah  Valley.  The  principal  towns  through 
this  valley  are  Harrisburg,  fifty -two  miles  from  Cham- 
bersburg;  Mechanicsburg,  forty -three  miles;  Carlisle, 
thirty -one  miles;  Kewville,  twenty  -  two  miles,  and  Ship- 
pensburg,  eleven  miles.  South  of  the  town  are  Marion, 
six  miles;  Greencastle,  eleven  miles;  Hagerstown,  twenty- 

89 


90  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

two  miles,  and  Martinsburg,  forty -two  miles.  At  the 
time  of  the  war  the  Cumberland  Valley  Railroad,  com- 
mencing at  Harrisburg,  passed  down  through  this  valley 
to  Hagerstown,  touching  at  all  the  places  named,  except 
Martinsburg.  It  has  since  been  extended  to  that  place. 
There  is  also  a  turnpike  road  from  Harrisburg  down 
through  this  valley,  passing  through  nearly  all  the  places 
named.  Williamsport,  one  of  the  principal  fords  of  the 
Potomac,  is  distant  from  Hagerstown  in  a  south  -  westerly 
direction  six  miles.  A  good  road  runs  direct  from  Green- 
castle  to  that  place,  and  is  some  three  miles  nearer  than 
by  way  of  Hagerstown, — the  distance  being  fourteen 
miles,  and  by  way  of  Hagerstown,  seventeen  miles. 

The  valley  between  the  Susquehanna  and  Potomac  is 
crossed  by  several  good  roads  or  turnpikes,  the  principal 
of  which  are,  the  National  Pike,  which  extends  from  Bal- 
timore to  Wheeling,  crossing  the  South  Mountain  by  Tur- 
ner's Pass,  and  passing  through  Frederick,  Boonsborough, 
Hagerstown,  Clearspring,  and  other  places;  the  road  by 
Monterey  Pass  above  Waynesborough,  from  which,  on  the 
eastern  side  of  the  mountain,  roads  diverge  to  Frederick, 
Emmittsburg,  and  Gettysburg;  the  pike  running  from 
Baltimore  to  Pittsburg,  crossing  the  mountain  by  New- 
man's Pass,  and  passing  through  "Westminster,  Gettysburg, 
Cashtown,  Greenwood,  and  Chambersburg;  and  the  pike 
which  runs  from  points  east  of  the  mountain  to  Carlisle 
and  crosses  by  Mount  Holly. 

In  the  public  square  of  Chambersburg  the  Pittsburg 
and  Baltimore  pike  crosses  the  road  from  Harrisburg  to 
Winchester  at  right -angles — the  former  running  almost 
directly  east  and  west.  Now  taking  a  stand  here  and 


MARYLAND  AND   SOUTHERN    PENNSYLVANIA,    FROM  THE  POTOMAC  TO 
THE  SUSQUEHA-NNA. 


92  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

facing  east,  we  have  Fayetteville,  six  miles  distant,  Green- 
wood—  a  place  of  but  few  houses  —  eight  miles,  Cashtown 
on  the  east  of  the  mountain,  sixteen  miles,  and  Gettys- 
burg, twenty  -  four  miles.  A  road  which  runs  from  Car- 
lisle by  Mount  Holly  and  Pine  Grove  along  the  South 
Mountain,  comes  out  into  the  Baltimore  Pike,  near  the 
top  of  the  mountain ;  and  roads  from  both  north  and  south 
of  the  pike  enter  into  it  at  Greenwood.  It  is  these  roads 
that  gave  this  little  place,  situated  at  the  western  base 
of  the  mountain,  its  importance  -during  the  invasion. 
Cashtown  on  the  eastern  base  of  the  mountain,  like 
Greenwood  on  the  western,  is  of  value  only  because  of 
the  several  roads  which  radiate  from  it. 

Gettysburg,  as  already  stated,  is  twenty  -  four  miles  dis- 
tant from  Chambersburg.  It  is  the  county  seat  of  Adams 
County,  and  contains  about  five  thousand  inhabitants.  A 
theological  seminary  and  college,  belonging  to  the  Evan- 
gelical Lutheran  Church,  are  located  there.  Between  two 
ranges  of  hills,  the  Catoctin  on  the  east,  and  the  South 
Mountain  on  the  west,  is  a  narrow  valley  which,  like  the 
Cumberland,  west  of  the  mountain,  has  always  been  noted 
for  its  beauty  and  fertility.  At  the  head  of  this  valley,  on 
a  gentle  western  slope,  and  forming  a  focal  center  for 
roads  running  north,  south,  east,  and  west,  lies  the  town 
of  Gettysburg.  A  mile  to  the  east  runs  Rock  Creek,  the 
chief  of  the  head  -  waters  of  the  Monocacy. 

Taking  a  position  now  in  the  historic  town  of  Gettys- 
burg, and  looking  to  the  north  -  east,  we  have  the  town 
of  York,  distant  twenty -eight  miles;  a  little  further  to 
the  left  is  Harrisburg,  thirty  -  five  miles;  and  across  the 
South  Mountain,  in  a  northwesterly  direction,  is  Carlisle, 


GOVERNOR  CURTIN'S  PROCLAMATION.  93 

twenty -eight  miles.  South  of  Gettysburg,  thirty -two 
miles,  is  Frederick ;  Baltimore,  southeast,  fifty  -  two  miles ; 
and  Washington,  nearly  due  south,  sixty -four  miles. 
Hagerstown,  by  way  of  Fairfield  and  Monterey  Pass,  is 
thirty -two  miles  distant  in  a  southwesterly  direction. 
Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  Hagerstown,  Chambersburg,  and 
Gettysburg  form  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle,  the  South 
Mountain  passing  directly  through  it,  and  separating  the 
latter  from  the  former. 

As  soon  as  it  was  apparent  that  General  Lee  contem- 
plated a  movement  northward,  the  authorities  of  our  State 
were  notified  of  the  fact,  and  were  assured  that  the  condi- 
tion was  such  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  could  not  be 
divided,  and  Pennsylvania  must  furnish  her  own  men  for 
her  defense.  On  the  9th  of  June  two  new  departments 
were  created:  that  of  the  Monongahela,  with  headquarters 
at  Pittsburg,  was  assigned  to  Major -General  W.  T.  H. 
Brooks;  and  that  of  the  Susquehanna,  with  headquarters 
at  Harrisburg,  was  given  to  Major -General  D.  3T.  Couch. 
On  the  12th,  Governor  A.  G.  Curtin  issued  a  proclamation, 
addressed  to  the  people  of  the  State,  telling  them  of  the 
danger  which  threatened  them,  and  calling  for  volunteers 
to  meet  the  emergency.  On  the  same  day  General  Couch, 
on  assuming  command  of  the  department,  also  issued  an 
address,  reiterating  what  Governor  Curtin  had  said,  and 
calling  for  a  general  and  speedy  enlistment.  The  responses 
to  these  calls  not  being  as  general  and  prompt  as  desired, 
the  President,  on  the  15th,  specifically  called  upon  the 
State  of  Pennsylvania  and  the  States  nearest,  for  the  fol- 
lowing militia:  Pennsylvania,  fifty  thousand;  Maryland, 
ten  thousand;  !N"ew  York,  twenty  thousand;  Ohio,  thirty 


34  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

thousand,  and  West  Virginia,  ten  thousand, — a  total  of 
one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men.  The  governors 
of  these  States  re-echoed  the  call,  but  still  the  responses 
were  weak.  The  uniformed  and  disciplined  regiments  of 
New  York  City  generally  responded  and  proceeded  to 
Harrisburg,  but  the  number  from  the  other  States,  includ- 
ing Pennsylvania,  who  went  to  meet  the  foe  was  but  com- 
paratively small.  A  liberal  estimate  of  the  number  who 
responded  was  about  as  follows:  Pennsylvania,  twenty- 
five  thousand;  New  York,  fifteen  thousand;  New  Jersey, 
three  thousand;  Maryland,  five  thousand;  Delaware,  two 
thousand, —  a  total  of  fifty  thousand.  Those  of  the  num- 
ber who  reported  at  Harrisburg  were  organized  into  two 
divisions,  one  under  General  "W.  F.  Smith,  and  the  other 
under  General  Dana.  On  the  same  day  that  the  President 
called  for  troops,  the  construction  of  breast  -  works  and 
the  digging  of  rifle  -  pits  along  the  river  front,  and  on  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  river,  were  commenced  and  carried 
forward  from  day  to  day.  At  the  same  time  these  prepar- 
ations were  being  made  at  Harrisburg,  similar  activity  was 
manifested  at  Pittsburg.  Thus  while  the  \vork  of  prepara- 
tion for  the  reception  of  the  enemy  was  going  on,  he  was 
pressing  toward  our  border,  and  soon,  as  we  will  show, 
made  his  appearance  in  our  midst. 

The  people  who  lived  along  the  southern  border  dur- 
ing the  war  were  kept  in  an  almost  continuous  state  of 
anxiety.  The  booming  of  cannon  was  frequently  heard, 
and  the  rumors  of  approaching  foes  at  times  threw  the 
whole  community  into  a  state  of  intense  excitement.  Dr. 
Philip  Schaff,  in  his  notes  on  Matthew  xxiv.  6,  as  pub- 
lished in  Lange's  commentary,  in  a  lucid  and  graphic 


WARS   AND   RUMORS    OF   WARS.  95 

manner  describes  the  excitement  which  prevailed  along 
the  border  during  the  week  preceding  the  appearance  of 
the  invading  army.  The  doctor,  whose  ability  as  a  scholar 
and  writer  is  widely  known,  resided  in  Mercersburg, 
Franklin  county,  at  the  time  of  the  war,  and  the  scripture 
upon  which  his  comments  are  based  is  as  follows:  — '•'•And 
ye  shall  hear  of  wars  and  rumors  of  wars"  The  doctor 
says:  "I  beg  leave  to  quote  a  passage  from  my  diary 
during  the  famous  Southern  invasion  of  Pennsylvania 
under  General  Lee,  in  June  and  July,  1863,  which  may 
throw  some  light  on  this  passage  ( Matthew  xxiv :  6.)  in 
its  wider  application  to  different  periods  of  repeated  ful- 
iillment : 

'Mercersburg,  Pa.,  June  iSlh,  fS6j.  —  It  seerns  to  me  that  I  now  under- 
stand better  than  ever  before  some  passages  in  the  prophetic  discourses  of 
our  Savior,  especially  the  difference  between  wars  and  rumors  of  wars  , 
and  especially  the  force  of  the  command  to  "flee  to  tlie  mountains,"  (v.  16) 
which  I  hear  again  and  again  in  these  days  from  the  mouth  of  the  poor 
negroes  and  other  fugitives.  Rumors  of  wars,  as  distinct  from  wars  are 
not,  as  usually  understood,  reports  of  wars  in  foreign  or  distant  countries, 
for  these  may  be  read  or  heard  of  with  perfect  composure  and  unconcern, 
but  the  conflicting,  confused,  exaggerated  and  frightful  rumors  which  pre- 
cede the  approach  of  war  to  our  own  homes  and  firesides,  especially  by  the 
advance  of  an  invading  army  and  the  consequent  panic  and  commotion  of 
the  people,  the  suspension  of  business,  the  confusion  of  families,  the  appre- 
hensions of  women  and  children,  the  preparations  for  flight,  the  fear  of 
plunder,  capture  and  the  worst  outrages  which  the  unbridled  passions  of 
brute  soldiers  are  thought  capable  of  committing  upon  an  unarmed  com- 
munity. Such  rumors  of  wars  are  actually  often  worse  than  war  itself,  and 
hence  they  are  mentioned  after  the  wars  by  way  of  climax.  The  present 
state  of  things  in  this  community  is  certainly  worse  than  the  rebel  raid  of 
General  Stuart's  cavalry  in  October  last,  when  they  suddenly  at  Mercers- 
burg,  at  noon  -  day,  seized  a  large  number  of  horses,  shoes  and  store  goods, 
and  twelve  innocent  citizens  as  candidates  for  Libby  prison,  but  did  no 
further  harm  and  left  after  a  few  hours  for  Chambersburg.  But  now  the 
•whole  veteran  army  of  Lee,  the  military  strength  and  flower  of  the  South- 


96  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

ern  rebellion  is  said  to  be  crossing  the  Potomac  and  marching  into  Penn- 
sylvania. We  are  cut  off  from  all  mail  communication  and  dependent  on 
the  flying  and  contradictory  rumors  of  passengers,  straggling  soldiers,  run- 
away negroes  and  spies.  All  the  schools  and  stores  are  closed  ;  goods  are 
being  hid  or  removed  to  the  country,  valuables  buried  in  cellars  or  gardens 
and  other  places  of  concealment ;  the  poor  negroes,  the  innocent  cause  of 
the  war,  are  trembling  like  leaves  and  flying  with  their  little  bundles  "  to 
the  mountains,"  especially,  the  numerous  run -away  slaves  from  Virginia, 
from  fear  of  being  captured  as  "contrabands"  and  sold  to  the  South;  politi- 
cal passions  run  high  ;  confidence  is  destroyed  ;  innocent  persons  are  siezed 
as  spies ;  tfye  neighbor  looks  upon  his  neighbor  with  suspicion,  and  even 
sensible  ladies  have  their  imagination  excited  with  pictures  of  horrors  far 
worse  than  death.  This  is  a  most  intolerable  state  of  things,  and  it  would 
be  a  positive  relief  of  the  most  painful  suspense  if  the  rebel  army  would 
march  into  town.' 

"  Shortly  after  the  above  was  written,"  adds  Dr.  Schafl', 
"various  detachments  of  Lee's  army  took  and  kept  pos- 
session of  Mercersburg  till  the  terrible  battles  at  Gettys- 
burg on  the  first  three  days  of  July,  and  although  public 
and  private  houses  were  ransacked,  horses,  cows,  sheep, 
and  provisions  stolen  day  by  day  without  mercy,  negroes 
captured  and  carried  back  into  slavery,  (even  such  as  I 
know  to  have  been  born  and  raised  on  free  soil,)  and  many 
other  outrages  committed  by  the  lawless  guerrilla  bands 
of  McNeil,  Imboden,  Mosby,  etc.,  yet  the  actual  reign  of 
terror,  bad  as  it  was,  did  not  after  all  come  up  to  the  pre- 
vious apprehensions  created  by  the  '  wars  and  rumors  of 
wars',  and  the  community  became  more  calm  and  com- 
posed, brave  and  unmindful  of  danger." 

Rumors  of  the  threatened  invasion  of  our  border  became 
prevalent  in  Chambersburg  toward  the  latter  part  of  the 
week  previous  to  the  actual  appearance  of  the  enemy. 
On  the  evening  of  Saturday,  June  13th,  the  town  was 
thrown  into  a  state  of  great  excitement  by  a  rumor  that 


REMOVAL   OF   VALUABLES.  97 

the  foe  was  approaching;  and  towards  evening  of  the  fol- 
lowing day  (Sunday,  14th),  the  report  was  in  circulation 
that  disaster  had  fallen  upon  the  Federal  forces  about 
Winchester,  and  the  enemy  were  approaching  in  force. 
Immediately,  as  upon  former  occasions,  when  news  of  the 
approach  of  the  Confederates  was  received,  great  excite- 
ment and  confusion  ensued.  The  usual  work  of  secreting, 
or  packing  and  sending  away,  merchandise  and  .other 
valuables  was  commenced.  The  stores  and  shops  were 
opened,  and  all  was  activity  in  removing  their  contents. 
The  firm,  of  which  the  writer  was  a  member,  boxed  and 
shipped  part  of  its  stock  of  dry  goods  to  Philadelphia, 
some  to  the  country  to  be  hid  in  farm-houses,  and  the 
larger  part  was  secreted  in  a  fire -proof  beer  vault  under 
an  adjoining  building.  The  officers  of  the  bank  removed 
their  valuables,  and  the  officials  of  the  court-house  packed 
and  sent  away  the  records  and  other  valuable  papers  be- 
longing to  the  county.  The  railroad  men  were  also  prompt 
to  meet  the  emergency,  and  by  noon  of  the  ensuing  day, 
Monday,  15th,  had  all  their  portable  property  loaded  on 
cars  and  ready  for  shipment. 

As  events  of  stirring  interest  are  now  to  be  narrated,  I 
will  resume  the  daily  summary  style,  and  will  commence 
with — 

Monday,  June  15.  On  this  day  we  witnessed  the  great- 
est excitement  which  had  occurred  up  to  that  time  during 
all  the  history  of  the  war.  Early  in  the  morning  farmers 
residing  in  the  southern  portion  of  our  county,  began  to 
pass  through  the  town  and  on  down  the  Harrisburg  pike 
with  their  stock  and  valuables.  The  road  was  crowded 
with  wagons,  horses  and  cattle.  Then  came  large  numbers 


98  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

of  colored  persons,  men,  women,  and  children,  bearing 
with  them  huge  bundles  of  clothing,  bedding,  and  articles 
of  house-keeping.  Many  of  these  had  come  from  the  val- 
ley of  Virginia,  while  a  few  were  residents  of  our  own 
county  and  the  neighboring  county  of  Washington,  in 
Maryland.  About  ten  o'clock  forty  or  fifty  wagons,  drawn 
by  horses  and  mules,  came  dashing  down  Main  street. 
They  were  attended  by  a  few  cavalry,  and  the  affrighted 
drivers  were  lashing  the  poor  jaded  brutes  attached  to  the 
wagons.  They  declared  that  the  enemy  were  in  close  pur- 
suit; that  a  large  part  of  the  train  had  been  captured,  and 
that  the  dreaded  foe  was  about  to  enter  Chambersburg. 
These  wagons  were  a  part  of  Colonel  McReynolds'  train, 
which  Jenkins'  cavalry  had  pursued  from  Berryville,  and 
across  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport  the  afternoon  before. 
As  they  came  dashing  down  our  street,  drivers  alternately 
lashing  the  poor  animals  and  looking  back  to  see  if  the 
enemy  were  in  sight,  the  scenes  of  terror  and  confusion 
were  perfectly  terrific.  Near  the  corner  of  Main  and 
Queen  streets  one  of  the  horses  dropped  dead  from  ex- 
haustion. It  was  said  that  all  along  the  road  from  the 
Potomac  to  this  place  wrecked  wagons  and  broken  down 
horses  and  mules  were  left  by  the  way.  When  passing 
through  the  public  square  of  this  place  at  head -long 
speed,  Lieutenant  Palmer,  on  provost  duty  here,  observing 
the  needless  panic,  drew  his  revolver  and  ordered  the 
teamsters  to  halt.  His  order  was  obeyed,  and  from  Cham- 
bersburg down  to  Carlisle  the  teams  were  driven  at  a 
moderate  pace.  At  that  place  they  were  taken  in  hand  by 
the  military  authorities,  and  subsequently  removed  beyond 
the  Susquehanna.  This  panic,  after  the  teams  had  passed 


JENKINS'  TROOPS  IN  CHAMBERSBURG.  99 

through  Hagerstown,  was  wholly  unnecessary,  as  the  in- 
vaders were  not  within  twenty  miles  of  them,  for  about  the 
time  they  reached  this  place  Jenkins  entered  Hagerstown. 
Between  this  force  of  the  enemy  and  the  wagon-  train  was 
Company  C,  First  New  York  Cavalry,  under  Captain 
Boyd.  This  gallant  command  of  about  forty  men  became 
separated  from  its  regiment,  part  of  which  escaped  west- 
wardly  with  part  of  General  Milroy's  forces,  and  crossed 
the  Potomac  at  Hancock  and  concentrated  at  Bloody  Run 

—  sometimes  called  Everett.     These  troops  afterward  did 
good  service  upon  the  enemy's  flank  during  the  invasion, 
.and  this  company  under  Captain  Boyd,  as  well  as  com- 
pany A  under  Captain  Jones,  will  be  heard  from  hereaf- 
ter in  this  narrative. 

The  arrival  of  this  train  and  the  information  it  brought 
of  the  approach  of  the  foe,  naturally  gave  a  fresh  impetus 
to  the  citizens  of  Chambersburg,  and  the  rush  from  the 
town  in  the  direction  of  Harrisburg  assumed  larger  pro- 
portions, while  those  who  remained  at  their  homes  —  by 
much  the  larger  number — waited  in  much  suspense  for 
the  arrival  of  the  enemy. 

At  an  early  hour  in  the  evening  of  this  day,  information 
was  received  of  the  approach  of  Jenkins'  troops,  and  about 
eleven  o'clock  at  night  they  reached  the  southern  end  of 
the  town.  Some  six  or  eight  were  sent  forward  into  the 
town  to  reconnoiter,  and  about  two  hundred  more  were 
detailed  to  make  a  rapid  charge  after  this  small  force,  and 
these  were  soon  followed  by  the  balance  of  the  command 

—  about  two  thousand  in  all. 

Seated  at  an  open  window  in  the  second  story  of  my  resi- 
dence, overlooking  the  public  square,  and  listening  for  the 


100  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

approaching  enemy,  I  at  length  heard  the  clatter  of  horses* 
feet  coming  rapidly  down  Main  Street.  When  opposite 
the  residence  of  Mr.  H.  M.  White — but  a  short  distance 
from  the  public  square  —  the  report  of  a  gun  was  heard. 
Almost  simultaneously  with  the  report  of  this  gun,  some 
four  or  five  cavalrymen  rode  into  the  square.  In  the 
darkness — the  gas  in  front  of  the  bank  building  only 
having  been  left  burning — they  became  separated,  and 
one  of  them,  evidently  the  officer  in  command  of  the 
squad,  who  had  ridden  over  near  the  bank,  called  out  in  a 
peculiarly  southern  tone,  "HawAms!  Hawkinsll  I  say, 

Hawkins,  whar  in  the are  you?  "     If  Lieutenant  Smith 

— for  such  was  his  name,  as  will  appear  shortly  — had 
called  upon  two  of  our  gallant  young  men,  John  A. 
Seiders  and  T.  M.  Mahon,  instead  of  his  Satanic  majesty, 
he  might  have  received  the  information  he  so  earnestly 
desired,  for  they  were  having  a  little  matter  of  business 
with  his  friend  "  Hawkins  "  across  the  square  and  near  the 
court-house  at  that  time.  But  Lieutenant  Smith's  anxiety 
for  his  friend  was  soon  relieved,  for  on  his  going  across  the 
square  to  ascertain  what  had  become  of  him,  he  fell  into 
the  hands  of  Seiders,  and  soon  thereafter  joined  the  object 
of  his  solicitude,  both  of  them,  however,  dismounted  and 
disarmed.  Following  this  call  for  his  absent  comrade,  the 
officer  again  called  out,  "  Whar's  the  may  aw  of  this  town? 
I  say,  whar's  the  may  aw  of  this  town?  If  the  may  aw 
does  not  come  here  in  five  minutes  we  will  burn  the 
town!"  The  "  May  aw"  not  responding  to  this  urgent 
call,  the  officer  rode  across  the  square  to  the  front  of  the 
court-house,  where  he  was  captured  by  Seiders.  In  a 
short  time  after  the  capture  of  Lieutenant  Smith,  the  two 


MR.  BRAND'S  ESCAPE.  101 

hundred  detailed  to  follow  the  reconnoitering  party,  came 
thundering  down  the  street,  followed  after  a  short  interval 
by  the  remainder  of  the  command.  Some  few  remained 
in  the  town,  but  the  larger  part  passed  on  down  and  out 
t)y  the  Harrisburg  pike,  and  after  picketing  the  various 
roads,  encamped  about  one  mile  out.  General  Jenkins, 
Tvith  his  staff,  went  to  the  residence  of  Colonel  A.  K. 
McClure,  which  stood  upon  the  place  where  Wilson  Fe- 
male College  now  stands,  —  the  fine  building  which  stood 
there  at  that  time  having  been  burned  in  the  destruction 
of  our  town  by  McCausland  a  year  afterward.  After  par- 
taking of  a  bountiful  supper  prepared  for  them,  the  honors 
of  the  table  being  royally  done  by  the  colonel's  accom- 
plished wife  —  the  colonel  himself  being  prudently  absent 
— lay  down  to  rest  for  the  night.  Leaving  Jenkins  and 
his  staff  so  comfortably  quartered  for  the  night  in  Mr. 
McClure's  mansion,  and  their  horses  picketed  in  his  clover 
fields,  we  will  return  to  town  and  detail  what  -occurred 
there  during  the  entrance  of  the  reconnoitering  party. 

As  the  scouts  came  galloping  down  Main  street,  with 
their  carbines  cocked  and  levelled,  the  darkness  prevented 
them  from  seeing  a  mortar -bed  and  some  piles  of  stone 
and  sand  in  front  of  Mr.  H.  M.  White's  residence,  then  in 
process  of  building,  and  one  of  the  horses  stumbled  and 
fell, throwing  its  rider  headlong  into  the  mortar -bed.  The 
fall  caused  his  carbine  to  go  off,  and  he,  as  well  as  his 
comrades,  supposed  that  a  citizen  had  fired  upon  them. 
Simultaneously  with  the  report  of  the  carbine,  Mr.  J.  S. 
Brand,  then  residing  in  a  house  near  by,  threw  open  the 
shutters  of  a  second  story  window  in  his  house  to  see 
"what  was  transpiring  in  the  street.  A  cavalryman,  then 


102  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

opposite  this  house,  hearing  the  report  of  the  gun  and 
the  opening  of  the  shutters,  cried  out  that  the  shot  came 
from  that  window.  In  a  short  time,  after  the  arrival  of 
the  other  cavalrymen,  a  number  of  them,  piloted  by  the 
one  who  averred  that  the  shot  came  from  Mr.  Brand's 
house,  went  to  the  place  and  knocked  at  the  door  demand- 
ing admittance,  and  declaring  the  purpose  of  hanging  the 
man  that  tired  the  shot.  Mrs.  Brand,  becoming  greatly 
alarmed  for  her  husband's  safety,  urged  him  to  go  up  into 
the  attic  and  hide  himself.  At  length,  to  gratify  his  wife, 
Mr.  Brand  complied,  but  finding  his  hiding-place  under 
the  roof  to  be  very  warm,  and  concluding  that  if  the  house 
was  searched  and  he  was  found  secreted,  their  suspicions 
would  be  confirmed,  he  came  forth  determined  to  face  the 
issue.  But  as  the  cavalrymen  were  yet  at  the  door  clam- 
oring for  entrance  and  threatening  to  break  it  in,  he  at 
length  at  the  urgent  solicitude  of  his  wife,  went  into  his 
back  yard  and  crept  into  a  bake  -  oven  and  drew  to  its  iron 
door.  But  if  the  attic  was  warm,  the  oven  was  hot,  for  it 
had  been  used  that  same  day  to  bake  bread.  After  shift- 
ing himself  from  one  hand  and  knee  to  the  other  until  he 
could  endure  it  no  longer,  he  once  more  came  forth  to 
brave  the  foe.  Before  it  was  quite  daylight  a  member  of 
Mr.  John  Jeffries'  family,  who  lived  adjoining,  came  over 
to  Mr.  Brand's  and  said  that  the  rebels  were  all  about  the 
house  waiting  for  daylight,  and  declaring  their  purpose  to 
search  it  and  hang  the  person  found  in  it.  These  ladies, 
Mrs.  Brand  and  Miss  Jeffries,  then  hit  upon  the  expedient 
of  disguising  Mr.  Brand  and  having  him  leave  the  house^ 
Accordingly,  they  arrayed  him  in  one  of  Mrs.  Brand's 
dresses,  and  a  large  flowing  sun -bonnet  was  put  on  his- 


CAPTURE   OF   TWO   SCOUTS.  103 

head  to  hide  his  beard.  In  this  disguise  Mr.  Brand  went 
out  of  his  back  door,  passed  up  his  lot  in  the  presence 
of  the  enemy,  and  crossed  over  to  the  residence  of  Mr. 
Jeffries  where  he  was  disrobed  and  where  he  had  no 
further  trouble  with  the  enemy.  The  situation  of  Mr. 
Brand  was  an  alarming  one,  and  he  availed  himself  of  the 
only  means  of  escape  which  presented  itself;  and  for  this 
he  was  indebted  to  the  ingenuity  of  women. 

Shortly  after  the  entrance  of  the  advance  guard  into  the 
public  square,  one  of  the  cavalry  -  men  rode  up  to  John  A. 
Seiders  and  T.  M.  Mahon,  as  they  stood  upon  the  court- 
house pavement,  and  inquired  of  them  in  what  direction 
the  remainder  of  the  squad  had  gone?  These  two  men  had 
just  returned  home  from  service  in  the  army,  and  they 
determined  to  try  their  hands  on  that  fellow.  Neither  of 
them  were  armed,  but  Mahon,  using  a  piece  of  a  plaster- 
ing lath  which  he  held  in  his  hand  as  a  sword,  seized  hold 
of  one  of  the  reins  of  the  bridle,  and  Seiders  the  other, 
and  quietly  demanded  his  surrender.  He  at  once  dis- 
mounted, and  his  sabre  and  pistol  —  the  other  being  taken 
by  Seiders  —  were  at  once  taken  by  Mahon,  who  quickly 
mounted  the  horse  and  rode  rapidly  out  Market  street  to 
Third,  up  Third  to  Queen,  and  down  Queen  to  the  market- 
house,  into  which  he  entered.  While  there  a  party  of  cav- 
alry-men rode  down  Second  street  toward  Market,  and 
Mahon,  as  soon  as  they  had  passed,  started  out  east  Queen 
at  a  rapid  gait.  Near  the  eastern  point,  at  the  junction  of 
Queen  and  Washington  streets,  he  encountered  a  squad 
who  called  upon  him  to  halt,  but  he  fled  on  out  the 
Gettysburg  pike  towards  Fayetteville.  At  Downey's, 
some  four  miles  distant,  he  turned  from  the  pike  and  pro- 


104  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

ceed.ed  to  Scotland,  where,  on  the  next  day,  he  gave  the 
horse  into  the  care  of  a  friend,  and  after  witnessing  the 
destruction  of  the  railroad  -  bridge  at  that  place,  he  eluded 
the  pickets  and  returned  on  foot  to  Chambersburg  and 
reported  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  to  the  railroad 
officials.  Finding,  however,  that  the  Confederates  had 
secured  his  name,  and  were  on  the  hunt  of  him,  he,  after 
having  been  for  some  time  hid  in  the  house  of  his  law 
preceptor,  William  McClellau,  Esq.,  left  and  sought  refuge 
in  safer  quarters.  Mr.  Mahon,  to  whom  I  am  indebted  for 
this  account,  desires  to  present  his  compliments  to  Mr. 
George  Hawkins,  should  he  be  yet  living  and  see  this 
statement,  and  to  assure  him  that  the  saddle,  carbine,  and 
case  of  medicines,  borrowed  of  him  under  such  pressing 
circumstances,  have  been  safely  kept,  and  he  will  be  happy 
to  return  them  to  him  now  that  "  this  cruel  war  is  over." 
Immediately  after  the  departure  of  Mahon  with  his  prize 
— the  Confederate  having  been  handed  over  to  several 
other  persons  who  came  upon  the  scene,  and  who  started 
to  conduct  him  to  the  jail,  but  released  him  when  they 
found  that  they  were  likely  to  be  caught,  —  another  cav- 
alry-man rode  up  to  where  Seiders  was  standing,  and 
inquired  what  had  become  of  his  comrade,  Hawkins. 
Seiders  now  being  armed  with  one  of  the  captured  pistols, 
presented  it  and  demanded  his  surrender.  To  this  demand 
he  at  once  complied  and  dismounted.  Seiders  quickly 
disarmed  him,  and  taking  his  sabre,  pistols,  and  spurs, 
mounted  his  horse  and  rode  rapidly  out  east  Market  street. 
At  Market  and  Second  streets  he  encountered  the  head  of 
the  column  which  had  passed  the  market  -  house  while 
Mahon  was  in  it.  To  their  command  to  halt  he  paid  no 


INCIDENTS   IN   CHAMBERSBURG. 


105 


attention,  lout  put  his  captured  animal  upon  its  speed  and 
galloped  out  to  Fayetteville.  Arriving  at  that  place  he 
took  an  inventory  of  his  capture,  and  it  was  found  to  be 
as  follows :  A  valuable  horse,  saddle,  bridle,  four  blankets 
rolled  up  and  fastened  behind  the  saddle,  two  fine  pistols, 
sabre  and  belt,  and  a  pair  of  saddle-bags,  containing  a 
dress  coat,  two  shirts,  a  Testament,  a  pack  of  cards,  a 
package  of  love  letters,  some  smoking  tobacco  and  other 
articles.  Mr.  Seiders  also  desires  to  present  his  compli- 
ments to  Lieutenant  Smith,  and  to  assure  him  that  he 
would  be  delighted  once  more  to  meet  him,  and  return  to 
him  whatever  of  these  articles  he  has  preserved.  From 
Fayetteville  Mr.  Seiders  proceeded  down  through  Cum- 
berland county  to  Harrisburg,  and  dressed  in  the  captured 
Confederate  uniform,  and  mounted  upon  his  captured  horse, 
he  did  excellent  scouting  service  during  the  invasion. 

I  return  now  from  this  extended  but  interesting  digres- 
sion to  our  main  narrative,  and  will  detail  the  events  of — • 

Tuesday,  June  16.  Early  this  morning  the  Confederates 
took  possession  of  what  is  known  as  Shirk's  or  Gelsinger's 
hill.  This  is  a  commanding  eminence  about  four  miles 
north  of  Chambersburg,  and  on  the  road  leading  to  Har- 
risburg. A  line  of  battle  was  formed  along  the  brow  of 
this  hill  by  a  part  of  the  Confederate  force,  while  detach- 
ments were  sent  out  in  all  directions  for  the  purpose  of 
plundering.  General  Jenkins  and  staff,  after  spending  the 
night  under  the  hospitable  roof  of  Colonel  McClure,  came 
early  in  the  day  into  Chambersburg  and  established  his 
head  -  quarters  at  the  Montgomery  House.  One  of  his 
first  acts  was  to  summon  the  burgess  and  town  -  council  to 
his  head  -  quarters,  when  he  made  a  demand  for  the  return 


106  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

of  the  two  horses  and  equipments  taken,  and  in  case  of 
their  not  being  returned,  payment  for  them,  and  in  default 
of  either,  he  threatened  the  destruction  of  the  town.  As 
the  captured  property  was  beyond  the  reach  of  the  coun- 
cil, the  matter  was  adjusted  by  the  payment  of  $900,  and 
the  handing  over  to  him  of  the  same  number  of  pistols 
taken.  For  these  he  would  not  receive  compensation  in 
money,  as  he  said  pistols  were  of  more  value  to  them 
than  money.  After  a  little  search  the  council  secured  by 
purchase  from  some  of  our  citizens  the  number  of  pistols 
wanted,  and  the  $900  were  paid  over  to  him  in  Confederate 
scrip.  Doubtless  he  expected  to  receive  United  States 
currency;  but  as  his  soldiers  had  flooded  the  town  with 
their  worthless  currency, .pronouncing  it  better  than  green- 
backs, the  city  fathers  took  him  at  his  word  and  paid  him 
in  his  own  money.  This  was  bought  up  of  our  business 
men  at  about  five  cents  on  the  dollar.  Seiders  afterward 
sold  the  horse  for  $175,  and  the  saddle  for  $35.  Out  of 
this  amount  he  refunded  what  the  transaction  cost  the 
council  ($75),  and  he  had  $135  left. 

General  Jenkins  also  issued  an  order  requiring  all  arms 
in  possession  of  our  citizens,  whether  public  or  private,  to 
be  brought  to  the  front  of  the  court-house  within  two 
hours;  and  in  case  of  disobedience  all  houses  were  to  be 
searched,  and  those  in  which  arms  were  found  should  be 
lawful  objects  of  plunder.  The  pretext  for  this  humili- 
ating order  was  that  his  troops  had  been  fired  on  by  a 
citizen  the  night  before.  Many  complied  with  this  requisi- 
tion, and  a  considerable  number  of  guns,  good,  bad,  and 
indifferent,  were  carried  to  the  appointed  place,  where  a 
committee  of  our  people  were  ordered  to  take  down  the 


CITIZENS    DISARMED.  107 

name  of  each  person  who  brought  a  gun.  This  was  to 
secure  the  houses  of  all  who  complied  with  the  order  from 
the  threatened  search.  Some,  of  course,  did  not  comply, 
but  enough  did  to  satisfy  the  enemy,  and  a  general  search 
was  avoided.  Captain  Fitzhugh,  Jenkins'  chief  of  staff, 
an  ill-natured  man  —  the  same  person  who  figured  so 
largely  in  the  burning  of  the  town  a  year  afterward  —  as- 
sorted the  guns  as  they  were  brought  in,  retaining  those 
that  could  be  used  by  their  men,  and  twisting  out  of  shape, 
or  breaking  over  the  stone  steps  of  the  court-house,  such 
as  were  unfit  for  service. 

During  the  whole  of  this  day  foraging  parties  were  sent 
out  to  all  parts  of  the  surrounding  country,  gathering 
horses  and  cattle,  of  which  large  numbers  were  taken  and 
sent  south  to  Williamsport  and  handed  over  to  Rodes' 
infantry.  One  of  these  plundering  parties  on  this  day 
visited  the  Caledonia  Iron  "Works,  situated  about  ten 
miles  east  of  Chambersburg,  at  the  foot  of  the  South 
Mountain,  and  belonging  to  Hon.  Thaddeus  Stevens. 
Under  the  promise  that  if  all  the  horses  and  mules  belong- 
ing to  the  establishment  were  delivered  to  them  the  iron 
works  would  not  be  burned,  about  forty  valuable  animals 
with  harness,  etc.,  were  carried  away.  Mr.  Stevens  came 
near  being  captured  by  this  party.  He  was  on  a  visit  to 
that  place,  and  upon  the  rumored  approach  of  the  Con- 
federates, was  hurried  away  to  Shippensburg  by  a  by- 
road, much  against  his  will  and  earnest  protest.  A  week 
later,  as  will  be  shown  in  its  appropriate  place,  these  iron 
works  were  fired  by  the  enemy  and  wholly  consumed. 

One  of  the  revolting  features  of  this  day  was  the  scour- 
ing of  the  fields  about  the  town  and  searching  of  house* 


108  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

in  portions  of  the  place  for  negroes.  These  poor  creatures 
— those  of  them  who  had  not  fled  upon  the  approach  of 
the  foe  —  sought  concealment  in  the  growing  wheat  fields 
about  the  town.  Into  these  the  cavalrymen  rode  in  search 
of  their  prey,  and  many  were  caught  —  some  after  a  desper- 
ate chase  and  being  fired  at.  In  two  cases,  through  the 
intercession  of  a  friend  who  had  influence  with  Jenkins,  I 
succeeded  in  effecting  the  release  of  the  captured  persons. 
That  this  practice  of  the  raid  was  not  confined  to  the 
vicinity  of  Chambersburg  alone,  but  was  practiced  else- 
where, is  proven  by  the  quotation  from  Rev.  Dr.  Behalf's 
diary  previously  given  in  which  he  said  that  colored  per- 
sons were  taken  and  sent  into  southern  slavery,  even 
"such  as  I  [he]  knew  to  have  been  born  and  raised  on 
free  soil."  In  some  cases  these  negroes  were  rescued  from 
the  guards,  who  were  conducting  them  South,  by  the  indig- 
nant people.  A  case  of  this  kind  occurred  in  Greencastle, 
in  which  a  few  determined  men,  armed  with  revolvers, 
captured  a  squad  which  had  in  charge  a  number  of  these 
poor  frightened  creatures,  and  released  them  from  the  un- 
happy fate  which  threatened  them.  This  feature  of  the 
war  indicated  the  object  for  which  it  was  waged,  to  estab- 
lish a  government  founded  upon  human  slavery.  Thank 
God,  the  effort,  as  well  as  the  iniquitous  cause  which  in- 
spired it,  not  only  failed,  but  went  down  never  again  to  be 
attempted  in  this  age  or  country.  That  slavery  was  the 
corner-stone  upon  which  the  government,  sought  to  be 
established  by  the  South,  was  to  rest,  is  proved  by  the 
admission  of  one  of  the  principal  persons  in  the  effort.* 

*Hon.  A.  H.  Stephens,  in  what  is  called  his  "Corner  Stone"  address, 
delivered  at  Savannah,  Georgia,  March  21,  1861.  That  part  of  this  address 
which  relates  to  slavery  will  be  found  in  Appendix  A. 


CAPTURE   OP   NEGROES.  109 

But  that  all  who  participated  in  the  war  against  the 
Federal  government,  either  did  not  entertain  the  same 
view  as  that  held  by  the  leaders  in  the  movement,  or  else 
changed  their  minds  during  the  progress  of  the  war,  is 
evident  in  the  following  thrilling  sentiment,  uttered  by 
Mr.  Maurice  Thompson,  a  Southern  man.* 

"I  am  a  Southerner; 
I  love  the  South;   I  dared  for  her 
To  fight  from  lookout  to  the  sea, 
With  her  proud  banner  over  me: 
But  from  my  lips  thanksgiving  broke, 
As  God  in  battle  thunder  spoke, 
And  that  Black  Idol,  breeding  drouth 
And  dearth  of  human  sympathy 
Throughout  the  sweet  and  sensuous  South 
Was,  with  its  chains  and  human  yoke, 
Blown  hellward  from  the  cannon's  mouth, 
While  Freedom  cheered  behind  the  smoke." 

Wednesday,  June  17.  About  eight  o'clock  this  morning 
General  Jenkins  ordered  the  stores  and  shops  to  be  opened 
for  two  hours,  and  that  his  men  should  be  permitted  to 
purchase  such  articles  as  they  personally  needed,  but  in  'all 
cases  must  pay  for  what  they  got.  Business  accordingly 
went  on  very  briskly  for  awhile  with  those  who  had  not 
removed  or  secreted  their  entire  stock.  Fortunately  for 
us  and  many  others,  but  little  was  found  in  our  stores ;  but 
what  little  we  had  which  the  soldiers  could  buy  under  the 
order  was  quickly  bought  up  and  paid  for  in  all  imagina- 
ble kinds  of  scrip.  Not  only  Confederate  notes  were  paid 
us,  but  shin  -  plasters  issued  by  the  city  of  Richmond  and 
other  southern  corporations.  While  this  traffic  was  in 
operation  a  Confederate  soldier  seized  a  number  of  rem- 
nants of  ladies'  dress  goods,  which  we  had  left  lie  on  the 

*This  beautiful  poem  will  be  found  in  Appendix  B. 


110  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

-counter,  not  thinking  them  worth  hiding,  and  putting 
them  under  his  arm  walked  out  and  down  past  Jenkins* 
head  -  quarters.  The  General  came  quickly  out  and  caught 
the  fellow  by  the  back  of  the  neck  and  ran  him  back  into 
the  store  on  the  double-quick,  saying  to  us  as  he  rushed 
him  up  to  the  counter,  "  Did  this  man  get  these  here?  and 
did  he  pay  for  them?"  Upon  being  told  that  he  had  taken 
them  and  had  not  paid  for  them,  the  General  drew  his 
sword,  and  flourishing  it  above  the  man's  head  and  swear- 
ing terribly,  said,  "  I've  a  mind  to  cut  your  head  off." 
Then  turning  to  us  he  said,  "  Sell  my  men  all  the  goods 
they  want;  but  if  any  one  attempts  to  take  anything  with- 
out paying  for  it,  report  to  me  at  my  head  -  quarters.  We 
are  not  thieves."  Some  of  the  officers  visited  the  drug 
stores  of  the  town  and  made  liberal  purchases,  telling  the 
proprietors  to  make  out  their  bills,  or  if  they  had  not  time 
to  do  so  to  guess  at  the  amount  and  it  would  be  paid. 

About  nine  o'clock,  while  we  were  doing  a  lively  busi- 
ness, a  soldier  came  "riding  at  great  speed  from  where  the 
main  body  were  stationed  out  on  the  Harrisburg  pike,  and 
reported  to  Jenkins  that  the  Yankees  were  coming.  The 
general  came  out  in  great  haste,  and  mounting  his  horse, 
and  in  a  voice  of  great  power,  ordered  the  men  to  the  front. 
A  rush  was  made  out  the  Harrisburg  pike,  and  soon  the 
town  was  free  from  the  enemy,  when  we  at  once  closed  our 
places  of  business.  In  the  course  of  an  hour  a  number  of 
men  returned  leading  the  horses,  and  went  on  down  the 
road  leading  to  Greencastle  to  the  outskirts  of  the  town 
and  there  waited.  Jenkins  had  dismounted  his  men  and 
was  prepared  to  fight  the  expected  Yankees  as  infantry. 
They  were  armed  with  Enfield  rifles  as  well  as  sabres.  In 
the  course  of  about  an  hour  afterward,  these  dismounted 


MOVEMENTS    OF    THE    CONFEDERATES.  Ill 

men  fell  back  and  marched  through  the  town  and  out  to 
where  their  horses  were,  and,  after  remounting,  continued 
to  fall  back  to  the  vicinity  of  Greencastle.  The  news  of 
the  occupation  of  our  town  by  the  Confederates  was  known 
all  over  the  country,  and  great  numbers  of  people,  as  well 
as  some  Federal  scouts,  moved  by  curiosity,  or  a  desire  to 
ascertain  precisely  where  the  enemy  were,  had  come  within 
sight  of  the  men  in  line  of  battle  on  Shirk's  Hill.  Seeing 
these,  and  hearing  of  the  gathering  of  troops  at  Harris- 
burg,  and  that  a  large  body  was  advancing,  they  were 
alarmed,  and,  supposing  themselves  to  be  in  danger  of  being 
attacked  in  overwhelming  numbers,  or  flanked  and  cut  off', 
they  fell  back  within  supporting  distance  of  the  Confed- 
erate infantry  at  Williamsport.  As  Jenkins  and  his  staff 
rode  up  street  after  the  dismounted  men  had  all  passed 
nearly  out  of  sight,  a  number  of  our  citizens  were  standing 
upon  the  pavement  in  front  of  the  court-house.  Suppos- 
ing that  they  might  be  armed  and  intended  to  fire  upon 
them,  the  general  and  his  staff'  drew  their  pistols  and  rode 
toward  the  citizens.  A  stampede,  of  course,  ensued.  As 
the  last  of  the  soldiers  was  leaving  the  northern  end  of 
the  town,  they  set  fire  to  a  large  frame  warehouse  then 
belonging  to  Messrs.  Oaks  &  Linn,  but  it  was  speedily 
extinguished  by  the  citizens  in  that  vicinity.  The  firing 
of  that  warehouse,  and  the  destruction  of  the  Scotland 
railroad  bridge,  were  the  only  acts  of  real  destruction 
attempted.  True,  many  horses,  cattle,  and  other  things 
were  taken,  but  all  was  within  the  rules  of  war,  except  the 
carrying  awray  of  free  negroes. 

After  Jenkins   withdrew  his   force   to   the  vicinity  of 
Greencastle,  he  sent  out  foraging  parties  in  all  directions 


112  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

in  search  of  additional  plunder.  One  detachment  consist- 
ing  of  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  under  the  com- 
mand of  Colonel  Ferguson  crossed  the  Cove  Mountain  by 
way  of  Mercersburg,  reaching  McConnellsburg,  the  county 
seat  of  Fulton  County,  shortly  after  daylight  on  Thurs- 
day. This  was  the  first  appearance  of  the  Confederates  in 
that  place  and  the  inhabitants  were  terribly  alarmed  as 
they  arose  from  their  beds  to  find  the  town  in  possession 
of  the  dreaded  enemy.  A  vigorous  search  was  at  once 
instituted  for  horses,  of  which  a  large  number  was  taken. 
The  stores  and  shops  were  also  visited,  and  although  the 
alarm  had  extended  there  and  stocks  were  nearly  all  re- 
moved or  concealed,  a  considerable  amount  of  valuable 
articles  was  taken.  In  some  cases  these  were  paid  for  in 
Confederate  scrip.  The  streets,  after  their  departure,  were 
lined  with  old  shoes,  boots,  and  hats  which  had  been 
thrown  aside  for  better  ones.  About  one  mile  north  of  the 
town  a  drove  of  fat  cattle,  valued  at  about  six  thousand 
dollars,  belonging  to  Ex -Sheriff  J.  W.  Taylor  of  this 
place,  was  grazing.  These  were  taken,  and  together  with 
the  horses  which  had  been  captured,  were  driven  with 
them  and  handed  over  to  Rodes'  infantry  at  Williamsport. 
On  the  following  Sunday  this  same  body  of  the  enemy 
plundered  the  stores  and  shops  of  Greencastle.  Had  it 
not  been  that  the  business  men  there  as  elsewhere  had 
removed  their  stocks,  the  losses  would  have  been  much 
greater.  Another  detachment  was  sent  east,  and  after 
plundering  the  rich  country  about  Wayncsborough,  crossed 
the  south-eastern  flank  of  the  South  Mountain,  where, 
at  the  Monterey  Pass,  on  Sunday,  the  21st,  the  Philadel- 
phia City  troop  and  Bell's  cavalry  of  Gettysburg,  encoun- 


VALUE  OF  PROPERTY  TAKEN.  113 

tered  their  pickets.  In  the  evening  of  the  same  day  about 
one  hundred  and  twenty  of  them  entered  Fair-field,  and 
returned  again  by  the  Furnace  road,  taking  with  them  all 
the  good  horses  they  could  find. 

From  the  time  that  these  cavalrymen  fell  back  from  this 
place  to  below  Greencastle — Wednesday,  the  17th  —  until 
Monday  morning,  the  22d,  the  whole  southern  portion  of 
Franklin  county  was  plundered  by  these  men,  and  the  cap- 
tures made  were  transferred  to  Rodes'  division  at  "Wil- 
liamsport.  It  would  be  difiicult  to  estimate  the"  value  of 
the  property  taken  by  this  raid,  but  it  certainly  amounted 
to  not  less  than  one  hundred  thousand  dollars.  Then  its 
coming  in  the  season  of  the  year  when  the  farming  inter- 
ests required  the  use  of  the  horses,  and  followed  a  few 
days  afterward  by  Lee's  vast  army,  which  added  vastly  to 
the  amount  taken,,  increased  immensely  its  inconvenience 
and  loss.  Many  croppers  who  had  little  else  than  their 
stock,  were  bankrupted.  The  effect  of  this  raid,  however, 
was  to  arouse  the  people  of  Pennsylvania  and  the  whole 
North,  and  volunteers  for  the  defense  of  the  border  hur- 
ried to  Harrisburg. 

By  Monday  morning,  the  22d,  the  various  detachments 
of  Jenkins'  command  had  all  rejoined  the  main  body  be- 
tween Greencastle  and  Hagerstown,  where,  on  that  day, 
they  were  joined  by  Rodes'  division  of  infantry,  when  the 
real  invasion  of  the  State  was  begun. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   INVASION. 

the  week  while  Jenkins  was  raiding  the 
southern  border  of  Pennsylvania,  the  corps  of  Hill 
_Ji  and  Longstreet  were  on  the  march  to  the  Potomac, 

A  while  the  Federal  army  was  moving  parallel  to 
'  them  on  the  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  Resuming 
our  narrative  of  the  daily  movements  of  these  two  armies 
where  we  left  off  in  a  previous  chapter  to  detail  the  dis- 
astrous affair  at  Winchester,  and  the  raid  of  Jenkins,  we 
commence  with: 

Monday,  June  15.  The  head  -  quarters  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  were  this  day  moved  from  Dumfries  to  Fair- 
fax Station;  the  Second  Corps  moved  from  Falmouth  to 
near  Aquia;  the  Fifth  Corps  from  Catlett's  Station  via 
Bristoe  Station  to  Manassas  Junction;  the  Sixth  Corps 
from  Aquia  Creek  and  Stafford  Court -House  to  Dum- 
fries; the  Twelfth  Corps  from  Dumfries  to  Fairfax  Court- 
House;  the  Cavalry  Corps  guarding  the  left  flank  of  the 
army  left  Warrentown  Junction  and  moved  to  Union 
Mills  and  Bristoe  Station;  the  Artillery  Reserve  moved 
from  "Wolf  Run  Shoals  to  Fairfax  Court -House;  and  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  after  marching  all  the  previous  night 
arrived  at  Centreville. 

Tuesday,  16.  This  day  the  Second  Corps  marched  from 
near  Aquia  via  Dumfries  to  Wolf  Run  Shoals,  on  the 

114 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  ARMIES.  115 

Occoquan;  the  Sixth  Corps  from  Dumfries  to  Fairfax  Sta- 
tion; and  the  Cavalry  Corps  from  Union  Mills  and  Bristoe 
.Station  to  Manassas  Junction  and  Bull  Run. 

General  Longstreet,  after  leaving  Culpeper  Court - 
House,  inarched  directly  across  the  county  east  of  the 
Blue  Ridge.  His  object  was  to  cover  Ewell  and  Hill  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Stuart's  cavalry,  on  this  day,  left 
its  encampment  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Rappahannock 
and  moved  along  Longstreet's  right  flank.  Longstreet 
hoped  that  Hooker  might  be  tempted  to  turn  about  and 
.attack  either  himself,  or  Hill  and  Ewell  through  one  of  the 
gaps  of  the  mountain,  in  which  case  Stuart  was  to  take 
advantage  of  any  opportunity  which  might  offer  and  in- 
terpose between  the  Federals  and  Washington.  General 
Hooker,  however,  understood  his  antagonist's  designs,  and 
adhered  to  his  main  purpose  to  make  the  safety  of  the 
National  Capital  the  paramount  consideration.  Accord- 
ingly, he  directed  the  daily  movements  of  his  army  so 
:as  to  insure  this  object,  until  that  army  was  posted  about 
Centreville,  Manassas,  and  Fairfax  Court -House,  entirely 
covering  all  the  approaches  to  "Washington. 

About  this  time  while  the  whole  North  was  in  a  state 
•of  commotion  and  excitement  consequent  upon  the  ap- 
proach of  the  foe,  the  Confederate  Capital  was  also  thrown 
into  a  state  of  consternation  by  the  approach  of  Federal 
troops  from  the  Peninsula.  General  Dix,  who  commanded 
at  Fortress  Monroe,  received  orders  from  Washington  to 
advance  upon  Richmond,  which,  it  was  believed,  was 
weakly  defended  at  that  time.  Troops  were  accordingly 
sent  by  water  and  landed  at  Yorktown.  General  Getty,  in 
command  of  one  column  of  about  seven  thousand  men, 


116  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

moved  as  far  as  Hanover  Junction  to  destroy  the  bridges 
over  the  North  and  South  Anna.  At  the  same  time  Gen- 
eral Keys,  with  another  column  of  about  five  thousand 
men,  moved  from  the  "White  House  to  secure  Bottom's 
Bridge,  on  the  Chickahominy,  and  thus  leave  a  clear  road 
for  General  Getty's  column  to  advance  on  the  city.  The 
consternation  in  the  Confederate  Capital  was  so  great  that 
it  was  in  contemplation  at  one  time  to  recall  Lee's  forces. 
Troops  were,  however,  hurriedly  brought  from  the  arar- 
risons  of  South  Carolina  and  other  places,  which,  with  the 
militia  that  was  called  out,  were  sufficient  to  defend  the 
place. 

Wednesday,  17.  The  First  Corps  marched  from  Man- 
assas  Junction  to  Herndon  Station;  the  Second  Corps 
from  Wolf  Run  Shoals  to  Sangster's  Station;  the  Third 
Corps  from  Manassas  Junction  to  Centreville;  the  Fifth 
Corps  from  Manassas  Junction  to  Gum  Springs;  the 
Eleventh  Corps  from  Centreville  to  Cow -Horn  Ford,  or 
Trappe  Rock,  on  Goose  Creek;  and  the  Twelfth  Corps 
from  Fairfax  Court  -  House  to  near  Dranesville. 

The  Cavalry  Corps,  on  this  day,  left  its  encampment  at 
Manassas  Junction  and  Bull  Run,  and  moved  to  Aldie, 
where,  after  a  sanguinary  contest  with  part  of  Stuart's 
force  under  General  Fitz  Hugh  Lee,  whicji  had  reached 
that  place  by  a  forced  march  to  anticipate  our  troops  in 
holding  that  gap,  the  enemy  were  put  to  flight,  and  that 
important  pass  was  taken  and  held  by  the  Union  forces. 

Thursday,  18.  The  head -quarters  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  were  this  day  moved  from  Fairfax  Station  to 
Fairfax  Court -House;  the  Sixth  Corps  moved  from  Fair- 
fax Station  to  Germantown ;  and  the  Twelfth  Corps  from 


MOVEMENTS   OF   THE   ARMIES.  117 

near  Dranesville  to  Leesburg.  J.  I.  Gregg's  cavalry  brig- 
ade advanced  from  Aldie  to  Middleburg,  and  returned  to  a 
point  midway  between  the  two  places. 

Sanguinary  engagements  occurred  between  the  cavalry 
of  the  two  armies,  with  continued  success  for  the  Union 
forces.  •  * 

General  Lee  with  Longstreet's  corps  arrived  this  day  at 
Berryville,  where  he  remained  several  days,  perfecting  his 
preparations  for  the  invasion  of  Maryland  and  Pennsyl- 
vania. 

Friday,  19.  The  First  Corps  marched  from  Herndon 
Station  to  Guilford  Station;  the  Third  Corps  from  Cen- 
treville  to  Gum  Springs;  and  the  Fifth  Corps  from  Gum 
Springs  to  Aldie.  The  cavalry  engagements  of  the  two 
preceding  days  were  renewed  on  this  day  and  the  enemy 
were  again  worsted.  General  Pleasanton  succeeded  in 
taking  the  two  important  passes  of  the  mountain,  Aldie 
and  Thoroughfare  gaps,  through  which  the  enemy  must 
pass  if  he  would  cross  the  Potomac  east  of  the  mountain, 
t)r  if  he  would  obtain  information  of  the  movements  of  the 
Federal  army.  Pleasanton,  therefore,  asked  for  infantry 
supports  in  order  to  secure  them  against  re -capture. 
Accordingly  the  Fifth  Corps  reached  Aldie  this  day. 

Saturday,  20.  The  Second  Corps,  in  accordance  with 
General  Pleasanton's  request,  moved  from  Sangster's  Sta- 
tion to  Centerville,  and  thence  toward  Thoroughfare  Gap ; 
the  second  division  (Howe's)  of  the  Sixth  Corps  advanced 
from  Germantown  to  Bristoe  Station. 

Sunday,  21.  The  Second  Corps  arrived  at  Thoroughfare 
Oap.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  these  two  important  places 
— Aldie  and  Thoroughfare  —  were  now  strongly  held  by 


118  THE    GREAT  INVASION. 

Federal  infantry,  the  former  by  the  Fifth  Corps  and  the- 
latter  by  the  Second.  Apprehending,  however,  that  Stuart 
would  throw  his  whole  force  upon  Gregg's  division  at  Up- 
peryille,  Pleasanton  went  forward  with  his  entire  command 
supported  by  Barnes'  (first)  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  to 
support  it.  After  a  series  of  brilliant  engagements,  Stuart 
was  driven  steadily  back  into  Ashby's,  where  he  took 
refuge  behind  a  portion  of  Longstreet's  corps,  which  had 
come  to  his  support.  This  day  StahPs  division  of  cavalry, 
from  the  defenses  of  Washington,  moved  out  from  Fairfax 
Court  -  House  via  Centerville  and  Gainesville  to  Buckland 
Mills. 

The  situation  now  may  be  stated  thus:  General  Hooker 
had  the  various  corps  of  his  army  so  placed  that  every 
approach  to  Washington,  south  of  the  Potomac,  was 
effectually  guarded.  In  addition  to  this  he  had  Lee  hope- 
lessly enclosed  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  unable  either  to- 
pass  to  the  east  of  the  mountain  and  cross  the  Potomac 
at  the  places  intended,  or  to  obtain  information  of  the 
movements  of  the  Federal  army.  General  Pleasanton,. 
in  the  Annals  of  the  War,  page  451,  in  summing  up  the 
results  of  the  series  of  cavalry  engagements  of  the  four 
preceding  days,  resulting  in  the  capture  and  holding  of 
Aldie  and  Thoroughfare  gaps,  states  them  thus:  "On. 
the  evening  of  the  16th  of  June,  the  Cavalry  Corps 
encamped  near  Mauassas,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
occupying  positions  between  that  point  and  Fairfax 
Court -House.  After  consulting  with  General  Hooker 
it  was  decided  that  I  should  proceed  by  the  way  of  Aldie, 
through  the  Bull  Run  Mountains,  into  London  Valley,  to- 
ascertain  if  Lee's  army,  or  any  portion  of  it,  were  in  that 


MOVEMENTS   OF   THE   ARMIES.  119 

vicinity.  I  started  early  on  the  17th,  made  a  long  march 
of  twenty -five  miles,  and  about  five  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, shortly  after  we  had.  entered  the  pass,  met  the 
enemy's  cavalry  coming  through.  After  a  hard  fight  for 
several  hours,  we  drove  them  back  to  the  west  side  of  the 
mountains.  On  the  18th  and  19th  we  were  again  engaged, 
and  forced  theni  beyond  Middleburg,  about  nine  miles 
from  Aldie,  and  on  the  21st,  advancing  with  Buford  on 
the  road  to  Union,  and  Gregg  on  the  Upperville  road,  we 
swept  the  London  Valley  to  the  base  of  the  Blue  Ridge, 
fighting  our  way  the  whole  distance.  Near  Upperville 
the  fighting  was  severe,  several  brigades,  on  each  side, 
being  engaged  in  charging  each  other;  but  such  was  the 
dash  and  spirit  of  our  cavalry  that  the  enemy  could  not 
withstand  it,  and  retreated  through  Ashby's  gap  badly 
worsted.  General  Buford,  on  the  right,  sent  some  parties 
to  the  top  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  they  reported  large 
masses  of  infantry  and  camps  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
toward  "Winchester.  There  being  no  infantry  in  the  Lou- 
don  Valley,  it  was  evident  General  Lee  did  not  intend 
to  cross  the  Potomac  lower  down  than  Shepherdstown. 
These  facts  were  reported  to  General  Hooker  on  the  night 
of  the  21st  of  June,  and  he  shortly  after  set  the  army 
in  motion  for  the  vicinity  of  Frederick  City,  Maryland, 
Buford's  division  of  cavalry  taking  up  a  position  at  Mid- 
dletown,  to  the  west  of  Frederick  City." 

General  Doubleday,  in  his  "  Chancellors ville  and  Gettys- 
burg," on  pages  101  and  102,  in  stating  these  results,  says: 
;<  It  is  very  certain  that  the  loss  of  the  pass  at  Aldie  was 
a  serious  blow  to  the  Confederate  cause.  This,  supple- 
mented by  Colonel  Dufiie's  operations,  gave  Hooker  pos- 


120  THE   GKEAT   INVASION. 

session  of  London  County,  and  threw  the  invading  column 
far  to  the  west.  If  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  posting 
forces  in  the  gaps  of  the  Bull  Hun  range  of  mountains, 
and  in  occupying  the  wooded  country  between  Thorough- 
fare Gap  and  Leesburg,  they  would  not  only  have  hidden 
their  own  movements  from  view,  but  would  have  had 
command  of  the  Potomac  from  Harper's  Ferry  to  within 
thirty  miles  of  Washington,  so  that  they  could  have 
operated  on  either  side  of  the  river." 

Having  posted  his  army  so  as  to  cover  completely  the 
National  Capital,  as  well  as  confine  his  antagonist  to  the 
valley  west  of  the  mountain,  General  Hooker  wisely  con- 
cluded to  wait  for  further  developments.  He  found  it 
difficult  to  believe  that  Lee  would  still  further  lengthen  out 
his  long  line  from  Richmond,  and  endanger  his  communi- 
cations by  continuing  his  course  northward,  and  accord- 
ingly determined  to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  meet  any 
exigency  which  the  further  movements  cf  his  adversary 
might  render  necessary.  Leaving  General  Hooker  we 
turn  our  attention  in  another  direction  and  note  what  was 
transpiring  there. 

On  Saturday,  20,  General  Ivnipe  was  sent  from  Harris- 
burg,  Pennsylvania,  up  the  valley  with  parts  of  two  regi- 
ments of  New  York  militia,  numbering  about  eight 
hundred  men.  These  were  the  first  to  reach  the  State 
Capital  in  response  to  the  call  of  Governor  Curtin.  The 
object  of  these  troops  was,  to  assist  in  rebuilding  the  rail- 
road bridge  at  Scotland,  a  station  on  the  Cumberland 
Valley  Railroad  about  four  miles  north-east  of  Cham- 
bersburg,  which  was  destroyed  by  Jenkins  on  Tuesday 
preceding,  and  then  to  proceed  to  the'  latter  place.  On  the 


GENERAL   LEE'S   ORDERS.  121 

following  day  —  Sunday,  21, — after  completing  their  task 
at  Scotland,  to  which  place  they  had  come  by  rail,  they 
came  on  to  Chambersburg  and  encamped  in  a  grove  about 
one  mile  south  of  the  town,  alongside  of  the  road  leading 
to  Greencastle  and  Hagerstown,  where  for  the  present  we 
may  leave  them. 

On  this  day,  Sunday,  21,  General  Lee,  then  at  Berry - 
ville,  south  of  the  Potomac,  issued  the  following  general 
order: 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 

June  2ist,  1863. 
General  Orders  No.  72. 

While  in  the  enemy's  country,  the  following  regulations  for  procuring 
supplies  will  be  strictly  observed,  and  any  violation  of  them  promptly  and 
vigorously  punished : 

I.  No  private  property  shall  be  injured  or  destroyed  by  any  person  belong- 
ing to  or  connected  with  the  army,  or  taken,  except  by  the  officer  hereinafter 
•designated. 

II.  The  chiefs  of  the  commissary,  quartermaster,  ordnance  and  medical 
departments  of  the  army  will  make  requisitions  upon  the  local  authorities  or 
inhabitants  for  the  necessary  supplies  for  their  respective  departments,  desig- 
nating the  places  and  times  of  delivery.     All  persons  complying  with  such 
requisitions  shall  be  paid  the  market  price  for  the  articles  furnished,  if  they 
so  desire,  and  the  officer  making  such  payment  shall  make  duplicate  receipts 
for  the  same,  specifying  the  name  of  the  person  paid,  and  the  quantity,  kind, 
and  price  of  the  property,  one  of  which  receipts  shall  be  at  once  forwarded 
to  the  chief  of  the  department  to  which  such  officer  is  attached. 

III.  Should  the  authorities  or  inhabitants  neg'.ect  or  refuse  to  comply  with 
such  requisition,  the  supplies  required  shall  be  taken  from  the  nearest  in- 
habitants so  refusing,  by  the  orders  and  under  the  directions  of  the  respective 
chiefs  of  the  departments  named. 

IV.  When  any  command  is  detached  from  the  main  body,  the  chiefs  of  the 
several  departments  of  such  command  will  procure  supplies  for  the  same,  and 
such  other  stores  as  they  may  be   ordered  to  provide,  in  the   manner  and 
subject  to  the  provisions  herein   prescribed,  reporting  their  action  to  the 
heads  of  their  respective  departments,  to  which  they  will  forward  duplicates 
of  all  vouchers  given  or  received. 

V.  All  persons  who  shall  decline  to  receive  payment  for  property  fur- 
nished on  requisitions,  and  all  from  whom  it  shall  be  necessary  to  take  stores 


122  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

or  supplies,  shall  be  furnished  by  the  officers  receiving  or  taking  the  same 
with  a  receipt  specifying  the  kind  and  quantity  of  the  property  received  or 
taken,  as  the  case  may  be,  the  name  of  the  person  from  whom  it  was  received 
or  taken,  the  command  for  the  use  of  which  it  is  intended,  and  the  market 
price.  A  duplicate  of  said  receipt  shall  be  at  once  forwarded  to  the  chief  of 
the  department  to  which  the  officer  by  whom  it  is  executed  is  attached. 

VI.  If  any  person  shall  remove  or  conceal  property  necessary  for  the  use 
of  the  army,  or  attempt  to  do  so,  the  officers  hereinbefore  mentioned  will 
cause  such  property  and  all  other  property  belonging  to  such  persons  that 
may  be  required  by  the  army,  to  be  seized,  and  the  officer  seizing  the  same 
will  forthwith  report  to  the  chief  of  his  department  the  kind,  quantity  and 
market  price  of  the  property  so  seized,  and  the  name  of  the  owner. 

By  command  of  GENERAL  R.  E.  LEE. 

R.  H.  CHILTON,  A.  A.  and  I.  G. 

Whether  or  not  this  order  was  printed  before  the  army 
reached  Chambersburg  I  can  not  say,  but  on  Wednesday 
following,  along  with  an  order  issued  by  Lieutenant  -  Gen- 
eral Ewell,  which,  with  other  papers,  was  printed  at  one 
of  the  printing  establishments  in  Chambersburg,  it  was 
freely  distributed  upon  slips  among  the  people.  Its  object 
was,  as  will  be  seen  by  its  perusal,  to  define  the  general 
plan  of  operations  of  his  army  while  in  our  State  in  pro- 
curing supplies.  This  plan,  to  the  credit  of  General  Lee 
be  it  said,  was  designed  to  confine  the  demands  of  his 
army,  and  the  methods  employed  in  securing  them,  within 
the  limits  of  civilized  warfare.  The  execution  of  these 
demands,  however,  would  bear  heavily  upon  the  people 
where  his  army  would  march,  but  the  humane  regulations 
established  would  and  did  prevent  entering  private  houses, 
and  the  indiscriminate  plunder  of  private  property. 

Monday,  22.  On  the  morning  of  this  day  two  compa- 
nies of  home  guards,  composed  of  citizens  of  Chambers- 
burg, went  out  and  joined  the  New  York  militia -men. 
The  home  guards  were  mostly  sent  out  on  the  Greencastle 


MOVEMENTS    ABOUT    CHAMBERSBURG. 

road  to  do  picket  duty,  while  the  militia  -  men  spent  much 
of  their  time  in  drill  exercise  with  two  beautiful  brass 
howitzers  which  they  had  brought  with  them.  These 
guns  they  had  placed  upon  a  hill  adjoining  their  camp,, 
which  commanded  the  Greencastle  road.  Sometime  in 
the  afternoon  a  person  supposed  to  be  a  woman  came  into 
the  camp.  She  was  attired  in  mourning  apparel,  with  her 
face  almost  concealed  in  a  black  bonnet  of  somewhat  anti- 
quated style.  She  went  about  the  camp  pretending  to  be 
silly,  and  inquired  where  a  certain  farmer  lived  whom  no- 
one  knew.  Some  of  the  home  guard  suspected  that  the 
mysterious  person  was  a  man  in  disguise,  and  advised 
the  colonel  in  command  to  arrest  her.  He  replied  that 
she  was  only  a  silly  woman,  and  must  not  be  disturbed. 
At  length  she  left  the  camp,  and  when  last  seen  was  mak- 
ing her  way  at  a  brisk  pace  southward  on  the  railroad. 
That  this  pretended  woman  was  a  Confederate  scout,  sent 
by  Jenkins  in  advance  to  ascertain  what  force  and  prepa- 
rations were  here  for  their  reception,  is  clear.  This  sus- 
picion is  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  previous  to  every 
Confederate  advance,  scouts  preceded  the  main  body  and 
mingled  with  our  people.  A  few  days  before  Jenkins'  first 
advance,  two  strange  men  came  to  Greencastle  and  re- 
mained at  a  hotel  there  until  the  cavalry  of  this  general 
entered  that  place,  when  they  threw  off  their  disguise  by 
uniting  with  the  Confederates  and  telling  the  landlord  to 
charge  their  bills  to  the  Southern  Confederacy. 

At  an  early  hour  in  the  morning  of  this  day,  Rodes* 
division  of  Swell's  corps,  which  was  encamped  about  Wil- 
liamsport  for  a  week,  advanced  down  the  valley  by  the  road 
leading  directly  to  Greencastle,  at  which  place  the  head 


124  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

of  the  column,  about  10  o'clock  A.  M.,  came  up  to  Jenkins' 
cavalry.  About  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  the  infantry, 
Jenkins  sent  a  detachment  of  cavalry  in  the  direction  of 
Chambersburg  for  the  purpose  of  reconnoitering.  At 
Marion — six  miles  south  of  that  place — this  force  came 
unexpectedly  upon  Mr.  D.  K.  Appenzellar,  then  a  young 
man  and  a  resident  of  Greencastle,  who  was  011  his 
way  to  Chambersburg  to  enter  tho  military  service.  Hav- 
ing captured  him  and  the  fine  horse  upon  which  he  was 
riding,  and  which  he  was  having  shod  when  the  force 
came  suddenly  upon  him,  they  plied  him  with  questions  as 
to  what  was  the  latest  news,  and  where  troops  were  col- 
lecting, and  how  many  were  in  Chambersburg.  To  their 
inquiries  he  said  that  he  had  been  in  Chambersburg  the 
day  before  and  was  told  there  that  General  McClellan  was 
on  the  way  from  Ilarrisburg  with  forty  thousand  men. 
This  was  the  usual  stereotyped  story  which  was  always 
floating  around  when  we  were  threatened  with  a  raid. 
The  cavalrymen  seemed  to  credit  Mr.  Appenzellar's  state- 
ment and  were  inclined  to  retrace  their  steps.  Just  at  this 
juncture  Captain  Boyd,  with  his  bold  and  dashing  com- 
pany of  the  First  !New  York  Cavalry,  who  had  covered 
the  wagon  train  in  its  rapid  flight  the  Monday  before, 
as  related  in  the  previous  chapter,  came  in  sight  and 
dashed  toward  the  enemy.  Remembering  Mr.  Appenzel- 
*  lar's  story  of  General  McClellan  with  his  forty  thousand 
men,  and  perhaps  supposing  that  these  dashing  horsemen 
were  the  advance  of  this  force,  the  Confederates  fled 
back  toward  Greencastle,  taking  Mr.  Appenzellar  with 
them.  When  within  about  half  a  mile  of  the  town  the 
main  body  of  Jenkins'  force,  with  the  advance  of  liodes' 


FIRST   BATTLE  IN   PENNSYLVANIA.  125 

infantry,  were  met,  and  seeing  the  scouting  party  re- 
treating pursued  by  Captain  Boyd  and  his  troopers,  and 
unaware  of  the  number  of  Federals  who  might  be  near  at 
hand  and  upon  them,  a  line  of  battle  was  hastily  formed. 
Fences  were  torn  down  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  road, 
and  Rodes'  infantry  took  a  position  upon  the  high*  ground 
of  Mr.  John  Kissecker's  farm.  Jenkins  threw  his  cavalry 
forward  and  formed  a  skirmish  line  upon  the  land  of  Mr. 
William  Flemming,  about  a  quarter  ^>f  a  mile  in  advance 
of  the  infantry/'  Jenkins  established  his  headquarters  in 
Mr.  Flemming's  house.  As  soon  as  the  Union  cavalry 
came  within  range  of  their  guns,  fire  was  opened  upon 

«y.  .*      '"*(*<'  *' 

them,  and  for  a  time  the  noise  and  clatter  were  quite 
lively.  A  sister  of  Mr.  Flemming,  going  to  the  window 
to  look  out,  barely  escaped  a  ball  which  came  crashing  in 
through  the  glass  close  by  her  head.  As  soon  as  the  dash 
and  curiosity  of  these  bold  riders  were  satisfied  they  with- 
drew out  of  range,  and  were  pursued  by  part  of  Jenkins 
force.  Mr.  Appenzellar,  who  wa6  a  witness  of  this  engage- 
ment, says  that  of  all  the  bold  and  fearless  soldiers  he  ever 
saw  —  and  he  saw  many  and  had  a  large  experience  during 
the  war  —  these  New  York  cavalrymen  exceeded  any  in 
these  qualities.  *  And  had  they  gone  but  a  short  distance 
further  they  would  have  come  into  a  cross  fire  which 
would  have  swept  them  nearly  all  away.  Their  foresight, 
however,  was  equal  to  their  courage,  and  they  knew  when 
to  stop. 

The  result  of  this  fight  was  one  man  killed  and  one 
wounded  upon  the  Federal  side.  The  killed  was  Corporal 
Rihl.  He  was  shot  through  the  upper  lip,  the  ball  passing 
through  his  head,  his  blood  bespattering  the  paling  fence 


126  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

in  front  of  Mr.  Fleming's  dwelling.  The  wounded  was 
Sergeant  Cafferty,  who  was  shot  through  the  leg.  A 
correspondent  of  the  Greencastle  Pilot,  in  its  issue  of  July 
28th,  1863,  says  that  the  Confederates  lost  two  men  killed. 
This  account,  however,  has  not  been  confirmed  by  any 
other  authority.  Corporal  Rihl  was  buried  by  the  Con- 
federates in  a  shallow  grave,  but  the  citizens  of  Green- 
castle,  a  few  days  afterward,  disinterred  his  body  and 
placing  it  in  a  coffin,  reburied  it  in  the  Lutheran  grave- 
yard of  that  place.  Sergeant  Cafferty  was  taken  in  charge 
and  cared  for  in  Greencastle,  where,  attended  by  one  of 
the  physicians  of  that  place,  he  recovered.  Rihl  Post  of 
the  Grand  Army  of  the  Republic  of  Greencastle  was  named 
after  this  brave  soldier  who  fell  in  that  engagement. 

This  battle — if  such  it  may  be  called  —  was  the  first  to 
occur  upon  Pennsylvania  soil  during  the  rebellion,  and 
Corporal  Rihl  was  the  first  to  lose  his  life.* 

As  an  introduction  to  the  next  scene  in  the  interesting 
chain  of  events  under  consideration,  I  give  the  following 
statement  by  Mr.  A.  J.  Schaff,  who  was  an  eye  -  witness  of 
what  he  relates : 

"  On  the  22d  of  June,  1863, 1  was  in  Marion  with  many 
others  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  such  information  as  I 
<3ould  in  regard  to  the  movements  of  the  Confederates. 
When  on  my  way  home,  which  was  about  two  miles 


*OnJune22d,  1886,  the  twenty -third  anniversary  of  this  battle,  Rihl  Post, 
•Grand  Army  of  the  Republic  of  Greencastle,  assisted  by  several  other  posts 
from  abroad,  and  an  immense  gathering  of  people,  again  exhumed  the  re- 
mains of  this  first  martyr  to  the  cause  of  the  Union  upon  Pennsylvania  soil, 
and  reinterred  them  near  the  place  where  he  fell.  A  beautiful  monument  is 
to  be  erected  over  his  grave,  and  the  place  will  henceforth  be  held  as  one 
of  the  sacred  shrines  of  our  country. 


THE   FEDERALS   ABOUT   CHAMBERSBURG.  127 

south-east  of  the  town,  I  heard  the  discharge  of  guns, 
and  upon  looking  in  the  direction  of  the  road  leading 
from  Green  castle  to  Chambersburg,  I  saw  Confederate  and 
Union  cavalry  approaching  each  other.  The  Union  troops 
were  moving  out  from  the  southern  part  of  Marion,  and 
the  Confederates  were  moving  toward  them,  and  were 
about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  south  of  them  on  the  Chambers- 
burg  road.  These  were  part  of  Jenkins'  force.  A  few 
shots  from  the  Union  cavalry  drove  the  Confederates  back 
to  near  Greencastle,  where  a  short  engagement  took  place. 
The  Union  cavalry  were  driven  back,  and  were  followed 
by  the  Confederates  to  near  Marion,  where  the  latter  went 
into  camp  upon  the  land  of  Michael  Slothour,  two  miles 
south  of  the  town.  While  these  troops  were  going  into 
camp,  I  climbed  up  into  a  tree,  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
to  the  east  of  them,  for  the  purpose  of  estimating  their 
numbers,  so  that  I  could  report  the  same  to  the  military 
who  were  near  Chambersburg.  Having  been  in  the  army, 
I  could  make  a  tolerably  fair  estimate  of  their  number. 
After  remaining  in  the  tree  until  I  was  satisfied  as  to  my 
estimate,  which  was  that  there  were  not  less  than  one 
thousand  of  them,  and  that  all  were  not  then  in  camp,  I 
descended  and  started  at  once  for  Chambersburg,  taking 
to  the  fields  lest  I  might  be  intercepted  by  the  Confeder- 
ates. When  I  came  to  that  point  where  the  Gabby  road 
intersects  the  road  to  Chambersburg,  I  encountered  a 
Federal  cavalry  picket.  He  asked  me  what  I  knew  of 
the  Confederates,  when  I  told  him  they  were  in  force 
below  Marion,  and  that  he  had  better  keep  a  sharp  look- 
out in  all  directions.  After  leaving  this  picket,  I  con- 
tinued on  in  the  direction  of  Chambersburg,  and  at  a 


128  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

point  about  three  miles  and  a  half  south  of  the  town, 
I  came  up  to  General  Knipe  and  his  staff.  They  were  on 
the  Greencastle  road,  were  mounted,  but  standing  still. 
"When  I  came  up  to  them,  General  Knipe  asked  me  if 
I  knew  anything  of  the  movements  of  the  Confederates. 
I  told  him  what  I  had  seen,  when  he  inquired  of  me  if 
there  were  any  roads  running  parallel  with  the  one  he 
was  on,  by  which  the  Confederates  could  get  in  his  rear. 
I  told  him  that  they  could  by  the  Warm  Spring  road, 
and  by  the  road  to  the  east  of  the  one  he  was  on.  Turn- 
ing to  his  staff,  the  general  said:  'Men,  we  can  not  hold 
a  point  this  far  out.'  Leaving  the  general  and  his  staff, 
I  proceeded  toward  Chambersburg,  and  about  a  mile 
south  of  the  town  came  into  the  camp  of  the  JS"ew  York 
soldiers.  The  officers  and  men  immediately  gathered 
about  me,  and  asked,  'How  near  are  the  rebels?'  When 
I  informed  them  that  they  were  in  force  about  six  or 
seven  miles  south  of  them,  they  at  once  proposed  to  set 
fire  to  their  tents  and  leave.  I  assured  them  that  by  a 
proper  effort  they  could  take  their  tents  and  camp  equi- 
page with  them.  This  was  well  on  toward  evening,  and  I 
assisted  in  loading  one  wagon  and  pulling  it  to  Chambers- 
burg,  as  they  had  no  horses  to  draw  it.  I  do  not  know  if 
the  remainder  of  their  tents  were  taken  away  or  permitted 
to  remain,  as  I  started  the  next  morning  for  Harrisburg." 
kSuch  is  Mr.  SchafFs  statement.  I  give  the  following 
account  of  the  further  conduct  of  these  men,  condensed 
from  the  written  statements  of  several  of  the  citizens  of 
Chambersburg,  who  were  witnesses  of  what  they  relate : 

About  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  a  great  commotion 
was  observed  all  over  the  camp.     The  officers  were  run- 


A   COWARDLY   FLIGHT.  129 

ning  around  and  in  an  excited  manner  giving  commands. 
The  soldiers  at  the  guns  hastily  abandoned  them,  and  the 
whole  command  hurriedly  left  and  marched  to  the  town, 
leaving  guns,  tents,  and  other  camp  equipage  standing. 
Arriving  at  Chambersburg,  they  took  passage  upon  a 
train  of  cars  and  left  in  the  direction  of  Harrisburg.  One 
of  the  officers  of  this  regiment — whether  the  colonel  or 
some  other  officer,  my  informants  do  not  know  —  came  in 
by  the  railroad,  and  instead  of  turning  off  at  the  "Waynes- 
borough  crossing  and  coming  in  by  Second  street,  kept  on 
along  the  railroad.  Passing  along  the  track,  his  horse 
fell  into  a  cattle  -  guard,  arid  because  of  his  inability  to  get 
him  out,  and  fear  of  the  Confederates,  his  owner  drew 
his  pistol  and  shot  him  through  the  head.  "Whether 
he  stopped  long  enough  to  take  off  the  saddle  and 
bridle,  is  not  known,  but  it  is  altogether  likely  some  one 
got  those  articles  very  cheaply.  The  officer  then  ran  on 
into  the  town  and  took  the  train  with  his  companions. 
Two  of  the  men  took  nervous  spasms,  one  of  whom  was 
unable  to  proceed  with  his  comrades,  and  was  concealed 
in  a  house  on  East  Market  street  during  all  the  period 
of  the  invasion,  and  until  the  Confederates  had  retreated 
after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  The  Home  Guard,  after 
the  cowardly  flight  of  these  men,  hauled  the  two  aban- 
doned howitzers  into  Chambersburg  and  placed  them  on 
the  cars,  and  they  were  taken  along  down  the  road. 
Meanwhile,  many  persons  went  to  the  abandoned  camp 
and  helped  themselves  to  what  they  pleased  of  clothing 
and  other  articles.  The  next  morning  some  of  the  citizens 
went  out  to  the  camp  and  brought  in  tents  and  other 
things  which  yet  remained,  among  which  were  sardines 


130  THE   GKEAT   INVASION. 

and  other  delicacies  rather  suited  to  a  sociable  picnic 
than  the  stern  realities  of  war.  '  One  of  the  citizens  of 
Ch§mbersburg —  Mr.  Abram  Metz  —  in  the  goodness  of 
his  heart,  loaded  a  one-horse  wagon  full  of  pantaloons, 
blouses,  blankets,  buckets,  camp  -  kettles,  pistols,  etc., 
which  he  ha'uled  down  to  Shippensburg,  where  the  train 
was  lying  over,  and  delivered  them  to  their  panic-stricken 
owners.  Upon  returning  to  Chambersburg,  he  encoun- 
tered the  advance  of  the  Confederates,  who  relieved  him 
• 

of  his  horse.. 

"Whether  or  not  General  Khipe  had  returned  to  camp 
and  given  the  order  for  this  retreat,  I  am  unable  to  say. 
The  probability  is  that  he  did  not,  for  had  he  been  there 
the  panic  and  loss  of  valuable  property  would  not  have 
taken  place. 

These  same  New  York  soldiers,  doubtless  to  cover  their 
own  cowardly  conduct,  returned  home  and  reported  that 
they  had  been  badly  treated  by  the  people  of  Chambers- 
burg — that  they  were  even  charged  with  the  water  they 
used.  This  foul  slander  is  yet  held  and  published  by  re- 
spectable papers.  It  is  untrue,  and  a  base  slander  upon  a 
people  who  were  profuse  in  their  hospitality  to  these  men 
when  they  halted  in  the  town  for  an  hour  or  two  on  the 
previous  Sabbath.  The  facts  stated,  however  humiliating 
to  those  concerned  therein,  are  entirely  reliable,  and  can 
be  attested  by  dozens  of  living  witnesses  of  undoubted 
respectability  and  veracity.* 


*In  a  matter  involving  so  serious  a  charge  as  the  one  stated,  the  writer,  in 
order  to  state  the  affair  correctly  and  do  no  injustice  to  the  parties  concerned, 
had  several  eye-witnesses  of  undoubted  veracity  write  out  their  own  state- 
ments, from  which  this  account  has  been  condensed. 


GENERAL    EWELI/S    ORDER.  131 

The  division  of  General  Rodes,  having  reached  Green- 
#astle  this  day,  encamped  about  the  town,  the  principal 
encampment  being  upon  the  farm  of  Rev.  J.  Loose. 
Shortly  after  their  arrival,  Colonel  Willis  of  the  Twelfth 
Georgia  Regiment  was  appointed  provost  -  marshal.  As- 
sisted by  Captain  Carson  and  the  adjutant,  with  a  detail 
of  men,  the  colonel  maintained  excellent  order  throughout 
the  town.  Either  while  in  Greencastle  or  before  leaving 
camp  near  Williamsport,  General  Ewell,  on  this  day,  is- 
sued the  following  general  order: 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  SECOND  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

June  22d,  1863. 
General  Orders,  No.  41). 

In  moving  in  the  enemy's  country  the  utmost  circumspection  and  vigilance 
are  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  army  and  the  success  of  the  great  objedl 
it  has  to  accomplish  depends  upon  the  observance  of  the  most  rigid  disci- 
pline. The  lieutenant-general  commanding,  therefore,  most  earnestly  ap- 
peals to  the  officers  and  men  of  his  command,  who  have  attested  their  bravery 
and  devotion  to  the  cause  of  their  country  on  so  many  battle  fields,  to  yield 
a  ready  acquiescence  in  the  rules  required  by  the  exigencies  of  the  case. 

All  straggling  and  marauding  from  the  ranks,  and  all  marauding  and  plun- 
dering by  individuals  are  prohibited,  upon  pain  of  the  severest  penalties 
known  to  the  service. 

What  is  required  for  the  use  of  the  army  will  be  taken  under  regulations  to 
be  established  by  the  commanding-general,  according  to  the  rules  of  civ- 
ilized warfare. 

Citizens  of  the  country  through  which  the  army  may  pass,  who  are  not  in 
the  military  service,  are  admonished  to  abstain  from  all  a<5ls  of  hostility, 
upon  the  penalty  of  being  dealt  with  in  a  summary  manner.  A  ready  ac- 
quiescence to  the  demands  of  the  military  authorities  will  serve  greatly  to 
lessen  the  rigors  of  war. 

By  command  of  LIEUTENANT- GENERAL  R.  S.  EWELL. 

A.  L.  PENDLETON,  A.  A.  General. 

This  order  was  evidently  issued  by  General  Ewell  in 
ignorance  of  the  one  issued  by  General  Lee  the  day  be- 
fore. This  may  be  accounted  for  from  the  fact  that  Ewell 


132  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

was  not  with  Lee,  but  in  advance  with  his  corps.  During- 
this  day  the  divisions  of  Generals  Early  and  Johnson 
crossed  the  Potomac  —  one  at  Williamsport  and  the  other 
at  Shepherdstown — ten  miles  south-east  in  the  direction 
of  Harper's  Ferry.  These  two  divisions  formed  a  junc- 
tion at  Hagerstown. 

Tuesday,  23.  About  ten  o'clock  in  the  forenoon  of  this 
day,  Jenkins'  cavalry  again  entered  Chambersburg.  Un- 
like his  former  entrance,  which  was  made  in  the  night 
and  under  evident  alarm,  and  with  a  wild  rush  down  the 
streets,  he  this  time  came  in  slowly  and  confidently.  The 
larger  part  of  the  force  proceeded  on  down  the  Harris- 
burg  pike  to  Shirk's  Hill,  which  they  had  occupied  for  a 
few  days  the  previous  week,  and  there  formed  in  line. 
Others  remained  in  town.  Shortly  after  the  arrival  of 
these  men,  Jenkins,  through  his  chief  of  staff,  Captain 
Fitzhugh,  made  a  requisition  upon  the  citizens  of  Cham- 
bersburg for  a  large  amount  of  provisions  for  his  command, 
which  were  to  be  brought  to  the  court-  house  pavement 
within  a  stipulated  time.  He  also  declared  that  if  this 
demand  was  not  complied  with  a  general  search  of  the 
houses  would  be  made,  and  all  provisions  found  taken. 
Of  course  the  citizens  had  to  comply  with  this  order,  and, 
like  the  citizens  of  Greencastle,  who,  in  response  to  a 
similar  demand  made  upon  them,  brought  plentifully  of 
onions,  the  citizens  of  Chambersburg  also  seemed  to  be 
moved  by  a  similar  common  impulse  and  brought  bacon. 
And  as  flitch  after  flitch,  and  jowl  after  jowl,  with  a 
sprinkling  of  bread,  cakes,  and  pies,  were  deposited  upon 
the  pile,  in  front  of  the  court-house,  the  name  of  the 
unwilling  contributor  to  the  stomach  of  the  Southern 


CONFEDERATES  OBTAIN  SUPPLIES.          133 

Confederacy  was  taken  down,  by  which  his  residence 
would  be  exempted  from  search  in  case  enough  was  not 
voluntarily  brought  in.  It  is  said  that  when  the  officer 
iin  charge  saw  the  people  of  our  sister  town  coming  from 
all  directions  with  baskets  full  of  the  delicious  antiscorbu- 
tics, he  asked  in  amazement  whether  the  people  there 
lived  upon  onions;  so  he  might  have  supposed  that  we 
liere  luxuriated  upon  the  greasy  product  of  the  hog.  We 
only  took  advantage  of  the  occasion  to  clean  out  our 
stock,  and  our  visitors  did  not  object  to  what  we  brought. 
It  would  be  an  interesting  item  to  see  the  list  of  names 
taken  that  day,  and  know  who  all  were  in  the  bacon  busi- 
ness, but  that  paper  unfortunately  has  not  been  preserved. 
During  the  afternoon  of  this  day,  a  raid  of  a  most 
shameful  and  yet  ludicrous  character  occurred  in  the 
neighborhood  of  where  the  new  depot  now  stands.  Upon 
the  site  of  this  depot  stood  a  large  frame  building,  once 
used  as  a  forwarding  or  railroad  freight  warehouse.  In 
this  building  were  stored  a  large  amount  of  government 
stores,  such  as  crackers,  beans,  bacon,  etc.  The  Con- 
federates had  not  yet  found  these  stores,  and  some  of 
.our  people  —  mostly  those  who  resided  in  the  eastern  out- 
skirts of  the  town,  and  had  no  scruples  against  taking 
.anything  from  "Uncle  Sam,  rather  than  have  the  Con- 
federates take  it  —  made  a  raid  upon  these  stores  and  in 
a  short  time  cleaned  out  the  whole  stock.  Men,  women, 
and  children  came  running  in  crowds,  and  a  general  scram- 
'ble  took  place,  and  upon  every  street  and  alley  leading 
from  the  warehouse  persons  were  seen  carrying  bacon  and 
Tolling  barrels  of  crackers  and  beans.  In  the  general 
•melee  some  came  in  contact  with  others,  when  scolding, 


134  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

kicking,  and  fighting  ensued.  One  woman  in  rolling- 
away  a  barrel  of  crackers  came  in  contact  with  another 
rolling  away  a  similar  prize,  and,  crowding  her  too  much 
she  turned  around  and  kicked  at  the  other,  but  not  being 
acquainted  with  the  laws  of  gravitation  and  momentum, 
missed  her  aim  and  went  sprawling  backward  over  her 
own  barrel.  By  the  time  she  had  gathered  herself  up 
some  one  had  rolled  away  her  prize,  at  which  a  general 
fight  set  in.  A  reliable  witness  to  whom  I  am  indebted 
for  this  description  of  this  shameful  and  ludicrous  occur- 
rence, assures  me  of  its  correctness,  and  says  that  he  saw 
one  man  roll  away  four  barrels  and  put  them  in  his  cellar. 
Transferring  our  observations  further  south,  we  find 
that  on  this  day  the  following  requisitions  were  made 
upon  the  authorities  of  Greencastle  by  the  commissary 
and  quartermaster  of  Rodes'  division: 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  SECOND  ARMY  CORPS, 

June  23d,  1863. 
To  the  Authorities  of  Greencastle  : 

By  direction  of  Lieutenant -General  R.  S.  Ewell,  I  make  requisition  for  the 
following  articles:  100  saddles  and  bridles;  12  pistols.  These  articles  are  to- 
be  furnished  at  two  o'clock  P.  M.  J.  A.  HARMON, 

Maj.  and  Q.  M.  Second  Corps  de  Armie. 

Following  this  requisition  came  another  for  onions,, 
sauerkraut,  potatoes,  radishes,  etc.,  signed  by  A.  M. 
Mitchell,  Maj.  and  Ch.  Com.  Then  another  demanding — 

Two  thousand  pounds  of  lead;  1,000  pounds  of  leather;  100  pistols;  IT 
boxes  of  tin;  200  curry-combs  and  brushes.  Signed, 

WM.  ALLEN,  M.  and  C. 

The  chief  of  the  topographical  engineers  also  demanded 
two  maps  of  Franklin  county. 

These  demands  were  so  heavy  that  the  council  felt  it 
impossible  to  fill  them,  and  no  effort  was  accordingly 


GENERAL   EWELL  IN   CHAMBERSBURG.  135 

made.  The  Confederates,  however,  secured  some  saddles, 
bridles,  and  a  considerable  amount  of  leather. 

During  the  afternoon  of  this  day,  part  of  Rodes'  division 
advanced  toward  Chambersburg,  encamping  over  night 
below  Marion.  Johnson's  division  left  its  encampment 
near  Hagerstown,  and  closed  up  upon  Rodes  at  Green- 
castle  ;  and  Early's  division  deflected  to  the  east  at  Hagers- 
town>  and  passing  down  by  a  parallel  road,  encamped  over 
night  near  Waynesborough. 

Wednesday,  24.  About  nine  o'clock  in  the  forenoon  of 
this  day,  the  sound  of  music  was  heard  up  Main  street, 
Chambersburg.  Kodes'  division  of  infantry,  preceded  by 
a  band  of  musicians  playing  "  The  Bonnie  Blue  Mag," 
made  its  appearance  on  the  brow  of  the  hill  by  the  Re- 
formed Church.  These  were  the  first  Confederate  infantry 
that  had  ever  penetrated  a  free  State.  This  column  of 
men  passed  out  down  through  the  town,  and  on  out  the 
Harrisburg  pike  to  Shirk's  Hill,  which  Jenkins*  cavalry 
held.  On  this  commanding  position  a  line  was  formed 
and  a  large  number  of  cannon  planted.  It  is  said  that  it 
was  in  contemplation  to  fortify  this  hill  and  make  a  stand 
there  against  the  apprehended  Federal  attack.  Through- 
out this  entire  day  long  columns  of  infantry  and  artillery, 
with  the  usual  accompaniments  of  immense  trains  of 
wagons  and  droves  of  cattle  and  ambulances,  streamed 
through  the  streets.  The  trains  were  parked  in  the  fields 
and  the  men  placed  in  camps  between  the  town  and  the 
hill  named.  According  to  an  estimate  made  by  one  of  the 
citizens  of  Chambersburg,  ten  thousand  three  hundred 
men — infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery  —  passed  through 
the  town  this  day. 


136  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

About  half-  past  ten  o'clock,  a  carriage  drawn  by  two 
horses  and  accompanied  by  several  horsemen,  was  observed 
coming  down  the  street.  It  was  stopped  in  front  of  the 
Franklin  Hotel.  One  of  the  occupants  of  this  carriage  was 
a  thin,  sallow  -  faced  man,  with  strongly  -  marked  Southern 
features,  and  a  head  and  physiognomy  which  strongly  in- 
dicated culture,  refinement  and  genius.  When  he  emerged 
from  the  carriage,  which  he  did  only  by  the  assistance  of 
others,  it  was  discovered  that  he  had  an  artificial  limb,  and 
used  a  crutch.  After  making  his  way  into  the  hotel,  he 
at  once  took  possession  of  a  large  front  parlor,  and,  sur- 
rounded by  six  or  eight  gentlemanly  -  looking  men,  he 
was  prepared  for  business.  A  flag  was  run  out  of  a  win- 
dow, and  head- quarters  established.  This  intellectual- 
looking  and  crippled  man  was  Lieutenant  -  General  R.  S. 
Ewell,  the  Commander  of  the  Second  Corps,  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia^ 

General  Ewell  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  and  had 
been  for  some  time  a  civil  engineer  on  the  Columbia  Kail- 
road  in  Pennsylvania.  He  had  been  at  one  time  stationed 
at  Carlisle  in  charge  of  the  United  States  barracks  at  that 
place.  Soon  after  the  commencement  of  the  war  he  joined 
the  Confederate  army,  and  rapidly  rose  to  the  position  of 
a  lieutenant-general  and  commander  of  a  corps  in  Lee's 
army.  He  had  lost  a  leg  at  the  second  Bull  Run  battle, 
and,  it  was  said,  when  he  rode  on  horse -back,  which  he 
seldom  did  except  in  battle,  he  was  invariably  strapped  to 
his  horse.  After  the  death  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  he 
was  made  commander  of  that  corps,  and  was,  at  the 
time  of  which  I  am  writing,  in  command  of  the  advance 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  on  its  way  to  Gettys- 


CONFEDERATES    IX    CIIAMBERSBURG.  137 

burg.  It  is  likely  that  lie  was  placed  in  the  advance 
because  of  his  familiarity  with  the  country,  especially 
about  York,  Columbia,  and  Harrisburg,  where  important 
events  were  expected  to  take  place.  At  the  time  of  the 
evacuation  of  Richmond  he  was  the  military  commander 
of  that  place,  and  gave  the  order  for  the  burning  of  the 
Confederate  capital.  On  April  6th,  1865,  during  the  re- 
treat of  the  Confederate  army  from  Petersburg,  General 
Ewell,  with  the  greater  part  of  his  corps,  was  captured. 

But  General  Ewell  was  a  man  of  business  as  well  as 
Avar,  and  he  at  once  proceeded  to  execute  his  purposes. 
Among  his  first  acts  was  to  appoint  Colonel  Willis,  of  the 
Twelfth  Georgia  regiment,  provost  -  marshal  of  the  town. 
The  colonel  made  his  headquarters  in  the  court-house,  and 
from  its  cupola  a  flag  was  displayed.  That  was  the  only 
emblem  of  the  rebellion  ever  put  up  in  Chambersburg, 
excepting  the  one  at  General  Ewell's  head  -  quarters, 
neither  of  which  was  the  regular  Confederate  flag.  Fol- 
lowing the  appointment  of  the  provost -marshal,  came  a 
requisition  upon  several  of  the  hotels  for  mattresses  and 
bed  -  clothing,  which  were  taken  to  the  public  school  build- 
ing on  King  street/  and  a  hospital  was  there  established, 
and  a  number  of  sick  of  the  command  taken  to  it.  In  a 
short  time  the  following  general  order,  designed  to  prevent 
the  soldiers  from  seizing  the  liquors  in  thejtown,  was  issued. 
It  is  to  be  regretted  that  this  order  was  not  made  perma- 
nent, here  and  elsewhere,  for  all  time.  The  following  is 
that  order: 


138  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

HEAD -QUARTERS  SECOND  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

CHAMBERSBURG,  June  24th,  1863. 
General  Orders. 

I.  The  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  tc  this  command,  without  written  per- 
mission from  a  major-general,  is  strictly  prohibited. 

II.  Persons  having  liquor  in  their  possession  are  required  to  report  the 
fact  to  the  provost -marshal,  or  the  nearest  general  officer,  stating  the  amount 
and  kind,  that  a  guard  may  be  placed  over  it,  and  the  men  prevented  from 
getting  it. 

III.  Any  violation  of  Part  I.  of  these  orders,  or  failure  to  comply  with 
Part  II.,  will  be  punished  by  the  immediate  confiscation  of  all  liquors  in  the 
possession  of  the  offending  parties,  besides  rendering  their  other  property 
liable  to  seizure. 

IV.  Citizens  of  the  country  through  which  the  army  may  pass,  who  are 
not  in  the  military  service,  are  admonished  to  abstain  from  all  acts  of  hos- 
tility, upon  the  penalty  of  being  dealt  with  in  a  summary  manner.     A  ready 
acquiescence  to  the  demands  of  the  military  authorities  will  serve  to  lessen 
the  rigors  of  war.        By  command  of 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL.  R.  S.  EWELL. 
A.  S.  PENDLETON,  A,  A.  General. 

I  am  not  aware  to  what  extent  those  who  had  liquor  in 
their  possession  responded  to  this  order  and  reported  at 
head -quarters,  but  very  soon  after  the  entrance  of  the 
Confederate  infantry,  guards  were  stationed  at  all  places 
where  it  was  kept.  If  there  were  any  cases  of  drunkenness 
among  the  soldiers,  I  did  not  see  it.  But  that  there  was 
at  least  one  instance,  although  it  did  not  come  under  my 
observation,  will  appear  in  the  proceedings  of  a  court- 
martial  shortly  to  be  given. 

Following  the  issue  of  the  general  order  in  regard  to 
liquors,  came  a  summons  to  our  business  men  to  convene 
in  the  parlor  of  the  National  Bank,  which  stood  next  to 
General  Ewell's  head  -  quarters,  and  the  few  who  had  not 
left  at  the  approach  of  the  invaders  repaired  to  that  place. 
After  assembling  there  three  of  Ewell's  staff  officers  joined 


REQUISITIONS   ON   CHAMBERSBURG. 

us  and  opened  up  their  business,  which  was  to  lay  before 
us  the  following  requisitions: 

To  the  Authorities  of  Chambersburg ,  Pennsylvania: 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  SECOND  ARMY  CORPS, 

June  24th,   1863. 

By  direction  of  lieutenant  -General  R.  S.  Ewell,  I  require  the  following 
articles:  5,000  suits  of  clothing,  including  hats,  boots,  and  shoes;  100  good 
saddles;  100  good  bridles;  5,000  bushels  of  grain  (corn  or  oats);  10,000  R>s. 
sole  leather;  10,000  ft>s.  horse-shoes;  400  Ibs.  horse-shoe  nails;  also,  the  use 
of  printing  office  and  two  printers  to  report  at  once.  All  articles,  except 
grain,  will  be  delivered  at  the  Court -House  Square,  at  3:00  o'clock  p.  M.,. 

to-day,  and  grain  by  6:00  o'clock  p.  M.  to-day. 

J.  A.  HARMON, 

Major  and  C.  Q.  M.  Second  Corps  D'Arm. 


HEAD -QUARTERS  SECOND  ARMY  CORPS, 

June  24th,  1863. 

By  the  command  of  Lieutenant -General  R.  S.  Ewell,  the  citizens  of  Cham- 
bersburg will  furnish  the  following  articles  by  3:00  this  afternoon:  6,000  Ibs- 
lead;  10,000  Ibs.  harness  leather;  50  boxes  of  tin;  1,000  curry  combs  and 
brushes;  2,000  Ibs.  picket  rope;  400  pistols;  all  the  caps  and  powder  in  town; 

also,  all  the  Neat's  foot  oil. 

WILLIAM  ALLEN,  M.  and  C. 


HEAD  -  QUARTERS  SECOND  ARMY  CORPS, 
••  June  24th,  1863. 

By  direction  of  Lieutenant -General  R.  S.  Ewell,  the  following  are  de- 
manded: 50,000  Ibs.  bread;  100  sacks  salt;  30  barrels  molasses;  500  barrels- 
Sour;  25  barrels  vinegar;  25  barrels  beans;  25  barrels  dried  fruit;  25  barrels 
sauerkraut;  25  barrels  potatoes;  11,000  Ibs.  coffee;  10,000  Ibs.  sugar;  100,000 
ft>s.  hard  bread. 

This  last  requisition,  which  is  without  signature,  was 
delivered  to  us  by  Major  Hawkes,  Commissary  General  of 
Ewell's  corps.  The  signature  was  probably  omitted  in 
copying  it.  On  the  evening  of  Monday,  22d,  about  eleven 
o'clock,  some  four  or  five  of  our  citizens,  in  connection 
with  the  pastors  of  the  town  —  five  or  six  in  number, — 


140  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

convened  in  the  cashier's  office  of  this  bank  to  make  some 
arrangements,  which  were  deemed  necessary,  to  receive 
the  approaching  enemy.  And  as  the  Burgess  and  Town 
Council  had  nearly  all  left  town,  and  the  contingency  of 
meeting  the  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  place,  which 
it  was  expected  would  soon  be  made,  should  be  provided  for, 
it  was  agreed  upon  that  the  pastors  should  act  in  behalf  of 
the  town  authorities.  The  venerable  Rev.  B.  S.  Schneck, 
D.  D.,  was  constituted  president  of  this  committee.  These 
gentlemen,  instead  of  receiving  the  demand  for  the  sur- 
render of  the  town,  —  our  southern  friends  simply  coming 
in  and  taking  it  without  asking  for  it,  —  found  that  they 
had  a  much  greater  business  on  their  hands  than  they  had 
expected,  and  accordingly  called  to  their  assistance  a  num- 
ber of  our  leading  business  men.  These,  with  the  minis- 
ters, were  now  in  session  to  hear  what  our  visitors  had  to 
say.  After  an  introduction  to  the  three  officers  by  our 
chairman,  Hon.  F.  M.  Kimmell,  who  was  made  such  by 
common  consent  rather  than  by  any  formal  action,  these 
papers  were  read,  after  which  a  considerable  pause  ensued. 
Here  was  a  chance  for  business  on  a  magnificent  scale, 
but  it  was  feared  the  terms  would  not  prove  satisfactory. 
Then,  too,  it  was  somewhat  out  of  season  for  sauerkraut 
but  our  southern  friends  seemed  to  think  that  as  they 
were  among  the  "  Pennsylvania  Dutch,"  that  favorite  dish 
would  be  found  the  whole  year  round.  They  did  not 
know  that  like  their  "  hog  and  hominy,"  sauerkraut  was 
especially  a  home  dish,  and  never  set  before  strangers. 
Taking  the  papers  into  his  hand  and  scanning  them  for 
awhile,  the  judge  began  to  read,  "ten  thousand  pounds  of 
sole  leather, — ten  thousand  pounds  of  harness  leather,— 


SAUERKRAUT   REQUISITION.  141 

one  hundred  thousand  pounds  of  hard  bread, — twenty- 
five  barrels  of  s-a-u-e-r-k-r-a-u-t."  Throwing  the  papers 
upon  the  table  he  said,  "  Why,  gentlemen,  do  you  wish  to 
insult  us?  Do  you  suppose  we  live  on  sauerkraut?"  "Oh 
no,  dear  sir,  we  mean  no  insult  whatever;  sauerkraut  is  an 
antiscorbutic,  and  our  men  need  something  of  the  kind," 
replied  Major  Hawkes.  "Well,  gentlemen,"  said  our 
spokesman,  "it  is  utterly  out  of  our  power  to  furnish 
these  things,  and  now,  if  you  are  going  to  burn  us  out 
you  will  only  have  to  do  it.  That's  all  I  have  to  say  about 
it."  The  Major  without  any  perceptible  excitement  said, 
"Why  gentlemen,  we  have  not  come  here  to  burn  and 
plunder.  We  are  not  vandals.  We  are  here  to  wage  an 
honorable  warfare.  These  things  we  need,  and  we  only 
propose  to  have  them  under  the  acknowledged  rules  of 
civilized  warfare."  "Well,"  said  the  judge,  "we  have  not 
these  things  in  the  town,  and  how  can  we  comply  with 
your  requisitions?"  "Send  out  throughout  the  county 
and  bring  them  in.  We  know  the  resources  of  the  county. 
We  have  studied  the  census  reports  and  we  know  these 
things  can  be  had  if  you  send  around  and  gather  them  in." 
"How  can  we  send  out  over  the  county,"  said  the  judge, 
"  all  our  horses  that  we  have  not  sent  off  your  army  has 
taken."  "Well,"  said  the  Major,  "it  will  not  do  for  you 
to  say  that  you  can  not  furnish  the  articles  we  require. 
General  Ewell  will  not  receive  such  a  report.  You  must 
say  just  what  you  can  do,  and  now  we  will  give  you  time 
to  consult  together.  Let  those  who  deal  in  certain  articles 
get  together  and  make  out  a  report  in  writing,  saying  just 
what  they  can  do,  and  we  will  meet  you  here  again  in  one 
hour  to  receive  your  reports." 


142  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  major's  directions  we  at  once 
went  to  work  to  make  out  such  reports  as  the  occasion 
demanded.  The  writer  went  around  among  the  merchants 
— for  we  all  then  dealt  in  groceries — to  secure  co-opera- 
tion, but  failed  to  find  a  single  one.  Nearly  all  had  fled. 
He  then  returned  to  his  store  and  wrote  about  thus: 
"Gentlemen,  there  are  in  our  cellar  the  following  articles: 
[Then  followed  the  number  of  hogsheads  and  barrels  of 
molasses  and  syrup,  tapped  and  untapped,  hogsheads  and 
barrels  of  sugar,  etc.]  I  have  endeavored  to  see  other 
dealers  in  these  articles  in  order  to  meet  your  requisition, 
but  have  failed  to  find  a  single  one.  I  now  submit  the 
question  to  you  as  honorable  gentlemen,  whether  it  would 
be  right  to  take  the  whole  of  our  stock,  or  let  the  burden 
fall  equally  upon  all?"  Signing  our  firm  name  to  this 
paper,  I  went  to  the  bank  at  the  time  specified  and  handed 
it  to  Judge  Kimmell,  telling  him  of  its  contents.  When 
the  officers  returned,  additional  requisitions  were  laid  be- 
fore us  for  some  drugs,  and  also  for  a  first-class  field 
glass  for  the  signal  corps.  Handing  the  papers  to  Major 
Hawkee,  Judge  Kimmell  said,  "Here,  major,  is  a  paper 
which  you  will  see  deserves  special  consideration.  It  is 
Mr.  Hoke's,"  pointing  to  me.  "We  were  then  directed  to 
remain  together  until  the  papers  were  taken  to  General 
Swell's  head-quarters  for  examination,  and  in  a  short  time 
one  of  the  staff'  returned  and  directed  us  to  go  to  our 
respective  places  of  business,  as  the  general  was  not  satis- 
fied with  our  reports,  but  would  send  around  a  guard  to 
examine  for  themselves.  At  this  announcement  we  all 
went  to  our  respective  places,  and  in  a  short  time  Major 
llawkes,  riding  past  and  observing  our  sign,  stopped  and 


STORES    RANSACKED.  143 

thus  addressed  me:  "You  are  Mr.  Hoke,  are  you  not?" 
Replying  that  I  was,  he  continued,  "General  Ewell  says 
that  you  have  made  the  only  satisfactory  report,  and  your 
groceries  shall  not  be  disturbed.  "We  may  be  under  the 
necessity  of  having  a  couple  of  barrels  of  that  New  Or- 
leans molasses  for  our  hospitals,  but  otherwise  you  shall 
not  be  disturbed."  As  I  thanked  the  major  for  this  con- 
sideration, he  rode  away,  and  in  a  short  time  squads  of  six 
or  eight  men,  under  command  of  an  officer,  were  seen  going 
around  the  town  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  examina- 
tion. When  one  of  these  squads  came  to  our  store,  and 
the  officer  in  command  ordered  me  to  unlock  the  door,  I 
told  him  what  Major  Hawkes  had  said,  when  he  replied, 

"That's  all  right,  sir;   I've  got  my  orders.     Open   your 

i 
door."     Opening  the  door  the  officer  entered  alone  —  the 

soldiers  crossing  bayonets  to  prevent  any  one  else  from 
going  in — and  passing  to  the  rear  and  out  again,  he  or- 
dered me  to  lock  it  up,  saying:  "All  right,  now;  you  will 
not  be  disturbed."  He  did  not  go  into  the  cellar  where 
our  groceries  were  stored.  After  these  squads  had  re- 
ported at  head -quarters,  our  grocery,  drug,  hardware, 
book  and  stationery,  clothing,  boot  and  shoe  stores  were 
all  relieved  of  most  of  their  remaining  contents.  In  this 
work  of  plunder  Major  Todd,  a  brother  of  the  wife  of 
President  Lincoln,  took  a  prominent  part,  and  came  near 
losing  his  life;  for  while  attempting  to  enter  the  cellar  of 
Dr.  Richards,  the  doctor's  daughter  flourished  an  axe  over 
his  head,  and  threatened  to  split  it  open  if  he  persevered, 
when  the  miscreant  ingloriously  fled. 

It  is  out  of  my  power  to  give  any  estimate  of  the  value 
of  the  property  taken  that  day.     But  it  must  be  recol-, 


144  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

lected  that  the  losses  of  that  day,  as  well  as  the  losses 
by  the  Stuart  and  Jenkins  raids,  were  afterward  supple- 
mented by  other  depredations  during,  the  continuance 
of  the  invasion — on  the  Sunday  following  especially  — 
and  by  the  destruction  of  the  town  a  year  afterward. 
This  much,  however,  can  be  said,  that  many  persons  who 
had  toiled  and  economized  for  years  to  gain  an  honor- 
able support,  as  well  as  lay  up  something  for  old  age, 
were  reduced  to  poverty.  I  am  aware  that  the  appropria- 
tion of  our  property  for  the  use  of  the  invading  army  was 
in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  war,  and  in  conformity 
with  General  Lee's  order  regulating  the  taking  of  sup- 
plies, and  in  most  cases  was  paid  for  in  worthless  scrip,  but 
why  it  is  that  the  Government,  which  reimburses  loyal  men 
in  the  South  for  their  losses,  refuses  the  same  to  loyal  per- 
sons in  the  North,  is  a  problem  that  seems  hard  to  solve. 

On  the  day  following  that  on  which  the  depredations 
just  stated  occurred,  Major  Hawkes  rode  up  to  me  when 
standing  in  front  of  our  store,  and  said  that  he  was  under 
the  necessity  of  having  two  barrels  of  our  "New  Orleans 
molasses  for  hospital  purposes.  These  were  taken  and  the 
major  paid  me  for  them  in  Confederate  scrip.  After  this 
our  cellar  was  undisturbed  until  the  Sunday  following, 
when  it  was  cleaned  out  by  Longstreet's  corps,  as  will  be 
shown  hereafter.  Major  Hawkes  informed  me  that  he 
was  born,  I  think,  in  New  York,  but  for  a  number  of  years 
had  resided  in  Charlestown,  "West  Virginia,  where  he  had 
been  engaged,  when  the  war  broke  out,  in  the  manufacture 
of  carriages. 

Among  the  things  demanded  in  the  requisitions  made, 
as  will  have  been  seen,  was  "  the  use  of  a  printing  office 


INCIDENTS   IN   CHAMBERSBURG.  145 

and  two  printers."  As  no  response  was  made  to  this  de- 
mand, the  printing  fraternity  were  dealt  with  as  the 
merchants  and  shop-keepers,  and  a  guard  was  sent  to  take 
possession  of  the  printing  establishment  of  the  Reformed 
Church.  To  Rev.  Samuel  R.  Fisher,  D.  D.,  editor  and 
business  manager  of  the  establishment,  the  proposition 
was  made  that  if  he  would  do  the  printing  they  wanted 
he  would  be  paid  for  it,  and  a  guard  placed  over  the  build- 
ing; but  if  he  would  not  voluntarily  do  so,  the  establish- 
ment would  be  used  and  neither  pay  nor  protection  given. 
Having  a  considerable  amount  of  valuable  machinery  and 
stock  on  hand,  the  doctor  wisely  concluded  to  accede  to 
their  demand,  and  for  a  few  days  he  was  busily  engaged 
upon  their  job.  In  addition  to  the  general  orders  of  Lee 
and  'Ewell,  some  of  which  have  been  already  given,  and 
other  military  papers,  many  thousands  of  parole  papers 
were  printed.  "With,  these  they  doubtless  intended  to  pa- 
role the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  defeat  and  capture  of 
which  they  seemed  to  believe  would  certainly  be  effected. 
That  it  was  also  their  intention  to  parole  the  citizens  of  the 
country  through  which  their  army  passed  seems  to  be  in- 
ferred in  the  parole  papers  for  citizens  which  they  had 
printed.  The  following  is  a  copy  of  tme  of  these  papers, 
which  was  preserved  by  one  of  the  persons  who  was  com- 
pelled to  print  them.  It  is  probably  the  only  one  now  in 
existence,  and  is  in  my  possession : 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  ROBES'  Div. 

186 

a  citizen  of is  hereby  released  on  con- 
dition that  he  will  give  no  information  concerning  or  serve  in  any  capacity 
whatever  against  the  Confederate  States,  until  regularly  exchanged  for  a 
citizen  of  the  Confederate  States. 


10 


146  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

The  execution  of  this  work  of  printing  took  several 
days,  and  when  it  was  completed  war  prices  were  charged 
and  the  bill  was  paid  in  Confederate  scrip.  Kev.  Dr. 
Fisher,  whose  financial  ability  was  unsurpassed,  succeeded 
in  disposing  of  this  worthless  paper  at  the  rate  of  twenty- 
five  cents  on  the  dollar  to  one  of  our  tanners,  who  paid  it 
to  one  of  the  commissary  officers  for  the  hides  of  the  cattle 
they  slaughtered  for  their  army.  This  was  the  best  con- 
ducted business  transaction  with  the  invaders  that  occurred 
about  here  to  my  knowledge.  I  shall  have  another  one  to 
relate  further  on  in  this  narrative,  which  displayed  similar 
acuteness,  and  the  actor  in  it  was  a  preacher  also.  After 
the  presses  were  put  to  work  to  execute  this  job  of  print- 
ing, our  town  was  flooded  with  printed  slips  containing 
Lee's  and  EwelPs  orders.  A  few  of  these  interesting  pa- 
pers only  have  survived  time  and  the  ravages  of  fire  when 
Chambersburg  was  destroyed  by  the  Confederates  a  year 
later;  but  I  was  fortunate  in  obtaining  a  single  one  of 
the  number — General  EwelPs  order  No.  1,  regulating  the 
liquor  traffic.  The  whole  of  the  papers,  however,  were 
published  in  the  Franklin  Repository  of  July  8th  and  15th, 
1863,  from  which  I  have  taken  them.  As  to  the  correct- 
ness of  the  copies  I  have  given  I  can  clearly  testify  from 
personal  knowledge. 

The  infantry  having  now  come  up  and  taken  a  position 
upon  Shirk's  Hill,  Jenkins'  cavalry  left  that  place  and 
went  on  further  down  the  valley. 

Early's  division,  which  encamped  on  the  previous  night 
in  the  vicinity  of  "Waynesborough,  marched  parallel  with 
Rodes'  down  the  valley  by  way  of  Quincy  and  Funkstown, 
coming  out  into  the  pike  leading  from  this  place  to  Gettys- 
burg at  Greenwood,  at  which  place  it  encamped. 


BATTLE    OF   NORTH   MOUNTAIN.  147 

At  an  early  hour  this  morning, —  "Wednesday,  24th, — 
Stewart's  brigade  of  infantry,  numbering  about  twenty -five 
hundred  men,  and  about  three  hundred  cavalry,  left  the 
main  column  at  Greencastle  and  went  westwardly  by  way 
of  Mercersburg  across  the  North  Mountain  to  the  village 
of  McConnellsburg,  in  Fulton  County.  'These  troops 
reached  Mercersburg,  ten  miles  distant  from  Greencastle, 
about  the  middle  of  the  day,  and  at  once  made  themselves 
at  home.  Learning  that  a  theological  seminary  was  lo- 
cated there,  Stewart  placed  a  guard  about  the  property  for 
its  protection.  The  soldiers  were  forbidden  to  enter  either 
the  seminary  or  private  houses  under  the  penalty  of  severe 
punishment.  The  stores  and  shops  were  ordered  to  be 
•opened,  and  the  soldiers  permitted  to  purchase  whatever 
they  needed.  To  their  credit  it  must  be  said  that  every- 
thing was  done  in  an  orderly  manner.  No  pillaging  was 
permitted,  and  whatever  was  taken  was  by  officers  who 
made  out  bills  and  paid  in  Confederate  scrip.  There  were 
at  this  time  in  the  vicinity  of  McConnellsburg  the  Twelfth 
Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  under  Lieutenant  -  Colonel  Moss,  a 
regiment  of  emergency  men  under  Colonel  Zinn,  and  an 
independent  company  of  emergency  men  from  Hunting- 
don County  under  Captain  "W.  "W.  Wallace.  Colonel 
Ziun's  regiment  was  encamped  on  the  top  of  the  Cove, 
or  North  Mountain,  on  both  the  Chambersburg  and  Mer- 
cersburg pikes,  in  strong  natural  positions,  with  some 
fortifications.  Colonel  Moss,  with  his  regiment,  was  en- 
camped down  in  the  valley,  east  of  the  town,  and  Captain 
"Wallace,  with  his  company,  was  in  McConnellsburg.  It 
wras  known  that  the  Confederates  were  about  "Williamsport 
.and  Greencastle,  and  Jenkins  was  roaming  all  over  the 


148  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

southern  part  of  Franklin  County  —  a  detachment  of  his 
force  having  visited  this  same  town  a  week  before  — 
and  these  troops  were  on  the  lookout  for  them.  Accord- 
ingly it  was  arranged  that  if  the  Confederates  approached 
by  either  the  Chambersburg  or  Mercersburg  pike,  Zinn 
was  to  tire  *a  small  gun,  when  the  troops  down  in  the 
valley  were  to  go  to  his  assistance.  Some  time  in  the 
afternoon  of  this  day  the  signal  gun  was  heard  on  the 
Mercersburg  pike,  and  a  scout  came  dashing  into  town 
with  the  information  that  the  enemy  was  approaching  in 
force.  At  once  all  was  excitement.  Captain  Wallace 
prepared  to  go  with  his  handful  of  men  to  the  top  of  the 
mountain  to  assist  Colonel  Zinn,  and  a  number  —  some 
half  dozen  men — :who  resided  in  the  village,  agreed  to 
accompany  him.  Those  who  volunteered  to  go,  armed 
themselves  with  old  muskets,  which  were  formerly  used 
by  a  volunteer  company.  Before  starting,  Captain  Wal- 
lace sent  his  flag  to  prevent  its  being  captured  to  Fort 
Littleton  in  charge  of  a  detachment  of  his  command.  It 
was  supposed,  of  course,  that  Colonel  Moss  would  take 
his  regiment  out  to  help  dispute  the  passage  of  the  moun- 
tain by  the  Confederates,  but  for  reasons  best  known  to 
himself  he  headed  his  men  westward  and  marched  away 
from  the  foe.  One  of  his  men,  however,  Lieutenant 
McDonald,  declared  that  he  was  not  going  to  run  away, 
and  he  accompanied  Captain  Wallace.  As  this  little 
company  reached  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  it  met 
Colonel  Zinn's  regiment  on  the  retreat.  Wallace  halted 
and  begged  Zinn  to  remain  with  him,  but  his  course,  like 
Colonel  Moss',  was  westwardly,away  from  the  approaching 
foe.  A  young  man  by  the  name  of  Freeburn,  of  Lewis- 


BATTLE  OF  NORTH  MOUNTAIN.  149 

town,  Pennsylvania,  however,  agreed  to  go  with  "Wal- 
lace's band,  and  he  and  Lieutenant  McDonald,  both  well 
mounted,  consented  to  act  as  scouts,  and  rode  forward  to 
discover  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy.  When  the  scouts 
first  saw  the  enemy  he  was  well  down  on  the  east  side 
of  the  mountain,  so  that  Colonel  Zinn,  had  he  remained, 
would  have  had  plenty  of  time  to  have  posted  his  men 
strongly;  and  had  Colonel  Moss  and  Zinn  both  remained, 
that  Confederate  brigade  might  not  have  crossed  the  moun- 
tain that  day,  and  there  would  be  a  page  in  the  history 
of  the  war  which  would  record  the  battle  of  the  North 
Mountain  as  a  twin  to  the  battle  of  the  South  Mountain. 
"When  about  half  way  up  the  mountain  Captain  "Wallace 
•divided  his  men  into  five  squads  and  placed  them  about 
sixty  feet  apart,  and  about  the  same  distance  above  the 
pike.  In  a  short  time  the  two  scouts  came  dashing  by, 
pursued  by  the  Confederates  who  opened  fire  upon  them. 
Young  Freeburn  was  wounded,  but  succeeded  in  making 
his  escape.  After  several  hundred  of  the  enemy  had  passed 
Captain  Wallace  opened  fire  upon  them,  when  they  called 
a  halt  and  demanded  a  surrender  of  the  attacking  party. 
They  also  returned  the  fire,  the  bullets  striking  the  bushes 
and  rocks  like  hail.  Finally  they  threw  out  flanking  par- 
ties, which  soon  almost  surrounded  the  little  band,  when 
the  whole  command  took  to  their  heels,  each  man  taking 
<?are  of  himself.  The  party  became  scattered,  some  of 
them  being  within  the  Confederate  lines  for  several  days. 
All,  however,  finally  escaped. 

Colonel  Moss  was  an  efficient  and  brave  officer,  and  his 
regiment  which  was  with  Milroy  at  Winchester  and  had 
^escaped  to  Bloody  Run,  had  seen  considerable  service  and 


150  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

proven  its  bravery.  He  doubtless  felt  that  he  had  suf- 
ficient reasons  for  avoiding  a  conflict  with  the  enemy  on 
this  occasion.  The  only  place  where  a  successful  stand 
could  have  been  made  was  upon  the  mountain,  but  what 
could  cavalry  do  in  such  a  place?  Had  they  been  armed 
with  carbines  and  fought  as  infantry,  they  might  have 
been  successful.  Sabres  and  pistols  would  have  been  of 
but  little  avail  in  such  a  place.  Then,  too,  Colonel  Moss 
knew  that  but  little  reliance  could  be  placed  upon  the  raw 
and  inexperienced  men  of  Colonel  Zinn's  command  in  a 
battle  with  the  tried  veterans  of  General  Stewart.  As  for 
the  effort  made  by  Captain  Wallace  with  his  thirty  or 
thirty -five  men,  we  are  compelled  rather  to  call  in  ques- 
tion his  judgment  than  to  admire  his  courage.  It  was  rash 
and  imprudent,  and  jeopardized  the  lives  of  men  too  brave 
and  patriotic  to  be  unnecessarily  sacrificed. 

The  only  casualty  upon  the  Federal  side  in  this  affair 
was  the  slight  wounding  of  Lieutenant  Freeburn.  It  was 
claimed  that  several  of  the  Confederates  were  killed  and  a 
number  wounded.  This  is  extremely  doubtful.  Indeed, 
the  Confederates  afterward  during  their  occupancy  of 
McConnellsburg  spoke  of  the  affair  as  of  but  little  import- 
ance, and  without  loss  to  them.  It  was  also  claimed  that 
the  first  blood  shed  upon  the  soil  of  Pennsylvania  during 
the  rebellion  was  at  this  engagement.  This,  too,  is  in- 
correct. This  honor  belongs  to  the  engagement  which 
occurred  on  the  Monday  previous  near  Greencastle.  This 
affair  then,  if  it  is  worthy  of  the  name  of  a  battle,  may  be 
called  the  battle  of  North  Mountain. 

Undue  importance  has  been  given  to  the  affair  on  the 
North  Mountain  in  its  relation  to  the  intentions  of  the 


THE   OBJECT   OF   THIS   EXPEDITION.  151 

enemy  in  this  movement.  It  was  supposed  that  the  object 
of  this  expedition  across  the  mountain  into  Fulton  County 
was  to  advance  up  the  valley  to  Mount  Union  and  burn 
the  bridges  and  tear  up  the  track  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad  at  that  place  and  about  the  Narrows  east  of  Lewis- 
town,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  moving  of  troops 
and  supplies  over  that  road,  and  that  the  check  received  on 
the  mountain  defeated  that  purpose.  In  this  view  of  the 
case  General  Couch,  who  commanded  the  Department  of 
the  Susquehanna,  issued  a  complimentary  order  to  the 
company,  and  the  directors  of  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad 
further  complimented  them  with  a  resolution  of  thanks.  It 
may  be  safely  assumed  that  the  only  object  the  enemy  had 
in  view  was  to  look  after  the  troops  of  Milroy's  command, 
which  had  escaped  from  "Winchester  and  had  crossed  the 
Potomac  at  the  lower  end  of  this  valley.  These,  it  would 
be  supposed,  might  operate  upon  the  left  flank  of  the  main 
column  of  the  invading  army;  and  it  was  doubtless  to 
prevent  this  that  this  lateral  movement  was  made.  Had  a 
raid  upon  the  railroad  at  Mount  Union  been  contemplated, 
the  Confederate  commanders  were  too  shrewd  to  detach 
infantry  to  effect  that  object.  By  the  time  they  could 
have  traversed  the  thirty  miles  from  McConnellsburg  up 
the  valley,  forces  could  have  been  concentrated  to  defeat  the 
movement,  as  well  as  cut  to  pieces  the  whole  force  before 
it  could  have  regained  the  main  column.  If  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  railroad  was  in  the  programme  at  all,  Imbo- 
den's  command  of  cavalry ,  would  undoubtedly  have  been 
chosen.  They  had  been  engaged  in  a  similar  work  along 
the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  from  Cum- 
berland to  Hancock,  and  within  a  short  time  after  the  de- 


152  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

parture  of  Stewart's  command,  this  formidable  force  crossed 
the  Potomac  near  that  place  into  southern  Pennsylvania. 
After  the  short  delay  occasioned  by  the  aftair  with  Cap- 
tain Wallace's  company,  just  related,  Stewart's  command 
resumed  its  march  and  reached  McConnellsburg  soon  after 
dark.  When  about  a  half  mile  east  of  the  place  a  line  of 
battle  was  formed  and  the  cavalry  dashed  into  the  town. 
They  expected  to  find  Milroy's  force  there.  As  soon  as 
the  infantry  had  entered  the  town  it  was  placed  under 
guard  and  the  citizens  were  ordered  to  remain  in  their 
houses.  A  few,  however,  who  were  anxious  to  see  what 
was  going  on,  ventured  out  into  the  streets,  and  were 
arrested  and  held  for  awhile.  The  invaders  disturbed 
nothing  during  the  night,  but  in  the  morning  they  entered 
the  stores  and  shops  and  helped  themselves  to  whatever 
they  wanted,  in  some  cases  paying  in  Confederate  scrip. 
About  one  third  of  the  cavalry  went  north  up  the  val- 
ley as  far  as  Burnt  Cabins,  gathering  horses  from  the 
farmers  along  the  way,  and  picking  up  others  which  had 
been  sent  from  Franklin  County  for  safety.  From  Burnt 
Cabins  they  re-crossed  the  mountain  by  Fannettsburg,  and 
thence  on  to  Chambersburg,  where  they  rejoined  the  main 
column.  In  passing  out  of  Horse  Valley  by  the  Strasburg 
Pass,  this  force  came  near  getting  into  collision  with  some 
of  the  mountaineers  who  had  fortified  the  pass,  but  were 
absent  from  their  works  when  these  men  passed  out  over 
the  mountain.  The  infantry  and  the  remainder  of  the 
cavalry  remained  in  and  about  McConnellsburg  until  early 
on  Friday  morning  when  they  finally  left,  re  -  crossing  the 
North  Mountain  by  the  Loudon  road  and  rejoining  the 
column  at  Chambersburg. 


CONFEDERATE   COURT   MARTIAL.  153 

This  day  the  corps  of  Generals  Hill  and  Longstreet 
crossed  the  Potomac  —  the  former  at  Shepherdstown,  and 
the  latter,  with  the  supply  trains,  at  Williamsport.  These 
two  corps  formed  a  junction  at  Hagerstown. 

Thursday,  25.  On  the  morning  of  this  day  General 
Ewell  removed  his  head  -  quarters  from  the  Franklin  Hotel 
in  Charubersburg  to  a  Mennonite  church,  which  stands  in 
the  midst  of  a  beautiful  grove,  one  mile  north  of  the  town, 
along  the  pike  leading  to  Harrisburg.  At  this  place  there 
was  held  on  that  day  a-  court  -  martial  for  the  trial  of  four 
persons  for  breaches  of  discipline.  The  following  is  the 
official  order  concerning  that  trial : 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  SECOND  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

June  25th,  '63. 
General  Order  No.  51. 

I.  Before  the  military  court,  convened  at  the  headquarters  of  the  army 
corps  of  Lieutenant -General  R.  S.  Ewell,  and  of  which  court  Colonel  R.  H. 
Lee  is  presiding  judge,  were  arraigned  and  tried.  (The  specifications  in  the 
-various  cases  being  lengthy  and  minute,  are  omitted.) 

ist.     Lieutenant  J.  B.  Countiss,  Twenty -first  Georgia  Regiment. 

Charge  I.     Drunkenness  on  duty. 

•Charge  II.     Conduct  to  the  prejudice  of  good  order  and  discipline. 

Finding:  Of  the  specifications  of  first  charge,  guilty. 

•Of  the  first  charge,  guilty. 

Of  the  specifications  of  the  second  charge,  guilty. 

Of  the  second  charge,  guilty. 

Sentence :  And  the  court  do  therefore  sentence  the  said  Lieutenant  J.  B. 
Countiss,  Twenty  -  first  Georgia  Regiment,  to  be  cashiered. 

2nd.  Private  Charles  Smith,  Company  C,  Forty -fifth  North  Carolina  Regi- 
ment. 

Charge  :  Desertion. 

Finding  :  Of  the  specification,  guilty. 

Of  the  charge,  not  guilty,  but 

Of  absence  without  leave,  guilty. 

Sentence  :  And  the  court  do  therefore  sentence  the  said  private  Charles 
Smith,  Company  C,  Forty -fifth  North  Carolina  Regiment,  to  forfeit  three 


154  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

months'pay,  and  to  be  branded  on  the  left  hip  with  the  letter  S,  two  inches 
in  length,  in  the  presence  of  his  regiment. 

3d.    Private  Louis  M.  Waynock,  Company  B,  Forty- fifth  Regiment. 

Charge  :    Desertion. 

Finding :  Of  the  specification,  guilty. 

Of  the  charge — not  guilty,  but 

Of  absence  without  leave,  guilty. 

Sentence  :  And  the  court  do  therefore  sentence  the  said  Louis  M.  Waynock, 
Company  B,  Forty -fifth  North  Carolina  Regiment,  to  forfeit  three  months' 
pay,  and  to  be  branded  on  the  left  hip  with  the  letter  S,  two  inches  in  length, 
in  the  presence  of  his  regiment. 

4th.     Private  Patrick  Herne,  Company  C,  Fifth  Alabama  Regiment. 

Charge:  Violation  of  gth  Article  of  War. 

Finding  :  Of  the  specification,  guilty. 

Of  the  charge,  guilty. 

Sentence  :  And  the  court  do  therefore  sentence  the  said  Patrick  Herne, 
Company  C,  Fifth  Alabama  Regiment,  to  forfeit  his  pay  for  three  months,  to 
perform  extra  police  and  fatigue  duty  for  two  months,  and  to  be  bucked  two 
hours  each  day,  for  seven  days. 

II.  The  proceedings,  findings  and  sentence  in  the  case  of  Lieutenant  J.  B. 
Countiss,  Twenty -first  Georgia  Regiment,  are  approved,  and  the  sentence 
will  be  carried  into  effect ;  and  Lieutenant  J.  B.  Countiss  ceases,  from  this 
date,  to  be  an  officer  of  the  Confederate  States  Army.  He  will  be  enrolled 
and  conscripted  by  his  brigade  commander,  and  will  be  allowed  to  join  any 
company  in  his  present  brigade  that  he  may  select. 

The  proceedings,  findings  and  sentence  in  the  cases  of  private  Charles 
Smith,  Company  C,  Forty -fifth  North  Carolina  Regiment,  and  Louis  M.  Way- 
nock, Company  B,  Forty  -  fifth  North  Carolina  Regiment,  are  approved,  and 
the  sentences  will  be  carried  into  effect,  except  so  much  of  them  as  inflict  the 
punishment  of  branding,  which  is  hereby  remitted. 

The  proceedings,  findings  and  sentence  in  the  case  of  private  Patrick 
Herne,  Company  C,  Fifth  Alabama  Regiment,  are  approved,  and  the  sentence 
will  be  carried  into  effect. 

By  command  of  Lieutenant  -  General  R.  S.  Ewell. 

A.  S.  PENDLETON,  A.  A.  General. 

The  superior  discipline  of  the  Southern  army  will  be 
seen  in  this,  that  officers  in  command  were  promptly  cash- 
iered for  drunkenness,  and  riot  permitted  to  remain  in 


FURNISHING    SUPPLIES.  155 

positions  whicn  would  endanger  others.  And  when  cash- 
iered they  were  not  permitted  to  resign  their  commissions, 
or  leave  the  army  and  return  to  civil  life,  but  were  reduced 
to  the  ranks  and  compelled  to  do  service  in  that  humble 
position.  If  that  kind  of  discipline  had  prevailed  in  the 
Union  army  there  would  have  been  fewer  disasters  from 
the  use  of  intoxicating  liquors.  The  penalty  inflicted 
upon  others  for  the  violations  of  the  rules  of  war,  as  stated 
in  the  charges  and  specifications  given,  requiring  the  for- 
feiture of  three  months  pay,  did  not  amount  to  much,  for 
the  pay  of  a  private  soldier  in  Confederate  scrip  was  worth 
only  the  value  of  the  paper  it  was  printed  on.  For  the 
benefit  of  those  who  do  not  know  what  "bucking"  is,  I 
will  state  that  it  consisted  in  tying  a  person's  hands  to- 
gether and  closing  his  arms  around  his  knees  and  passing 
a  stick  through  to  keep  him  in  that  helpless  and  ludicrous 
position. 

Some  time  during  this  day  two  young  men  —  officers 
connected  with  the  artillery  —  came  with  a  requisition  for 
all  the  flannels  and  other  woolen  goods  we  had,  suitable 
for  making  cartridges  for  cannon.  "We  having  previously 
removed  everything  of  value  out  of  the  store,  they  found 
only  a  few  remnants  which  we  did  not  think  worth  secret- 
ing. These  they  had  me  to  measure  for  them,  one  of  them 
noting  down  the  lengths.  When  asked  the  price  I  told  him 
I  should  have  a  dollar  a  yard,  counting  upon  Confederate 
scrip  as  the  pay.  He  inquired  what  we  sold  them  at,  say- 
ing they  would  not  allow  me  more  for  them  than  our  usual 
price,  for  their  money  was  as  good  as  ours,  and  if  it  was 
not  they  intended  to  make  it  so  before  leaving  the  State. 
After  striking  an  average  price  he  wrote  and  gave  me  a 


156  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

paper  of  which  the  following  is  a  correct  copy, — the  origi- 

•  -•jbi^^t 

nal  I  yet  have  in  my  possession : 

I  hereby  certify  that  I  have  received  of  J.  Hoke  &  Co. ,  merchants,  Cham- 
bersburg,  Pa.,  this  25th  day  of  June,  1863,  and  in  accordance  with  General 
Order  No.  72,  Head  -  quarters,  and  have  furnished  duplicate  vouchers,  9  (nine) 

yards  flannel  at  63%  cents  per  yard,  $5.90. 

JOHN  M.  GREGORY,  JR., 

First  lyieut.  and  Ord.  Officer  Art'y  2d  Corps. 

Throughout  the  day  there  were  numerous  calls  made 
upon  us  for  tea  for  the  hospitals,  castile  soap,  etc.,  all  of 
"which  were  paid  for  in  Confederate  scrip.  The  officers 
with  whom  we  had  dealings  were  in  every  case  courteous 
and  gentlemanly.  Some  of  the  privates,  however,  when 
they  had  access  to  the  store  were  the  reverse,  and  unlike 
the  officers,  who  invariably  asked-  for  what  they  desired 
to  purchase,  went  searching  through  the  store,  opening 
drawers,  and  looking  for  concealed  goods.  These  always 
•e  xamined  our  fire  -  proof  safe,  which,  to  prevent  its  being 
broken  open,  was  unlocked  and  its  contents  removed. 
Frequently  when  articles  were  asked  for,  which  we  had 
secreted  or  sent  away,  the  almost  universal  remark  was, 
"  Well,  we  will  get  these  things  when  we  get  to  Philadel- 
phia, or  Baltimore,  or  Washington."  Some  would  inquire, 
"Do  you  think  the  merchants  of  Harrisburg  have  sent 
off  their  goods,  too?"  Occasionally  efforts  were  made,  as 
we  believed,  to  ascertain  whether  we  had  actually  sent  our 
goods  away,  or  had  hidden  them.  A  citizen  would  come 
to  us  and  say  that  colonel,  or  major,  or  captain  so-and-so 
had  desired  him  to  procure  for  him  a  web  of  shirting,  or 
something  of  the  kind,  for  his  own  family  use,  and  if  we 
would  furnish  it  he  would  pay  for  it  in  gold.  Our  reply 
always  was,  "We  have  these  things  hidden  away  in  a 


MOVEMENTS   OF   THE   ARMIES.  157 

beer  vault  and  can  not  get  at  them ;  besides  this,  if  we 
would  furnish  these  things  it  would  reveal  the  fact  that 
goods  are  in  town,  and  a  general  search  might  be  ordered." 

In  the  morning  of  this  day  Johnson's  division  com- 
menced passing  through  the  town,  and  throughout  the 
whole  of  it  until  evening,  regiment  after  regiment,  and 
brigade  after  brigade  of  infantry,  with  long  trains  of  artil- 
lery, wagons,  and  ambulances  passed  through  Chambers- 
burg  and  on  down  the  Harrisburg  pike  and  encamped 
about  Shirk's  Hill. 

Hill's  corps  marched  from  Hagerstown  and  encamped 
over  night  between  Greencastle  and  Chambersburg. 

General  Early,  on  this  day,  rode  from  his  encampment 
at  Greenwood  to  General  Ewell's  head  -  quarters,  one  mile 
north  of  Chambersburg,  to  consult  with  hini  as  to  his  fu- 
ture course.  He  was  directed  to  proceed  on  the  following 
morning  by  way  of  Gettysburg  to  York.,  break  up  the 
Northern  Central  Kailroad,  seize  tho  bridge  across  the 
Susquehanna  at  "Wrightsville,  and  wait  there  for  further 
orders. 

As  soon  as  the  Confederate  forces  began  to  pass  through 
Chambersburg,  we  saw  the  propriety  of  sending  informa- 
tion of  their  number  and  movements  to  the  authorities 
at  Harrisburg.  This  we  could  do  by  eluding  the  pickets 
north  of  the  town,  crossing  the  North  Mountain  into 
the  valley  beyond,  and  thence  passing  up  to  about  New- 
port, on  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  about  forty  miles 
above  Harrisburg.  To  communicate  directly  with  "Wash- 
ington we  could  not,  but  as  telegraphic  communications 
from  the  capital  of  our  State  to  the  National  Capital  were 
uninterrupted,  we  knew  that  to  send  information  to  the 


158  THE.  GREAT   INVASION. 

former  would  insure  its  transmission  where  most  needed. 
In  accordance  with  our  purpose,  then,  to  keep  our  authori- 
ties well  informed,  a  number  of  our  citizens  made  careful 
estimates  of  the  number  of  troops  and  guns  that  daily 
passed  through  the  town.  This  information,  with  the 
directions  taken  by  the  troops,  was  carried  to  Harris- 
burg  by  a  number  of  young  men  of  Chambersburg  and 
Franklin  County.  Hon.  F.  M.  Kimmell,  at  one  time  the 
presiding  judge  of  this  district,  and  who  had  acted  as  pro- 
vost-marshal during  the  time  Chambersburg  was  under 
martial  law  in  1862,  had  been  directed  by  Governor  Curtin 
to  exercise  a  general  supervision  here  during  the  war. 
This  fact  was  unknown  to  us,  yet  by  general  consent  we 
co  -  operated  with  him  in  collecting  and  forwarding  infor- 
mation. The  judge  invariably  wrote  the  dispatches.  These 
were  small  slips  of  paper  about  an  inch  or  two  square,  and 
simply  stated  the  number  of  troops  and  guns  that  passed 
that  day,  and  the  route  they  took.  Messages  were  in  some 
cases  carried  verbally,  and  whenever  anything  which  we 
considered  of  special  importance  occurred,  we  made  it  a 
point  to  dispatch  a  messenger  as  soon  as  possible.  Several 
of  these  special  occasions,  with  the  perilous  trips  of  the 
scouts,  will  hereafter  be  given.  In  the  lapse  of  time  since 
the  war  I  am  unable  to  remember  the  names  of  all  the 
heroic  young  men  who  rendered  such  valuable  service  to 
their  country.  The  following  were  some  of  them:  Shearer 
Houser,  Benjamin  S.  lluber,  J.  Porter  Brown,  Anthony 
Hollar,  Sellers  Montgomery,  T.  J.  Grimeson,  Stephen  "W". 
Pomeroy,  and  Mr.  Kinney.  The  archives  of  the  Govern- 
ment contain  the  names  of  all  who  rendered  this  service, 
for,  in  addition  to  procuring  the  services  of  a  scout  when 


EXPERIENCES    OF    FEDERAL    SCOUTS.  159 

one  was  specially  needed,  it  fell  to  the  writer's  lot  to  fur- 
nish them,  with  money  to  defray  their  traveling  expenses, 
which,  with  an  additional  sum  to  each  one,  was  refunded 
to  him  by  General  Couch  when  he  moved  his  head-quarters 
to  Chambersburg,  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

Some  of  the  scouts  who  made  these  perilous  journeys 
to  Harrisburg  had  narrow  escapes.  In  almost  every  case 
they  were  either  chased,  fired  upon,  or  captured  in  passing 
through  the  Confederate  lines.  When  capture  seemed 
inevitable  they  would  chew  and  swallow  their  dispatch. 
This  was  sometimes  inserted  in  the  end  of  a  plug  of  to- 
bacco, which  could  be  conveniently  bitten  oft',  or  in  the 
boots,  or  somewhere  about  the  clothing.  Various  devices 
were  resorted  ta  to  throw  the  Confederates  off  their  guard 
in  case  of  capture.  A  bundle  with  two  or  three  dirty 
shirts  and  as  many  pair  of  socks,  would  be  carried  along, 
and  the  enemy  were  made  believe  that  the  bearer  was  an 
unsophisticated  country  school  -  master  going  home  to  get 
his  clothes  washed.  This  ruse  was  successfully  played  by 
Mr.  Kinney,  the  principal  of  the  academy  at  Chambers- 
burg.  He  and  Mr.  A.  Hollar  were  caught  some  six  or  eight 
miles  from  town  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  June  28th, 
while  bearing  a  dispatch  of  great  importance,  and  having 
swallowed  the  small  piece  of  paper  on  which  it  was  writ- 
ten, they  affected  ignorance  of  what  was  going  on,  and 
said  they  were  engaged  in  teaching  school  and  were  going 
home  to  get  some  washing  done.  The  ruse  took  and  they 
were  allowed  to  proceed.  Having  reached  the  pass  of  the 
mountain  at  Strasburg,  Mr.  Hollar  returned  to  town,  leav- 
ing Mr.  Kinney  to  proceed  alone,  but  when  passing  up 
through  Perry  County  he  was  arrested  by  some  Federal 


160  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

soldiers,  who  refused  to  believe  his  story  that  he  had  im- 
portant information  and  took  him  a  prisoner  to  Harris- 
burg,  supposing  him  to  be  a  spy.  At  the  capital  he 
established  his  identity  and  delivered  his  message. 

All  of  us  who  were  engaged  in  this  work  of  communi- 
cating with  our  authorities  were  aware  that  according  to 
the  laws  of  war,  our  lives  would  be  forfeited  in  case  we 
were  detected,  but  we  were  careful  to  do  our  work  so  as  to 
avoid  suspicion.  On  one  occasion  General  Couch  sent  us 
this  message  by  one  of  our  scouts :  "  Tell  the  gentlemen 
who  are  engaged  in  sending  us  this  information  that  what 
they  are  doing  is  of  great  importance,  and  I  hope  they 
will  continue  it,  but  they  must  exercise  the  greatest  cau- 
tion, for  if  they  are  detected  they  will  surely  be  executed." 

Friday,  26.  This  day  was  fraught  with  great  events, 
and  stands  marked  in  the  history  of  Chambersburg.  This 
will  appear  in  the  following  facts : 

At  an  early  hour  in  the  morning  of  this  day — Hill's 
corps  being  close  at  hand — Rodes'  division  left  its  en- 
campment about  Shirk's  Hill,  where  it  had  been  since  the 
"Wednesday  preceding,  and  moved  on  down  the  Harris- 
burg  road.  Throughout  the  whole  of  this  day,  until'  after 
dark,  the  road  -was  lined  with  soldiers,  cannon,  and  wagon 
trains.  This  division  encamped  that  night  somewhere 
about  Itfewville.  Johnson's  division,  following  Kodes, 
moved  but  a  short  distance  below  Greenvillage. 

About  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  Heth's  division  of 
Hill's  corps  entered  the  town,  but,  instead  of  following 
Rodes  and  Johnson  down  the  Harrisburg  pike,  turned  east 
in  the  diamond,  or  public  square,  and  proceeded  on  out  the 
Gettysburg  road  and  encamped  near  Fayetteville.  About 


LEE'S   ENTRANCE  INTO   CHAMBERSBURG.  161 

nine  o'clock  A.  M.,  General  A.  P.  Hill,  the  commander  of 
the  Third  Corps,  attended  by  one  or  two  of  his  staff,  came 
in.  Dismounting  in  the  diamond  and  hitching  his  horse 
in  front  of  a  grocery  store,  the  general  entered  into  con- 
versation with  one  of  our  citizens.  As  General  Hill  had 
at  one  time  been  stationed  at  the  United  States  Barracks 
at  Carlisle,  he  inquired  of  the  citizen  concerning  a  number 
of  persons  with  whom  he  had  been  acquainted  at  that 
place.  The  citizen  gave  him  whatever  information  he 
could,  and  then  inquired  of  him  when  he  expected  Gen- 
eral Lee  to  arrive.  Hill  replied,  "I  am  expecting  him 
every  moment."  Casting  his  eyes  up  Main  Street,  he  said, 
"There  he  comes,  now."  The  citizen, — Mr.  Bishop,  the 
photographer, — at  once  set  out  for  his  photograph  gal- 
lery, and  having  made  everything  ready  to  take  a  pic- 
ture of  the  general  when  he  should  arrive,  threw  open 
his  window  and  pushed  the  camera  out.  This  attracted 
the  attention  of  some  soldiers  and  teamsters,  who  were 
sitting  along  the  curbstones,  and  they  rose  to  their  feet, 
exclaiming,  "  See,  we  are  going  to  have  our  pictures  taken." 
This  unexpected  occurrence  prevented  Mr.  Bishop  from 
executing  his  purpose,  which  is  deeply  to  be  regretted,  for 
the  occasion  was  one  worthy  the  genius  of  the  best  artist. 
General  Hill  seemed  to  be  a  man  of  splendid  physique. 
Of  ordinary  height,  his  figure  was  slight  but  athletic, 
and  his  carriage  erect.  His  dress  was  the  ordinary  Con- 
federate gray,  and  was  plain  and  without  ornament, 
except  the  stars  upon  the  collar  of  his  coat,  which  desig- 
nated his  rank.  His  appearance  indicated  a  man  of  ro- 
bust health,  and  one  who  cared  not  for  the  tinsel  of 

military  trappings,   or  the  honors  of  his  high  position. 
11 


162  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

He  fell  upon  April  2d,  1865,  when.  General  Grant  broke 
the  Confederate  lines  about  Petersburg. 

Returning  to  the  second  story  of  my  dwelling,  on  the 
north-east  corner  of  the  diamond,  where  I  hud  been  to 
take  a  look  at  General  Hill,  I  found  there  a  number  of 
the  ministers  of  the  town.  They  had  been  in  the  habit 
of  meeting  there  to  look  upon  the  hosts  of  invaders,  for 
from  the  windows  of  that  room  an  uninterrupted  view 
could  be  had  of  Main  Street,  from  the  Reformed  Church 
to  the  Presbyterian,  at  the  lower  end.  Seeing  a  group  of 
about  fifteen  or  twenty  finely  mounted  horsemen  coming 
over  the  brow  of  the  hill,  opposite  the  Reformed  Church, 
I  called  the  attention  of  the  persons  present  to  them,  when 
one  of  them  exclaimed,  "  That's  General  Lee  and  his  staff." 
Snatching  our  hats  we  made  rapid  strides  down  the  stairs 
and  out  into  the  diamond  tp  see  them  enter.  Taking  a 
position  in  front  of  the  printing  establishment  of  the  Re- 
formed Church,  then  known  as  the  Mansion  House,  I 
watched  the  entrance  of  these  men  and  the  memorable 
scenes  which  there  transpired.  Lee  and  his  staff  stopped 
directly  in  front  of  where  I  stood.  General  Hill  had,  upon 
perceiving  the  approach  of  General  Lee,  mounted  his 
horse,  and  riding  slowly  toward  him,  held  his  hat  grace- 
fully above  his  head.  The  two  generals — Lee  and  Hill  — 
then  rode  a  short  distance  away  from  the  group,  and  held 
a  short,  whispered  consultation.  As  a  large  part  of  Heth's 
division  of  Hill's  corps  had  already  passed  through  Cham- 
bersburg,  not  following  the  two  divisions  of  Ewell's  corps 
down  the  valley  toward  Harrisburg,  but  turning  eastward 
and  going  out  on  the  pike  leading  to  Gettysburg,  I  con- 
cluded that  if  Lee  followed  in  the  same  direction,  Balti- 


3 


164  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

more  and  Washington  were  his  destination.  With  this 
impression  upon  my  mind,  I  watched  with  intense  interest 
the  result  of  the  council  then  taking  place,  and,  observing 
Mr.  Benjamin  S.  Huber,  who  resided  a  few  miles  from 
town,  standing  by  my  side,  and  remembering  that  he  had 
been  sent  a  few  days  before  with  a  message  to  Harrisburg,. 
and  that  he  could  be  relied  upon  for  any  duty,  I  said  to 
him,  "  There,  Ben,  is  perhaps  the  most  important  council 
in  the  history  of  this  war,  and  the  fate  of  the  Government 
may  depend  upon  it.  If  General  Lee  goes  on  down  the 
valley,  then  Harrisburg  and  Philadelphia  are  threatened; 
if  he  turns  east,  Baltimore  and  Washington  are  in  danger, 
and  the  Government  ought  to  know  which  way  he  goes  as 
soon  as  possible."  To  this  Huber  replied,  "  Well,  I  have 
just  got  back  from  Harrisburg  and  I  am  tired,  but  as  soon 
as  he  starts  so  that  I  can  see  which  way  he  goes,  I  will  be 
off  again  for  Harrisburg."  In  a  short  time  the  council 
between  the  two  generals  ended,  and  Hill  falling  back  and 
Lee  riding  in  advance,  the  whole  cavalcade  moved  forward. 
Reaching  nearly  the  middle  of  the  diamond,  where  the 
road  leading  to  Harrisburg  is  crossed  at  right  angles  by 
the  pike  leading  to  Gettysburg  and  Baltimore,  Lee  drew 
the  right  -  hand  rein  and  his  horse  turned  eastward.  Look- 
ing around  for  Huber,  I  saw  him  elbowing  his  way  through 
the  crowd  of  citizens  to  convey  this  important  informa- 
tion to  Harrisburg.  The  following  is  his  own  account  of 
his  trip: 

"  I  struck  at  once  across  the  country  for  Roxbury,  at 
the  base  of  the  North  Mountain,  and  as  I  was  acquainted 
with  every  foot  of  the  way,  I  had  no  difficulty  in  eluding 
the  rebel  pickets.  At  Roxbury  I  secured  the  services  of 


MR.   HUBER       REPORTS   AT   HARRISBURG.  165 

Mr.  S.  L.  Sentman  (the  same  who  a  few  days  later  fur- 
nished Mr.  S.  "W.  Pomeroy  with  a  horse),  and  under  his 
guidance  —  he  being  mounted  and  I  on  foot  —  we  passed 
through  the  gap  into  Dothan  Valley.  "We  had  to  cross 
Trout  Run  several  times,  and  as  I  was  walking  and  had  to 
wade  it,  the  water  came  up  nearly  to  my  knees.  When 
we  reached  Amberson's  Valley,  Mr.  Sentman  left  me,  and 
I  pursued  my  way  alone,  and  passed  into  Perry  County 
near  Germantown.  Upon  entering  Amberson's  Valley,  I 
pressed  a  horse,  and  at  Germantown  I  had  my  horse  fed 
.and  got  my  supper.  Here  I  came  near  being  arrested  as  a 
rebel  spy,  but  I  was  at  length  allowed  to  proceed.  About 
eight  o'clock  I  left  Germantown  for  Newport,  some  forty- 
two  miles  distant.  This  distance  I  rode  in  about  seven 
hours  without  dismounting.  Arriving  at  Newport,  on  the 
Pennsylvania  Railroad,  about  forty  tiiiles  above  Harris- 
burg,  near  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  I  put  my  horse 
at  a  hotel,  and,  a  train  coming  along  soon  after,  I  took 
passage  for  the  capital.  Shortly  after  daylight  we  reached 
Harrisburg,  and  when  I  got  out  of  the  car  I  met  Hon. 
D.  W.  Rowe,  then  in  the  military  service,  now  judge 
•of  this  district.  I  told  Judge  Rowe  the  news  I  brought, 
when  he  at  once  conducted  me  to  the  capitol.  Upon  en- 
tering one  of  the  rooms  I  found  myself  in  the  presence  of 
a  number  of  distinguished  persons,  among  whom  were 
Krovernor  Curtin,  General  Couch,  and  General  Smith. 
After  telling  them  my  statement  I  was  put  through  a  close 
examination  by  one  of  the  generals — General  Smith,  I 
think  it  was.  After  the  close  of  the  examination  the  gen- 
eral said,  'Well,  gentlemen,  the  information  this  young 
man  brings  is  of  the  most  vital  importance,  if  we  can  rely 


166 


THE    GREAT    INVASION. 


upon  it.'  "William  McClellan,  Esq.,  at  that  time  a  promi- 
nent attorney  here,  with  whom  I  was  well  acquainted,, 
happening  to  be  present,  said,  '  Gentlemen,  I  know  this 
young  man;  you  can  rely  upon  every  word  he  says.'  After 
a  short  consultation  between  the  governor  and  the  mili- 
tary men,  dispatches  were  hurriedly  written  and  the  tele- 
graph operators  in  the  room  were  set  to  work.  After  a. 


BENJAMIN  S.  HUBER, 

The  scout  who  bore  to  the  authorities  the  first  intelligence  of  the  direction  GeneraF 
.    I,ee  and  staff  were  going.    (From  a  photograph  taken  during  the  •war.) 

little  while  I  arose  to  leave,  when  the  governor  took  me 
by  the  hand,  thanking  me  for  the  information  I  had 
brought,  and  gave  me  a  paper  entitling  me  to  return  free 
on  the  cars  to  Newport.  Returning  to  Newport  I  mounted 
my  horse  and  rode  home  the  way  I  had  come,  and  upon 
nearing  home  I  again  encountered  Confederates,  one  of 


GENERAL    LEE.  167 

whom  took  my  hat  from  my  head.  Reaching  home,  I 
found  it  empty  and  deserted.  While  I  was  away  the  Con- 
federates were  swarming  all  over  that  part  of  the  country, 
and  my  wife  becoming  alarmed  shut  up  the  house  and 
went  to  a  relative  of  hers.  During  her  absence  the  Con- 
federates entered  the  house  and  carried  off  nearly  all  our 
clothing,  so  that  I  was  left  without  a  change  of  clothing 
or  a  hat  to  replace  the  one  taken  from  me." 

The  authorities  at  Washington  were  aware  on  Saturday, 
the  27th,  that  Lee  had  passed  through  Chambersburg  the 
day  previous,  and  had  gone  east.  Is  it  not  fair  to  suppose 
that  this  important  fact  was  made  known  to  them  by  the 
message  carried  by  Mr.  Huber? 

General  Lee,  as  he  sat  on  his  horse  that  day  in  the  pub- 
lic square  of  Chambersburg,  looked  every  inch  a  soldier. 
He  was  at  that  time  about  fifty -two  years  of  age,  stoutly 
built,  of  medium  height,  hair  strongly  mixed  with  gray, 
and  a  rough,  gray  beard.  He  wore  the  usual  Confederate 
gray,  with  some  little  ornamentation  about  the  collar  of 
his  coat.  His  hat  was  a  soft  black  without  ornament  other 
than  a  military  cord  around  the  crown.  His  whole  ap- 
pearance indicated  dignity,  composure,  and  disregard  for 
the  gaudy  trappings  of  war  and  the  honor  attaching  to 
his  high  station.  Any  one  who  had  ever  seen  his  picture, 
as  it  is  found  in  the  various  histories  of  the  war,  would 
have  had  no  difficulty  in  singling  him  out  in  a  crowd. 
General  Lee  seemed  to  have  not  only  the  most  profound 
respect  of  his  men  —  officers  and  privates — but  their  ad- 
miration and  love.  With  some  few  exceptions  among  the 
officers,  some  of  whom  quietly  expressed  their  feelings  to 
some  of  our  citizens,  and  seemed  to  fear  that  they  had 


168  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

made  a  mistake  in  coming  into  our  State,  the  whole  army 
had  the  most  unbounded  confidence  in  their  commanding 
general,  and  would  unhesitatingly  follow  him  wherever 
he  would  lead  them. 

The  men  composing  the  general's  staff  were  a  splendid 
looking  body.  Finely  mounted,  neatly  dressed,  and  excel- 
lent in  horsemanship,  they  presented  an  appearance  which 
those  who  witnessed  them  will  be  likely  ever  to  remember. 

There  were  with  the  Confederates,  presumably  with  that 
group,  two  officers  of  the  British  army  and  one  of  the 
Prussian.  Those  officers  were,  no  doubt,  expecting  and 
desiring  to  witness  the  downfall  of  the  Republic.  That 
such  was  the  case  with  at  least  one  of  them — Colonel 
Freemantle  of  the  British  service — is  demonstrated  in  an 
article  he  afterward  wrote  for  Blackwood's  Magazine,  in 
which  he  narrates  the  events  of  the  Pennsylvania  cam- 
paign. His  abuse  of  the  people  of  the  border,  and  of  the 
ladies  of  Chambersburg,  whom  he  calls  "viragoes,"  his 
congratulations  to  General  Longstreet  upon  the  apparent 
success  of  Pickett's  great  charge  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
third  day's  battle,  and  his  regret  at  their  repulse,  clearly 
show  his  hatred  of  our  country  and  its  institutions.  We 
heard  at  the  time  of  the  presence  of  these  foreign  officers, 
but  did  not  distinguish  them  from  others. 

In  that  group  of  distinguished  men  were  the  brains  of 
the  vast,  moving  host  which  came  swarming  through  our 
borders,  and  while  we  were  inclined  to  admire  their  genius, 
we  yet  looked  upon  them  as  the  enemies  of  our  country,  and 
could  only  hope  and  pray  that  they  would  meet  the  terrible 
overthrow  which  they  deserved.  In  precisely  one  week 
from  the  day  of  this  imposing  pageant,  our  hopes  and 


GENERAL   LEE   AT   CHAMBERSBURG.  169 

prayers  were  realized,  and  the  defeated  hosts  were  thrown 
back  from  the  heights  of  Gettysburg,  and  with  their 
crushing  defeat  commenced  the  decline  and  downfall  of 
the  cause  for  which  they  fought. 

General  Lee  selected  for  his  head  -  quarters  a  grove 
which  then  stood  along  the  pike  leading  to  Gettysburg, 
near  the  eastern  edge  of  Chambersburg.  It  was  once 
known  as  "  Shetter's  Woods,"  but  afterward  as  "  Messer- 
•smith's  "Woods,"  after  the  late  George  R.  Messersmith, 
Esq.,  who  at  the  time -referred  to  owned  it.  It  was  for 
many  years  the  place  where  picnics  and  Fourth  of  July 
celebrations  were  held.  The  Centennial  Anniversary  of 
American  Independence,  on  July  4th,  1876,  was  held 
there.  The  grove  has  recently  been  cut  down,  and  the 
place  is  now  a  cultivated  field.  It  was  a  beautiful  loca- 
tion, and  from  Friday,  June  26th,  to  Tuesday  morning, 
30th,  General  Lee  and  his  staft'  tarried  there.  There 
he  held  his  councils  of  war,  there  he  received  reports 
from  the  various  parts  of  his  vast  army,  and  there  he 
planned  and  ordered  an  attack  .on  the  capital  of  our 
State,  and  there  on  the  night  of  Monday,  29th,  when 
Longstreet's  scout  brought  information  'of  the  where- 
abouts of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  recalled  that 
•order  and  decided  to  cross  the  South  Mountain  and  fight 
.a  battle  upon  the  direct  line  to  Baltimore  and  Washing- 
ton. Other  acts  of  importance  which  transpired  upon 
this  historic  spot  during  those  memorable  four  days  of 
General  Lee's  residence  there,  will  be  given  in  their  ap- 
propriate places. 

In  the  morning  of  this  day — Friday,  26th, — Early's  di- 
vision left  its  camp  at  Greenwood,  where  it  had  remained 


170  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

over  the  previous  day,  and  proceeded  by  the  pike  to  Get- 
tysburg on  its  way  to  York,  according  to  instructions- 
given  General  Early  by  General  Ewell  at  the  visit  of  the 
former  to  the  latter's  head  -  quarters  near  Chambersburg 
the  day  before.  While  on  their  way  across  the  mountain 
they  burned  the  Caledonia  Iron  Works,  which  belonged 
to  Hon.  Thaddeus  Stevens.  These  works  were  situated 
about  two  miles  east  of  Greenwood,  at  the  base  of  the 
South  Mountain,  and  about  ten  miles  from  Chambers- 
burg.  They  consisted  of  a  large  charcoal  furnace,  forge, 
rolling  mill,  coal  house,  shops,  stables,  and  other  build- 
ings. On  Tuesday,  June  16th,  as  has  been  said,  while 
Jenkins'  cavalry  occupied  Chambersburg,  a  marauding 
party  visited  these  works,  and  upon  the  condition  that 
they  should  be  spared,  all  the  horses  and  mules  belong- 
ing to  the  premises  were  delivered  to  them.  Hon.  John 
Sweeney,  Mr.  Stevens'  business  manager,  says  that  he  had 
an  interview  with  General  Early,  as  he  sat  upon  his  horse 
that  day,  and  endcavorcl  to  dissuade  him  from  executing 
his  threat  to  destroy  these  works.  lie  told  him  that  so  far 
as  Mr.  Stevens  was  concerned,  he  would  be  better  off  if 
his  works  had  been  destroyed  ten  years  before,  but  for 
the  sake  of  the  many  .poor  people  who  were  dependent 
upon  them  for  support,  and  would  be  thrown  out  of  em- 
ployment if  they  were  destroyed,  he  should  spare  them. 
To  this  appeal  General  Early  replied,  "  That  is  not  the  way 
Yankees  do  business.  They  do  not  go  on  unless  they  make 
money.  Then,  Mr.  Stevens  is  an  enemy  of  the  South. 
He  is  in  favor  of  confiscating  their  property  and  arm- 
ing the  negroes.  His  property  must  be  destroyed." 
General  Early  then  specially  detailed  Colonel  French  to 


EARLY   AT    GETTYSBURG.  171 

apply  the  torch,  and  the  whole  was  soon  a  mass  of  smoul- 
dering ruins.* 

In  the  afternoon  of  this  day  Early's  division  reached 
Gettysburg,  when  a  requisition  was  made  upon  the  authori- 
ties for  sixty  barrels  of  flour,  seven  thousand  pounds  of 
pork  or  bacon,  one  thousand  two  hundred  pounds  of  sugar, 
one  hundred  pounds  of  coffee,  one  thousand  pounds  salt, 
forty  bushels  onions,  one  thousand  pairs  shoes,  five  hundred 
hats;  or,  ten  thousand  dollars  in  money.  To  this  demand 
the  town  council,  through  its  president,  Mr.  D.  Kendlehart, 
made  the  following  reply: 

GETTYSRURG,  June  26th,  1863. 
GENERAL  EARLY: 

Sir — The  authorities  of  the  borough  of  Gettysburg,  in  answer  to  the  de- 
mand made  by  you  upon  the  said  borough  and  county,  say  that  their  authority 
extends  but  to  the  borough,  and  that  the  requisition  asked  for  can  not  be 
given,  because  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  comply.  The  quantities  required 
are  far  beyond  that  in  our  possession.  In  compliance,  however,  to  the  de- 

*  I  am  indebted  to  Professor  J.  Praise  Richard,  the  historian,  for  a  copy  of  a 
letter  from  General  Early  to  him,  in  response  to  an  inquiry  as  to  his  reasons 
for  destroying  Mr.  Stevens'  iron  works.  General  Early  says  in  his  letter 
from  Lynchburg,  Virginia,  May  yth,  1886: 

"No  column  of  our  troops  was  sent  to  burn  the  iron  works  of  Thaddeus- 
Stevens,  near  Greenwood,  in  the  campaign  into  Pennsylvania,  in  1863.  My 
division  of  Swell's  corps  was  ordered  to  move  along  the  western  base  of 
South  Mountain  until  it  came  to  the  road  from  Chambersburg  to  Gettysburg, 
which  I  did,  passing  through  Waynesborough  and  one  or  two  smaller  villages. 
I  found  the  iron  works  above  mentioned  on  the  road  aforesaid,  where  it  be- 
gins to  ascend  the  South  Mountain,  and  they  were  burned  by  my  order,  and 
on  my  own  responsibility.  My  reasons  for  giving  the  order  were  founded  on 
the  fa<5l  that  the  Federal  troops  had  invariably  burned  such  works  in  the 
South,  wherever  they  had  penetrated,  and  notably  among  them  the  iron 
works  of  Hon.  John  Bell,  of  Tennessee,  who  was  the  Constitutional  candi- 
date for  the  presidency  in  1860,  and  who  was  too  old  to  take  any  part  in  the 
war  then  pending.  Moreover,  in  some  speeches  in  congress,  Mr.  Stevens 
had  exhibited  a  most  vindictive  spirit  toward  the  people  of  the  South,  as  he 
continued  to  do  to  the  day  of  his  death.  This  burning  was  simply  in  retalia- 
tion for  various  deeds  of  barbarity  perpetrated  by  Federal  troops  in  some  of 
the  Southern  States,  as  was  the  subsequent  burning  of  Chambersburg  in  1864. 
"  Respectfully  yours,  etc.,  J.  A.  EARLY." 


172  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

mands  we  will  request  the  stores  to  be  opened  and  the  citizens  to  furnish 
whatever  they  can  of  such  provisions,  etc.,  as  may  be  asked.  Further  we 
can  not  promise. 

By  authority  of  the  council  of  the  borough  of  Gettysburg,  I  hereunto,  as 
president  of  said  Board,  attach  my  name.  D.  KENDLEHART. 

General  Early's  orders  required  him  to  proceed  without 
delay  to  York,  and  as  no  response  was  made  to  his  requi- 
sition, it  was  not  pressed.  Leaving  him  en  route  to  that 
place,  we  again  turn  our  attention  to  our  southern  border 
and  note  some  events  transpiring  there. 

Previous  to  crossing  the  Potomac,  General  Lee  had  sent 
"General  Imboden  with  his  cavalry,  consisting  of  about 
thirty  -  three  hundred  men,  to  break  up  the  Baltimore  and 
•Ohio  Railroad  in  order  to  prevent  any  forces  from  the 
West  from  coming  in  from  that  direction  upon  his  rear. 
^Starting  in  at  Cumberland,  Maryland,  he  moved  east- 
wardly  along  the  railroad,  doing  considerable  damage  to 
the  track,  bridges,  and  depots,  as  well  as  the  canal  boats 
rand  locks  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal,  as  far  down 
as  Martinsburg.  After  the  execution  of  this  work  he 
crossed  the  Potomac,  either  on  this  day  or  the  preceding 
one,  at  Cherry  Run  Ford,  a  point  about  eight  miles  east 
of  Hancock.  From  this  ford  the  main  part  of  his  force 
came  up  into  and  through  Little  Cove,  in  the  southern 
part  of  the  (Franklin)  county  to  the  Cove  Gap.  At  the 
Maryland  line  a  detachment  left  this  body,  and  following 
up  Licking  Creek  entered  the  Great  Cove  and  passed  up 
to  Webster  Mills,  six  miles  south  of  McConnellsburg  in 
Fulton  County,  and  thence  crossed  the  mountain  by  Hun- 
ter's Road  and  rejoined  the  main  body  at  the  gap.  "While 
in  the  cove  this  force  did  great  damage.  The  farmers  lost 
nearly  all  their  stock,  and  Robinson's  store  at  Big  Cove 


MILITIA   MOVEMENTS.  173 

Tannery,  and  Patterson's  at  "Webster  Mills,  were  com- 
pletely stripped  of  their  contents.  In  many  cases  houses 
were  entered  and  private  property  taken.  Promising 
the  reader  that  he  will  hear  from  these  men  again,  we 
leave  them  in  their  camps  at  the  Cove  Gap,  east  of  the 
]S"orth  Mountain,  and  at  Mercersburg,  three  miles  further 
to  the  east. 

On  the  evening  of  this  day  Longstreet's  corps  encamped 
about  four  miles  south  of  Greencastle.  Hood's  division, 
and  probably  one  other,  came  directly  from  Williamsport 
by  the  pike  leading  to  the  former  place. 

Saturday,  27.  At  about  ten  o'clock  in  the  forenoon  of 
this  day  Jenkins'  cavalry  entered  and  passed  through  Car- 
lisle, and  went  into  camp  at  Kingston,  thirteen  miles  from 
Harrisburg.  In  the  afternoon  Rodes'  division  of  infantry 
entered  and  took  possession  of  the  place,  encamping  be- 
tween it  and  Kingston. 

General  Knipe,  who  commanded  the  advanced  Federal 
troops  in  the  valley,  steadily  fell  back  from  Shippensburg, 
where  he  rallied  the  frightened  !New  York  militia  previously 
spoken  of,  to  about  two  miles  south  of  Carlisle,  at  which 
place  he  intended  to  make  a  stand  against  the  advancing 
foe.  Rifle  pits  were  prepared,  in  which  he  was  assisted 
by  citizens  of  the  town,  several  hundred  of  whom  were 
under  arms  to  assist  in  the  defense  of  the  place.  But  hav- 
ing received  on  Wednesday  night  information  of  the  ap- 
proach of  Rodes'  division,  he  prudently  fell  back  toward 
Harrisburg.  That  Johnson's  division,  if  it  left  its  encamp- 
ment about  Greenvillage  at  all  until  it  left  for  Gettysburg 
on  the  Tuesday  morning  following,  did  not  go  much  further 
down  the  valley,  is  proved  in  the  fact  that  when  the  con- 


174  .  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

•centration  commenced,  it  marched  from  its  camp  to  Green- 
wood in  a  single  day.  This  march,  which  was  made 
•directly  across  the  county  by  the  roads,  which  are  not 
always  good,  might  have  been  made  from  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Shippensburg,  but  not  any  further  down  the 
valley. 

As  previously  'stated,  on  the  preceding  day  Heth's  di- 
vision of  Hill's  corps  passed  through  Chambersburg  and 
on  out  east  to  Fayetteville,  where  it  encamped.  Follow- 
ing this  division  during  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  and 
the  forepart  of  the  day  following  —  Saturday,  the  27th. — 
were  Fender's  and  Anderson's  divisions  —  Fender  in  ad- 
vance. Throughout  the  entire  afternoon  of  the  day,  and 
until  late  in  the  evening,  the  three  divisions  of  Longstreet's 
corps  passed  through  and  went  on  out  the  Plarrisburg  pike, 
turning  off  at  the  Mennonite  Church,  where  General  Ewell 
had  his  head  -  quarters  a  few  days  before,  and  went  into 
camp  along  the  east  bank  of  the  ConocOcheague  Creek. 
Hood's  division  encamped  on  the  farm  of  Mr.  Peter  Leh- 
man, two  and  a  half  miles  north-east  of  Chambersburg; 
Pickett's  division  upon  Mr.  John  N.  Long's  farm,  and 
McLaws'  still  further  up  along  the  creek. 

On  this  day  General  Lee  at  his  head  -  quarters  near 
Chambersburg  issued  the  following  general  order: 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  ARMY  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

CHAMBERSBURG,  PA.,  June  zyth,  1863. 
General  Order,  No.  73. 

The  commanding  general  has  observed  with  marked  satisfaction  the  con- 
duct of  the  troops  on  the  march,  and  confidently  anticipates  results  com- 
mensurate with  the  high  spirit  they  have  manifested. 

No  troops  could  have  displayed  greater  fortitude,  or  better  performed  their 
arduous  marches  of  the  past  ten  days. 

Their  conduct  in  other  respects  has,  with  few  exceptions,  been  in  keep- 


GENERAL   LEE'S    HUMANE    ORDER.  175 

ing  with  their  character  as  soldiers,  and  entitles  them  to  approbation  and 
praise. 

There  have,  however,  been  instances  of  forgetfulness  on  the  part  of  some 
that  they  have  in  keeping  the  yet  unsullied  reputation  of  this  army,  and  that 
the  duties  exacted  of  us  by  civilization  and  Christianity  are  not  less  obliga- 
tory in  the  country  of  the  enemy  than  in  .our  own. 

The  commanding  general  considers  that  no  greater  disgrace  could  befall 
the  army,  and  through  it,  our  whole  people,  than  the  perpetration  of  the 
barbarous  outrages  upon  the  unarmed  and  defenseless,  and  the  wanton  de- 
struction of  private  property,  that  have  marked  the  course  of  the  enemy  in 
our  own  country. 

Such  proceedings  not  only  degrade  the  perpetrators  and  all  connected  with 
them,  but  are  subversive  of  the  discipline  and  efficiency  of  the  army,  and 
destructive  of  the  ends  of  our  present  movement. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  we  make  war  only  upon  armed  men,  and  that 
we  can  not  take  vengeance  for  the  wrongs  our  people  have  suffered  without 
lowering  ourselves  in  the  eyes  of  all  whose  abhorrence  has  been  excited  by 
the  atrocities  of  our  enemies,  and  offending  against  Him  to  whom  vengeance 
belongeth,  without  whose  favor  and  support  our  efforts  must  all  prove  in 
vain. 

The  commanding  general,  therefore,  earnestly  exhorts  the  troops  to  ab- 
stain, with  most  scrupulous  care,  from  unnecessary  or  wanton  injury  to 
private  property,  and  he  enjoins  upon  all  officers  to  arrest  and  bring  to  sum- 
mary punishment  all  who  shall  in  any  way  offend  against  orders  on  this  sub- 
ject. R.  E.  I<EE,  General. 

This  order,  unlike  the  former  one  issued  on  the  21st,  it 
will  be  seen,  was  written  by  General  Lee  himself,  and  not 
by  his  adjutant.  The  object  of  the  former  one  was,  as  has 
been  stated,  to  prevent  the  indiscriminate  plunder  of  our 
people  and  to  confine  the  demands  of  the  army,  and  the 
methods  to  be  employed  in  securing  them,  within  the 
limits  of  civilized  warfare.  Under  the  regulations  pre- 
scribed private  property  was  to  be  respected,  and  in  no 
case  taken  except  when  needed  by  the  army,  and  then  only 
by  officers  specially  charged  for  that  duty.  Candor  com- 
pels me  to  say  that  in  the  main  these  humane  regulations 


176  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

were  observed.  The  taking  of  groceries,  provisions,  sta- 
tionery, hardware,  clothing,  hats,  boots  and  shoes,  drugs, 
horses,  cattle,  corn,  oats,  hay,  etc.,  was  clearly  within  the 
rules  of  civilized  warfare,  and  nothing  more  than  the 
Federal  army  did  when  in  the  enemy's  country.  And  hav- 
ing been  recognized  as  belligerents  in  the  exchange  of  pris- 
oners, and  in  other  ways,  the  Confederates  had  the  right 
while  in  our  country  to  the  usages  accorded  to  armies  in  an 
enemy's  country.  This, to  their  credit  be  it  said,  they  ex- 
acted of  us  without  many  acts  of  wanton  and  useless  plun- 
der. Indeed  I  must  say  that  from  all  the  conceptions  I 
had  formed  from  history  of  the  desolation  produced  by  an 
invading  army — in  a  civil  war  especially,  which  is  usually 
attended  with  more  rancor  and  bitterness  than  one  be- 
tween opposing  nations — this  invasion  of  our  State  widely 
differed.  With  the  exception  of  a  few  instances,  where 
stragglers  from  the  main  line  committed  some  depreda- 
tions, private  houses  were  not  entered  with  hostile  intent. 
But  one  person — a  Mr.  Strite  —  was  killed.  He  resided 
a  few  miles  south  of  Chambersburg,  and  some  distance 
from  the  main  road  over  which  the  army  passed.  While 
standing  in  his  yard,  in  front  of  his  house,  three  stragglers 
from  Hill's  corps  came  up  to  him  and  demanded  his  money, 
which  he  immediately  gave  them.  Soon  afterward  two 
more  stragglers  came  and  made  a  similar  demand,  and 
having  no  more  to  give  them,  they  killed  him  and  con- 
cealed his  body  under  the  manure  in  the  adjoining  barn- 
yard. In  a  few  instances  persons  were  relieved  of  watches, 
pocket-books,  boots,  etc.,  by  stragglers,  but  never  in  the 
presence  of  an  officer.  But  of  all  the  adepts  at  appropri- 
ating hats,  some  of  these  Confederate  soldiers  displayed  an 


PLUNDER   BY   THE   ARMY.  177 

ingenuity  that  was  indeed  remarkable.  As  they  marched 
along  the  streets,  sometimes  close  to  the  pavements,  and 
in  a  few  cases  upon  them  because  of  the  mud,  those  pos- 
sessing hats  having  them  crushed  into  a  shapeless  mass 
under  their  arms,  it  required  but  an  instant  to  grab  a 
hat  from  the  wondering  on  -  looker  and  place  it  where 
it  could  not  be  recognized  by  the  owner.  This  was 
repeatedly  done  in  the  presence  of  officers,  who  invari- 
ably tried  to  have  the  offending  person  pointed  out,  that 
the  stolen  property  might  be  restored  and  the  offender 
punished,  but  in  the  similarity  of  the  men  and  the  necessity 
for  the  column  to  keep  moving  on,  not  a  single  one  was 
detected. 

But  that  the  humane  intentions  of  General  Lee  were 
not  wholly  regarded,  and  acts  of  plunder  were  committed, 
is  clearly  established  by  this  second  order  from  the  com- 
mander in  chief,  in  which  he  refers  to  some  acts  of  dis- 
obedience and  expresses  his  regret  at  the  same.  In  further 
proof  of  this  fact  I  introduce  extracts  from  a  report  of 
the  Pennsylvania  campaign,  written  by  Colonel  Free- 
mantle,  one  of  the  British  officers  who  was  with  the  Con- 
federate army,  and  published  in  Blackwood' s  Magazine,  of 
September,  1863.  Colonel  Freemantle  says :  "  So  com- 
pletely was  the  country  through  which  the  Confederate 
army  passed  robbed  and  plundered,  that  all  the  cattle  and 
farm  horses  having  been  seized  by  General  Ewell,  farm 
labor  had  come  to  a  complete  standstill."  In  another 
place  the  same  writer  says:  "Lee's  retreat  was  encum- 
bered by  Swell's  immense  train  of  plunder."  Why  it  was 
that  General  Ewell's  corps  gained  this  distinction  over  the 
other  two  for  its  plundering  propensities,  may  probably  be 


178  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

accounted  for  in  the  fact  that  it  always  went  in  advance 
and  left  but  little  for  the  others  to  take. 

During  the  time  the  Confederate  army  occupied  this 
valley,  marauding  parties  were  sent  out  into  all  parts  of 
the  country  in  search  of  horses.  The  mountain  passes  and 
gaps  were  especially  visited,  and  every  nook  and  corner 
from  Mercersburg  to  Newburg  was.  searched,  and  many 
valuable  animals  were  captured  and  taken  away.  In  two 
cases  armed  resistance  was  made  to  these  marauders.  One 
of  these  was  at  what  is  known  as  Keefer's  Gap.  At  this 
place  an  old  path  crosses  the  mountain  into  Horse  Valley. 
The  farmers  in  the  neighborhood  of  this  gap  to  the  num- 
ber of  about  twenty  or  twenty  -  five  formed  a  camp  at  this 
place,  erecting  several  tents,  and  laying  in  a  stock  of  pro- 
1  visions  and  food  for  their  horses.  They  then  brought  to 
the  place  from  one  hundred  to  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  horses.  The  men  in  charge  were  .all  well  armed  and 
determined  to  protect  their  property.  Some  fifteen  or 
twenty  were  kept  continually  on  duty  while  the  rest  at- 
tended to  the  horses  and  brought  in  needed  supplies.  The 
roads  and  paths  were  well  guarded,  and  when  a  suspicious 
person  would  come  along,  two  of  the  guards  would  take 
him  in  charge  and  conduct  him  to  the  top  of  the  moun- 
tain, and  with  orders  not  to  be  seen  around  there  any 
more  would  let  him  go.  At  intervals  of  about  five  min- 
utes a  gun  was  discharged,  and  in  this  way  a  continuous 
booming  was  kept  up.  This  deterred  the  enemy  from 
approaching  the  place,  and  while  every  other  gap  in  the 
mountain  was  visited  and  horses  taken,  not  a  visit  was 
made  to  this  place. 

The  other  instance  of  armed  resistance  was  at  the  Stras- 


ARMED    RESISTANCE.  179 

"burg  Pass  leading  into  Horse  Valley.  This  valley  is  very 
narrow  and  of  considerable  length,  and  being  surrounded 
by  mountains  which  are  passable  only  at  a  few  places, 
resistance  seemed  to  be  practicable.  Mr.  Stephen  Keefer, 
the  supervisor  of  the  township,  summoned  his  neighbors, 
who  like  himself  were  all  hardy  mountaineers,  and  by 
felling  trees  across  the  road  which  enters  the  valley  from 
Loudon  at  its  southern  end,  effectually  closed  it  against 
all  intruders  in  that  direction.  On  the  top  of  the  moun- 
tain, covering  the  approach  by  the  Strasburg  road,  breast- 
works of  logs  and  stones,  masked  by  bushes,  were  erected, 
and  about  thirty  of  the  hardy  mountaineers  with  their 
trusted  rifles  stood  guard.  At  the  upper  end  of  the  valley, 
which  was  closed  by  the  obstructions  already  referred  to, 
several  hundred  valuable  horses  belonging  to  the  farmers 
residing  there,  and  to  persons  east  of  the  mountain,  who 
had  sent  them  there  for  concealment,  were  placed.  One 
day  the  guard  was  withdrawn  for  a  time,  when  the  de- 
tachment of  about  one  hundred  cavalry,  which  had  left 
'General  Stewart's  brigade  at  McConnellsburg  and  proceeded 
up  the  valley  as  far  as  Burnt  Cabins,  and  recrossed  the 
mountain  by  Fannettsburg  and  Horse  Valley,  and  out 
into  the  plains  to  the  east  by  this  pass,  came  along,  but 
found  the  breastworks  empty.  Had  the  mountaineers 
been  at  their  post  a  battle  would  most  certainly  have 
taken  place,  but  to  the  serious  loss  of  those  brave  de- 
fenders of  their  property,  for  the  enemy  came  upon  their 
entrenchments  to  the  rear.  Or  had  these  marauders  gone 
up  the  valley  some  six  or  eight  miles,  they  would  have 
.augmented  their  captures  by  some  two  or  three  hundred 
liorses.  The  reader  might  inquire,  how  did  these  invaders, 


180  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

unacquainted  with  these  mountain  roads,  find  their  way 
into  and  out  of  these  intricate  places?  They  had  pro- 
cured maps  of  our  county  which  they  had  studied  well. 
And  that  they  were  guided  by  some  sympathizer  in  their 
cause,  of  which  there  were  some  among  us,  seems  clear 
from  the  fact  that  a  man  rode  with  them  having  his  face 
covered  with  a  handkerchief.  That  traitorous  guide,  not- 
withstanding his  disguise,  was  recognized  by  some,  but  fear- 
ing that  they  might  be  mistaken  and  an  innocent  person 
be  consigned  to  eternal  infamy,  his  name  was  not  given. 

In  addition  to  the  instances  of  resistance  just  given, 
there  were  several  gallant  dashes  made  upon  the  Confeder- 
ate communications  by  squads  of  Federal  cavalry,  which 
deserve  mention.  After  the  main  body  of  the  Confederate 
army  had  passed,  the  communications  with  Virginia  were 
kept  open  by  detachments  of  cavalry.  Ignorant  of  Lee's 
destination,  and  discouraged  by  the  hosts  of  defiant  and 
boastful  Confederates  who  had  passed  along,  the  sur- 
prise and  joy  of  the  people  of  Greencastle  knew  no  bounds 
when,  on  Thursday,  July  2d,  a  company  of  Union  cavalry 
dashed  into  that  place.  These  men  were  under  the  com- 
mand of  Captain  Uhlrick  Dahlgren,  who  was  afterward 
killed  near  Richmond.  They  had  come  across  the  mountain 
from  the  Federal  column  by  Monterey  Pass.  If  a  band 
of  angels  had  come  down  into  the  town  they  could  not 
have  been  more  unexpected  or  welcome.  It  required  only 
a  few  minutes  to  apprise  the  people  of  their  presence, 
when  all  Greencastle  seemed  to  be  in  the  ^street.  Hats 
flew  into  the  air  and  cheer  followed  cheer.  Even  the  old 
and  staid  ministers  forgot  the  proprieties  and  many  wept 
for  joy.  Their  leader,  the  gallant  Dahlgreen,  though  a 


CAPTAIN  DAHLGREN'S  EXPLOIT.  181 

mere  youth,  had  the  entire  confidence  of  his  men,  and  he 
seemed  to  handle  them  with  perfect  ease  and  skill.  Cap- 
tain Dahlgren  immediately  ordered  all  the  citizens  off  the 
streets,  and,  after  hiding  his  men  behind  the  recesses  of 
the  public  square,  went  up  into  the  steeple  of  the  Reformed 
Church,  where,  with  his  glass,  he  scanned  the  country  for 
miles  around.  .  Perceiving  a  company  of  Confederate  cav- 
alry coming  from  the  #outh,  and  hurriedly  estimating  their 
number,  he  rapidly  descended,  and  declared  his  determi- 
nation to  give  battle,  notwithstanding  their  number  was 
double  that  of  his  own.  He  hastily  placed  his  men  so 
that  the  advancing  enemy  could  not  see  them  until  they 
would  reach  the  square,  and  then,  pistol  in  hand,  and 
leaning  forward  until  he  touched  his  horse's  neck,  with 
every  nerve  strained  with  eagerness  to  meet  the  foe,  he 
waited  until  they  were  within  a  few  hundred  yards,  when 
the  word  was  given,  and  with  a  wild  yell,  the  charge 
was  made  upon  the  astonished  and  panic  stricken  enemy. 
Although  from  the  superior  number  of  the  Confederates 
it  was  feared  that  these  heroic  men  would  be  annihilated, 
yet  they  put  the  enemy  to  flight,  capturing  seventeen  of 
their  number,  three  of  whom  were  officers.  This  party 
had  in  charge  a  mail -bag  from  Richmond,  and  in  it  were 
found  important  papers  from  the  Confederate  President 
for  General  Lee.  As  soon  as  the  importance  of  his  capture 
was  seen,  Dahlgren  hastily  left  by  the  way  he  had  come. 
•Galloping  out  the  Waynesborough  road,  he  detailed  a 
number  of  men  to  remain  and  barricade  it  on  the  hill  east 
of  the  town  to  prevent  pursuit  and  recapture.  This  they 
did  by  piling  wagons,  hay  -  ladders  and  other  things  across 
the  road.  The  guard,  after  having  erected  the  barricade 


182  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

and  remained  there  awhile  to  resist  any  pursuit  that  might 
be  made,  at  length  left  and  went  after  their  companions. 
This  mail,  with  the  prisoners,  was  delivered  to  the  Federal 
army  east  of  the  mountain. 

On  the  morning  of  Saturday,  July  4th,  Captain  Dahl- 
gren  and  his  brave  band  again  visited  Greencastle,  at 
which  time  a  similar  engagement  took  place,  This  en- 
gagement resulted  in  the  capture  of  seventeen  Confederate 
infantry  and  seven  cavalry,  and  a  number  wounded.  In 
both  these  brilliant  aft'airs  the  Union  soldiers  escaped  any 
injury. 

About  noon  of  "Wednesday,  July  1st,  a  single  Confeder- 
ate soldier  rode  into  Fayetteville  in  the  direction  of  Cham- 
bersburg,  when  he  was  halted  by  a  citizen  and  compelled 
to  surrender,  which  he  did  by  handing  to  his  captor  a  small 
pouch  of  letters.  The  courage  of  the  citizen  then  un- 
happily failed  him  and  he  allowed  the  soldier  to  return  to 
General  Imboden's  camp  at  Greenwood.  The  capture  of 
the  letters  was  reported,  and  in  a  brief  time  a  detachment 
of  cavalry  under  command  of  Captain  McNeil,  of  Vir- 
ginia, rode  into  the  town  and  arrested  six  or  seven  of  the 
citizens  and  took  them  to  Imboden's  camp.  That  night 
the  command  moved  on  toward  Gettysburg,  taking  their 
prisoners  with  them.  After  a  narrow  escape  from  being 
hung  they  were,  on  the  3d,  released  and  permitted  to  re- 
turn to  their  homes. 

Sunday,  28.  At  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  this 
day,  the  advance  guard  of  Jenkins'  cavalry  reached  Me- 
chanicsburg,  some  eight  miles  from  Harrisburg.  Two 
cavalrymen  bearing  a  flag  of  truce  dashed  into  the  town,, 
and,  halting  in  the  public  square,  inquired  for  the  civil 


CONFEDERATES   AT   MECIIASICSLURG   AND   YORK.  183 

authorities,  and  also  demanded  the  flag  which  had  been 
floating  until  a  short  time  before  their  entrance,  which 
was  taken  down  at  the  suggestion  of  some  of  the  Federal 
•  cavalry  -  men  as  they  withdrew  from  the  town.  The  bur- 
gess making  his  appearance,  they  demanded  of  him  the 
flag,  under  the  threat  that  the  place  would  be  shelled 
if  their  request  was  not  immediately  complied  with.  As 
there  was  no  alternative  the  flag  was  surrendered,  and 
the  citizens  had  the  mortification  to  see  one  of  the  Con- 
federates riding  away  seated  upon  it.  After  satisfying 
themselves  that  the  town  would  be  surrendered  without 
resistance,  the  entire  Confederate  force  of  cavalry  and 
mounted  infantry  under  General  Jenkins,  with  four  pieces 
of  artillery,  rriade  their  appearance,  and  passing  through 
the  town  encamped  about  one  mile  out.  After  seeing  his 
men  encamped,  Jenkins  returned  to  the  town  and  took  up 
his  head  -  quarters  at  the  Ashland  House.  Soon  after  his 
return  he  issued  a  requisition  upon  the  place  for  fifteen 
hundred  rations  to  be  delivered  at  the  Town  Hall  within 
an  hour  and  a  half.  About  two  o'clock  the  general  and 
his  staff  left  town  and  proceeded  to  his  camp. 

In  the  morning  of  this  day  Early's  division,  which  had 
left  Gettysburg  some  time  on  Friday  afternoon,  reached 
the  town  of  York.  This  division  had  marched  from 
Gettysburg  to  the  latter  place  by  two  different  roads.  One 
part  of  the  division  went  by  way  of  East  Berlin,  while  the 
remainder  passed  through  Hanover  to  the  junction  of  the 
Northern  Central  Railroad,  about  ten  miles  from  York. 
The  railroad  at  this  place  was  effectually  broken  up,  thus 
severing  connection  with  Baltimore  by  that  line.  As  the 
division  approached  York,  the  burgess,  Mr.  David  Small, 


184  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

went  out  several  miles  to  meet  the  advancing  Confederates 
and  surrender  to  them  the  town.  Special  immunity  was 
expected  because  of  this  voluntary  surrender,  but  no 
sooner  were  the  enemy  in  possession  of  the  town,  than  de- 
mands were  made  for  a  large  amount  of  supplies,  among 
which  were  two  hundred  barrels  of  flour,  thirty  thousand 
bushels  of  corn,  and  one  thousand  pairs  of  shoes.  This 
requisition  was  soon  followed  by  another,  demanding  the 
sum  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  cash.  The  furnish- 
ing of  this  money  was  to  be  the  consideration  for  sparing 
the  town  from  plunder  and  destruction,  and  notwithstand- 
ing twenty  -  eight  thousand  dollars  —  all  that  could  be 
obtained  at  the  time  —  were  paid  over,  General  Early 
issued  the  following  order,  or  address,  to  the  people 

To  the  Citizens  of  York: 

I  have  abstained  from  burning  the  railroad  buildings  and  car  shops  in  your 
town,  because,  after  examination,  I  am  satisfied  that  the  safety  of  the  town 
would  be  endangered  ;  and,  acting  in  the  spirit  of  humanity,  which  has  ever 
characterized  my  government  and  its  military  authorities,  I  do  not  design  to 
involve  the  innocent  in  the  same  punishment  with  the  guilty.  Had  I  applied 
the  torch  without  regard  to  consequences,  I  would  have  pursued  a  course  that 
vould  have  been  vindicated  as  an  act  of  retaliation  for  the  many  authorized 
afts  of  barbarity  perpetrated  by  your  own  army  upon  our  soil.  But  we  do 
not  war  upon  women  and  children,  and  I  trust  the  treatment  you  have  met 
with  at  the  hands  of  my  soldiers  will  open  your  eyes  to  the  monstrous  in- 
iquity of  the  war  waged  by  your  government  upon  the  people  of  the  Confed- 
erate states,  and  that  you  will  make  an  effort  to  shake  off  the  revolting 
tyranny  under  which  it  is  apparent  to  you  all  you  are  yourselves  undergoing. 

J.  A.  EARLY,  Maj.  Gen.  C.  5.  A. 

If  this  levy  of  money  upon  a  defenseless  town,  which 
had  been  surrendered,  and  which  had  evinced  a  meek  and 
unresisting  spirit,  and  in  default  of  its  payment  the  de- 
clared intention  to  destroy  the  place,  was  at  all  justifiable, 
or  within  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare,  it  would  be  diffi- 


THE  SUSQUEHANNA  BRIDGES.  185 

•cult  to  see  how  many  of  the  charges  of  inhumanity  and 
heartlessness  made  against  Federal  officers  in  the  South, 
can  be  sustained.  Shortly  after  the  entrance  of  the  Con- 
federates into  York,  General  Gordon  was  sent  with  his 
brigade  to  Wrightsville,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Susque- 
hanna,  twelve  miles  distant.  The  object  of  this  expedition 
was  to  seize  the  bridge  which  crossed  the  river  from  that 
place  to  Columbia  on  the  eastern  bank. 

As  considerable  importance  has  been  attached  to  this 
effort  upon  the  part  of  the  Confederates  to  seize  this 
bridge,  I  shall  detail  with  some  minuteness  the  manner  of 
its  destruction.  As  soon  as  it  was  known  at  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Department  of  the  Susquehanna  that  the 
Confederates  were  entering  the  southern  border  of  Penn- 
sylvania preparations  were  made  to  hold  this  bridge. 
On  Wednesday,  24th,  Colonel  Jacob  G.  Frick  took  com- 
mand of  the  men  who  had  been  collected  at  Columbia. 
'These  consisted  of  a  few  men  from  the  Twentieth  and 
Twenty -seventh  Regiments  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  the 
Philadelphia  City  Troop,  under  command  of  Captain 
'Samuel  J.  Randall,  the  Patapsco  Guards,  and  several  com- 
panies of  the  citizens  of  Columbia  and  adjacent  places. 
Among  these  was  a  company  of  colored  volunteers  from 
•Columbia.  These  were  probably  among  the  first  colored 
soldiers  in  the  war,  and  they  did  excellent  service.  Colonel 
Frick  sent  his  men  to  the  west  side  of  the  river,  where 
breastworks  were  thrown  up  and  other  preparations  made 
for  the  expected  enemy.  Orders  from  head  -  quarters  were 
issued  to  Colonel  Frick  that  in  the  event  of  the  approach 
of  the  enemy,  and  his  inability  to  hold  the  bridge,  he 
should  destroy  it,  and  in  no  case  permit  it  to  fall  into  the 


186  THE    GKEAT   INVASION. 

enemy's  possession.     The  following  is  the  order  of  General 
Couch,  the  department  commander: 

HARRISBURG,  June  28th,  1863. 
By  the  Atlantic  and  Ohio  Telegraph  Lines. 
To  MAJOR  HALLER,  U.  S.  A.— A.  D.  C.: 

When  you  find  it  necessary  to  withdraw  the  main  body  of  Colonel  Prick's 
command  from  Wrightsville,  leave  a  proper  number  on  the  other  side  to  de- 
stroy the  bridges,  and  use  your  own  discretion  in  their  destruction.  Keep 
them  open  as  long  as  possible  with  prudence.  D.  N.  COUCH. 

The  duty  of  superintending  this  work  was  laid  upon  Mr. 
Robert  Crane,  who  was  assisted  by  Messrs.  E.  K.  Smith, 
William  Faesig,  Isaac  Real,  Henry  Berger,  John  Gilbert, 
Frederick  Bost,  H.  P.  Moore,  "W.  Green,  Michael  Libhart, 
J.  B.  Bachman,  Davis  Murphy,  W.  W.  Upp,  Michael  Shu- 
nian,  Henry  Duck,  and  I.  C.  Turner.  These  men  cut  the 
roof  of  the  bridge,  removed  some  of  the  timbers,  and 
bored  all  'the^arches,  charging  them  with  powder  and  at- 
taching fuses.  Four  men  were  placed  in  charge  of  these 
fuses,  who  were  to  apply  the  match  when  the  order  was 
issued  by  Colonel  Frick.  We  will  now  let  Colonel  Frick 
tell  the  result  in  his  official  report  to  General  Couch: 

"Late  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day  I  crossed  the 
river,  assumed  command  and  disposed  of  my  forces  for  de- 
fense. During  the  night  my  force  was  increased  by  four 
companies  from  Columbia,  three  white  and  one  colored,, 
numbering  about  one  hundred  and  seventy -five  men. 
Early  next  morning,  having  obtained  trenching  tools  from, 
citizens  of  Columbia  and  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Com- 
pany, my  own  men  and  the  negro  company  (the  other 
three  companies  having  left  for  their  homes)  began  the 
work  of  intrenching.  During  the  morning  a  detachment 
of  convalescent  soldiers  from  York,  and  the  Patapsco 


COLONEL  FRICK'S  REPORT.  187 

Guards,  with  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  more  men  joined 
my  command,  and  were  posted  on  the  left  of  town,  pro- 
tecting the  left  flank  of  my  position.  These  men  I  placed 
under  command  of  Lieutenant  -  Colonel  Green.  These 
were  also  joined  during  the  morning  by  scattered  frag- 
ments of  the  Twentieth  Regiment  Pennsylvania  Volun- 
teers, under  command  of  Lieutenant  -  Colonel  Sickles, 
which  I  posted  on  the  right  of  town  as  a  protection  to  the 
right  flank.  The  work  of  intrenching  was  continued  un- 
til the  approach  and  attack  of  the  enemy,  about  half-  past 
four  o'clock  P.  M.;  and  whilst  the  work  was  in  progress  I 
selected  with  the  assistance  of  Major  Haller,  A.  D.  C.  to 
the  commanding  general,  the  several  points  at  which  to 
post  my  limited  number  of  men.  The  main  body  of  the 
enemy,  about  twenty -five  hundred  strong,  composed  of 
cavalry,  artillery  and  infantry,  took  up  their  position  about 
six  o'clock  P.  M.,  on  the  turnpike,  in  the  immediate  front 
of  my  troops,  and  within  three  quarters  of  a  mile  of  our 
rifle  pits.  A  force  of  cavalry  and  infantry  moved  down 
the  railroad  on  our  left  and  attacked  our  skirmishers,  who 
after  replying  to  their  fire  for  a  short  time  retired  to  the 
main  body,  which  kept  up  a  steady  fire  and  held  the  enemy 
in  check  until  they  received  orders  to  retire  to  the  bridge. 
"  The  Confederates  succeeded  in  getting  a  battery  in  po- 
sition on  the  elevated  ground  on  our  right  and  a  section  in 
our  immediate  front.  These  guns  were  used  most  vigor- 
ously against  those  of  my  command  occupying  the  rifle 
pits.  In  the  meantime  they  sent  a  column  of  infantry 
under  cover  of  a  high  hill  on  our  right,  within  a  few  hun- 
dred yards  of  the  river.  None  but  their  skirmishers  ap- 
proached within  range  of  the  guns  of  our  men  occupying 


188  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

the  rifle  pits,  and  those  being  in  a  grain  field  obscured 
from  our  view,  except  when  they  would  rise  to  fire,  it  was 
difficult  to  do  them  much  harm  or  to  dislodge  them.  They 
depended  exclusively  upon  their  artillery  to  drive  us  from 
our  position  here.  Having  no  artillery  ourselves  on  that 
side  of  the  river  with  which  to  reply,  and  after  retaining 
our  position  for  about  one  hour  and  a  quarter,  and  dis- 
covering that  our  remaining  longer  would  enable  the 
enemy  to  reach  the  river  on  both  my  flanks,  which  I  was 
unable  to  prevent  because  of  the  small  number  of  men 
under  my  command,  and  thus  get  possession  of  the  bridge, 
•cut  off'  our  retreat  and  secure  a  crossing  of  the  Susque- 
hanna,  which  I  was  instructed  to  prevent,  I  retired  in  good 
•order  and  crossed  the  bridge  to  the  Lancaster  County  side. 
Before  the  enemy  had  left  York  for  the  river  here,  I  made 
a.s  I  supposed  every  necessary  arrangement  to  blow  up  one 
span  of  the  Columbia  bridge.  "When  they  got  within  sight, 
the  gentlemen  charged  with  the  execution  of  that  work 
repaired  promptly  to  the  bridge  and  commenced  sawing 
off  the  arches  and  heavy  timbers,  preparatory  to  blowing 
aa p  with  powder  which  they  had  arranged  for  that  purpose. 
After  an  abundance  of  time  was  allowed  them,  and  after 
I  supposed  every  man  of  my  command  was  ever  the  river, 
and  when  the  enemy  had  entered  the  town  with  his  artil- 
iery  and  reached  the  barricade  at  the  bridge-head,  I  gave 
the  order  to  light  the  fuse.  The  explosion  took  place,  but 
our  object  in  blowing  up  the  bridge  failed.  It  was  then 
that  I  felt  it  to  be  my  duty,  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  crossing  the  river  and  marching  on  Harrisburg  in 
the  rear,  destroying  on  the  route,  railroads  and  bridges,  to 
order  the  bridge  to  be  set  on  fire" 


OBJECT   OF   WRIGHTSVILLE   EXPEDITION.  189 

The  bridge  was  owned  by  the  Columbia  Bank;  it  was 
five  thousand  six  hundred  and  twenty  feet  long,  and  cost 
one  hundred  and  fifty  -  seven  thousand  three  hundred  dol- 
lars. Its  destruction  was  necessary  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  crossing  into  eastern  Pennsylvania. 

This  affair  at-  "Wrights ville,  if  it  was  of  sufficient  magni- 
tude to  be  called  a  battle,  was  the  third  engagement  of  the 
war  in  Pennsylvania. 

This  expedition  to  Wrightsville,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was  ordered  by  General  Early,  who  doubtless  received  his 
orders  from  his  corps  commander,  General  Ewell.  General 
Ewell,  several  years  before  the  war,  was  employed  as  a 
civil  engineer  upon  the  Harrisburg  and  Columbia  Rail- 
road. He  was  familiar  with  the  whole  country,  and  doubt- 
less had  other  objects  in  view  in  attempting  to  seize  this 
bridge  than  plundering  Columbia  and  breaking  up  railroad 
communications  with  Philadelphia.  It  was  supposed  at 
that  time  that  it  was  designed  to  throw  Early's  division 
and  Hill's  corps,  which  was  then  marching  in  that  direc- 
tion, across  the  Susquehanna  at  that  place,  with  the  pur- 
pose of  attacking  Harrisburg  from  the  east,  while  Hodes 
and  Johnson  attacked  it  from  the  south.  This  movement 
would  have  been  exceedingly  hazardous,  for  whatever 
forces  might  have  crossed,  would  have  been  separated  from 
the  chief  command  by  a  river  a  mile  wide,  with  neither 
bridge  nor  ford  between  Columbia  and  Harrisburg — a 
distance  of  about  twenty  -  eight  miles. 

General  Long,  in  the  extract  from  his  article  in  the 
Philadelphia  Times,  given  in  our  first  chapter,  says:  "Be- 
fore entering  upon  the  execution  of  his  plans,  General  Lee 
had  marked  out  his  line  of  operations,  which  was  to  ad- 


190  THE    GREAT    IXVAtilv,::. 

vance  into  Pennsylvania,  with  Gettysburg  or  York  for  his 
objective  points,  as  circumstances  might  dictate.  It  was 
his  determination  to  give  battle  at  one  or  the  other  of  these 
places."  If  a  battle  with  the  Federals  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  York  was  expected  by  General  Lee,  the  possession 
of  the  Columbia  bridge,  to  prevent  the  approach  of  troops 
from  that  direction,  was  a  necessity.  That  cither  a  battle 
at  that  place,  or  crossing  the  river  and  marching  upon 
Harrisburg  by  its  east  bank,  was  expected,  is  clear  from 
the  fact  that  up  to  the  night  of  Monday,  29th,  when  the 
plan  of  the  campaign  was  suddenly  changed,  the  move- 
ments of  troops  were  nearly  altogether  in  the  direction 
of  York.* 


*  Colonel  W.  H.  Swallow,  Adj  utant  -  General  to  General  Rodes,  in  a  letter 
to  the  writer,  dated  at  Nashville,  Tennessee,  May  yth,  1886,  says: 

"General  I/well,  and  Colonel  Turner  of  his  staff,  both  told  me  in  confi- 
dence at  Berryville,  before  crossing  the  Potomac,  that  York,  Pennsylvania, 
or  that  vicinity,  was  to  be  the  ground  where  General  Lee  expected  to  concen- 
trate his  army.  I  believe  that  if  Lonrjstreet  had  not  tarried  so  long  at  Cham- 
bersburg,  York  would  have  been  the  point  of  concentration  on  the  3oth, 
instead  of  Gettysburg." 

As  stated  elsewhere,  Longstreet's  corps  reached  Chambersburg  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  Saturday,  June  syth,  and  went  into  camp  near  the  town.  On 
Monday  morning  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws  left  their  encampment 
and  marched  to  Greenwood  —  some  eight  miles  distant.  At  that  place  they 
remained  until  the  afternoon  of  Wednesday,  ist,  when  they  proceeded  across 
the  mountain  and  reached  Marsh  Creek,  four  miles  from  Gettysburg,  before 
n  o'clock  the  same  night.  This  encamping  over  Monday  night  at  Greenwood, 
after  but  eight  miles  march,  was,  as  General  Longstreet  says,  by  Lee's  order; 
and  the  delay  there  until  the  following  Wednesday  was,  he  says,  occasioned 
by  Johnson's  division  of  Swell's  corps,  and  the  latter's  wagon  train,  fourteen 
miles  in  length,  which  had  the  right  of  way.  Pickett's  division  was,  by 
Lee's  order,  left  near  Chambersburg  to  protect  the  rear,  until  early  on  the 
morning  of  Thursday,  26.,  when,  summoned  to  the  front,  it  by  a  forced  march 
reached  the  field  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  That  there  was  con- 
siderable delay  in  Longstreet's  movements  is  true,  but  whether  or  not  he  was 
responsible  for  it,  except  probably  for  his  inactivity  on  Sabbath,  the  28th,  is 
for  the  reader  to  judge.  General  McLaws,  in  a  recently  published  article  in 
the  Philadelphia  Press,  says  that  if  Stuart's  cavalry  had  not  taken  the  cir- 
cuitous route  it  did,  and  had  been  in  communication  with  General  Lee,  it 


LOXGSTREET'S  MEN  ix  CIIAMBERSBURG.  191 

I  return  now  to  the  occurrences  about  Chambersburg. 
There  were  but  few  movements  of  troops  through  the 
streets  this  day  (Sunday,  28th).  The  last  of  Hill's  forces 
had  passed  through  town  the  day  previous,  and  were  en- 
camped about  Fayetteville  and  Greenwood.  Longstreet's 
corps  was  encamped  a  few  miles  north  -  east  of  the  town. 
Religious  services  were  held  in  their  camps,  and  the  men 
were  quietly  resting  from  the  fatigue  of  their  weary  march. 

Notwithstanding  this  quiet  in  the  camps,  however,  im- 
portant events,  so  far  as  the  business  men  of  the  town 
were  concerned,  were  transpiring.  Squads  of  men,  each 
in  charge  of  one  or  more  officers,  visited  the  town  and 
cleaned  out  the  stores  of  what  the  troops  which  preceded 
them  had  left.  Sitting  in  my  house  connected  with  our 
store  about  one  o'clock  p.  M.,  the  sound  of  an  axe  chopping 
somewhere  about  the  front  was  heard.  Repairing  to  the 
place  I  found  a  party  of  soldiers  chopping  away  the  cellar 
door  leading  to  where  our  groceries  were  kept,  and  after 
effecting  an  entrance,  an  officer  with  blank  book  and  pencil 
noted  down  the  contents.  Having  finished  his  inventory 
of  our  stock,  a  guard  was  placed  over  the  same  until  it 
could  be  removed.  This  guard,  after  the  departure  of 
the  officer,  ransacked  our  private  or  family  cellar  in  the 
rear  of  the  store  cellar,  and  carried  away  whatever  they 
could  lay  their  thieving  hands  on.  When  the  officer  re- 
turned to  remove  our  groceries,  I  informed  him  of  what 
the  guard  had  done,  at  which  he  seemed  to  become  very 
indignant,  but  one  of  the  men  showed  him  a  can  of  pre- 
served fruit,  and  after  a  few  whispered  words  between 

would  have  been  left  to  protect  the  rear,  at  Chambersburg,  and  lyongstreet's 
whole  corps  would  have  moved  at  once  to  the  front.  General  Longstreet, 
then,  is  not  to  blame  for  his  delay  at  Chambersburg. 


192  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

them,  the  can  was  placed  in  a  wagon  and  the  officer's 
wrath  suddenly  subsided.  Similar  scenes  were  at  the  same 
time  being  enacted  all  over  the  town,  and  scarcely  a  store 
or  shop  escaped.  About  four  o'clock  in  the  evening  a 
number  of  teams  were  brought  into  town,  and  distributed 
around  at  various  places,  and  the  contents  of  every 
store,  shop  and  cellar  were  taken  and  loaded  into  these 
wagons.  The  dry  goods  men  at  that  time  dealt  also  in 
groceries,  and  all  suffered  the  loss  of  their  entire  stock. 
"We  had  in  our  cellar  a  considerable  amount  of  molasses, 
syrup,  sugar,  etc.,  which  General  Ewell  had  kindly  spared 
us.  These  we  would  have  removed  with  our  stock  of  dry 
goods,  but  the  cellar  was  deep  and  the  hogsheads  heavy, 
and  we  were  unable  to  draw  them  out.  The  Confederates, 
however,  were  equal  to  the  occasion,  and  when  thirty  or 
forty  of  them  took  hold  of  the  ropes,  they  soon  had  them 
all  up  in  front  of  the  store.  When  all  were  up,  and  before 
loading  them  into  their  wagons,  an  officer  with  a  blank 
book  noted  down  the  number  of  gallons  in  each  hogshead 
and  barrel,  and  also  the  amount  of  sugar,  etc.  He  seemed 
to  be  acquainted  with  the  business  of  handling  groceries, 
and  in  deciphering  the  marks  upon  the  vessels,  and  when 
fixing  upon  the  number  of  gallons  in  such  as  were  tapped 
he  would  form  his  estimate  after  several  liftings,  which 
were  always  satisfactory  to  both  sides  in  the  transaction. 
In  all  this  process  he  would  have  me  by  his  side  to  see 
that  he  was  acting  fairly.  Before  giving  the  order  to  load 
into  the  wagon,  he  directed  me  to  select  whichever  of  the 
tapped  vessels  I  wanted  to  retain  for  my  own  use,  and 
after  designating  one,  he  had  the  men  put  it  back  into 
the  cellar.  This  was  the  largest  sale  of  groceries  we 


LOXGSTREET'S  MEN  IN  CHAMBERSBURG.  193 

had  ever  made  in  one  day,  and  that  was  on  the  Sabbath 
too.  Our  loss  was  heavy,  but  so  was  it  with  every  other 
business  establishment  of  the  town.  This,  be  it  remem- 
bered, was  but  one  of  the  instances  in  which  we  were 
made  to  suffer  by  the  enemy,  and  a  year  later,  when 
McCausland's  band  visited  us,  nearly  the  whole  town  was 
laid  in  ashes.  " 

I  was  not  aware  on  that  day  that  a  requisition  had  been 
made  upon  us.  That  one,  however,  .was  made,  not  upon 
the  citizens,  but  upon  the  Borough  officials,  who  failed  to 
respond  because  they  had  left  town,  is  evident  in  Colonel 
Freemantle's  account  of  the  transactions  of  that  day,  in 
Black-wood's  Magazine.  Colonel  Freemantle  says : 

"  Major  Moses  tells  me  that  his  orders  are  to  open  the 
stores  in  Chambersburg  by  force,  and  seize  all  that  is 
wanted  for  the  army  in  a  regular  and  official  manner, 
giving  in  return  its  value  in  Confederate  money  or  a  re- 
ceipt. The  store -keepers  have,  doubtless,  sent  away  their 
most  valuable  goods  on  the  approach  of  the  Confederate 
army.  Much  also  has  been  already  seized  by  Ewell,  who 
passed  through  nearly  a  week  ago.  But  Moses  was  much 
elated  at  having  already  discovered  a  large  supply  of  ex- 
cellent felt  hats  hidden  awav  in  a  cellar,  which  he  annexed 

«/ 

at  once." 

The  hats  referred  to  were  taken  from  one  of  the  enter- 
prising dealers,  and  were  valued  at  about  two  thousand 
dollars.  That  man  has  never  recovered  from  his  loss  on 
that  day. 

Colonel  Freemantle  continues:  "Moses  proceeded  into 
town  at  eleven  o'clock  A.  M.  with  an  official  requisition 
(from  General  Longstreet),  for  three  days'  rations  for  the 


13 


194  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

whole  army  in  this  neighborhood.  These  rations  he  is  to 
seize  by  force,  if  not  voluntarily  supplied.  *  *  Neither 
the  mayor  nor  the  corporation  officers  were  to  be  found 
anywhere,  nor  were  the  keys  of  the  principal  stores  forth- 
coming until  Moses  began  to  apply  the  axe.  *  *  I  re- 
turned to  the  camp  at  six  o'clock  p.  M.  Major  Moses  did 
not  get  back  till  very  late,  much  depressed  at  .the  ill  success 
of  his  mission.  He  had  searched  all  day  most  idefatiga- 
bly,  and  had  endured  much  contumely  from  the  Union 
ladies,  who  called  him  a  'thievish,  little  rebel  scoundrel,' 
and  other  opprobious  epithets.  But  this  did  not  annoy 
him  so  much  as  the  manner  in  which  everything  he  wanted 
had  been  sent  away  or  hidden  in  private  houses,  which  he 
is  not  allowed  by  General  Lee's  order  to  search.  He  has 
only  managed  to  secure  a  quantity  of  molasses,  sugar,  and 
whisky." 

That  molasses  was  taken  from  us;  the  whisky  from  the 
building  adjoining. 

The  following  day  Major  Moses,  commissary -general  of 
Longstreet's  corps,  rode  around  to  each  place  plundered 
and  paid  for  the  things  taken.  When  he  came  to  settle 
with  me,  he  drew  from  his  pocket  a  book  in  which  the 
articles  were  carefully  noted  down.  Taking  his  seat  at  my 
desk  he  wrote  in  a  hurried  and  business-like  manner  an 
itemized  bill.  He  then  asked  me  the  price  at  which  we 
sold  each  article,  which  he  scrutinized  for  awhile  and  then 
set  down  what  he  thought  was  right.  Footing  up  the  whole 
he  paid  me  in  Confederate  scrip.  While  writing  so  hur- 
riedly I  said  to  him,  "Why,  major,  you  write  just  like  a 
Philadelphia  lawyer."  "That's  just  what  I  am,"  he  re- 
plied. "  I  studied  law  on  Walnut  Street,  Philadelphia,  but 


LONGSTREET'S  I^EN  IN  CHAMBERSBTJRG.  195 

rsome  years  ago  I  removed  South,  where  I  have  resided 
-ever  since."  After  receiving  my  pay  in  his  worthless  scrip, 
I  said  to  him,  "  Now,  major,  tell  me  what  to  do  with  this 
money  /"  Straightening  himself  up  and  listening  to  what 
•I  said,  he  replied,  "  Well,  now,  that  is  an  important  ques- 
tion, and  deserves  the  best  answer  I  can  give.  My  advice 
to  you  is  to  invest  this  money  in  Confederate  bonds.  They 
are  at  least  as  good  as  the  money,  and  if  our  cause  suc- 
ceeds, as  we  expect  it  will,  the  bonds  will  be  paid.  If  we 
fail,  then  of  course  our  bonds  will  be  worthless,  but  so  will 
yours,  for  your  government  will  be  bankrupt  by  that 
time."  The  reader  may,  perhaps,  be  curious  to  kno~,v 
whether  1  took  the  major's  advice,  or  what  I  did  with  my 
•*'  money."  It  will  be  recollected  that  when  telling  of  the 
shrewdness  of  Rev.  Dr.  Fisher  in  disposing  of  the  scrip 
given  him  for  printing  done  for  the  Confederates,  I  stated 
that  the  doctor  did  the  best  in  his  dealings  with  the 
Confederates  of  :iny  man  I  knew,  with  one  exception, 
and  that  was  a  preacher  also.  The  present  is  perhaps 
the  time  to  tell  of  that  incident.  Shortly  after  the  re- 
treat of  the  Confederates  from  our  State,  an  elderly  gentle- 
man came  into  our  store  and,  after  purchasing  a  few 
things,  took  me  aside  and  proposed  to  leave  a  deposit  of 
a  considerable  sum  of  Greenbacks,  for  the  purpose  of 
buying  up  all  the  Confederate  scrip  I  could  get.  He  did 
not  inform  me  what  he  wanted  it  for,  nor  where  he  lived, 
but  I  learned  afterward.  He  instructed  me  to  pay  from 
four  to  five  cents  on  the  dollar,  and  because  of  my  con- 
senting to  rid  our  county  of  this  worthless  trash,  with 
which  it  wras  flooded  and  which  was  considered  of  no  value, 
lie  allowed  me  six  cents  on  the  dollar  for  mine.  Major 


196  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

Moses  allowed  us  fifty  cents  per  gallon  for  molasses  and 
syrup.  Six  cents  on  the  dollar  for  our  scrip  netted  us  just 
three  cents  per  gallon  for  what  not  long  after  we  could  have 
gotten  one  dollar  per  gallon  for.  The  reader  can  have 
some  idea  of  the  profit  or  loss  of  that  day's  transaction, 
when  in  addition  to  our  whole  stock  of  sugar  and  other 
groceries,  eight  hundred  gallons  of  molasses  and  syrup 
were  taken. 

I^have  often  felt  anxious  to  know  what  the  Confederates 
did  with  our  molasses.  Perhaps  the  solution  of  this  ques- 
tion is  given  by  General  Imboden  in  an  article  contributed 
by  him  to  the  Galaxy  of  November,  1871.  Speaking  of 
General  Lee's  great  simplicity,  and  sharing  the  lot  of  his 
soldiers,  General  Imboden  says:  "On  one  occasion  some 
molasses  was  obtained  and  sent  to  the  field.  One  of  Gen- 
eral Lee's  staff,  who  was  caterer,  that  week  —  that  is,  he 
drew  the  rations  for  the  head  -  quarters  mess — set  a  small 
pitcher  of  molasses  before  the  general  at  dinner,  who  was 
delighted  to  eat  it  with  his  hot  corn  bread.  Seeing  his 
satisfaction  the  catering  colonel  remarked,  '  General,  I 
secured  five  gallons  for  head  -  quarters.'  '"Was  there  as 
much  for  every  mess  the  size  of  ours  ? '  '  Oh,  no,  the  sup- 
ply won't  last  a  week.'  '  Then,  I  direct.,  colonel,  that  you 
immediately  return  every  drop  you  have,  and  send  an 
order  that  no  molasses  shall  be  issued  to  officers  or  men 
except  the  sick  in  hospital.' '; 

In  a  few  weeks  my  strange  friend  called  again,  and  tak- 
ing what  scrip  I  had  procured,  left  another  deposit.  This 
he^continued  until  he  had  gotten  about  all  that  could  be 
had.  But  who  was  the  strange  man  who  was  dealing  in 
Confederate  money  ?  The  following  was  his  history  as  I 


•A  MINISTER'S  FINANCIERING.  197 

.afterward  learned  it:  He  was  a  Presbyterian  minister, 
.and  resided  somewhere  in  the  valley  of  Virginia,  and.  being 
an  uncompromising  Union  man  he  thundered  the  terrors 
•of  the  law  upon  the  heads  of  his  Confederate  congrega- 
tion until  they  locked  the  church  against  him.  When  the 
{Confederates  advanced  near  where  he  lived  he  would  flee 
north  across  the  Potomac,  and  when  the  Union  forces 
would  occupy  the  territory  he  would  return,  and,  sur- 
rounded by  a  guard  of  Union  soldiers,  would  open  his 
church  and  preach  again.  Three  of  his  neighbors  desiring 
to  sell  their  property  and  move  further  down  in  the  Con- 
federacy, he  bought  their  farms,  payable  in  currency,  and 
would  thus  follow  the  wake  of  the  Confederate  army  and 
buy  up  their  scrip  and  pay  it  over  for  the  farms.  He  was 
Si  sharp  financier,  and  what  became  of  him  and  how  he 
made  out  with  his  purchases  I  never  heard. 

While  the  scene  of  plunder  just  related  was  taking 
place  in  Chambersburg  the  following  interesting  incident 
took  place  at  General  Lee's  head -quarters;  and  as  the 
sequel  of  it  is  so  interesting,  I  will  allow  the  principal 
iictor  therein  to  relate  her  own  story.  The  person  referred 
to  is  Mrs.  Ellen  McLellan,  widow  of  a  former  citizen  of 
Chambersburg,  William  McLellan,  Esq.: 

MR.  J.  HOKE  : 

Dear  Sir — I  take  pleasure  in  complying  with  your  request,  and  will  give 
you  a  brief  account  of  my  interview  with  General  Lee,  as  nearly  as  I  can 
recollect  it  now.  The  mills,  provisions,  and  stores  throughout  the  town  and 
surrounding  country  were  all  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  in  many  fami- 
lies supplies  were  running  short.  On  the  Sunday  before  the  battle  of  Gettys- 
burg (June  28th),  matters  had  become  so  serious  that  it  became  necessary  for 
some  one  to  seek  an  interview  with  the  enemy  and  obtain  flour.  I  sent  for 
one  of  the  body-guards,  and  a  captain  came  in  response.  From  him  I  learned 
that  I  could  see  General  Lee  by  going  to  his  head -quarters  in  Messersmith'» 


£98  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

woods.  This  captain  offered  me  an  escort,  but  assured  me  that  I  could  go- 
alone  with  perfect  safety,  showing  me  a  copy  of  General  Lee's  order  that  any 
one  who  would  insult  a  woman  byword,  look,  or  act,  would  be  instantly  shot. 
I  then  decided  to  decline  an  escort,  and  taking  my  young  daughter  I  set  out 
for  the  camp.  I  found  the  rules  were  stringently  enforced,  but  had  no  diffi- 
culty in  passing  through  the  ranks.  Everything  was  in  most  perfect  order  ;. 
even  the  horses  were  picketed  so  as  to  do  no  injury  to  the  trees  in  the  grove 
where  their  tents  were  pitched.  Reaching  head-quarters  I  found  the  General 
t-cated  with  his  officers  at  the  table.  A  subordinate  met  me  and  learning  my 
errand  placed  two  camp-stools,  and  in  a  short  time  I  found  myself  seated  by 
General  Lee  himself.  I  stated  to  him  our  need,  and  told  him  starvation 
would  soon  be  at  hand  upon  many  families  unless  he  gave  us  aid.  He  seemed 
.startled  by  this  announcement,  and  said  that  such  destitution  seemed  impos- 
sible in  such  a  rich  and  beautiful  grain  -  growing  country,  pointing  to  the 
rich  fields  of  grain  all  around  his  camp.  I  reminded  him  that  this  growing 
grain  was  useless  to  us  now,  and  that  many  of  our  people  had  no  means  to-- 
lay  in  supplies  ahead.  He  then  assured  me  that  he  had  turned  over  the  sup- 
plies of  food  he  found,  to  his  men  to  keep  them  from  ravaging  our  homes. 
He  said,  "God  help  you  if  I  permitted  them  to  enter  your  houses.  Your 
supplies  depend  uprn  the  amount  that  is  sent  in  to  my  men. "  He  then  told 
me  to  send  one  or  two  of  our  prominent  men  to  him.  I  replied  that  they 
had  nearly  all  gone  away,  fearing  that  they  would  be  seized  and  taken  off. 
(I  feared  to  give  him  the  names  of  any  of  our  gentlemen.)  He  then  asked 
me  to  send  a  miller  who  could  give  him  an  idea  of  the  quantity  required. 
On  leaving  I  asked  for  his  autograph.  He  replied:  "Do  you  want  the  auto- 
graph of  a  rebel?"  I  said,  "General  Lee,  I  am  a  true  Union  woman,  and 
yet  I  ask  for  bread  and  your  autograph."  The  general  replied,  "It  is  to- 
your  interest  to  be  for  the  Union,  and  I  hope  you  may  be  as  firm  in  your" 
principles  as  I  am  in  mine."  He  assured  me  that  his  autograph  v.-ould  be  a~ 
dangerous  thing  to  possess,  but  at  length  he  gave  k  to  me.  Changing  the 
topic  of  conversation,  he  assured  me  the  .war  was  a  cruel  thing,  and  that  he- 
only  desired  that  they  would  let  him  go  home  and  eat  his  bread  there  in 
peace.  All  this  time  I  was  impressed  with  the  strength  and  sadness  of  the 
man. 

I  trust  these  few  facts  may  prove  of  use  to  you.  I  am  glad  to  see  that  you 
are  getting  up  these  bits  of  unwritten  history.  Of  course  I  have  just  given 
you  an  outline  of  the  affair  and  you  are  at  liberty  to  use  it  as  you  see  fit. 

MRS.  ELLEN  MCLELLAN. 

The  sequel  to  this  visit  of  Mrs.  McLellan  will  appear 


MRS.  M'LELLAN'S  VISIT  TO  LEE.  199 

in  the  following  fact.  Judge  Kimmell  says  that  on  the 
same  day  of  Mrs.  McLellan's  visit  to  General  Lee's  head- 
quarters, or  the  day  following,  he  can  not  now  say  which, 
an  officer  of  General  Lee's  staff  came  to  his  residence  and 
rapped  at  his  door.  Upon  opening  the  door  the  officer 
said,  "Are  you  Judge  Kimmell?"  Replying  in  the  af- 
firmative, the  officer  handed  him  a  paper,  saying,  "  General 
Lee  sends  you  this."  The  Judge  says  that  it  had  become 
known  to  some  that  he  was  engaged  in  sending  informa- 
tion of  the  Confederates  to  the  authorities  at  Harrisburg. 
and  knowing  that  his  life  would  be  forfeited  if  found  out, 
he  thought  as  the  officer  handed  him  the  paper  from 
General  Lee  that  "  the  very  mischief  was  to  pay."  His 
fears,  however,  quickly  subsided  when  he  read  the  paper 
and  found  that  it  was  an  order  from  General  Lee  on  the 
guard  at  Stoufier's  mill  for  a  number  of  barrels  of  flour 
for  the  poor  of  the  town.  Before  he  could  use  the  order, 
General  Lee  had  left  and  it  was  of  no  assistance. 

In  the  evening  of  this  day  —  Sunday,  28th  —  the  camp 
fires  of  the  advance  of  Ileth's  division,  which  had  marched 
from  its  camp  about  Fayetteville  on  that  day,  were  seen 
from  Gettysburg  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  mountain, 
above  Cashtown. 

Monday,  29.  On  this  day  Jenkins'  cavalry  moved  from 
their  encampment  one  mile  east  of  Mechanicsburg  toward 
Shiremaustown  and  also  toward  Bridgeport  on  the  bank 
of  the  Susquehanna  by  the  Harrisburg  pike.  When  ap- 
proaching Oyster's  Point  —  a  place  on  the  turnpike  about 
equally  distant  between  Mechanicsburg  and  Bridgeport  — 
they  came  in  conflict  with  a  force  of  infantry  sent  forward 
by  General  Couch.  The  brief  skirmish  which  ensued 


200  THE    GREAT  INVASION. 

ended  in  an  artillery  duel,  the  Union  guns  being  planted 
at  the  Point  and  those  of  Jenkins  at  the  Stone  Church 
about  a  half  mile  north  of  Shiremanstown.  There  were 
no  casualties  on  either  side.  This  was  the  fourth  skirmish 
of  the  war  upon  Pennsylvania  soil. 

On  Sunday,  28th,  a  company  of  the  Twelfth  Pennsyl- 
vania cavalry,  which  had  escaped  from  "Winchester  at  the 
time  of  Milroy's  rout,  and  retreated  to  Bloody  Hun  in  Bed- 
ford County,  Pennsylvania,  and  subsequently  with  others 
of  these  escaped  forces  had  advanced  to  McConnellsburg 
in  Fulton  County,  was  surprised  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Cove,  or  North  Mountain,  by  a  detachment  of  General 
Imboden's  force,  which,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  en- 
camped about  the  Gap  and  Mercersburg.  In  this  affair  a 
number  of  this  company  were  captured  by  the  enemy.  In 
the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  a  company  of  Imboden's 
men,  thought  to  have  been  the  same  who  had  the  skirmish 
in  the  morning  with  these  Peimsylvanians,  dashed  into 
McConnellsburg,  but  finding  no  Federal  soldiers  there  they 
did  not  dismount,  but  returned  by  the  way  they  had  come 
—  in  the  direction  of  Mercersburg.  At  an  early  hour  on 
Monday  morning  Company  A,  First  New  York  Cavalry, 
commanded  by  Captain  Jones,  which  had  also  escaped 
from  Winchester  into  Pennsylvania,  entered  McConnells- 
burg from  the  direction  of  Bloody  Run.  Shortly  after  the 
arrival  of  this  small  force  a  company  of  mounted  militia- 
men arrived  from  Mount  Union,  a  small  town  thirty  miles 
up  the  valley  on  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad.  Jones  was 
seated  in  a  hotel,  and  his  men  were  sitting  about  the  door, 
their  horses  hitched  near  by.  The  militia  -  men  remained 
upon  their  horses  in  a  cross  street.  Presently  some  of 


CAPTAIN   JONES    AT    M'CONNELLSBURG.  201 

Jones'  scouts  came  dashing  in  from  the  mountain  and 
reported  the  approach  of  the  enemy  by  the  Mercersburg 
road.  Jones  very  composedly  inquired  the  number  of  the 
approaching  force,  and  when  informed  that  they  did  not 
exceed  seventy -five  —  nearly  double  the  number  of  his 
command,  he  having  thirty -eight  —  declared  his  purpose 
to  fight  them.  He  at  once  ordered  his  men,  who  were 
nearly  all  Irishmen,  and  fond  of  a  fight,  to  examine  their 
arms  and  fall  into  line.  The  men  examined  their  pistols 
and  then  stuck  them  into  their  boots.  Jones  then  pro- 
posed to  the  captain  of  the  militia -men  that  he  should  place 
his  men  in  the  cross  street  where  they  would  be  entirely 
unseen  by  the  Confederates  until  he  should  have  drawn 
them  down  below  where  they  were  stationed,  when  they 
were  to  make  some  demonstrations  merely  to  frighten  the 
enemy  by  the  show  of  their  numbers,  leaving  whatever 
fighting  was  to  be  done  to  him  and  his  command.  To 
this  the  captain  of  the  militia -men  consented  and  his  men 
were  placed  according  to  the  plan  agreed  upon.  Jones 
then  placed  his  little  command  of  thirty-eight  inline  — 
he  taking  the  rear — and  as  the  Confederates  entered  the 
town  from  the  east,  he  fell  slowly  back  and  thus  drew 
them  on.  But  before  the  enemy  had  reached  the  cross 
street  in  which  the  militia -men  were  concealed,  Captain 
Irvine,  who  commanded  the  Confederates,  ordered  his 

men  to  "Charge  the  Yankees."     But  they  did  not 

charge,  for  some  of  the  militia -men,  anxious  to  see  what 
was  going  on,  ventured  down  to  the  corner,  where  they 
were  discovered.  Captain  Irvine,  seeing  these  men,  con- 
cluded that  a  job  was  being  put  up  upon  him,  and  these 
men  were  to  come  in  on  his  rear.  Instead  then  of  charg- 


202  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

ing  the  Yankees,  Jones,  seeing  their  apparent  indecision, 
in  a  voice  like  a  clap  of  thunder  shouted,  "Right-about 
face — charge."  At  this  instant  the  militia -men  took  a 
sudden  notion  that  they  had  business  at  home,  and  the 
whole  command  took  to  their  heels  and  ingloriously  fled. 
Reports  say  that  they  did  not  stop  until  they  reached 
Burnt  Cabins,  twelve  miles  distant.  Captain  Jones'  brave 
command,  however,  were  equal  to  the  occasion,  and  with 
terrific  yells  they  dashed  toward  the  enemy  who  turned 
and  fled  by  the  way  they  came.  Before  the  edge  of  the 
town  was  reached  firing  began,  but  the  whole  population, 
of  the  place  rushed  into  the  street,  and  ran  after  the  pur- 
sued and  pursuing,  yelling  and  hallooing  at  the  top  of 
their  voices.  The  pursuit  was  continued  for  about  a  mile, 
when  all  the  enemy  whose  horses  were  not  fleeter  than. 
Captain  Jones'  were  captured.  Two  of  the  Confederates 
were  killed  and  two  wounded.  Captain  Irvine's  com- 
mand consisted  of  sixty -three  men.  Jones  had  thirty- 
eight.  Besides  the  two  Confederates  killed,  Jones  took 
thirty -two  men  and  thirty -three  horses.  He  had  no  other 
casualties  in  his  command  than  one  man  wounded.  When 
the  citizens  saw  the  party  return  to  McConnellsburg,  the 
Confederates  being  about  as  many  as  Federals,  they,  could 
not  at  first  know  which  side  was  victorious.  Jones,  wisely 
concluding  that  the  few  who  had  escaped  would  soon  re- 
port their  misfortune  across  the  mountain,  and  bring  a 
heavier  force  against  him,  hurriedly  left  toward  Bloody 
Run  with  his  prisoners  and  captured  horses.  The  citizens 
went  out  to  where  the  dead  lay,  and  placing  them  in  cof- 
fins, interred  them  near  where  they  fell.  While  this  in- 
terment was  taking  place  a  Confederate  cavalry  force 


MOVEMENTS    OF    THE    CONFEDERATES.  203 

came  down  from  .the  direction  of  Mercersburg,  while  an- 
other force  crossed  the  mountain  by  the  Hunter's  roadr 
six  miles  down  the.  valley,  coming  into  MeConnellsburg 
from  the  west  while  the  others  entered  from  the  east. 
Thus  the  town  was  again  in  the  enemy's  hands,  but 
Captain  Jones  was  not  there  to  bo  caught.  This  Con- 
federate force  consisted  of  about  four  hundred  men,  and 
they  had  with  them  three  pieces  of -artillery,  which  they 
planted  upon  an  eminence  to  the  east  of  the  town.  They 
were  part  of  Imboden's  command.  Expecting  to  find 
Federal  soldiers  secreted  in  the  town,  a  search  was  made,, 
but  failing  to  find  any,  they  left  again  about  dark.  The 
citizens  who  were  engaged  in  burying  the  Confederate 
killed,  were  taken  by  this  command,  notwithstanding  they 
displayed  an  improvised  flag  of  truce,  consisting  of  a 
white  handkerchief  attached  to  a  stick.  They  were,  how- 
ever, speedily  released  when  the  officer  in  command  saw 
what  they  were  doing  and  how  decently  they  were  inter- 
ring his  fallen  comrades. 

This  is  the  ffth  battle  of  the  war  upon  Pennsylvania  soil, 
and  for  dash  and  gallantry,  as  well  as  for  the  magnitude 
of  its  results  in  proportion  to  the  numbers  engaged,  is  per- 
haps without  a  parallel  in  the  whole  struggle. 

This  day  the  balance  of  Heth's  division  crossed  the  moun- 
tain and  joined  the  advance,  which  had  crossed  the  day 
previous.  It  was  this  addition  that  increased  the  Con- 
federate camp  fires  about  Cashtown,  as  seen  from  Gettys- 
burg in  the  evening.  (Prof.  Jacob's  Battle  of  Gettysburg, 
page  21.) 

In  the  morning  of  this  day  the  divisions  of  Generals 
McLaws  and  Hood  of  Longstreet's  corps  left  their  encamp- 


204  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

ments  along  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Conococheague  Creek, 
two  and  three  miles  north-east  of  Chambersburo;,  and 

O  ' 

proceeded  directly  across  the  fields  to  Fayetteville,  where 
they  encamped.  The  Engineer  Corps  went  before  and 
prepared  the  way  by  removing  the  fences.  Dr.  McClay, 
of  Greenvillage,  who  stood  upon  Shirk's  Hill  and  wit- 
nessed their  march,  says:  "The  Confederates  passed 
right  across  the  country  in  a  direct  line  for  Fayetteville, 
regardless  of  roads,  and  evidently  in  a  hurry.  From 
Monn's  Mill  down  to  Hargleroad's  they  lay  in  immense 
numbers.  They  were  all  moving  when  we  looked  over 
the  fields  from  the  highest  point  on  the  hill.  Drums  were 
beating,  and  the  ear -piercing  fife  and  the  shrill  notes  of 
the  trumpet  were  all  calling  to  arms.  We  gazed  on  the 
scene  and  silently  invoked  the  God  of  battles  to  protect  our 
army  and  nation  from  this  great  force  of  misguided  men." 
The  other  division  of  this  corps — Pickettrs —  remained 
behind  until  the  morning  of  Thursday,  July  2d,  to  pro- 
tact  their  rear  and  preserve  their  line  of  communications. 
In  the  meantime,  during  the  three  days  it  yet  remained, 
detachments  were  employed  in  destroying  the  railroad. 
This  they  did  by  prying  up  the  rails  and  then  piling  up 
the  ties  and  rails  from  the  fences,  with  the  rails  upon  the 
top,  and  setting  fire  thereto.  "When  the  latter  became 
heated  they  were  bent  out  of  shape  by  their  own  weight, 
and  thereby  became  unfit  for  use.  On  "Wednesday,  July 
1st,  they  destroyed  the  railroad  shops.  Fearing  to  involve 
the  surrounding  buildings  by  setting  these  shops  on  fire, 
the  walls  were  battered  until  they  fell.  Ten  or  more  men 
would  take  a  lon<?  iron  rail,  such  as  are  used  for  railroad 

o  7 

purposes,  and  use  it  as  a  battering  ram,  and  in  this  way 


ANOTHER  VISIT  TO  GENERAL  LEE.  205 

they  soon  succeeded  in  throwing  down  these  buildings. 
A  large  lot  of  lumber  was  carried  from  one  of  these  shops 
and  piled  upon  the  turn  -  table  and  then  set  on  fire.  This 
not  only  secured  the  destruction  of  the  lumber,  but  the 
turn-tables  also. 

In  the  early  part  of  this  day  Dr.  J.  L.  Suesserott,  one  of 
the  leading  physicians  of  Chambersburg,  visited  General 
Lee  at  his  head  -  quarters  at  Messersmith's  woods.  The 
object  of  his  visit  and  what  he  saw  are  thus  stated  by  the 
doctor: 

MR.  J.  HOKE: 

Sir — On  Monday,  June  2^th,  1863,  I  visited  General  L.ee  at  his  head- 
quarters, near  Chambersburg,  for  the  purpose  of  having  a  blind  mare,  the 
property  of  one  of  my  neighbors,  exempted  from  capture.  All  of  the  oth«-r 
available  horses  having  been  either  captured  or  removed  to  safe  quarters,  I 
wanted  to  have  the  use  of  this  one  for  the  purpose  ol  having  my  corn  plowed. 
After  having  stated  to  the  general  the  object  of  my  visit,  and  while  the  papnr 
was  being  prepared  according  to  his  order,  I  employed  my  time  in  watching 
the  features  and  movements  of  the  great  commander.  Never  have  I  seen  so 
much  emotion  depicted  upon  a  human  countenance.  With  his  hand  at  times 
clutching  his  hair,  and  with  contracted  brow,  he  would  walk  with  rapid 
strides  for  a  few  rods  and  then,  as  if  he  bethought  himself  of  his  actions,  he 
would  with  a  sudden  jerk  produce  an  entire.change  in  his  features  and  de- 
meanor and  cast  an  inquiring  gaze  on  me,  only  to  be  followed  in  a  moment 
by  the  same  contortions  of  face  and  agitation  of  person.  The  order  for  the 
safety  of  the  horse  having  been  finished  and  given  me,  I  left  and  made  rapid 
strides  toward  town,  only  to  find  that  the  Medical  Purveyor  of  the  Confederate 
Army  had  taken  the  horse,  and  my  corn,  which  badly  needed  working,  had 
to  do  without  it  and  take  its  chance  along  with  hundreds  of  acres  within  the 
county  in  the  same  condition.  J.  L..  SUESSEROTT. 

That  General  Lee  Was  not  entirely  happy  in  the  position 
he  then  occupied,  and  that  his  mind  was  somewhat  tinged 
with  eager  anxiety,  if  not  with  sadness,  is  apparent  in  this 
statement  by  Dr.  Suesserott,  as  well  as  in  that  of  Mrs. 
Ellen  McLellan.  who  was  accorded  an  interview  with  him 


206  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

on  the  preceding  day,  and  whose  statement  has  been 
previously  given.  To  her  he  said  that  he  only  desired 
that  they  would  let  him  go  home  and  eat  his  bread  there 
in  peace.  The  "strength  and  sadness"  of  the  general 
deeply  impressed  her. 

There  were  special  reasons  for  the  deep  anxiety  and 
sadness  of  General  Lee  on  the  day  under  consideration. 
He  was  then  in  the  great  Cumberland  Valley,  one  of  the 
most  beautiful,  thrifty,  and  productive  places  in  all  the 
country.  All  of  this  would  appear  in  wide  contrast  with 
the  war  -  desolated  and  slavery  -  cursed  country  from  which 
he  came.  Then,  too,  there  was  the  extreme  crisis  which 
lie  must  have  known  was  near  at  hand,  and  which  would 
result  in  the  destruction  of  thousands  of  lives,  and  spread 
desolation  and  grief  in  many  of  the  homes  he  saw  all 
around  him.  Add  to  these  considerations  the  uncertainty 
as  to  his  course.  If,  as  General  Longstreet  says  in  his  first 
contribution  to  Annals  of  the  War,  page  419,  the  scout 
Harrison,  whom  he  had  sent  into  the  Federal  lines,  re- 
ported the  whereabouts  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in 
the  night  of  the  29th,  then  Lee  was  entirely  ignorant  of 
where  his  opponent  was,  and  his  situation  was  certainly 
embarrassing.  Or  if,  as  Longstreet  says  in  his  second 
article,  in  which  he  corrects  the  statement  and  places  the 
return  of  the  scout  in  the  evening  of  the  28th,  (Annals 
of  the  "War,  page  632.)  then  orders  for  the  concentration 
of  the  army  to  the  east  of  the  mountain  had  already  been 
issued.  In  either  case  there  was  ground  for  much  anxiety. 
At  all  events  it  seems  clear  that  General  Lee  had  lost 
much,  of  his  equanimity.  Other  instances  yet  to  follow 
will  show  a  similar  state  of  mind. 


DESCRIPTION    OF    THE    ARMY.  207 

The  main  body  of  the  Confederate  army  having  nearly 
all  passed  from  our  midst,  a  brief,  general  description  may 
be  given  to  assist  the  reader  in  forming  his  conception  of 
the  appearance  of  such  an  immense  host. 

First,  as  is  usually  the  case  with  armies  on  a  march, 
comes  a  brigade  or  two  of  cavalry.  After  an  interval  of 
probably  a  day,  the  different  regiments  composing  a  bri- 
gade, and  the  various  brigades  composing  a  division, 
and  the  several  divisions  of  a  corps,  pass,  with  their 
immense  trains  of  artillery,  caissons,  forges,  ambulances, 
and  ammunition  wagons.  These  wagons  are  each  drawn 
by  four  or  six  horses  or  mules,  and  in  passing  along  the 
macadamized  streets  they  make  that  grinding  noise  which 
indicates  immense  weight  of  freightage.  In  some  instances 
herds  of  fifty  to  one  hundred  cattle  are  driven  along  for 
the  use  of  the  men.  Scattered  here  and  there  along  the 
line  at  the  heads  of  brigades,  are  bands  of  musicians. 
« Dixie,"  " My  Maryland,"  and  the  "Bonnie  Blue  Flag" 
were  the  favorite  pieces  played.  The  passage  of  a  corps 
usually  occupied  from  a  day  to  a  day  and  a  half,  and  some- 
times a  division  or  a  corps  was  so  closely  succeeded  by 
another  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  uninitiated  to  fix 
upon  the  precise  time  when  one  departed  and  another 
came.  Many  of  the  wagons,  horses,  mules,  and  .cannon 
bore  the  inscription,  "  U.  S.,"  and  were  either  captured  in 
battle,  or  taken  from  the  government.  Each  regiment 
and  brigade  had  its  flag,  but  there  seemed  to  be  no  two 
entirely  alike.  Some  bore  the  insignia  of  the  State  from 
which  it  came,  and  others  some  other  device,  and  but  few 
the  stars  and  bars  of  the  Confederacy.  This  diversity  of 
flags  was  typical,  of  the  cause  for  which  the  Confederates 


208  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

fought — for  a  government  composed  of  a  number  of  inde- 
pendent sovereignties.  Not  so  the  Federal  Army.  It 
carried  but  one  flag  —  the  glorious  stars  and  stripes,  which 
represents  one  government,  one  sovereign  head,  with  many 
members. 

The  Confederate  infantry,  as  they  marched  through 
Chambersburg,  presented  a  solid  front.  They  came  in 
close  marching  order,  the  different  brigades,  divisions,  and 
corps,  all  within  supporting  distance  of  each  other.  Their 
dress  consisted  of  nearly  every  imaginable  color  and  style, 
the  butternut  largely  predominating.  Some  had  blue 
blouses,  which  they  had  doubtless  stripped  from  the  Union 
dead.  Hats,  or  the  skeletons  of  what  had  once  been  hats, 
surmounted  their  partly  covered  heads.  Many  were 
ragged,  shoeless,  and  filthy,  affording  unmistakable  evi- 
dence that  their  wardrobes  sadly  needed  to  be  replenished. 
They  were,  however,  all  well  armed  and  under  perfect 
discipline.  They  seemed  to  move  as  one  vast  machine. 
Laughing,  talking,  singing,  and  cheering  were  not  indulged 
in.  Straggling  was  scarcely  seen,  but  when  some  of  them 
did  wander  from  the  lines,  and  caught  any  of  our  people 
in  retired  places,  they  did  not  hesitate  to  appropriate  to 
themselves  hats,  boots,  watches,  and  pocketbooks.  This 
proves  that  their  good  behavior  when  under  the  eyes  of 
their  officers  was  due  to  discipline  rather  than  innate  hon- 
esty and  good  breeding. 

There  was  a  perceptible  difference  in  the  character  of  the 
cavalry  -  men  and  that  of  the  infantry.  The  former,  as  a 
class,  were  superior  to  the  latter  in  all  respects.  This  may 
be  accounted  for  in  the  fact  that  the  cavalry -men  were 
mostly  the  well-to-do  in  the  South,  the  educated,  the 


CHARACTERISTICS   OF   THE   SOLDIERS.  209 

aristocracy,  the  slave-holders,  while  the  rank  and  file  of 
the  infantry  were  the  uneducated,  the  lower  classes,  many 
of  whom  were  conscripted  into  the  service.  Many  of  these 
seemed  to  have  no  intelligent  understanding  of  the  cause  of 
the  war,  of  what  they  were  fighting  for,  or  of  the  value 
of  the  Government  they  were  undertaking  to  overthrow. 
When  interrogated  upon  these  points  they  would  say  that 
they  were  fighting  for  their  rights.  What  rights  they  had 
which  they  were  in  danger  of  losing,  they  did  not  attempt 
to  tell.  There  was  a  .marked  difference  in  these  men, 
which  seemed  to  be  a  peculiarity  of  all  from  the  same 
State.  Those  from  Mississippi  and  Texas  were  more 
vicious  and  defiant  than  those  from  other  parts  of  the 
South.  Usually  the  discontented,  those  who  sought  op- 
portunity to  escape,  were  from  Xorth  Carolina.  Many 
declared  that  when  the  war  first  broke  out  they  were  in 
favor  of  the  Union,  but  having  been  forced  into  the  army, 
they  only  desired  that  their  side  should  win.  Here  and 
there  were  some  geniuses  and  lovers  of  fun.  They  sup- 
posed that  as  they  were  in  Pennsylvania  they  were 
among  the  "Pennsylvania  Dutch,"  that  the  German  lan- 
guage was  mostly  spoken,  and  that  the  people  lived  on 
sauerkraut  and  lager -beer,  and  many  and  rich  were  the 
jokes  they  got  off'  against  some  of  our  people  of  Teutonic 
form  and  appearance.  Passing  along  the  road  in  front  of 
a  house,  before  which  stood  a  person  whose  ample  form 
and  stomach  and  rubicund  face  indicated  good  living  and 
plenty  of  lager,  a  soldier  said  to  another  by  his  side,  "  I'll 
bet  that  old  fellow  drinks  lots  of  beer."  "  Xo,  no,"  said 
the  man,  who  overheard  the  remark,  "  I  never  drink 
beer."  At  this  the  soldier  cried  out  in  imitation  of  Penn- 

14 


210  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

sylvania  Dutch,  "Och,  mine  countree!  mine  countree!" 
Another  soldier,  meeting  one  of  our  citizens  whose  appear- 
ance invited  the  question,  inquired  of  him,  "  Can  you  tell 
where  a  fellow  can  get  a  little  whisky?"  "!STo,  sir,  I  can't 
tell;  I  never  drink  whisky,"  replied  the  man.  Looking 
him  squarely  in  the  face,  and  judging  the  truthfulness  of 
what  he  said  hy  the  redness  and  fullness  of  the  same,  the 
soldier  replied,  "  Well,  I  guess  not." 

Many  of  the  men  of  the  army  seemed  specially  to  hate 
President  Lincoln.  They  had  beea  made  to  believe  that 
he  was  responsible  for  the  war,  and  that  he  was  brutal  and 
barbarous.  A  report  was  in  circulation  among  them  that 
he  had  fled  from  Washington  to  Boston,  and  that  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  yet  in  Virginia,  and  that  they 
would  have  only  Pennsylvania  militia  to  overcome,  and 
then  Ilarrisburg,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  and  Washington 
would  fall  into  their  hands. 

The  officers  in  command  of  the  infantry,  like  the  men 
composing  the  cavalry,  were  also  of  the  high  and  cultivated 
class.  Many  of  them  with  whom  we  had  business  trans- 
actions seemed  to  be  perfect  gentlemen;  and  while  com- 
pelled under  the  exigencies  of  the  occasion  to  appropriate 
our  property  to  the  use  of  their  army,  to  be  paid  for  in 
scrip  which  they  knew  was  of  no  value,  they  did  it  in  an 
apologizing  way.  Some  of  these  men  were  overheard  to 
express  their  fears  that  they  had  run  into  a  trap  by  coming 
over  here,  and  would  not  be  able  to  get  out  again  without 
severe  loss.  In  looking  upon  the  large  number  of  persons 
who  in  some  way  managed  to  come  into  the  town  from 
the  surrounding  country,  the  supposition  of  some  of  these 
officers  was,  that  they  were  soldiers  in  disguise.  When 


INCIDENTS   IN   CHAMBERSBURG.  211 

assured  that  such  was  not  the  case,  and  that  the  fighting 
population  of  the  North  was  scarcely  touched  yet,  they 
seemed  greatly  astonished.  The  following  case  will  illus- 
trate this  point:  A  number  of  officers  were  seated  one 
morning  in  front  of  the  residence  of  one  of  our  citizens, 
their  horses  being  hitched  to  the  shade  trees.  When  the 
gentleman  of  the  house  appeared  at  the  door,  one  of  the 
officers  thus  addressed  him:  "How  long,  sir,  is  this  war 
going  to  continue?"  The  gentleman  replied,  "You  can 
answer  that  question  better  than  I  can."  "  What  do  you 
mean  by  that?"  said  the  Confederate.  " I  mean  that  this 
war  will  continue  as  long  as  you  Southern  people  are  able 
to  fight.  If  you  can  stand  it  twenty  years  more,  then  the 
war  will  last  twenty  years  yet,"  said  the  citizen.  Seeing 
that  his  words  made  some  impression  upon  the  soldiers, 
the  gentleman  was  emboldened  to  say  further:  "You, 
gentlemen,  must  have  seen  for  yourselves  since  you  have 
come  North  that  there  are  any  number  of  able-bodied 
men  yet  to  draw  upon,  and  the  people  here  have  scarcely 
yet  awakened  to  the  fact  that  there  is  a  war  upon  their 
hands;  but  this  invasion  will  open  their  eyes  to  the  fact, 
and  if  it  were  possible  for  you  to  annihilate  the  whole  of 
our  armies  now  in  the  field,  that  would  only  bring  out 
.another  and  larger  one  to  take  you  some  morning  before 
breakfast."  The  officers  listened  respectfully  to  what  the 
citizen  said,  and  one  of  them,  who  was  seated  upon  a  cellar 
door,  arose  and  addressing  his  companions,  said,  "  There 
is  more  truth  than  fun  in  what  he  says."  This  remark  led 
to  considerable  discussion  among  them  about  the  large 
number  of  men  they  had  seen  since  they  had  entered 
Pennsylvania. 


212  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

It  was  a  subject  of  frequent  remark  by  the  Confederates, 
while  here,  about  the  magnificent  country  and  the  many 
large  and  flourishing  towns  they  had  seen  since  coming 
North.  The  dwelling  houses  of  the  farmers  and  the  large 
and  excellent  barns  also  excited  their  astonishment  and 
admiration.  Letters  written  while  in  Chambersburg  to  be 
sent  to  their  friends  in  the  South,  but  lost  from  their 
pockets  and  picked  up  by  some  of  the  citizens,  expressed 
astonishment  at  the  rich  and  beautiful  country,  the  excel- 
lent farming,  fine  houses  and  barns,  and  thrifty  and  flour- 
ishing towns  they  had  seen.  The  evident  superiority  of 
the  country  north  of  the  Potomac  to  that  south  of  it,  and 
the  hopelessness  of  their  cause  from  the  immense  resources 
of  our  people  yet  untouched,  exercised  a  discouraging 
effect  upon  the  soldiers,  and  many  stealthily  disappeared 
from  the  ranks.  In  disguising  and  assisting  them  to 
escape,  some  of  our  citizens  lent  their  aid.  The  following 
instance  will  show  how  this  assistance  was  given :  On  the 
evening  of  July  1st,  a  soldier  called  at  the  residence  of  one 
of  our  citizens  -and  declared  his  intention  to  make  an  effort 
to  escape  from  the  army  and  remain  in  the  North.  After 
satisfying  himself  that  the  man  was  sincere  and  not  en- 
deavoring to  get  him  into  difficulty,  the  citizen  arranged 
to  meet  him  at  a  designated  place  early  the  next  morning 
with  a  suit  of  clothing.  According  to  agreement  he  met 
the  soldier,  and  after  putting  off"  his  Confederate  uniform 
and  arraying  himself  in  a  citizen's  suit,  leaving  his  bene- 
factor his  musket,  which  he  yet  retains,  the  soldier  leaped 
over  the  fence,  exclaiming,  "  Farewell  to  Jeff'  Davis  and 
the  Southern  Confederacy."  This  soldier,  before  leaving, 
assured  his  friend  that  many  in  the  army  were  disheartened 


DESERTIONS    FROM   CONFEDERATE    ARMY.  213 

after  seeing  the  North.  The  South,  he  said,  had  put  all  its 
available  force  in  the  field,  while  here  in  the  North  they 
.saw  any  number  of  able-bodied  men  who  could  yet  be 
drawn  upon.  The  deserters  from  the  Confederate  army, 
while  in  Chambersburg,  were  numerous,  and  there  are 
now  several  of  them  residing  there.  A  number  of  colored 
persons  also  made  their  escape  from  the  army  while  in 
Pennsylvania,  some  of  whom  are  yet  living  there.  Said 
the  writer  to  one  of  these  soon  after  the  war,  "  Where 
were  you  born,  Sam?"  "I  was  born  in  Georgia,  sah," 
replied  my  sable  friend.  "How  did  you,  get  up  here?" 
I  inquired.  "  I  come  Norf  wid  my  young  master;  I  was 
his  sarvant,  and  he  was  an  offisser,  and  when  he  got 
wounded  at  de  battle  of  Gettysburg  I  just  dun  run  away." 
^'Did  the  colored  people  of  the  South  understand  what  the 
war  was  about,  and  that  the  Yankees  were  their  friends?  " 
"  O,  yes  sah,  dey  all  know'd  dat.  My  master  used  to  tell 
us  dat  de  Yankees  would  kill  us  and  eat  us  up.  Dey  try 
.to  make  us  believe  dey  got  ho'ns."  "Did  you  believe 
these  stories?  '  "We  dun  let's  on  we  be  mighty  skeerd, 
but  no  nigger  beliebed  it."  These  poor,  downtrodden 
creatures  took  advantage  of  their  opportunity,  and  now, 
thanks  to  the  providence  of  God,  they  are  free  men  and 
•citizens  of  the  Republic. 

During  the  time  we  were  under  Confederate  rule,  we 
were  without  information  of  what  was  transpiring  in  the 
country  outside  of  the  lines,  only  as  an  occasional  paper 
was  brought  through  by  our  scouts.  The  first  information 
we  received  of  the  battle  of  Wednesday,  July  1st,  and  the 
•death  of  General  Reynolds,  was  by  one  of  the  Philadel- 
phia dailies,  which  Mr.  Benjamin  S.  Huber,  one  of  our 


214  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

scouts,  brought  from  llarrisburg.  Our  Southern  visitors,, 
however,  received  their  regular  mails  from  Richmond,  and 
an  occasional  Richmond  paper  would  be  received,  in  which 
glowing  accounts  were  given  of  the  success  of  the  Con- 
federate cause  elsewhere.  One  edition  of  these  papers  re- 
ceived announced  that  General  Johnston  had  defeated 
General  Grant  and  raised  the  siege  of  Vicksburg.  The 
object  of  these  false  statements  doubtless  was  to  cheer  and 
encourage  their  army  in  our  State.  These  statements, 
however,  in  connection  with  the  presence  of  the  vast  army 
in  our  midst,  had  a  fearfully  depressing  effect  upon  us,, 
and  some  feared  that  our  grand  and  glorious  Government 
would  be  overthrown.  This  depressed  feeling  we  enter- 
tained until  the  information  came  that  the  invaders  had 
been  defeated  at  Gettysburg  and  were  retreating  south- 
ward, when  the  revulsion  from  despondency  to  exultation 
was  so  great  that  we  had  not  language  sufficient  to  ex- 
press it. 

The  people  of  Chambersburg  did  not  attempt  to  conceal 
from  the  enemy  their  patriotic  principles.  And  while  all 
felt  the  necessity  of  prudence  in  not  unnecessarily  obtrud- 
ing these  upon  the  invaders,  they  were  nevertheless  declared 
when  the  exigency  required  it.  To  the  credit  of  our  ene- 
mies, however,  be  it  said  that  they  expressed  their  respect 
for  those  who  honestly  held  to  their  principles,  even  though 
differing  from  them,  but  equally  denounced  such  as  at- 
tempted to  hide  them,  or  shield  themselves  behind  a  pro- 
fession of  neutrality  or  sympathy.  They  as  Southern  men 
claimed  the  right  to  adhere  to  what  they  supposed  to  be- 
the  principles  of  the  South,  and  expected  that  those  resid- 
ing in  the  North  would  maintain  the  principles  supposed 


INCIDENTS   AT   CHAMBERSBURG.  215 

to  be  peculiarly  ^Northern.  Honest  in  their  convictions,  as 
we  believe  the  most  of  them  were,  they  equally  detested 
servility  and  professed  friendship  where  they  had  no  right 
to  expect  it. 

It  has  been  said  by  a  recent  southern  writer*  that  Chani- 
bersburg,  at  the  time  Lee's  army  passed  through  it,  was  a 
town  of  flags,  and  that  the  national  colors  floated  from 
nearly  every  building.  This  is  not  correct.  The  people 
here  understood  the  proprieties  of  the  occasion  too  well  to 
expose  their  flags  to  capture  by  flaunting  them  in  the  faces 
of  the  invaders.  The  only  flags  exposed  to  view  were 
small  miniature  ones  pinned  to  the  bosoms  of  some  of  our 
ladies.  While  not  concealing  their  predilections,  nor  treat- 
ing with  unlady-like  conduct  the  strangers  who  were 
among  them,  they  won  the  regard  of  all  by  their  consistent 
behavior.  I  stood  one  evening  in  front  of  a  house  where 
a  number  of  ladies  were  assembled  and  singing  patriotic 
songs,  and  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Star  Spangled  Banner, 
which  was  sung  with  good  effect,  a  Confederate  soldier, 
who,  with  about  a  half  dozen  others,  was  standing  upon 
the  pavement  and  listening  respectfully,  said:  "It  is  the 
prettiest  flag  the  world  ever  saw." 

The  great  preponderating  impression  which  was  made 
upon  the  mind  by  looking  upon  an  army  like  that  which 
passed  through  here  on  its  way  to  Gettysburg  was  its 
immenseness.  No  idea  of  its  magnitude  can  be  formed  by 
any  description  which  can  be  given.  If  the  whole  army 
with  its  appendages  —  Early 's  Division  and  Stuart's  cav- 
alry, which  did  not  pass  through  this  place, — the  artillery 

*  Colonel  R.  M.  Powell  of  the  Texas  brigade,  Hood's  division,  in  the  Phila- 
delphia Weekly  Times  of  December  I3th,  1884. 


216  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

and  wagon  trains,  ambulances,  cattle,  etc.,  had  all  been 
placed  in  a  line  in  usual  marching  order,  it  would  have 
extended  nearly  from  Chambersburg  to  Harrisburg — fifty 
miles.  This  may  seem  incredible,  but  its  truthfulness 
will  appear  when  I  state  that  I  shall  have  occasion  here- 
after to  tell  of  a  single  wagon  train  fourteen  miles  long, 
and  of  another  twenty-five  miles  in  length.  And  I  give  it 
as  my  opinion,  based  upon  what  that  army  did  both  be- 
fore and  after  the  invasion,  that  all  the  unorganized, 
undisciplined,  and  inexperienced  militia  of  the  State  could 
not  have  withstood  or  vanquished  that  mighty  host.  It 
required  an  army  equal  in  numbers,  arms,  organization, 
discipline,  and  experience  to  accomplish  this.  Like  a  huge 
serpent,  it  slowly  and  cautiously  made  its  way  into  our 
State,  turning  its  head  now  in  one  direction,  and  then  in 
another,  until  its  tail  was  threatened  to  be  trodden  upon 
when  it  turned  eastwardly  and  crossed  the  South  Moun- 
tain. But  thanks  be  to  God  —  ten  thousand  thanks,  the 
grand  and  glorious  Army  of  the  Potomac  met  it,  and 
upon  the  heights  of  Gettysburg  crushed  its  venomous 
head.  Upon  that  "Altar  of  Sacrifice,"  that  "Field  of 
Deliverance,"  that  "Mount  of  Salvation,"  and  amidst 
those  "  Munitions  of  Rocks "  the  Rebellion  received  its 
death  blow,  and  like  the  tradition  concerning  the  serpent, 
which  says  that  notwithstanding  its  deadly  wounds,  it  yet 
lingers  in  fitful  life  until  the  going  down  of  the  sun,  this 
great  monster  of  secession  dragged  its  slimy  length  along 
until  the  sun  of  the  rebellion  set  at  Appomattox,  when 
it  yielded  up  its  life. 

I  now  resume  my  narrative,  and  as  we  are  upon  the  eve 
of  momentous  events,  I  invite  the  reader's  close  attention 
to  what  is  to  follow. 


CHANGE  IN  MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  ARMY.        217 

Iii  the  evening  of  this  day — Monday,  June  29th, —  some 
time  after  dark,  in  company  with  two  of  our  citizens,  I 
went  up  into  the  steeple  of  the  Reformed  Church  to  take 
observations.  From  that  elevated  position  we  had  an 
uninterrupted  view  for  miles  around  us.  The  line  of  the 
railroad  could  be  traced  by  the  numerous  fires  still  burn- 
ing. The  sound  of  the  drum  was  heard  in  the  direction 
of  Pickett's  Camp.  Along  the  South  Mountain,  for  miles 
up  and  down  the  valley,  innumerable  lights  were  seen. 
That  these  lights  were  used  as  signals  for  communicating 
information,  we  well  knew,  but  of  their  occasion  and  import 
we  were  of  course  ignorant.  Perhaps  the  fact  about  to 
be  related  will  solve  this  problem.  Some  time  in  the  after 
part  of  this  night,  probably  about  one  or  two  o'clock,  I 
was  awakened  by  my  wife  who  told  me  to  come  to  the 
window  for  some  important  movement  was  going  on 
among  the  Confederates.  Peering  cautiously  through  the 
half-closed  shutters  we  saw  a  continuous  stream  of  wagons 
driven  hurriedly  through  our  street.  They  were  coming 
hack  from  the  direction  of  Harrisburg,  and  turning  east 
at  the  Public  Square,  drove  on  out  the  Gettysburg  pike. 
Although  these  wagons  were  heavily  loaded,  as  the  grind- 
ing noise  they  made  indicated,  they  were  sometimes  driven 
at  a  trot.  A  low,  rumbling  noise  could  be  heard  which 
sounded  strange  in  the  stillness  of  the  night,  as  if  the 
whole  valley  were  filled  with  moving  trains.  These  wagons 
proved  to  be  part  of  Ewell's  train,  and  their  rapid  passage 
eastward  was  a  part  in  the  great  act  of  the  concentration 
about  Gettysburg,  which  will  be  fully  described  hereafter. 

But  what  was  the  cause  of  the  sudden  change  in  Gen- 
eral Lee's  plans,  and  the  rapid  concentration  of  his  army 


218  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

to  the  east  of  the  mountain  ?  It  was  on  the  evening  of 
this  day,  according  to  General  Longstreet's  statement,  that 
the  scout  he  had  sent  into  the  Federal  lines  came  to  his 
head  -  quarters  near  Chambersburg,  and  reported  that  the 
Federal  army  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  that  the  head 
of  it  was  about  Frederick  City  to  the  east  of  the  mountain. 
General  Longstreet  says  that  the  importance  of  the  in- 
formation brought  by  this  scout  was  such  that  he  sent  him 
at  once  to  General  Lee's  head  -  quarters,  where  he  imparted 
the  startling  information  he  brought.  Owing  to  General 
Stuart's  course  around  the  Federal  army,  Lee  had  been 
deprived  of  all  information  of  Hooker's  movements,  and 
supposed  that  he  was  yet  south  of  the  Potomac  watching 
the  approaches  to  Washington.  The  information  brought 
by  this  scout  opened  his  eyes  to  the  danger  which  threat- 
ened his  communications,  and  he  was  compelled  at  once 
to  turn  about  and  meet  his  foe.  That  this  was  the  first 
information  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac which  Lee  received  after  entering  Pennsylvania,  is 
clear  from  the  further  statement  by  Longstreet  in  the 
article  referred  to.  The  General  says,  "We  had  not  heard 
from  the  enemy  for  several  days,  and  General  Lee  was  in 
doubt  as  to  where  he  was;  indeed,  we  did  not  know  that 
he  had  yet  left  Virginia."  * 

In  the  absence  of  the  knowledge  of  the  whereabouts  of 
the  Union  army,  or  rather  upon  the  presumption  that  it 
was  yet  south  of  the  Potomac,  General  Lee  had  determined 
to  attack  Harrisburg,  but  upon  receiving  the  informa- 

*  General  Longstreet's  account  of  the  sending  of  the  scout  Harrison,  and 
his  return  to  his  head -quarters  near  Chambersburg,  is  given  in  the  first 
chapter  of  this  book  on  page  56. 


THE  CHANGE  IN  MOVEMENTS.  219 

tion  brought  by  this  scout,  the  plan  was  at  once  changed,, 
and  the  orders  already  issued  countermanded.  That  such 
were  the  facts  will  appear  from  the  following  additional 
statement  by  General  Longstreet  in  the  article  already  re- 
ferred to.  That  statement  is  as  follows:  "General  Lee 
had  already  issued  orders  that  we  were  to  advance  toward 
Harrisburg."  Again  he  says  that  upon  meeting  General 
Lee  the  next  morning,  after  the  arrival  of  Harrison,  he 
asked  him  "if  the  information  brought  by  the  scout  might 
not  involve  a  change  of  direction  of  the  head  of  the  column 
to  the  right  ?"  To  this  remark  he  says  General  Lee  "im- 
mediately acquiesced  in  the  suggestion,  possibly  saying 
that  he  had  already  given  orders  to  that  effect."  He  then 
adds,  "  the  movement  toward  the  enemy  was  begun  at 
once." 

Whatever  uncertainty  there  may  be  as  to  whether  Long- 
street's  scout  reported  to  him.  and  Lee  on  the  evening  of 
Sunday,  28th,  or  of  Monday,  29th,  according  to  the  first- 
named  general's  contradictory  statements  given  of  this 
affair,  as  previously  referred  to,  there  can  be  no  question 
as  to  the  precise  time  when  the  concentration  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Gettysburg  occurred.  This  is  placed  beyond  dis- 
pute by  the  facts  in  the  case  yet  to  be  related,  as  well  as- 
by  General  Longstreet  himself,  who  says  that  "  about  noon 
(Tuesday,  30th,)  the  road  in  front  of  my  corps  was  blocked 
by  Hill's  corps  (the  two  divisions  which  had  been  in  camp 
about  Fayetteville  and  Greenwood)  and  EwelVs  wagon 
train,  which  had  cut  into  the  road  above"  (Annals  of  the 
War,  page  420.) 

As  has  already  been  shown,  up  to  the  night  of  Monday  ^ 
29th,  Lee's  objective  was  Harrisburg.  "But,"  it  may  be- 


220  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

replied,  "if  General  Lee  contemplated  an  attack  upon 
Harrisburg,  why  did  he  send  two  corps  of  his  army  to  the 
east,  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg,  and  but  two  divisions 
of  one  corps  —  Rodes'  and  Johnson's  —  down  the  valley 
upon  the  direct  line  to  the  capital?"  This  may  be  ac- 
counted for  as  follows:  A  glance  at  the  map  will  show 
that  Lee  rested  his  army  at  that  time  in  the  form  of  a  tri- 
angle. The  vertex  of  this  triangle  was  at  Chambersburg, 
the  left  side  extended  to  near  Harrisburg — fifty -two  miles 
distant;  the  right  side  to  York,  fifty -three  miles,  and  the 
Susquehanna  River  formed  the  third  side.  The  distance 
from  York  to  Harrisburg  is  twenty -eight  miles;  byway 
of  Columbia,  and  along  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Susque- 
hanna, it  is  forty  miles.  Troops  concentrated  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  York  could  be  used  upon  either  flank.  Then, 
too,  General  Lee,  notwithstanding  his  seeming  contempt 
for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  was  too  wise  and  cautious, 
in  the  absence  of  any  knowledge  of  the  whereabouts  of 
that  army,  to  leave  so  important  a  pass  in  the  mountains 
•unguarded  as  the  one  leading  from  Chambersburg  to  Get- 
tysburg, thereby  increasing  the  danger  to  his  line  of  com- 
munications in  case  of  the  advance  of  all  his  forces  upon 
Harrisburg  by  the  Cumberland  Valley.  He  might  have 
supposed,  and  certainly  had  reason  to  suppose,  that  his 
old  antagonist  would  follow  him  up  and  strike  him  at  the 
most  favorable  opportunity.  To  prepare  for  such  a  con- 
tingency was  but  common  prudence:  hence  the  movement 
of  the  larger  part  of  his  army  across  the  South  Mountain. 
But  before  giving  an  account  of  the  concentration  of 
the  Confederate  army,  let  us  look  at  the  situation,  and  see 
where  the  various  divisions  and  parts  of  it  were  on  that 


POSITION   OF   THE   ARMY,  JUNE   29TH.  221 

Monday  night,  and  we  will  be  the  better  prepared  to  fol- 
low them  in  their  course  toward  the  decisive  field. 

1.  EweWs  Corps.     Early's  division  was  at  York;  Redes' 
division  about  Carlisle;  Johnson's  somewhere  about  Ship- 
pensburg;  Jenkins'  cavalry  about  four  or  five  miles  from 
the  defenses  of  the  capital  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Sus- 
quehanna.     Two  brigades  of  cavalry  belonging  to  Stuart's 
Corps,  commanded  respectively  by  Generals  William  E. 
Jones  and  Beverly  Robertson,  which  did  not  accompany 
their  chief  in  his  erratic  course  around  the  Federal  army, 
but  accompanied  Lee's  infantry  up  the  valley,  were  en- 
camped somewhere  about  Carlisle. 

2.  HilVs  Corps.     Heth's  division  was  east  of  the  South 
Mountain  at  Cashtowu;    Fender's  and  Anderson's  about 
Fayetteville  and  Greenwood. 

3.  Long  sir  eeC  s  Corps.     The  divisions  of  McLaws  and 
Hood  were   about   Fayetteville.      Pickett's   division   was 
about  three  miles  northeast  of  Chambersburg. 

Imboden's  Cavalry  was  at  Mercersburg  and  the  Gap,  three 
miles  out  at  the  mountain. 

Stuart's  Cavalry  was  at  Union  Mills,  in  Maryland,  some 
distance  north  of  "Westminster. 

Imagine  a  vast  fan  with  the  base  of  its  handle  at  Lee's 
head  -  quarters  near  Chambersburg,  and  its  circumference 
extending  from  Mercersburg  on  the  left,  through  Carlisle 
to  York,  its  extreme  right,  and  you  will  be  able  to  form 
some  idea  of  the  positions  occupied  by  the  Confederate 
army  on  the  night  of  Monday,  June  29th.  "With  the  ex- 
ception of  Pickett's  division,  which  was  to  remain  at  this 
place  to  protect  their  line  of  communications,  and  Im- 
boden's cavalry,  which  was  to  keep  the  way  open  for  the 


222  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

brigades  of  William  E.  Jones  and  Beverly  Robertson,  who 
were  to  protect  the  rear  of  Ewell's  wagon  train,  and  then 
themselves  follow  on  to  Gettysburg,  all  the  scattered  parts 
of  this  great  host,  with  their  immense  trains,  were  to  be 
called  together  at  one  point  near  their  extreme  right.  All 
this  must  be  done  without  confusion,  and  upon  different 
roads;  or  where  the  same  road  was  used  by  different  corps 
xind  divisions,  the  right  of  way  must  be  determined,  and 
the  time  allotted  to  each  declared.  To  each  of  these  com- 
mands at  some  of  the  points  named  couriers  must  have 
been  sent,  while  others  may  have  been  notified  by  signals. 
May  not  the  mysterious  fires  we  saw  that  evening  from 
the  church  steeple  have  been  the  signals  employed?  Five 
hours  after  the  order  for  the  concentration  of  these  forces 
was  issued,  a  copy  of  it  could  have  been  carried  to  every 
point,  except  to  General  Early  at  York,  and  he  could  have 
been  notified  by  courier  in  eight  hours,  allowing  a  rider 
to  go  at  the  rate  of  seven  miles  an  hour.  * 

Tuesday,  30.  The  hasty  passage  of  the  wagon  train 
through  Chambersburg  in  the  night  of  the  29th,  convinced 
us  that  Lee  was  concentrating  his  army,  and  that  no  time 
should  be  lost  in  sending  this  all -important  information 
to  the  authorities  at  Harrisburg.  Rising  early  in  the 
morning  to  see  after  procuring  a  person  to  convey  a 
message  to  the  capital,  I  was  called  upon  by  Judge  Kim- 
mell,  and  after  exchanging  a  few  words  upon  the  import- 
ance of  the  fact, he  left  me,  and  in  a  short  time  procured 
the  services  of  Mr.  Stephen  W.  Pomeroy,  then  a  young 

*  General  Doubleday  says  in  his  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg"  that 
General  Early  received  I^ee's  order  to  march  to  Gettysburg  sometime  in  the 
afternoon  of  Monday,  29th.  If  General  Doubleday  is  correct  in  this  state- 
ment, then  Longstreet's  scout  reported  to  him  on  the  evening  of  Sunday,  28th. 


MR.  POMEROY'S  DISPATCH  TO  HARRISBURG.  223 

man  residing  in  the  valley  in  the  northern  part  of  our 
county,  but  now  an  honored  minister  of  the  Presbyterian 
Church.  Mr.  Pomeroy,  in  the  following  letter  to  ex- 
Governor  Curtin,  relates  the  circumstances  of  his  trip: 

MOUNT  UNION,  Pennsylvania,  November  13,  1883. 
HON.  A.  G.  CTTRTIN: 

Dear  Sir — In  compliance  with  your  request,  I  send  you  the  account  of 
how  I  came  to  send  you  the  telegram  of  the  concentration  of  the  Confederate 
army  at  Gettysburg  during  the  war.  After  being  discharged  from  the  nine 
months'  service  of  the  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  I  happened  to  be  home,  at 
my  father's — Judge  Pomeroy,  of  Roxbury,  Franklin  County, — when  the 
enemy  were  marching  down  the  Cumberland  Valley.  There  was,  of  course, 
great  excitement,  for  the  enemy  were  at  our  doors  and  taking  what  they 
would.  Farmers  hid  their  horses  and  other  stock  in  the  mountains,  as  far 
as  possible.  One  day  three  hundred  cavalry  marched  into  Roxbury.  When 
we  learned  of  their  coming,  ten  of  the  men  who  had  been  out  in  the  nine 
months'  service  armed  ourselves  as  best  we  could  and  went  out  to  intercept 
them ;  but  the  odds  were  too  great,  so  we  retired.  Anxious  to  hear  the  news 
and  render  what  service  we  might  to  our  country,  a  number  of  us  walked  to 
Chambersburg,  a  distance  of  fourteen  miles,  reaching  there  in  the  afternoon. 
That  night  the  Confederates  were  concentrating  at  Gettysburg.  Next  mornin~ 
Judge  F.  M.  Kimmell,  with  whom  my  father  sat  as  associate  judge,  learned 
that  a  son  of  Thomas  Pomeroy  was  in  town.  He  sent  for  me  to  come  to  him 
at  once.  I  found  the  judge  on  the  street  that  leads  to  McConnellsburg,  a 
short  distance  from  the  Franklin  Hotel,  where  the  Central  Presbyterian 
Church  now  stands.  As  the  town  was  full  of  Confederates  and  a  Confederate 
had  his  beat  near  us,  the  judge  asked  me  in  a  low  tone  if  I  was  a  son  of  Judge 
Pomeroy.  I  replied  in  the  affirmative.  With  apparent  unconcern  he  asked 
me  to  follow  him.  I  did  so,  and  he  led  me  into  a  little  dark  back  room,  and 
told  me  that  the  Confederates  were  concentrating  at  Gettysburg  and  Governor 
Curtin  did  not  know  it.  He  said  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the 
governor  should  know  it  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  and  asked  me  if  I 
would  take  a  telegram  to  the  nearest  point  on  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  and 
send  it  to  him.  He  added:  "It  is  of  infinite  importance  to  him  and  to  the 
country."  I  replied  that  I  would  try  it.  The  telegram  was  already  written, 
so  he  cut  a  hole  in  the  buckle  strap  of  my  pantaloons  and  deposited  the  tele- 
gram to  be  sent  there,  and  said:  "Get  this  safely  and  in  the  shortest  time 
possible  to  the  governor."  Assuming  indifference  I  came  to  the  street  and 


224  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

met  the  Confederate  guard,  who  did  not  disturb  me.  Some  of  those  who 
came  with  me  wishing  to  return  to  Roxbury,  we  set  out  together. 

We  met  many  at  the  edge  of  the  town  returning,  who  could  not  get  through 
the  guard  who  were  stationed  around  the  town. 

Coming  to  the  forks  of  the  Strasburg  and  Roxbury  roads  we  found  both 
cavalry  and  infantry.  On  the  left  there  was  a  slight  hollow,  also  several 
wheat  fields,  and  beyond  these  there  were  woods.  This  was  the  only  way  to 
hope  for  escape. ,  At  my  proposal  we  crept  along  this  hollow,  at  the  end  of 
which  there  were  some  wheat  fields;  we  kept  these  between  us  and  the  guard 
till  we  reached  the  woods.  When  getting  over  the  fence  into  the  woods  we 
were  seen  by  the  enemy.  They  called,  rode  after  us  and  leveled  their  muskets 
at  us,  but  we  ran  on,  and  as  they  did  not  fire  or  follow  far  we  escaped.  Still 
fearing  capture  we  kept  to  the  fields.  Before  we  reached  Strasburg  all  had 
fallen  back  but  one.  We  must  have  walked  about  seventeen  miles  before  we 
got  to  Roxbury.  As  the  horses  were  hid  in  the  mountains  I  was  in  dread  lest 
I  should  not  get  a  horse,  but  I  met  Mr.  S.  L.  Sentman  riding  into  town  to  get 
feed  for  his  horses  in  the  mountains.  Telling  him  of  the  message  I  was  car- 
rying he  gave  me  his  horse.  Informing  my  father  of  my  errand  I  set  out  on 
my  trip  at  once.  It  was  about  noon.  The  Amberson  Valley  road  was,  I  knew 
blockaded  with  trees  to  prevent  the  marauders  from  entering  the  valley  to 
steal  horses.  On  this  account  I  crossed  the  mountain  into  Amberson  Valley 
by  a  foot  path,  then  another  mountain  into  Path  Valley.  Reaching  my 
uncle's,  W.  R.  Pomeroy,  at  Concord,  and  telling  him  my  business  he  got  mo 
another  horse.  The  Narrows,  below  Concord,  were  blockaded  by  citizens  of 
Tuscarora  Valley,  many  of  whom  knew  me.  The  report  having  reached 
them  that  I  was  killed  while  trying  to  hinder  the  Confederates  from  entering 
Roxbury,  the  obstacles  and  excitement  of  my  friends  at  finding  me  alive 
hindered  me  about  ten  minutes.  Free  from  them,  I  hastened  down  the  Tus- 
carora Valley  as  fast  as  my  horse  could  carry  me.  At  Bealtown  Mr.  Beal, 
now  the  Rev.  D.  J.  Beal,  speedily  got  me  a  fresh  horse.  When  I  reached 
Silas  E.  Smith's  I  did  these  two  things,  got  lunch  and  proved  to  the  future 
Mrs.  Pomeroy  that  I  was  not  dead,  as  she  supposed,  but  good  for  many  years 
to  come.  From  thence  I  rode  to  my  uncle's,  Joseph  Pomeroy,  at  Academia, 
found  them  likewise  mourning  my  supposed  death,  and  he  supplied  another 
horse,  the  fastest  he  had.  That  carried  me  to  within  a  mile  of  my  destina- 
tion, when  a  soldier  on  guard  called,  Halt!  I  told  the  sergeant  on  guard  my 
mission  and  requested  one  of  the  guard  to  go  with  me,  that  I  might  get  the 
telegram  off  to  Harrisburg  in  the  shortest  time  possible. 

Getting  on  the  horse  behind  me  we  rode  in  a  few  minutes  to  the  office. 
Finding  the  operator,  he  cut  the  telegram  out  of  the  strap  of  my  pantaloons 


MR.   POMEBOY  S    DISPATCH. 


225 


and  sent  it  at  once  to  you.  The  excitement  and  journey  being  over,  and  the 
telegram  being  off  to  you,  I  began  to  look  at  the  time  and  found  it  about 
midnight.  I  had  walked  that  day  about  seventeen  miles  and  ridden  about 
forty -one  miles.  Anxious  as  I  was  about  the  critical  state  of  the  country,  I 
was  so  tired  I  had  to  seek  the  house  of  my  kinsman,  Major  J.  M.  Pomeroyj 
in  Perryville,  now  Port  Royal,  for  rest. 

The  above  is  the  history  of  that  telegram,  that,  I  believe,  first  gave  you 
notice  of  the  concentration  of  the  Confederate  troops  at  Gettysburg,  just  be- 
fore the  famous  battle  in  that  place. 

Respectfully  yours,  STEPHEN  W. 


REV.  STEPHEN  W.  POMEROY, 

The  scout  who  bore  the  first  intelligence  to  the  authorities  of  the  concentration  of 
the  Confederate  Army.    (From  a  recent  photograph.) 

WASHINGTON,  December  nth,  1883. 
My  Dear  Sir: 

Your  dispatch  was  the  first  authentic  information  I  received  of  the  concen- 
tration of  the  army  of  General  I^ee  on  Gettysburg,  and,  treating  it  as  true, 
a&ed  on  it.  Yours  truly,  A.  G.  CURTIN. 

Rev.  S.  W.  Pomeroy. 

It  will  be  seen  from  Mr.  Pomeroy's  statement  that  he 

15 


226  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

reached  Port  Royal  about  midnight  of  Tuesday,  30th.  Pre- 
suming that  no  time  was  lost  in  forwarding  this  important 
dispatch  from  Port  Royal,  and  that  equal  promptness 
was  made  in  Harrisburg  in  forwarding  it  to  "Washington, 
it  is  fair  to  suppose  that  the  fact  of  Lee's  concentration 
was  made  known  at  General  Meade's  head  -  quarters  some- 
time that  same  night.  General  Meade  was  at  that  time  at 
,Taneytown,  thirteen  miles  south  of  Gettysburg.  Is  there 
any  evidence  of  the  reception  there  of  this  information? 
Colonel  James  G.  Biddle,  in  the  Annals  of  the  War,  page 
208,  says  that  "  on  the  night  of  the  30th,  after  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  had  made  two  days  marches,  (from  Frederick  to 
Taneytown,)  General  Meade  heard  that  Lee  was  concentrat- 
ing his  army  to  meet  him."  There  were  other  ways  by  which 
the  knowledge  of  this  concentration  east  of  the  South 
Mountain  might  have  been  conveyed  to  General  Meade, 
but  it  is  fair  to  suppose  that  the  information  referred  to 
by  Colonel  Biddle  was  conveyed  by  Mr.  Pomeroy. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  this  day — Tuesday,  30th, — 
General  Longstreet  rode  from  his  head  -  quarters  about 
three  miles  north-east  of  Chambersburg  to  Lee's  head- 
quarters in  Messersmith's  woods,  upon  the  eastern  sub- 
urbs of  the  town,  when,  after  a  short  consultation  with 
the  latter,  in  which  he  informed  him  that  he  had  coun- 
termanded his  order  for  an  attack  on  Harrisburg,  and 
had  determined  to  cross  the  South  Mountain  and  meet 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in  consequence  of  the  infor- 
mation brought  by  the  scout  Harrison,  the  two  generals 
proceeded  together  to  Greenwood,  where  they  encamped 
and  remained  over  that  night.  On  the  following  morning 
— "Wednesday,  July  1st,  —  they  resumed  their  journey,  and 


CONCENTRATION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES.        227 

after  proceeding  together  some  three  or  four  miles,  heavy 
firing  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg,  at  which 
Lee  rode  rapidly  forward  to  ascertain  the  cause,  leaving 
Longstreet  to  see  after  the  hurrying  forward  of  the  two 
divisions  of  his  corps,  which  were  in  camp  about  Fayette- 
ville.  After  attending  to  this  duty,  General  Longstreet 
again  went  forward  and  rejoined  Lee  about  five  o'clock  in 
the  evening  in  the  rear  of  the  line.  (Annals  of  the  War, 
pages  419,  420. 

The  two  divisions  of  Hill's  Corps  —  Fender's  and  An- 
derson's—  left  their  encampments  about  Fayetteville  and 
Greenwood,  and  proceeded  across  the  mountain  and  re- 
joined Heth  at  Cash  town.  From  that  place  the  divisions 
of  Heth  and  Pender  moved  toward  Gettysburg  and  en- 
camped over  night  at  Marsh  Creek,  four  miles  out.  An- 
derson's division  remained  at  Cashtown. 

Early's  division  of  Swell's  Corps  left  York  and  marched 
by  way  of  East  Berlin  to  Heidlersburg,  where  it  remained 
over  night.  White's  battalion  of  cavalry  of  Imboden's 
command,  moved  from  York  to  Gettysburg  by  the  turn- 
pike, thus  protecting  Early's  flank  and  rear. 

Rodes'  division  of  the  same  corps  left  its  encampment 
below  Carlisle  and  marched  across  the  South  Mountain  by 
the  turnpike  leading  through  Mount  Holly  and  Peters- 
burg (sometimes  called  York  Springs),  and  thence  to 
Heidlersburg,  where  it  rejoined  Early,  and  with  his  division 
encamped  for  the  night.  Heidlersburg  is  distant  from 
Carlisle  twenty -two  miles,  from  York  twenty  miles,  and 
from  Gettysburg  ten  miles.  The  remaining  division  of 
E well's  Corps — Johnson's  —  retraced  its  steps  from  the 
neighborhood  of  Shippensburg  to  Greenvillage,  six  miles 


228  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

north  -  east  of  Chambersburg,  and  from  tlience  went  by  the 
country  road  directly  across  through  Scotland  to  Green- 
wood, where  it  remained  over  night. 

General  Johnson's  wagon  train,  instead  of  following 
him  across  the  country,  came  up  to  Chambersburg  and, 
turning  east  in  the  public  square,  proceeded  toward  Gettys- 
burg. Part  of  Rodes'  wagon  train  also  retraced  its  way 
to  Chambersburg,  and  joining  with  Johnson's,  passed  on 
toward  the  same  destination.  This  was  the  train  which 
passed  through  Chambersburg  during  the  night,  as  pre- 
viously narrated,  and  these  two,  when  united,  were,  ac- 
cording to  the  statement  of  General  McLaws  in  Annals 
of  the  War,  page  440,  fourteen  miles  in  length.  Its  im- 
portance may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  it  was  given 
the  precedence  over  Longstreet's  two  divisions,  and  it  was 
the  detention  caused  by  it  that  prevented  these  divisions 
from  reaching  the  field  of  battle  as  soon  as  was  expected.* 

The  divisions  of  Generals  McLaws  and  Hood,  which 
were  unable  to  proceed  until  Swell's  wagon  train  had  all 
passed,  were  detained  at  their  encampments  about  Fayette- 
ville  until  the  following  afternoon,  when  by  a  forced  march 
the  former  reached  Marsh  Creek,  four  miles  from  Gettys- 
burg, a  little  after  dark,  and  the  latter  got  within  about 
the  same  distance  at  twelve  o'clock  at  night.  The  artillery 
belonging  to  these  two  divisions  did  not  get  the  road  until 
two  o'clock  the  following  morning  (Thursday,  July  2d.)  f 

*  General  Longstreet,  General  McLaws,  and  Dr.  Cullen,  Medical  Director 
of  I^ongstreet's  corps,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  pages  420,  439,  and  440. 

fThe  facts  stated  in  regard  to  the  detention  of  Longstreet's  two  divisions 
and  artillery  train  are  so  important,  and  so  much  relied  upon  by  that  general 
in  rindication  of  his  alleged  tardiness  in  attacking  the  Federal  left  on  Thurs- 
day, July  2d,  that  we  emote  his  precise  words.  The  reader  will  do  well  to 


JENKINS   AT   MECHANICSBURG.  229 

The  withdrawal  of  General  Rodes'  division  was  covered 
by  Jenkins'  cavalry,  which  remained  below  Carlisle  until 
the  ensuing  day — Wednesday.  On  Tuesday  an  engage- 
merit  took  place  between  two  New  York  regiments  and 
Jenkins'  men  some  four  miles  from  the  earthworks  thrown 
up  on  the  high  hills  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Susquehanna. 
On  the  Union  side  three  or  four  were  wounded,  and  about 
ten  on  the  Confederate  side.  This  was  the  sixth  engage- 
ment of  the  war  upon  Pennsylvania  soil.  In  the  evening  a 
small  force  of  this  command  entered  Mechanicsburg,  and 
planting  a  battery  a  short  distance  below  the  town,  fired  a 
few  shots,  after  which  they  fell  back  to  Carlisle.  On  the  en- 
suing day —  "Wednesday — the  whole  force  followed  Rodes' 
infantry  by  the  pike  across  the  mountain.  Arriving  at 
Petersburg  about  the  middle  of  the  day,  Jenkins  made  a 
demand  upon  the  citizens  for  a  large  amount  of  provisions. 
His  men  at  the  same  time  instituted  a  search  for  horses, 
and  stores  were  broken  into  and  robbed.  The  hotels  and 
restaurants  were  closed  by  an  order  from  Jenkins,  and  all 
drinking  was  prohibited.  Mr.  E.  Hiteshew,  a  leading  citi- 
zen and  merchant  of  that  place,  in  order  to  secure  protec- 

keep  these  facts  well  in  remembrance  as  they  will  be  referred  to  hereafter  in 
important  connections.  General  Longstreet  says:  "Our  march  on  this  day 
was  greatly  delayed  by  Johnson's  division  of  the  Second  Corps,  which  came 
into  the  road  (the  Gettysburg  pike)  from  Shippensburg,  and  the  long  wagon 
trains  that  followed  him.  McLaws'  division,  however,  reached  Marsh  Creek, 
four  miles  from  Gettysburg,  a  little  after  dark,  and  Hood's  division  got  within 
nearly  the  same  distance  of  the  town  about  twelve  o'clock  at  night."  (An- 
nals of  the  War,  page  310.)  Again,  on  page  420,  the  general  says:  "About 
noon,  the  road  in  front  of  my  corps  (the  two  divisions  of  Mcl^aws  and  Hood) 
-was  blocked  by  Hill's  corps  (Fender's  and  Anderson's  divisions)  and  Swell's 
wagon  train,  which  had  cut  into  the  road  from  above  (at  Chambersburg).  The 
orders  were  to  allow  these  trains  to  precede  us,  and  that  we  should  go  into 
camp  at  Greenwood,  about  ten  miles  from  Chambersburg.  My  infantry  was 
forced  to  remain  in  Greenwood  until  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  ist;  ray 
artillery  did  not  get  the  road  until  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  zd," 


230  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

tion  to  that  part  of  his  stock  which  had  not  been  sent 
away  upon  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  invited  Jenkins 
and  his  staff  to  dine  with  him.  The  invitation  was  ac- 
cepted, a  guard  was  placed  about  his  premises,  and  while- 
at  dinner  the  following  conversation  between  Mr.  Iliteshew 
and  the  officers  took  place.  Mr.  Hiteshew  inquired,  "  Gen- 
eral, have  you  any  recent  intelligence  from  Vicksburg?" 
"  Oh  yes,"  said  Jenkins,  "  Grant  is  in  a  tight  place.  He 
has  put  himself  in  a  bad  position  and  his  army  is  being 
terribly  slaughtered."  Then  taking  a  piece  of  bread  he? 
improvised  a  miniature  representation  of  Vicksburg,  and- 
said,  "You  see  nature  has  made  Vicksburg  impregna- 
ble, and  Grant  has  shown  his  want  of  judgment  in  putting- 
his  army  where  they  will  all  be  either  killed  or  captured."" 
That  conversation  occurred  on  July  1st,  and  on  the  4th,  — 
three  days  afterward — Vicksburg  was  surrendered  to  Gen- 
eral Grant.  Mr.  Hiteshew  then  said,  "  Do  you  expect  to 
take  Baltimore  and  Washington,  general  ? "  "  Most  cer- 
tainly we  do;  we  expect  to  remain  here  all  summer," 
replied  Jenkins.  "  But,"  continued  Mr.  Hiteshew,  "  don't 
you  think  you  will  meet  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  some- 
where before  you  reach  Baltimore?"  At  this  Captain  Fitz- 
hugh,  Jenkins'  chief  of  staff,  said,  "  Oh,  the  Army  of  the- 
Potomac  is  away  down  in  Virginia;  they  will  most  likely 
cross  the  river  about  Shepherdstown  and  advance  over  the 
battle  field  of  Antietam."  "No,"  said  Jenkins,  "that  is 
too  far  up  the  river;  I  suspect  they  will  cross  lower  downr 
and  we  may  meet  them  between  this  and  Baltimore."  Din- 
ner over,  Jenkins  and  Mr.  Hiteshew,  lighting  their  cigars,, 
took  a  stroll  to  the  top  of  a  hill  below  the  town  where  the 
sound  of  distant  firing  was  heard.  Presently  a  cavalry- 


GENERAL   IMBODEN   IN   CHAMBERSBURG.  231 

man  dashed  up  and  handed  Jenkins  an  envelope.  Hastily 
opening  it,  he  said,  "Mr.  Hiteshew,  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac is  at  Gettysburg  now."  The  order  to  mount  was 
quickly  given,  and  in  a  short  time  the  whole  command 
was  en  route  for  the  scenes  of  strife,  where,  during  that 
same  afternoon,  Jenkins  received  a  slight  wound  by  a 
piece  of  a  shell  grazing  the  top  of  his  head. 

The  withdrawal  of  Rodes  and  Johnson  from  the  valley 
left  it  open  to  an  advance  of  the  Emergency  men,  congre- 
gated at  Harrisburg,  upon  Lee's  communications,  and  the 
cavalry  brigades  of  Generals  "W.  E.  Jones  and  Beverly 
Robertson  were  left  to  prevent  this.  General  Imboden 
was  also  ordered  from  Mercersburg  to  Chambersburg  to 
relieve  Pickett,  who  was  to  proceed  to  Gettysburg.  About 
four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  Wednesday,  July  1st, 
Imboden's  force  entered  Chambersburg,  and  shortly  after- 
ward an  official  requisition  was  made  upon  the  citizens  for 
a  large  amount  of  provisions,  among  which  were  five 
thousand  pounds  of  bacon.  As  the  people  were  utterly 
unable  to  comply  with  this  new  demand,  the  Confederates 
became  indignant  and  threatened  to  break  open  every 
store  and  house  and  institute  a  vigorous  search.  The  con- 
sternation produced  by  these  men  exceeded  any  the  people 
had  suffered  up  to  that  time  during  the  war,  and  had  riot 
some  sudden  emergency  called  them  away  scenes  of  vio- 
lence would  doubtless  have  taken  place.  In  the  midst  of 
their  threats,  and  when  squads  were  already  going  in  dif- 
ferent directions  to  execute  them,  to  the  people's  great 
relief  they  quickly  withdrew  from  the  town  and  proceeded 
out  toward  Gettysburg.  The  cause  of  their  sudden  de- 
parture has  been  given  by  General  Imboden  himself  in 


282  TIIK    GREAT   INVASION. 

an  article  contributed  to  the  Galaxy  of  April,  1871,  which 
is  as  follows:  "That  night  ("Wednesday,  July  1st,)  I  re- 
ceived a  brief  note  from  General  Lee,  expressing  the 
apprehension  that  we  were  in  danger  of  being  cut  off 
from  communication  with  him  by  the  Union  cavalry,  and 
directing  us  to  move  next  morning  as  far  as  South  Moun- 
tain on  the  road  to  Gettysburg,  and  keep  it  open  for 
Generals  William  E.  Jones  and  Beverly  Robertson,  whose 
brigades  of  cavalry  were  in  the  direction  of  Shippensburg." 
Evidently  the  points  where  danger  to  the  communication 
between  Chambersburg  and  Gettysburg  was  apprehended, 
were  at  Greenwood  and  Newman's  Pass,  near  the  top  of 
the  mountain,  where  roads  from,  down  the  valley  inter- 
sected the  pike.  At  these  places  a  comparatively  small 
force  could  have  effectually  prevented  the  passage  of 
troops,  and  Imbodeu  at  once  moved  out  to  these  points 
and  remained  there  until  Pickett's  division  passed  on  the 
ensuing  day — Thursday  —  and  the  cavalry  brigades  of 
Jones  and  Robertson,  just  before  midnight,  after  which  he 
followed  on  to  Gettysburg.  The  two  named  brigades  of 
cavalry — Robertson  in  advance  —  were  the  last  of  the 
Confederate  army  which  passed  through  Chambersburg  to 
Gettysburg. 

Having  given  an  account  of  the  concentration  of  Lee's 
army  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  front  and  notice  an 
event  which  transpired  there  on  this  day  —  June  30th. 
About  half  past  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  a  detachment 
from  Heth's  division  under  General  Pettigrew  left  their 
encampment  at  Cashtown  and  advanced  upon  a  recon- 
noisance  to  within  about  one  mile  of  Gettysburg.  They 
had  with  them  a  number  of  wagons,  and  it  was  supposed 


POSITION   OF   THE   CONFEDERATES,   JUNE   30TH.  233 

that  they  intended  to  enter  Gettysburg  and  fill  these 
wagons  with  plunder.  Approaching  the  town,  this  de- 
tachment halted,  and  after  a  careful  observation  by  the 
officers,  through  their  field-glasses,  they  withdrew  and  en- 
camped at  Marsh  Creek. 

As  we  are  now  upon  the  eve  of  the  first  day's  battle,  it  is 
important  that  the  reader  have  a  correct  knowledge  of 
the  position  of  the  various  corps  and  divisions  of  the  Con- 
federate army  at  the  close  of  this  day.  The  following 
statement  will  give  this  information:  the  divisions  of 
Heth  and  Pender  of  Hill's  corps  were  at  Marsh  Creek, 
four  miles  west  of  Gettysburg;  Anderson's  division  of  the 
same  corps  was  at  Cashtown,  four  miles  further  west. 
The  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood,  of  Longstreet's  corps 
were  about  Fayetteville  and  Greenwood,  and  Pickett  of 
the  same  corps,  near  Chambersburg.  Early  and  Rodes 
of  Swell's  corps  were  at  Ileidlersburg,  ten  miles  north  of 
•Gettysburg,  and  Johnson  of  the  same  corps  was  at  Green- 
wood, sixteen  miles  west  of  the  last-named  place.  Jen- 
kins'  cavaly  was  below  Carlisle;  the  brigades  of  Jones  and 
Robertson,  about  Shippensburg;  Imboden's  at  Mercers- 
burg,  and  Stuart  was  somewhere  north-west  pf  York. 

Leaving  these  troops  to  rest  during  this  eventful  night, 
we  will  next  turn  our  attention  to  the  Federal  army. 


H 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  FEDERAL  ARMY. 

1ST  a  previous  chapter,  the  daily  movements  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  from  June  llth,  when  it  left 
i[  its  encampment  about  Falmouth  and  started  north- 
A  ward  to  checkmate  Lee,  until  Sunday,  21st,  when  it 
T  had  reached  Fairfax,  Centerville,  and  Leesburg,  were 
given.  Upon  that  day  the  different  corps  of  that  army 
were  so  posted  that  all  the  approaches  to  Washington 
south  of  the  Potomac  were  completely  covered.  Besides- 
this  the  gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge  were  so  strongly  held  that 
Lee  was  shut  in  the  valley,  and  could  cross  the  Potomac 
only  to  the  west  of  the  mountain  instead  of  to  the  east,. 
as  originally  intended.  And  now,  having  traced  out  the 
lines  of  march  of  each  corps  and  division  of  the  Con- 
federate army  in  its  northward  movement,  up  to  the  even- 
ing of  Tuesday,  June  30th, — the  night  previous  to  the 
first  clay's  engagement  at  Gettysburg,  I  will  resume  the 
daily  record  of  the  movements  of  the  Federal  army  from 
the  point  where  I  left  off'  until  I  shall  have  brought  it 
face  to  face  with  its  foe. 

The  paramount  purpose  of  General  Hooker  was  to  se- 
cure the  safety  of  the  National  Capital,  and  to  effect  this 
he  was  not  to  be  diverted  either  by  the  strategy  of  Lee 
or  the  clamors  of  the  people.  In  accordance  with  this 
purpose  he  tarried  in  the  position  he  had  taken,  covering 

234 


.*     u 

i 

*  * 


9     . 


.  GENERAL  HOOKER'S  PLAN.  235 

"Washington,  until  he  was  certain  that  the  point  of  danger 
was  further  north,  when  he  again  put  his  army  in  motion. 

The  movements  of  the  army  during  the  days  interven- 
ing from  June  21st  to  the  25th,  as  will  be  seen  in  the 
statement  yet  to  follow,  were  but  few  compared  _with 
those  of  the  succeeding  three  days.  This  was  because  the 
purpose  of  Lee  had  not  yet  been  fully  developed.  On 
Monday,  22d,  Early's  and  Johnson's  divisions  of  Swell's 
Corps  had  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  followed  Rodes  of 
the  same  corps,  who  had  crossed  a  week  before,  down  the 
valley.  And  on  Wednesday,  24th,  Hill  and  Longstreet 
had  also  crossed  and  gone  in  the  same  direction.  On  the 
25th,  however,  it  became  apparent  that  Lee's  immediate 
objective  was  the  Susquehanna,  and  General  Hooker's 
course  was  at  once  clear.  Unlike  Lee,  who  was  in  an 
enemy's  country,  with  a  hostile  population  all  about  him 
who  reported  to  the  authorities  his  every  movement,  and 
his  eyes  bandaged  because  of  the  absence  of  his  cavalry, 
and  therefore  compelled  to  feel  his  way,  Hooker  was  not 
under  the  necessity  of  this  caution,  nor  of  guessing  his 
enemy's  intentions,  but  could  act  promptly  and  intelli- 
gently. The  significance  of  this  will  appear  in  the  fact 
that  the  march  from  Fairfax  to  Frederick  in  Maryland 
was  one  of  the  most  rapid  of  the  .war.  The  Eleventh 
Corps,  it  is  said,  marched  fifty  -  four  miles  in  two  days. 

The  plan  adopted  by  General  Hooker  was  to  move  in  a 
parallel  line  with  Lee  on  the  east  side  of  the  South  Moun- 
tain and  occupy  its  gaps  and  thus  be  prepared  to  meet  him 
in  case  he  turned  east  toward  Baltimore  and  Washington. 
He  also  intended,  in  case  an  opportunity  offered,  to  fall 
upon  his  enemies'  communications.  "With  "Washington, 


236  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

then,  for  its  pivotal  point,  the  Federal  army,  like  a  vast 
moving  fortress,  with  a  frontage  of  one  hundred  thousand 
glittering  bayonets,  stood  as  a  wall  of  steel  between  the 
Capital  and  its  foes,  and  ready  to  be  swung  around  to 
meet  whatever  exigency  might  arise.  With  these  pur- 
poses in  view  the  reader  will  be  better  prepared  to  under- 
stand the  details  yet  to  be  presented. 

I  come  now  to  narrate  the  movements  of  the  Federal 
army,  and  commence  where  I  left  off  in  a  former  chapter. 

Monday,  June  22.  The  Cavalry  Corps  and  Barnes'  First 
Division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  retired  from  Upperville  to 
Aldie.  Stahl's  Cavalry  Division  marched  from  Buckland 
Mills  via  New  Baltimore  to  "Warrenton. 

Tuesday,  23.  Stahl's  cavalry  moved  from  "Warrenton 
via  Gainesville  to  Fairfax  Court -House. 

Wednesday,  24.  Newton's  (Third)  division  of  the  Sixth 
Corps  moved  from  Germantown  to  Centreville,  and  the 
Eleventh  Corps  from  Cow  Horn  Ford,  or  Trappe  Hock, 
on  Goose  Creek,  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac  at 
Edward's  Ferry.  Stahl's  cavalry  moved  from  Fairfax 
Court  House  to  near  Dranesville. 

Thursday,  25.  This  day  important  movements  were  to 
be  made.  Hooker  was  fully  aware  of  his  enemies'  pur- 
poses and  movemente,  and  was  about  to  put  his  army 
again  in  motion  to  meet  them.  The  vast  force  was  ac- 
cordingly swung  around,  throwing  its  left  wing,  consist- 
ing of  the  First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  Corps,  the  whole 
under  the  command  of  Reynolds,  across  the  Potomac  at 
Edward's  Ferry.  At  night  these  three  corps  encamped 
respectively  at  Barnesville,  the  mouth  of  the  Monocacy, 
and  at  Jefferson  in  Maryland,  completely  covering  Cramp- 


THE  FEDERAL  ARMY  CROSSES  THE  POTOMAC.      237 

ton's  and  Turner's  passes.  The  Second  Corps  withdrew 
from  Thoroughfare  Gap  and  Gainesville  and  proceeded  to 
Gum  Springs.  As  soon  as  this  corps  left  Thoroughfare 
Gap,  Stuart  emerged  from  his  forced  position  in  the  valley, 
and  set  out  upon  his  intended  expedition  northward,  but 
unexpectedly  coming  upon  the  Second  Corps  at  Haymar- 
ket,  he  was,  after  a  short  engagement  compelled  to  with- 
draw and  return  to  Buckland  and  Gainesville.  Howe's 
(second)  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  moved  from  Bristoe 
Station  to  Centcrville,  Crawford's  division"  (two  brigades) 
of  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  from  the  defenses  of  Washing- 
ton, marched  from  Fairfax  Station  and  Upton's  Hill  to 
Vienna.  Stannard's  Vermont  Brigade,  also  from  the  de- 
fenses of  the  Capital,  left  the  mouth  of  the  Occoquan  en 
route  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  Stahl's  cavalry 
moved  from  near  Dranesville,  Virginia,  via  Young's  Island 
Ford,  on  the  Potomac,  en  route  to  Frederick  City,  Mary- 
land. The  Reserve  Artillery  moved  from  Fairfax  Court 
House,  across  the  Potomac  to  near  Poolesville. 

Friday,  26.  This  day  some  changes  were  made  in  the 
positions  occupied  by  the  left  wing,  with  the  view  to  the 
more  complete  covering  of  Turner's  Pass,  through  which 
the  National  Pike  passes.  The  First  Corps  marched  from 
Barnesville  to  Jefferson;  the  Third  Corps  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Monocacy  to  Point  of  Rocks;  and  the  Eleventh 
Corps  from  Jefferson  —  the  First  taking  its  place  there  — 
to  Middletown.  The  Second  Corps  advanced  from  Gum 
Springs  to  the  north  side  of  the  Potomac  at  Edward's 
Ferry;  the  Fifth  Corps  from  Aldie  via  Carter's  Mills,  Lees- 
burg,  and  Edward's  Ferry,  to  within  four  miles  of  the 
mouth  of  the  Monocacy;  the  Sixth  Corps  from  German- 


238  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

town  and  Centerville  to  Dranesville;  the  Twelfth  Corps 
from  Leesburg  via  Edward's  Ferry  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Monocacy;  the  Cavalry  Corps  (Buford's  and  Gregg's  di- 
visions) from  Aldie  to  Leesburg;  Stahl's  cavalry  division 
•continued  oil  its  way  to  Frederick  City,  and  Crawford's 
Pennsylvania  Reserves  moved  from  Vienna  to  Goose 
Oeek.  The  head -quarters  of  the  army  were  moved  from 
Fairfax  Court  House  via  Drauesville  and  Edward's  Ferry 
to  Poolesville. 

Saturday,  27.  The  head  -  quarters  were  this  day  moved 
from  Poolesville  to  Frederick  City;  the  First  and  Third 
Corps  were  moved  from  their  respective  camps  at  Jeffer- 
son and  Point  of  Rocks  to  Middletown,  joining  at  that 
place  the  Eleventh,  which  had  reached  there  the  day 
previous.  The  left  wing  of  the  army  was  now  all  massed 
against  Turner's  Pass,  which  rendered  any  advance  by 
the  enemy  by  that  route  impossible.  The  Second  Corps 
marched  from  near  Edward's  Ferry  via  Poolesville  to 
Barnesville;  the  Fifth  Corps  from  a  point  between  Ed- 
ward's Ferry  and  the  mouth  of  the  Monocacy  to  Ballinger's 
Creek,  near  Frederick  City;  the  Sixth  Corps  from  Dranes- 
ville via  Edward's  Ferry  to  near  Poolesville;  the  Twelfth 
Corps  from  near  the  mouth  of  the  Monocacy  via  Point  of 
Rocks  to  Knoxville;  and  Crawford's  Pennsylvania  Re- 
serves moved  from  Goose  Creek  by  the  same  ferry  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Monocacy.  The  whole  of  the  infantry  hav- 
ing now  crossed  the  river  into  Maryland,  Buford's  and 
•Gregg's  cavalry,  which  had  remained  at  Leesburg  to  cover 
this  crossing  from  an  attack  by  Stuart,  also  crossed.  The 
former  proceeded  to  the  vicinity  of  Jefferson,  and  the  latter 
in  the  direction  of  Frederick  City.  Stahl's  cavalry  on 
this  day  reached  the  last  named  place. 


.   GENERAL  STUART'S  RAID.  239 

On  this  day  Stuart,  who  had  been  driven  back  by  the 
Second  Corps,  upon  which  he  unexpectedly  came,  on  the 
25th,  succeeded,  after  considerable  difficulty,  in  crossing 
the  Potomac  into  Maryland  in  the  vicinity  of  Dranesville, 
and  started  on  his  erratic  course  around  the  Federal  army. 
Here  at  this  point  Stuart  made  his  great  mistake.  Instead 
of  following  in  the  rear  of  Lee  where  the  mountain  passes 
south  of  the  Potomac  were  closed  against  him,  and  taking 
possession  of  Crampton's,  Turner's,  and  Monterey  passes 
on  the  north  of  the  river,  thereby  masking  Lee's  move- 
ments, protecting  his  line  of  communications,  harassing  the 
Federal  forces,  and  reporting  their  presence,  he  departed 
from  his  proper  connection  with  the  army  and  went  upon 
a  raid  to  the  east,  and  only  reached  his  own  friends  in  the 
-evening  of  Wednesday,  July  2d.  In  consequence  of  this 
course,  the  Confederate  commander  was  in  ignorance  of  the 
whereabouts  of  his  adversary,  and  only  learned  of  him  in 
the  evening  of  Sunday,  June  28th,  or  Monday,  29th. 

It  is  claimed  by  some  Southern  writers  that  the  great 
disaster  of  the  Pennsylvania  campaign  was  owing  to  the 
course  pursued  by  General  Stuart,  and  by  some  he  has 
been  severely  blamed.  Let  us  consider  where  the  responsi- 
bility for  his  course  rests.  General  Lee  says  of  his  orders 
to  Stuart:  "General  Stuart  was  left  to  guard  the  passes  of 
the  mountains  and  to  observe  the  movements  of  the  enemy, 
whom  he  was  instructed  to  harrass  and  impede  as  much  as 
possible,  should  he  attempt  to  cross  the  Potomac.  In  that 
event  General  Stuart  was  directed  to  move  into  Maryland, 
crossing  the  Potomac  on  the  east  or  west  of  the  Blue 
Ridge,  as  in  his  judgment  should  be  best,  and  take  posi- 
tion on  the  right  of  our  column  as  it  advanced."  *  Gen- 

*  Annals  of  the  War,  page  419. 


240  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

eral  Longstreet  says:  "  My  corps  left  Culpeper  on  the  15th, 
and  with  a  view  of  covering  the  march  of  Hill  and  Ewell 
through  the  valley,  moved  along  the  east  side  of  the  Blue 
Ridge.  General  Stuart  was  in  my  front  and  on  my  flank, 
reconnoitering  the  movements  of  the  Federals.  When  it 
was  found  that  Hooker  did  not  intend  to  attack,  I  with- 
drew to  the  west  side,  and  marched  to  the  Potomac.  As 
I  was  leaving  the  Blue  Ridge,  I  instructed  General  Stuart 
to  follow  me,  and  to  cross  the  Potomac  at  Shepherdstown, 
while  I  crossed  at  Williamsport,  ten  miles  above.  In  re- 
ply to  these  instructions,  General  Stuart  informed  me  that 
he  had  discretionary  powers  from  General  Lee;  whereupon 
I  withdrew.  General  Stuart  held  the  gap  for  awhile,  and 
then  hurried  around  beyond  Hooker's  army,  and  we  saw 
nothing  more  of  him  until  the  evening  of  the  2d  of  July, 
when  he  came  down  from  York  and  joined  us,  having 
made  a  complete  circuit  of  the  Federal  army."  *  It  will 
be  seen  from  the  foregoing  that  if  Geneal  Lee  is  not 
directly  responsible  for  the  course  pursued  by  Stuart,  he 
indirectly  is,  for  he  gave  him  discretionary  power  to  pursue 
whatever  course  his  own  judgment  dictated.  Stuart  had 
made  several  circuits  around  the  Federal  army  during  the 
war,  and  had  gained  some  advantages  and  much  celebrity, 
and  using  the  discretion  given  him,  he  chose  that  course 
again.  A  prudent  commander,  unless  he  held  his  adver- 
sary in  contempt,  would  scarcely  have  given  such  discre- 
tion to  a  subordinate  upon  the  eve  of  an  invasion  of  his 
territory.f 

*  Annals  of  the  War,  page  418. 

f  General  Stuart  has  been  severely  blamed  for  the  route  lie  took  around  the 
Federal  army.  Several  Confederate  officers,  among  them  Generals  Wilcox, 
Long,  and  Alexander,  and  Colonel  Walter  Taylor,  in  papers  contributed  to 


I 


RESPONSIBILITY   FOR   STUART'S    RAID.  241 

General  Lee  expected  of  Stuart  that  he  would  "  harass 
and  impede"  the  Federal  army  in  case  it  should  "attempt 
to  cross  the  Potomac."  Did  he  suppose  that  General 
Hooker  would  fail  to  find  out  that  he  was  no  longer  in  the 
valley  threatening  Washington,  but  off*  upon  an  invasion 
of  Pennsylvania?  or  that,  aware  of  these  facts,  he  would  sit 
down  in  idleness  and  permit  him  to  go  where  he  pleased? 
or  that  Stuart  could  prevent  an  army  of  a  hundred  thou- 
sand brave  and  patriotic  men  from  crossing  the  Potomac 
for  the  rescue  of  their  imperilled  country?  or  that  he  could 
detain  them  until  he  could  capture  Harrisburg,  and  per- 
haps Philadelphia?  If  he  did,  then  his  credulity  can  only 

the  "Southern  Historical  Society, "  at  Richmond,  Virginia,  attribute  the 
failure  of  the  Pennsylvania  campaign  to  Stuart's  erratic  course,  and  that  it 
was  "a  fatal  blunder,"  and  was  made  by  Stuart  "solely  to  gratify  his  ambi- 
tion for  sensational  display  in  disobedience  of  the  orders  of  General  Lee." 
These  charges  against  General  Stuart  have  called  forth  several  articles  in  the 
General's  defense,  from  which  I  select  the  following  :  General  Stuart  in  his 
official  report,  says  that  in  a  personal  interview  with  General  Lee,  on  the  23d 
of  June,  he  first  broached  the  subject  of  his  circuit  around  the  Federal  army 
and  subsequently  received  his  consent.  His  language  is  :  "I  submitted  to 
the  commanding  general  a  plan  of  leaving  a  brigade  or  so  of  cavalry  in  my 
present  front,  and  passing  through  Hopewell,  or  some  other  gap  in  the  Bull 
Run  Mountains,  attain  the  enemy's  rear,  and  moving  between  his  main  body 
and  Washington,  cross  the  Potomac  into  Maryland  and  join  our  army  north 
of  that  river." 

General  Lee,  in  his  report,  says  :  "Upon  the  suggestion  of  General  Stuart 
that  he  could  damage  the  enemy  and  delay  his  passage  of  the  river  by  getting 
in  his  rear,  he  was  authorized  to  do  so.  *  *  *  General  Stuart  was  directed 
to  hold  the  mountain  passes  with  part  of  his  command  as  long  as  the  enemy 
remained  south  of  the  Potomac,  and  with  the  remainder  to  pass  into  Mary- 
land and  place  himself  on  the  right  of  General  Ewell.'  It  was  left  to  his  dis- 
cretion whether  he  should  enter  Maryland  east  or  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge  ; 
but  he  was  instructed  also  to  lose  no  time  in  placing  himself  on  the  right  of 
the  column  as  soon  as  he  should  perceive  the  enemy  moving  northward." 

In  s.11  these  instructions  to  General  Stuart  there  is  no  warrant  for  him  to 
make  a  complete  detour  of  the  Federal  army.  The  only  discretion  granted 
him  was  as  to  whether  he  should  cross  the  Potomac  into  Maryland  east  or 
•west  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  He  was,  however,  to  rejoin  the  army  somewhere  tn 
Maryland.  In  order  to  get  around  this  difficulty  Major  McClellan,  of  Stuart's 
staff,  says  that  "With  the  orders  from  Lee  to  Stuart  was  a  letter  from  General 
16 


242  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

be  accounted  for  upon  the  adage  that  "  Whom  the  gods 
would  destroy,  they  first  make  mad." 

I  resume  now  the  daily  movements  of  the  army  with 
Sunday,  28.  The  continued  advance  of  the  Confederates 
into  Pennsylvania  calling  for  a  further  forward  movement 
of  the  Federal  army,  Crampton's  and  Turner's  passes 
were  left  in  charge  of  Buford's  division  of  cavalry,  and 
the  infantry  moved  forward  as  follows:  The  First  Corps 
marched  from  Middletown  to  Frederick  City;  the  Second 
Corps  from  Barnesville  to  Monocacy  Junction;  the  Third 
Corps  from  Middletown  to  near  Woodboro';  the  Sixth 

Lee  to  Stuart  marked  confidential.  The  letter  discussed  the  plan  submitted 
during  the  day  by  Stuart,  at  the  personal  interview  with  Lee,  of  passing 
around  the  enemy's  rear.  It  informed  Stuart  that  General  Early  would  move 
on  York,  Pennsylvania,  with  the  right  wing,  and  that  it  was  desirable  to  place 
his  cavalry,  as  speedily  as  possible,  with  Early's  division.  The  letter  also  sug- 
gested that,  as  the  roads  leading  northward  from  Shepkerdstown  and  Williams- 
port  were  already  incumbered  with  the  artillery  and  transportation  of  the 
army,  the  route  in  that  direction  would  consume  more  time  than  the  proposed 
one  of  passing  to  the  enemy's  rear.  This  letter  also  informed  Stuart  that  he 
could  take  either  route  his  discretion  might  dictate,  but  that  if  he  chose  the 
latter  General  Early  would  receive  instructions  to  look  out  for  him  at  York, 
Pennsylvania.  York  was  particularly  mentioned  as  the  point  at  which  Stuart 
was  to  look  out  for  Early,  and  as  the  probable  point  of  concentration." 

In  confirmation  of  the  foregoing,  I  now  quote  from  the  official  report  of  Gen- 
eral Stuart,  which  is  in  the  archives  of  the  Government  at  Washington .  General 
Stuart  says  :  "  I  was  advised  by  General  Lee  that  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia would  move  in  two  columns  for  the  Susquehanna.  General  Early  com- 
manded one  of  the  divisions  to  the  eastward,  and  I  was  directed  to  commun- 
icate with  him  as  speedily  as  practicable  after  crossing-  the  Potomac,  and 
place  my  command  on  his  right  flank.  It  was  expected  that  I  would  find  him 
at  York,  Pennsylvania.  It  is  believed  that  had  the  corps  of  Hill  and  Long- 
street  moved  onward,  instead  of  halting  near  Chambersburg,  three  or  four 
days,  that  York  could  have  become  the  point  of  concentration  instead  of 
Gettysburg.  Moreover,  considering  York  as  the  point  of  junction,  the  route 
I  took  to  get  there  was  certainly  as  direct  and  far  more  expeditious  than  the 
alternate  one  proposed." 

It  will  be  perceived  from  the  foregoing  that  in  the  event  of  Stuart  taking 
the  circuitous  route  around  the  Federal  army,  General  Lee  was  to  notify 
Early  to  be  on  the  look-out  for  him  at  York.  No  such  notice  was  received  by 
General  Early.  May  it  not  be  inferred  that,  ignorant  of  Stuart's  intended  or 
forced  circuit,  Lee  did  not  send  the  order  ? 


CHANGE    OF   FEDERAL    COMMANDERS.  243 

Corps  from  near  Poolcsville  to  Hyattstown;  the  Eleventh 
Corps  from  Middletown  to  near  Frederick;  and  the  Twelfth 
Corps  from  Knoxvillc  to  Frederick  City.  Gregg's  cavalry 
division  reached  Frederick  City  and  marched  thence  to 
New  Market  and  Ridgeville.  Crawford's  Pennsylvania 
Reserves  marched  from  the  mouth  of  the  Monocacy  and 
joined  the  Fifth  Corps  at  Ballinger's  Creek. 

On  this  day  important  events  transpired.  General 
Hooker,  who  had  exhibited  such  consummate  skill  in 
handling  his  army,  was  succeeded  in  command  by  Gen- 
eral George  G.  Meade.  The  circumstances  which  led  to 
this  change  were  as  follows:  On  Friday,  26th,  General 
French  was  placed  in  command  of  the  garrison  at  Harper's 
Ferry  —  supposed  to  be  ten  or  eleven  thousand  strong,  and 
strongly  posted  upon  Maryland  Heights.  On  the  same 
day  that  General  French  assumed  this  command,  General 
Hooker  sent  the  Twelfth  Corps  under  General  Slocum  as 
far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Monocacy,  with  the  view  that  the 
two  corps  should  operate  upon  the  enemy's  line  of  com- 
munication by  following  up  his  rear,  capturing  his  couriers 
and  trains,  and  intercepting  him  in  case  of  his  defeat.  He 
therefore  inquired  of  the  authorities  at  "Washington  by 
telegraph  as  follows: 

"Is  there  any  reason  why  Maryland  Heights  should  not  be  abandoned, 
after  the  public  stores  and  property  are  removed?  " 

This  dispatch  was  forwarded  at  half-  past  ten  o'clock  on 
Saturday,  27th,  and  brought  the  following  reply  from  Gen- 
eral Halleck: 

"Maryland  Heights  have  always  been  regarded  as  an  important  point  to  be 
held  by  us,  and  much  expense  and  labor  incurred  in  fortifying  them.  I  can 
not  approve  of  their  abandonment,  except  in  case  of  absolute  necessity." 


244  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

In  response  to  his  inquiry,  General  Hooker  at  once  sent 
the  following  rejoinder: 

"I  have  received  your  telegram  in  regard  to  Harper's  Ferry.  I  find  ten 
thousand  men  here  in  condition  to  take  the  field.  Here  they  are  of  no  earthly 
account.  They  can  not  defend  a  ford  of  the  river;  and,  so  far  as  Harper's 
Ferry  is  concerned,  there  is  nothing  of  it.  As  for  the  fortifications,  the  work 
of  the  troops,  they  remain  when  the  troops  are  withdrawn.  No  enemy  will 
ever  take  possession  of  them  for  them.  This  is  my  opinion.  All  the  public 
property  could  have  been  secured  to  -  night,  and  the  troops  marched  to  where 
they  could  have  been  of  some  service.  Now,  they  are  but  a  bait  for  the 
rebels,  should  they  return.  I  beg  that  this  may  be  presented  to  the  secretary 
of  war,  and  his  excellency,  the  president. 

"JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Major -General." 

Before  General  Hooker  had  time  to  receive  a  reply  to 
this  last  communication,  he  sent  the  following  additional 
one: 

"SANDY  HOOK,  June  27th,  1863. 
"MAJOR -GENERAL  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General  in  Chief: 

"My  original  instructions  require  me  to  cover  Harper's  Ferry  and  Wash- 
ington. I  have  now  imposed  upon  me,  in  addition,  an  enemy  in  my  front  of 
more  than  my  numbers.  I  beg  to  be  understood,  respectfully  but  firmlv,  that 
I  am  unable  to  comply  with  this  condition,  with  the  means  at  my  disposal, 
and  earnestly  request  that  I  may  at  once  be  relieved  from  the  position  I  oc- 
cupy. JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Major -General." 

General  Halleck  had  never  regarded  General  Hooker 
with  much  favor,  and  the  relations  between  them  were 
not  at  all  friendly  and  cordial.  •  He  therefore  very  naturally 
improved  his  opportunity  to  get  rid  of  one  whom  he  did 
not  regard  as  a  suitable  person  for  the  command  of  the 
army,  and,  using  his  influence  with  President  Lincoln 
as  his  military  adviser,  induced  him  to  accept  General 
Hooker's  resignation  and  place  General  Meade,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  in  the  chief  command.  In 
accordance  with  this  arrangement,  at  two  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  day  following  the  interchange  of  messages 


HOOKER  LEAVES  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC.     245 

between  Generals  Hooker  and  Halleck — Sunday,  28th, — 
Colonel  Hardie  of  the  "War  Department  reached  Frederick 
with  the  official  orders  making  these  changes.* 

General  Hooker,  upon  receiving  the  official  acceptance 
•of  his  resignation,  issued  the  following  characteristic  order: 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

FREDERICK,  MARYLAND,  June  28,  1863. 

In  conformity  with  the  orders  of  the  War  Department,  dated  June  ayth, 
1863,  I  relinquish  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  is  trans- 
ferred to  Major -General  George  G.  Meade,  a  brave  and  accomplished  officer, 
who  has  nobly  earned  the  confidence  and  esteem  of  the  army  on  many  a 
well  fought  field.  Impressed  with  the  belief  that  my  usefulness  as  the  com- 
mander of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  impaired,  I  part  from  it,  yet  not  with- 
out the  deepest  emotions.  The  sorrow  of  parting  with  the  comrades  of  so 
many  battles  is  relieved  by  the  conviction  that  the  courage  and  devotion  of 
this  army  will  never  cease  nor  fail;  that  it  will  yield  to  my  successor,  as  it 
has  to  me,  a  willing  and  hearty  support.  With  the  earnest  prayer  that  the 
triumph  of  this  army  may  bring  successes  worthy  of  it  and  the  nation,  I  bid 
it  farewell.  JOSEPH  HOOKER,  Major-  General. 

General  Hooker  took  leave  of  the  principal  officers  of 
the  army  on  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  he  relinquished 
command.  They  were  drawn  up  in  line,  and  he  passed 
.along  shaking  hands  with  each  and  laboring  in  vain  to 
stifle  his  emotions.  The  tears  rolled  down  his  cheeks. 
The  officers  also  were  deeply  affected.  The  scene  was 
.similar  to  the  final  separation  between  Washington  and 
his  officers  at  the  close  of  the  war  of  the  revolution. 

General  Hooker  at  once  set  out  for  Baltimore  according 
to  his  instructions,  and  waited  there  three  days  for  further 
orders  from  the  adjutant -general's  office,  but  as  none  came 
he  went  over  to  Washington,  where  he  was  forthwith 
.arrested  by  General  Halleck  for  visiting  the  Capital  with- 

*  Colonel  James  G.  Biddle  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  207. 


246  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

out  leave,  and  in  violation  of  the  rule  which  forbade  officers, 
to  do  so. 

General  Hooker  was  undoubtedly  right  in  the  course  he- 
wished  to  pursue,  and  the  general  voice  of  history  will 
sustain  him  in  it.  lie  may  have  acted  hastily  in  tendering 
his  resignation,  but  whatever  faults  he  may  have  had,  his 
high  position,  the  distinguished  services  he  had  rendered, 
the  masterly  manner  in  which  he  handled  his  army,  and 
the  hold  he  had  in  the  confidence  and  love  of  that  army 
upon  which  the  destiny  of  the  government  hung,  should 
have  secured  to  him  better  treatment.  It  was  not  the  first 
time,  however,  that  patriotism  and  devotion  to  duty  have 
been  sacrificed  to  official  jealousy  and  personal  spite. 

The  order  placing  General  Meade  in  command  of  the 
army  was  a  complete  surprise  to  him.  He  had  never 
sought  promotion,  and  was  as  modest  as  he  was  brave. 
He  had  entered  the  war  as  a  brigadier  in  the  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,  and  commanded  a  division  at  Antletam  and  at 
Fredericksburg,  and  the  Fifth  Corps  at  Chancel lorsville. 
He  was  loved  and  respected  by  his  own  soldiers  because 
he  was  always  ready  to  endure  hardships  with  them.  Plain 
in  dress  and  speech,  and  familiar  in  conversation,  he  was 
accessible  to  all.  He  enjoyed  in  a  high  degree,  especially 
after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  the  confidence  of  Presi- 
dent Lincoln.  General  Meade  was  not  elated  by  his  pro- 
motion, but  on  the  contrary  was  evidently  deeply  impressed 
with  a  sense  of  the  great  responsibility  which  rested  upon 
him.  The  destiny  of  the  Republic  was  in  his  hands.  One 
false  step  now  and  the  Union  would  be  lost.  And  yet  he 
did  not  shrink  from  taking  the  position  which,  unsought 
and  unexpected,  had  been  assigned  him,  and  he  announced 


GENERAL    MEADE    ASSUMES    COMMAND.  247 

to  the  army  his  acceptance  of  the  command  in  the  follow- 
ing modest  and  appropriate  words: 

"  HEAD  -  QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"June  28th,  1863. 

"  By  direction  of  the  President  of  t'oe  United  States,  I  hereby  assume  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  As  a  soldier,  in  obeying-  this  order  —  an 
order  totally  unexpected  and  unsolicited  —  I  have  no  promises  or  pledges  to 
make.  The  country  looks  to  this  army  to  relieve  it  from  the  devastation  and 
disgrace  of  a  hostile  invasion.  Whatever  fatigues  and  sacrifices  we  may  be 
called  upon  to  undergo,  let  us  have  in  view  constantly  the  magnitude  of  the 
interests  involved,  and  let  each  man  determine  to  do  his  duty,  leaving  to  an 
all  -  controlling  Providence  the  decision  of  the  contest.  It  is  with  just  diffi- 
dence that  I  relieve  in  the  command  of  this  army,  an  eminent  and  accomplished 
soldier,  whose  name  must  ever  appear  conspicuous  in  the  history  of  its 
achievements;  and  I  rely  upon  the  hearty  support  of  my  companions  in  arms 
to  assist  me  in  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  the  important  trust  which  has 
been  confided  to  me.  GEORGE  G.  MEADE, 

"Major-  General  Commanding." 

Such  a  change  of  commanders  of  a  great  army  upon  the 
eve  of  battle,  in  which  the  destiny,  not  only  of  the  nation 
but  of  republican  institutions,  was  at  stake,  was  a  fearful 
experiment.  It  reflects  great  honor  upon  the  patriotism 
of  the  men  composing  that  army,  that  demoralization,  to 
some  extent,  did  not  result,  but  they  cheerfully  accepted 
the  fact  of  the  change,  and  pressed  on  to  meet  their  foe 
without  as  much  as  an  hour's  delay.  Can  history  produce 
anything  like  it? 

General  Meade,  as  soon  as  he  entered  upon  the  command, 
sought  an  interview  with  General  Hooker,  and  used  every 
effort  to  obtain  of  him  information  concerning  the  strength 
and  position  of  the  different  corps  of  the  army,  and  the 
movements  of  the  enemy.  In  his  testimony  before  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  he  said,  "  My  pre- 
decessor, General  Hooker,  left  the  camp  in  a  very  few 


248  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

hours  after  I  relieved  him.  I  received  from  him  no  intima- 
tion of  any  plan,  or  any  views  that  he  may  have  had  up 
to  that  moment,  and  I  am  not  aware  that  he  had  any,  but 
was  waiting  for  the  exigencies  of  the  occasion  to  govern 
him,  just  as  I  had  to  do  subsequently."  *  Thrown  entirely 
upon  his  own  resources,  General  Meade  summoned  his 
trusted  friend,  General  Reynolds,  to  his  side,  and  the  two 
together  agreed  upon  a  plan  which  ended  in  the  victory  at 
Gettysburg,  f  It  should  be  stated  here  that  what  was  de- 
nied General  Hooker  was  granted  to  General  Meade,  and 
he  was  given  the  option  to  do  as  he  pleased  with  the 
men  at  Harper's  Ferry.  He,  however,  either  did  not 
approve  of  Hooker's  project  to  send  these  men  in  con- 
junction with  the  Twelfth  Corps  to  operate  upon  Lee's 
line  of  communication,  or  else  he  supposed  the  time  for 
that  movement  had  passed,  and  he  could  use  these  men 
to  better  advantage  elsewhere.  lie  accordingly  ordered 
General  Slocum  to  rejoin  the  main  army,  and  the  bulk  of 
the  garrison  at  Harper's  Ferry,  under  General  French,  was 
directed  to  take  a  post  as  a  reserve  at  Frederick  when 
our  forces  moved  forward.  General  Couch,  with  his 
emergency  men  at  Harrisburg,  estimated  at  twenty  thou- 
sand, was  also  placed  under  his  orders. 

Among  the  first  oificial  acts  of  General  Meade,  after 
assuming  the  command  of  the  army,  was  to  ask  the  assent 
of  the  government  at  "Washington  to  the  appointment  of 
General  Kilpatrick  to  the  division  of  cavalry  under  General 
Stahl,  and  the  promotion  of  Ouster,  Merritt,  and  Farns- 
worth,  three  young  captains,  to  the  command  of  brigades 

*  Colonel  James  G.  Biddle  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  207. 
f  Major  Joseph  G.  Roseng-arten  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  62. 


COMMUNICATION    WITH    WASHINGTON   CUT.  249 

in  that  division.  The  request  was  at  once  acceded  tu,  and 
the  subsequent  career  of  these  men  attested  the  wisdom 
of  that  change.  Shortly  after  the  dispatch  from  Wash- 
ington was  received,  granting  this  request  of  General 
Meade,  a  second  message  came  over  the  wire  announcing 
that  Stuart  with  his  cavalry  was  making  a  raid  near  the 
•Capital;  and  in  a  short  time  thereafter  the  wire  was  cut  and 
telegraphic  communications  for  a  time  ceased.*  Stuart, 
after  crossing  the  Potomac  on  the  day  previous,  passed 
close  to  Washington  and  Baltimore,  creating  considerable 
excitement  in  those  cities.  At  liockville  he  came  upon  a 
large  wagon  train,  filled  with  supplies,  on  its  way  from 
Washington  to  the  army  at  Frederick.  This  train,  with 
its  escort,  he  captured  and  took  with  him  to  Gettysburg, 
Landing  it  over  there  to  the  Confederate  quartermaster. 
Colonel  Walter  Taylor,  of  General  Lee's  staff,  in  a  contri- 
bution to  the  Southern  Historical  Society  papers,  says  that 
the  capture  of  this  train  was  unfortunate  for  Stuart,  for  in 
•capturing  and  bringing  it  away  he  was  considerably  de- 
layed. After  the  capture  of  this  train,  Stuart  kept  on  his 
way  in  a  northerly  direction  through  Brookville,  travelling 
all  night. 

Monday,  29.     As  the  army  was  now  approaching  that 


*The  proximity  of  General  Stuart  to  the  National  Capital,  and  the  sever- 
ing of  telegraphic  communications  with  the  head  -  quarters  of  the  army,  pro- 
duced deep  anxiety  in  Washington.  General  Halleck,  on  Monday  night, 
agth,  telegraphed  to  General  Couch,  in  command  of  the  Department  of  the 
Gusquehanna,  at  Harrisburg,  as  follows:  "I  have  no  communication  with 
General  Meade. "  Hon.  Edgar  Cowan,  then  in  Washington,  telerjraphed  to 
Governor  Curtin  at  Harrisburg  :  "  Stanton  can  hear  nothing  from  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  we  all  fear  that  it  has  met  with  some  disaster."  Secre- 
tary Seward,  on  the  night  of  the  2gth,  telegraphed  to  Hon.  Thurlow  Weed,  at 
Albany,  New  York,  to  urge  Governor  Seymour  to  send  on  the.  New  York 
militia,  and  that  the  government  was  in  extreme  peril." 


250  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

important  pass  in  the  mountain — Newman's  Pass,  where 
the  pike  leading  through  Gettysburg  to  Baltimore  crosses, 
and  where,  if  at  all  south  of  the  Susquchanna,  Lee  would 
.concentrate  for  battle — it  became  all  important  to  have  it 
well  in  hand  and  some  well  defined  plan.  The  following 
was  therefore  agreed  upon:  A  strong  cavalry  force  was  to 
be  thrown  out  to  the  left  to  cover  Monterey  Pass,  and  thus 
protect  the  flank  and  rear  from  an  attack  from  that 
quarter;  and  to  the  right,  to  look  after  Stuart,  who  was 
moving  around  in  that  direction.  The  seven  corps  of  in- 
fantry were  to  radiate  from  Frederick  upon  seven  different 
roads,  which,  while  diverging  from  that  place,  all  tended 
northward  and  converged  at  Gettysburg.  The  plan  will 
be  best  understood  by  imagining  a  vast  fan,  with  the  base 
of  its  handle  resting  upon.  Frederick,  the  point  of  diver- 
gence, and  the  seven  different  corps,  like  the  sticks  of  the 
fan,  radiating  therefrom.  This  immense  force  could  be 
pushed  northward  to  the  Susquehanna,  or  swung  around 
to  interpose  between  the  enemy  and  Philadelphia,  in  case 
he  should  go  in  that  direction,  or  be  concentrated  at  Gettys- 
burg or  any  other  point,  if  necessary. 

In  accordance  with  the  general  plan  nl  ready  stated,  the 
First  and  Second  brigades  of  Buford's  cavalry,  commanded 
respectively  by  Generals  Gamble  and  Devin,  left  Middle- 
town  and  crossed  through  Turner's  Pass  to  Boonsborough,. 
west  of  the  South  Mountain.  Finding  no  enemy  in  that  vi- 
cinity, they  turned  north  and  passed  through  Cavetown  to 
Monterey  Springs,  recrossing  the  mountain  there  and  en- 
camping over  night  near  Fairfield.  This  reconnoissance 
developed  the  fact  that  the  enemy  were  all  further  down 
the  valley,  and  that  no  danger  was  to  be  feared  from  that 


MOVEMENTS    OF   TROOPS.  251 

direction  either  from  the  left  flank  or  rear.  Merritt's  bri- 
gade of  the  same  division  proceeded  from  Middletown  to 
Mechanicstown;  Gregg's  division  marched  from  TSew 
Market  and  Ridgeville  to  Westminster;  and  Ki4patrick'& 
division,  formerly  StahPs,  went  from  Frederick  to  Lit- 
tlestown. 

Stuart,  after  riding  all  the  previous  night,  reached  at 
the  dawn  of  day  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  at 
Sykesville.  The  bridge  at  this  place  was  burned,  and  the 
track  about  Hood's  mill  was  torn  up.  Resting  here  dur- 
ing the  forepart  of  the  day,  the  command  some  time  in  the 
afternoon  resumed  its  march,  and  reached  Westminster 
about  five  o'clock  p.  M.  At  this  place  a  spirited  engage- 
ment took  place  between  this  force  and  the  First  Delaware 
Cavalry,  which  was  at  length  driyen  oft'  and  pursued  some 
distance  toward  Baltimore,  adding  much  to  the  panic 
there.  Gregg's  division  of  the  Federal  cavalry,  which 
was  marching  in  that  direction  to  intercept  Stuart,  was 
delayed  by  the  infantry  and  trains,  and  did  not  reach 
Westminster  until  some  hours  after  Stuart  had  passed. 
At  night  the  head  of  Stuart's  column  rested  at  Union 
Mills,  half  way  between  Westminster  and  Littlestown. 

The  movements  this  day  were  as  follows:  The  army 
head -quarters  were  moved  from  Frederick  City  to  Taney- 
town,  an d-- the  artillery  rese-rve  from  the  first  named  place 
to  Bruceville.  The  First  and  Eleventh  corps  marched 
from  Frederick  to  Emmittsburg — the  last  named  by  a 
road  parallel  to  the  Emmittsburg  road  leading  through 
Cregerstown;  the  Third  and  Twelfth  corps  moved  on 
parallel  roads  to  Taneytown  and  Bruceville,  where  they 
encamped;  the  Second  Corps  from  Monocacy  Junction  via 


252  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

Liberty  and  Johnsville  to  Uniontowii,  still  further  east; 
the  Fifth  from  Ballingcr's  Creek  via  Frederick  and  Mount 
Pleasant  to  Liberty;  and  the  Sixth,  following  Gregg's 
cavalry-,  went  from  Ilyattstown  via  New  Market  and 
Ridgeville,  to  New  Windsor.  The  outer  line  of  the  great 
fan,  it  will  thus  be  seen,  extended  from  Emmittsburg  on 
the  left  to  New  Windsor  on  the  right — the  First  Corps 
under  Reynolds  forming  the  left  of  the  army,  and  the 
Sixth  under  Sedgwick  its  right.  This  was  the  position 
of  the.  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  evening  of  Monday, 
June  29th, —  the  night  before  the  concentration  of  Lee's 
forces  began  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg. 

Tuesday,  30.  The  First  Corps  on  this  day  started  from 
Emmittsburg  for  Gettysburg,  but  hearing  that  the  enemy 
were  reported  to  be  upon  the  Fairfield  road,  General 
Reynolds  halted  it  at  Marsh  Creek.  The  Third  Corps 
marched  from  Tancytown  in  the  direction  of  Emmittsburg, 
and  encamped  at  Bridgeport;  the  Twelfth  Corps  marched 
from  the  same  place,  and  rested  over  night  at  Littlestown; 
the  Fifth  Corps  from  Liberty  via  Johnsville,  Union  Bridge, 
.and  Union  to  Union  Mills;  and  the  Sixth  went  from  New 
Windsor  to  Manchester.  The  Artillery  Reserve  moved 
from  Bruceville  to  Taneytown.  Gregg's  cavalry  division 
left  Westminster  and  proceeded  to  Manchester,  and  Kil- 
patrick's  division  went  from  Littlestown  to  Hanover  to 
intercept  Stuart.  Stuart,  who  had  bivouacked  over  night 
at  Union  Mills,  midway  between  Westminster  and  Littles- 
town,  hearing  that  Kilpatrick  was  at  the  last  named  place 
waiting  for  him,  attempted  to  avoid  an  encounter  by  going 
through  cross  roads  to  Hanover,  but  Kilpatrick,  who  was 
aware  of  this  change,  anticipated  him  and  reached  that 


STUART'S  ADVANCE.  253 

place  first.  When  Stuart  arrived  at  about  ten  o'clock  in 
the  forenoon,  a  desperate  engagement,  which  lasted  four 
hours,  ensued  between  Kilpatrick  and  the  Confederate 
rear  under  General  Wade  Hampton.  Both  sides  claim 
the  victory  in  this  engagement;  the  Confederates,  how- 
ever, were  driven  further  northward. 

"When  at  Hanover,  Stuart  was  but  twelve  miles  from 
Gettysburg,  and  fourteen  from  York.  Ignorant  of  the 
concentration  of  the  Confederate  army  at  the  first  named 
place,  and  expecting  to  unite  with  Early  at  York,  as  he 
says  General  Lee  directed,  and  unaware  that  Early  was 
then  en  route  from  that  place  to  Gettysburg,  he  pressed 
on  further  northward,  crossing  the  tracks  of  both  White's 
battalion  of  cavalry  and  Early's  whole  division,  and  yet 
failed  to  ascertain  the  departure  of  these  troops,  or  the 
course  they  had  taken.  Had  he  known  of  Early's  de- 
parture from  York,  and  the  direction  he  had  taken,  he 
could  have  effected  a  junction  with  him  before  sundown 
somewhere  about  East  Berlin.*  Or  had  he  fallen  in  with 
White's  battalion,  which  on  that  day  had  gone  by  the 
York  pike  toward  Gettysburg,  he  could  have  joined  it 
and  reached  the  Confederate  advance  at  Marsh  Creek 
that  same  night.  But  he  was  ignorant  of  the  move- 
ments of  these  two  commands,  and  they  were  equally 
ignorant  of  his  approach,  for  no  notice,  such  as  it  is  al- 
leged General  Leo  had  promised  to  send  Early,  had  reached 
him.  Had  Early  known  that  Stuart  had  taken  the  cir- 
cuitous route  around  the  Federal  army,  he  might  have 
been  on  the  look-out  for  him,  but  he  was  also  ignorant 

*  Colonel  W.  H.  Swallow,  in  the  Southern  Bivouac  of  November,   1885, 
page  365. 


254  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

of  this.  Indeed  at  one  time  on  that  day  Stuart  was 
within  seven  miles  of  Early 's  infantry — the  latter  actually 
hearing  his  guns  —  and  yet  they  were  mutually  ignorant 
of  each  other's  proximity.  Surely  the  people  who  resided 
in  that  neighborhood  must  have  been  very  loyal  to  their 
government,  and  known  how  to  keep  their  own  counsels, 
or  Stuart  failed  to  interrogate  them. 

At  a  late  hour  this  day  Stuart  learned  that  Early  had  left 
York,  but  was  misinformed  as  to  the  direction  he  had  taken. 
He  was  told  that  he  had  gone  in  the  direction  ot  Shippens- 
burg.  Misled  by  this  report,  he  abandoned  his  design  upon 
York,  and  turned  the  head  of  his  column  in  the  direction 
he  supposed  Early  had  gone.  Encamping  over  night  some- 
where west  of  York,  he  resumed  his  march  next  morning, 
and  passing  through  Di'llsburg  and  Churchtown,  reached 
Carlisle  in  the  evening.  Here  he  was  surprised  to  hear 
that  Rodes  had  marched  in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg, 
and  the  town  was  in  possession  of  Pennsylvania  and  New 
York  militia -men  under  General  Smith,  who  had  ad- 
vanced that  day  from  Harrisburg.  After  demanding  the 
surrender  of  the  town,  and  throwing  a  few  shells  into  it, 
and  burning  the  United  States  barracks  situated  outside 
of  the  place,  he  hastily  left  and  hurriedly  made  his  way  to 
Gettysburg,  which  he  reached  in  the  evening  of  the  ensu- 
ing day.  And  this  was  the  bold  rider  who  was  to  "  harass 
and  impede"  the  patriot  army  in  case -it  should  "attempt  to 
cross  the  Potomac  "  in  pursuit  of  the  invaders  of  its  soil, 
and  the  would-be  destroyers  of  its  government. 

The  cavalry  brigades  of  Gamble  and  Devin,.  under  the 
command  of  General  •  Buford,  which  had  rested  over  night 
near  Fairfield,  after  their  reconnoissance  west  of  the  moun- 


FEDERAL   ARMY   PREPARING   TO  CONCENTRATE.  255 

tain  the  previous  day,  marched  by  way  of  Emmittsburg  to 
Gettysburg,  and  proceeding  westwardly  on  the  pike  lead- 
ing to  Chambersburg,  encamped  over  night  about  one  mile 
and  a  half  from  the  town. 

Aware  of  the  fact  that  indications  pointed  to  a  probable 
collision  with  the  Confederate  army  in  a  short  time,  Gen- 
eral Meade,  soon  after  assuming  command  of  the  army, 
directed  General  Reynolds  to  proceed  to  Gettysburg  and 
report  to  him  the  character  of  the  ground  there,  at  the 
same  time  ordering  General  Humphreys  to  examine  the 
ground  in  the  vicinity  of  Emmittsburg.  Tkese  precau- 
tions were  taken,  not  with  the  pufpose  to  halt  the  army 
there  and  wait  for  an  attack,  but  to  be  prepared  for  any 
emergency  which  might  arise, —  the  army  in  the  meantime 
still  pressing  forward.  On  the  night  of  Tuesday,  30th, 
information  reached  hea^-  quarters  that  Lee  was  concen- 
trating his  army  east  of  the  mountain  in  the  vicinity  of 
Gettysburg,  and  General  Meade,  "ignorant  of  the  nature 
of  the  ground  in  front  of  him,  at  once  instructed  his 
engineers  to  select  some  ground  having  a  general  refer- 
ence to  the  existing  position  of  the  army,  which  he  might 
occupy  by  rapid  movements  of  concentration,  and  thus 
give  battle  on  his  own  terms,  in  case  the  enemy  should 
advance  across  the  South  Mountain.  The  general  line  of 
Pipe  Creek  was  selected,  and  a  preliminary  order  of  in- 
structions issued  to  the  corps  commanders,  informing  them 
of  the  fact,  and  explaining  how  they  might  move  their 
corps  and  concentrate  in  a  good  position  along  the  line."  * 
These  were  but  ordinary  precautions,  which  any  com- 
mander, who  had  any  reasonable  sense  of  the  responsibili- 

*  Colonel  James  G.  Biddle,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  pages  208,  209. 


256  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

ties  of  his  position,  would  have  taken,  and  yet  they  have 
been  made  the  ground  of  an  accusation  that  General 
Meade  contemplated  a  retreat  from  Gettysburg  to  the 
position  selected  at  Pipe  Creek.  This  accusation  does 
great  injustice  to  General  Meade,  and  the  fact  that  he  was 
not  unduly  committed  to  that  line,  nor  unwilling  to  meet 
the  enemy  elsewhere,  is  proven  by  General  Humphreys,- 
who  says  that  in  the  instructions  issued  to  the  corps  com- 
manders relating  to  the  line  of  Pipe  Creek,  it  was  expressly 
declared  that  "  Developments  may  cause  the  commanding 
general  to  assume  the  offensive  from  his  present  positions." 
A  very  few  hours  after  these  instructions  were  issued,  cir- 
cumstances did  cause  a  change.  General  Meade  himself 
says:  "It  was  my  firm  determination,  never  for  an  instant 
deviated  from,  to  give  battle  wherever  and  as  soon  as  I 
could  possibly  find  the  enemy." 

Simultaneously  with  the  issuing  of  the  instructions  to 
the  corps  commanders  regarding  Pipe  Creek,  General 
Meade  circulated  the  following  timely  order: 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

June  3oth,  1863. 

The  commanding  general  requests  that  previous  to  the  engagement  soon 
expected  with  the  enemy,  corps  and  all  other  commanding  officers  will  ad- 
dress their  troops,  explaining  to  them  briefly  the  immense  issues  involved  in 
the  struggle.  The  enemy  are  on  our  soil ;  the  whole  country  now  looks  anx  - 
iously  to  this  army  to  deliver  it  from  the  presence  of  the  foe ;  our  failure  to 
do  so  will  leave  us  no  such  welcome  as  the  swelling  millions  of  hearts  with 
pride  and  joy  at  our  success  would  give  to  every  soldier  of  this  army. 
Homes,  firesides,  and  domestic  altars,  are  involved.  The  army  has  fought 
well  heretofore ;  it  is  believed  that  it  will  fight  more  desperately  and  bravely 
than  ever,  if  it  is  addressed  in  fitting  terms.  Corps  and  other  commanders 
are  authorized  to  order  the  instant  death  of  any  soldier  who  fails  in  his  duty 

this  hour.  By  command  of 

MAJOR  -  GENERAL  MEADE, 

S.  WILLIAMS,  Assistant  Adjutant -General. 


THE  T'.VO  ARMIES  ON  EVE  OF  BATTLE.         257 

As  wo  ure  now  upon  the  eve  of  battle,  the  two  great 
armies  having  been  brought  almost  face  to  face,  it  will  be 
well  to  recapitulate  the  positions  occupied  by  each. 

Positions  occupied  by  the  Confederate  army  on  the  night 
of  Tuesday,  June  30th: 

The  divisions  of  Heth  and  Fender,  of  Hill's  Corps,  were 
at  Marsh  Creek,  four  miles  west  of  Gettysburg,  on  the 
Chambersburg  road,  and  Anderson's  division  of  the  same 
corps  was  four  rniies  further  west  on  the  same  road,  at 
Cashtown.  The  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood  of  Long- 
street's  Corps  were  about  Fayetteville  and  Greenwood,  six- 
teen miles  from  Gettysburg,  on  the  Chambersburg  pike, 
and  Pickett's  division  of  the  same  corps  was  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Chambersburg.  Early  and  Rodes  of  E well's 
Corps  were  at  Heidlersburg,  ten  miles  north  of  Gettys- 
burg, and  Johnson's  division  of  this  corps  was  at  Green- 
wood. Jenkins'  cavalry  was  below  Carlisle ;  the  brigades 
of  Jones  and  Robertson  were  about  Shippensburg;  Im- 
boden  at  Mercersburg,  and  Stuart  somewhere  north-west 
of  York. 

Positions  occupied  by  the  Federal  army  on  the  night  of 
Tuesday,  June  30th: 

The  First  Corps,  under  General  Reynolds,  was  at  Marsh 
Creek,  between  Emmittsburg  and  Gettysburg,  and  four 
miles  from  the  last  named  place;  the  Eleventh  Corps,  Gen- 
eral Howard,  was  at  Emmittsburg,  ten  miles  from  Gettys- 
burg; the  Third  Corps,  General  Sickles,  was  at  Bridgeport, 
twelve  miles  from  Gettysburg;  the  Twelfth  Corps,  Gen- 
eral Slocum,  was  at  Littlestown,  ten  miles;  the  Second 
Corps,  General  Hancock,  was  at  Uniontown,  twenty  miles; 
the  Fifth  Corps,  General  Sykes,  was  at  Union  Mills,  six- 


17 


258  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

teen  miles;  and  the  Sixth  Corps,  General  Sedgwick,  was 
at  Manchester,  twenty -seven  miles.  Gregg's  cavalry  di- 
vision was  at  Manchester;  Kilpatrick's  at  Hanover;  and 
the  brigades  of  Gamble  and  Devin,  of  Buford's  division, 
were  about  one  mile  and  a  half  west  of  Gettysburg,  on  the 
Chambersburg  road.  This  vast  fan  was  now  about  to  be 
closed,  and  as  the  Confederate  army,  in  its  concentration, 
was  swung  to  the  right  and  closed  upon  its  right  support, 
the  Federal  army  was  to  be  swung  to  the  left,  and  close 
upon  its  left.  The  point  of  contact  between  the  two  great 
opposing  forces  was  Gettysburg,  and  the  parts  which  would 
first  come  in  contact  were,  Reynolds  upon  the  Federal 
left,  and  Heth  upon  the  Confederate  right.  The  reader 
will  do  well  to  watch  in  the  coming  details  the  times  and 
places  where  the  various  parts  of  these  two  great  hosts 
came  into  collision. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   FIRST    DAY    OF    THE    BATTLE    AT    GETTYSBURG  — WEDNES- 
DAY,  JULY    1ST,    1863. 

Jy  g!N~  the  morning  of  Wednesday,  July  1st,  Heth's  divis- 

J-j!^  ion  of  Hill's  Corps  advanced  from  Marsh  Creek  upon 

j>     Gettysburg.     General  Buford,  as  stated  in  the  pre- 

A    vious  chapter,  held  the  ridges  west  of  the  town  with 

TT 

'  the  cavalry  brigades  of  Generals  Gamble  and  Devin. 
About  half-  past  nine  o'clock  these  men  appeared  in  front 
-of  Buford's  videttes,  and  skirmishing  commenced  on  the 
farm  of  Hon.  Edward  McPhersou,  and  thus  the  series  of 
battles  at  Gettysburg  began. 

The  object  of  this  advance  by  General  Heth  is  thus 
stated  by  Colonel  W.  II.  Taylor,  General  Lee's  adju- 
tant-general, in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  307:  "Instruc- 
tions had  been  sent  to  General  Heth  to  ascertain  what 
force  was  at  Gettysburg,  and,  if  he  found  infantry  opposed 
to  him,  to  report  the  fact  immediately,  without  forcing  an 
engagement."  General  Buford,  however,  was  aware  of 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  had  prepared 
for  them  by  dismounting  a  large  part  of  his  force  and 
placing  them  in  line.  His  batteries  also  had  been  planted 
at  commanding  points. 

259 


1*0] 


VIEW  FROM  PENNSYLVANIA  COLLEGE. 
From  a  Photograph  by  Tipton.) 


THE    FIRST   ENCOUNTER.  2G1 

As  soon  as  General  Heth  found  himself  in  the  presence 
of  Buford's  dismounted  cavalry,  he  formed  his  men  in  line 
of  battle,  with  Archer's  and  Davis'  brigades  in  front,  and 
Pettigrew's  and  Brockenborough's  in  the  rear.  Unaware 
that  any  Federal  infantry  were  near,  Heth  sent  word  to 
General  Hill  at  Cashtown  that  the  advance  of  his  division 
had  encountered  the  enemy's  cavalry  near  Gettysburg. 

At  an  early  hour  in  the  morning  General  Reynolds  re- 
ceived a  dispatch  from  General  Buford,  informing  him  of 
the  proximity  of  the  Confederates,  at  which  he  set  out  at 
once  to  his  assistance  with  the  nearest  division  —  that  of 
Wadsworth,  leaving  General  Doubleday,  his  second  in 
command,  to  draw  in  the  pickets,  assemble  the  artillery 
and  the  remainder  of  the  corps,  and  follow  after  as  soon  as 
possible.  He  also  dispatched  a  courier  to  General  Howard 
at  Emmittsburg,  ordering  him  to  advance  to  the  front  as 
rapidly  as  he  could.  This  order  reached  General  Howard 


NOTE.  —  Pennsylvania  College,  a  view  from  which  is  illustrated  on  the 
opposite  page,  fronts  south,  and  the  elevation  to  the  right  is  Seminary 
Ridge,  upon  which,  extending  about  three  miles  south,  the  Confederate  line 
was  placed  during  the  second  and  third  days'  engagements.  This  view  shows 
where  the  battle  of  the  first  day  commenced.  It  extended  down  below  the 
theological  seminary,  which  is  seen  upon  the  ridge,  and  northward  and  east- 
ward for  about  a  mile  and  a  half.  Reynolds'  Grove,  in  which  that  general 
was  killed,  is  seen  near  the  seminary.  The  road  leading  westward,  by  which 
the  main  body  of  the  Confederates  came  —  the  Chambersburg  road — passes 
up  over  Seminary  Ridge,  as  is  shown. 

There  are,  two  roads  entering  Gettysburg  from  the  west — the  one  from 
Chambersburg,  and  the  other  from  Fairfield  and  Monterey  Pass,  which  comes 
in  somewhat  diagonally  from  the  south-west.  Both  these  roads  are  inter- 
sected by  ridges  running  north  and  south.  That  one  nearest  the  town  turns 
somewhat  toward  the  east,  and  is  called  Seminary  Ridge,  because  on  it  a 
Lutheran  theological  seminary  is  located.  Between  this  ridge  and  another 
one  farther  west,  a  small  stream  of  water,  called  Willoughby's  Run,  passes. 
The  battle  in  the  forepart  of  this  day  was  fought  principally  upon  these 
heights  on  both  sides  of  the  stream.  In  the  afternoon,  when  Howard's  Corps 
•came  up,  the  line  was  extended  around  north  and  north-east  of  the  town. 


262  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

at  eight  o'clock,  and  lie  at  once  put  his  corps  in  motion  — 
Barlow's  division  taking  the  most  direct  route,  and  the 
divisions  of  Generals  Schurz  and  Steinwehr  proceeding  by 
Horner's  Mills — a  distance  of  thirteen  miles. .  Having  thus 
put  his  corps  in  motion,  General  Howard,  accompanied  by 
his  staff,  pushed  forward  in  advance  to  the  scene  of  strife. 
At  about  ten  o'clock  General  Reynolds  dashed  into 
Gettysburg  in  advance  of  his  troops,  and  pushing  on  out  by 
the  Chambersburg  road  to  Seminary  Hill,  took  a  survey 
of  the  situation.  Seeing  the  enemy  was  there  in  force,, 
and  that  Buford's  dismounted  cavalrymen  were  being 
badly  pressed,  he  rode  rapidly  back  again  into  the  town 
and  out  the  Emmittsburg  road  about  a  mile,  and  there  met 
the  head  of  his  column,  which  he  turned  directly  across 
the  fields  toward  the  seminary.  The  men  hurriedly  formed 
in  line  under  cover  of  the  ridge,  when  the  right  moved  to 
the  north  side  of  the  Chambersburg  pike  and  across  the 
bed  of  the  abandoned  railroad,  and  the  left  advanced  to 
the  west  of  the  rid^e  near  the  seminary. 

o  v 

From  the  time  the  conflict  opened,  up  to  the  arrival 
of  Wadsworth's  division,  Buford's  men,  though  hotly 
pressed,  resisted  the  approaches  of  the  enemy  most  stub- 
bornly, and  by  taking  advantage  of  every  favorable  point 
to  protract  the  struggle,  succeeded  in  holding  on  until  the 
expected  assistance  at  length  came.  But  while  the  forma- 
tion of  the  line  was  in  progress,  the  heroic  Reynolds,  see- 
ing the  pressure  which  was  made  upon  Buford's  slender 
lines,  led  Cutler's  brigade  forward  for  their  relief.  Hall's 
Second  Maine  battery  was  posted  in  the  road,  and  the 
Fourteenth  Brooklyn  and  the  Ninety  -  fifth  New  York 
were  advanced  a  short  distance  on  the  left.  General 


GENERAL   REYNOLDS    KILLED.  263 

"Wadsworth  was  also  directed  to  place  the  three  re- 
maining regiments  of  his  brigade,  the  One  Hundred 
and  Forty-seventh  Xew  York,  the  Seventy  -  sixth  Xew 
York,  and  the  Fifty  -  sixth  Pennsylvania  on  the  right  of 
the  road.  When  this  formation  was  completed,  the  cav- 
alry brigade  under  Gamble,  which  had  been  most  heavily 
engaged,  withdrew  and  formed  in  column  on  the  left  of 
the  infantry.  Between  the  Fairfield  and  Chambersburg 
roads  was  a  piece  of  woods,  which  both  parties  were 
contending  for.  Archer's  brigade,  preceded  by  a  line 
of  skirmishers,  was  crossing  Willoughby's  Run  to  enter 
these  woods  on  one  side  as  the  Iron  Brigade  was  going  in 
on  the  other.  General  Reynolds,  anxious  as  to  the  result, 
rode  forward  a  short  distance  to  reconnoiter,  and  raising 
his  field  glass  to  his  eyes  he  sought  to  take  in  the  full 
situation,  when  a  ball  from  a  sharp-shooter's  musket 
struck  him  on  the  back  of  the  head,  coming  out  near  the 
eye,  and  he  fell  dead. 

Major  Joseph  G.  Rosengarten,  of  General  Reynolds'  staff, 
in  an  article  contributed  to  the  Annals  of  the  "War,  pages 
64,  65,  thus  describes  the  fall  of  his  distinguished  chief: 
"In  the  full  flush  of  life  and  health,  vigorously  leading  on 
the  troops  in  hand,  and  energetically  summoning  up  the 
rest  of  his  command,  watching  and  even  leading  the  at- 
tack of  a  comparatively  small  body,  a  glorious  picture  of 
the  best  type  of  a  military  leader,  superbly  mounted,  and 
horse  and  man  sharing  in  the  excitement  of  the  battle, 
Reynolds  was,  of  course,  a  shining  mark  to  the  enemy's 
sharp-shooters.  He  had  taken  his  troops  into  a  heavy 
growth  of  timber  on  the  slope  of  a  hillside,  and,  under  the 
regimental  and  brigade  commanders,  the  men  did  their 


264 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


T7ork  well  and  promptly.  Returning  to  the  expected  di- 
vision, he  was  struck  by  a  minnie  ball,  fired  by  a  sharp- 
shooter hidden  in  the  branches  of  a  tree  almost  overhead, 
and  killed  at  once;  his  horse  bore  him  to  the  little  clump 
of  trees,  where  a  cairn  of  stones  and  a  rude  mark  on  the 
bark,  now  almost  overgrown,  still  tell  the  fatal  spot."  * 


WHERE  GENERAL  REYNOIJJS  FELL. 
From,  a  Photograph  by  Tipton. 


-Major -General  John  Fulton  Reynolds  was  born  in  Lancaster,  Pennsyl- 
vania, in  1820;  he  had  served  his  country  in  Mexico  and  in  California,  as 
well  as  in  nearly  every  important  action  yet  fought  in  Virginia;  and  now  re- 
turning to  his  native  state  to  defend  her  from  her  invader,  he  yields  up  his 
life  almost  in  sight  of  his  home.  He  was,  in  the  estimation  of  those  who 
knew  him  well  and  were  the  best  able  to  judge,  the  greatest  soldier  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  ever  lost  in  battle.  General  Meade  said  of  him,  "He  was 
the  noblest  as  well  as  the  bravest  gentleman  in  the  army." 

The  body  of  General  Reynolds  was  at  once  borne  to  the  rear  and  placed 


CAPTURE  OF  GENERAL  ARCHER.  265 

"With  the  fall  of  General  Reynolds,  the  command  de- 
volved upon  Major -General  Abner  Doubleday,  who  had, 
after  executing  Reynolds'  orders  and  setting  the  remaining 
two  divisions  of  the  corps  in  motion,  pushed  on  ahead  to  the 
field  of  battle.  General  Doubleday  at  once  set  to  work  to 
meet  the  advancing  enemy,  and  for  another  hour  the  work 
of  destruction  went  on,  until  the  Federal  line  fell  back  to 
Seminary  Ridsre.  As  Wadsworth  fell  back  with  his  left, 
and  Archer  pressed  forward  on  his  heels,  the  right  of  our 
division  was  swung  around -in  the  rear  of  the  pursuers, 
enveloping  the  Confederate  advance,  and  making  prisoners 
of  General  Archer  and  several  hundred  of  his  men.* 


for  awhile  in  a  little  house  on  the  Emmittsburg  road.  In  the  heat  of  the 
battle  it  was  put  into  an  ambulance  and  taken  by  his  faithful  orderly  and  a 
small  escort  to  the  nearest  railroad  station,  whence  it  was  borne  to  Baltimore, 
thence  to  Philadelphia,  and  finally  to  Lancaster,  his  former  home.  Here,  on 
the  fourth  of  July,  while  the  defeated  hosts  of  rebellion  were  seeking  safety 
in  flight,  it  was  interred  in  the  tranquil  cemetery,  where  he  lies  in  the  midst 
of  his  family,  near  the  scenes  of  his  childhood,  and  in  the  soil  of  his  native 
state. 

*  Colonel  Swallow,  in  the  Southern  Bivouac  of  December,  1885,  in  an  in- 
teresting article  on  the  first  day's  battle  of  Gettysburg,  thus  relates  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  capture  of  General  Archer  and  part  of  his  command.  The 
account  is  of  value,  not  only  for  the  details  of  this  event,  but  for  the  circum- 
stantial description  of  the  opening  of  the  great  series  of  battles  at  this  place 
from  a  Confederate  standpoint.  His  account  is  as  follows  : 

"The  division  of  General  Heth,  of  A.  P.  Hill's  Corps,  which  began  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  was  composed  of  four  brigades,  as  follows  :  Archer's 
Tennessee  brigade,  Davis'  Mississippi  brigade,  Pettigrew's  North  Carolina 
brigade,  and  Brockenborough's  Virginia  brigade.  Archer's  Tennessee  brigade 
was  composed  of  the  First,  Seventh,  and  Fourteenth  Tennessee  regiments, 
Thirteenth  Alabama  and  Fifth  Alabama  battalion.  In  marching  down  the 
Chambersburg  pike  on  Wednesday  morning  to  Gettysburg,  Archer's  Tennes- 
see brigade  was  in  the  advance.  Willoughby's  Run  crosses  the  Chambers- 
burg  pike  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  town,  and  runs  south  toward  the 
Emmittsburg  road.  Now,  as  Archer's  men  were  marching  on  toward  the 
town,  nothing  transpired  until  they  came  within  two  miles  of  the  town,  when 
the  pickets  of  General  Buford's  dismounted  cavalry  were  first  seen  along  the 
road,  and  to  the  right  and  left  of  it,  by  the  Seventh  Tennessee  regiment. 

"The  Fifth  Alabama  battalion  was  deployed  at  once  to  the  right  of  the 
Chambersburg  pike  as  skirmishers.  General  Archer  with  his  brigade  now 


266  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

At  length,  shortly  after  eleven  o'clock,  the  two  remaining 
divisions  of  Reynolds'  Corps  came  upon  the  field,  together 
with  Cooper's,  Stewart's,  Reynolds',  and  Stevens'  batteries. 
General  Doubleday's  own  division,  then  commanded  by 
General  Rowley,  was  at  once  taken  to  the  front  and  placed 
in  position;  the  division  of  General  Robinson  was  placed 
in  reserve  at  the  seminary.  Fender's  Confederate  division 
had  also  by  this  time  come  up  from  Marsh  Creek,  and  was. 
formed  in  the  rear  of  Heth.  The  Confederate  batteries,, 
too,  were  posted  on  the  ridge  west  of  Willoughby's  Run.,, 
as  well  as  upon  every  other  commanding  position,  the  fire 
from  which  swept  the  field  in  every  direction  and  proved 
terribly  destructive. 

At  half -past  eleven  o'clock  A.  M.,  General  Howard,  in 

formed  in  the  rear  of  his  skirmish  line.  At  the  same  time  Davis'  Mississippi 
brigade  formed  in  line  on  the  left  of  the  pike,  and,  moving  forward  in  this 
order,  Archer's  men  pushed  in  Buford's  pickets  for  a  half  a  mile  or  more, 
when  the  pickets  suddenly  disappeared,  and  the  advance  division  of  Rey- 
nolds' Corps  loomed  into  view. 

"This  advance  force  of  Reynolds  were  the  two  brigades  of  Wadsworth's- 
division,  commanded  by  Cutler  and  Meredith.  This  force,  when  first  seen 
by  Archer's  men,  seemed  to  be  in  some  confusion,  and  were  apparently  get- 
ting into  position.  General  Wadsworth  took  three  regiments  of  Cutler's 
brigade,  with  a  battery,  and  placed  them  to  the  Federal  right  of  the  Cham- 
bersburg  road,  and  between  the  road  and  an  unfinished  railroad  cut,  which 
ran  parallel  with  the  turnpike  into  town.  This  force  was  directly  in  front  of 
Davis'  Mississippi  brigade,  who  held  Heth's  left.  The  remainder  of  Rey- 
nolds' force,  composed  of  the  two  remaining  regiments  of  Cutler's  brigade 
and  all  of  Meredith's  brigade,  was  posted  to  the  right  of  the  Chambersburg 
pike  and  almost  in  front  of  General  Archer.  He  placed  Meredith's  brigade 
on  our  right  flank.  It  was  protecfled  by  a  strip  of  woods.  Archer's  men 
were  pushing  ahead,  and  had  advanced  to  near  Willoughby's  Run,  when 
Reynolds'  force  first  came  in  sight. 

"Archer  now  waited  some  moments,*  until  his  artillery  came  up,  when  the 
first  gun  was  fired  and  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was  begun.  The  first  man 
killed  on  the  Confederate  side  was  Henry  Raison,  Company  B,  Seventh  Ten- 
nessee. He  fell  dead  on  the  skirmish  line.  The  company  was  commanded 
by  Captain  John  Allen. 

"It  is  a  coincidence  that  Archer's  Tennessee  brigade,  which  opened  the 
battle,  was  the  brigade  that,  in  Heth's  division,  but  then  commanded  by  Pet- 


HOWARD   ASSUMES   COMMAND.  267 

advance  of  his  troops,  came  upon  the  field,  and,  ignorant 
of  the  deatli  of  Reynolds,  sent  messengers  i:i  search  of 
him,  and  asking  for  instructions.  While  waiting  the  re- 
turn of  his  aids,  he  went  to  the  top  of  the  college,  which 
is  situated  about  half  a  mile  a  little  north  of  east  of 
the  theological  seminary,  to  reconnoiter  the  surrounding 
country.  His  aid,  Major  Biddle,  soon  came  hack  and 
reported  the  sad  intelligence  of  the  fall  of  Reynolds,  and 
that  the  command  now  devolved  upon  himself.  He  at 
once  assumed  the  command,  turning  over  his  corps  to- 
General  Carl  Schurz.  It  is  claimed  that  while  upon  the 
top  of -the  college  General  Howard  saw  the  advantages  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  at  once  gave  orders  to  halt  Steinwehr's" 
division  of  his  corps  there,  and  form  a  strong  line,  sup- 
ported by  artillery,  as  a  rallying  place  in  case  of  defeat 

tigrew — in  what  is  known  as  Pickett's  charge — burst  into  the  Federal  breast- 
works in  front  of  Hancock's  Corps- with  desperate  valor.  It  was  the  tattered 
remnant  of  this  same  brigade  that  fought  the  last  battle  north  of  the  Poto- 
mac, at  Falling  Waters,  on  the  line  of  the  retreat,  when  General  Pettigrew, 
then  in  command  of  Heth's  division,  was  killed,  dying  while  defending  the 
lives  of  the  sick  and  wounded  of  his  command,  whom  the  fortunes  of  war 
had  committed  to  his  care. 

"As  soon  as  Archer's  artillery  opened,  his  command  crossed  Willoughby's 
Run,  driving  the  enemy  before  them — who  were  disputing  its  passage — into  a 
skirt  of  woods.  Here  they  were  again  attacked  by  the  Confederates,  who* 
moved  on  rapidly,  firing  while  advancing.  General  Reynolds,  who  had 
placed  a  brigade  on  Archer's  extreme  right,  concealed  by  a  wood,  seeing  a. 
part  of  Archer's  brigade  on  the  east  side  of  the  run  ordered  a  charge,  and 
Meredith's  brigade  swept  down  on  the  Confederates  rapidly,  and  those  that 
had  crossed  the  run  were  captured — probably  about  two  hundred — including- 
General  Archer.  While  this  was  going  on  General  Reynolds,  the  Federal 
commander,  while  brandishing  his  sword  and  issuing  orders,  was  observed  by 
one  of  Heth's  sharp-shooters,  concealed  in  a  tree,  who  instantly  raised  his 
rifle  and  shot  him  dead.  This  took  place  behind  the  seminary  and  near 
Willoughby's  Run. 

"After  Archer  and  his  men  were  captured,  the  remainder  of  his  brigade 
fell  back  some  distance  to  a  new  position,  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  Pettigrew 
and  Brockenborough.  At  the  same  time  the  Fourteenth  Brooklyn  and  Ninety- 
fifth  New  York,  who  had  contested  the  passage  of  the  run,  now  changed 


268  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

upon  the  position  they  then  occupied.     For  this  act  he 
received  the  thanks  of  Congress. 

The  claim  made  for  General  Howard  that  he  was  the 
first  of  the  Union  generals  to  perceive  the  advantages  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  is  disputed  by  some,  who  give  this  credit  to 
General  Reynolds.  Reynolds'  claim  rests  on  the  following 
statement,  made  by  General  Doubleday:  "Buford  gave 
way  slowly,  taking  advantage  of  every  accident  of  ground 
to  protract  the  struggle.  After  an  hour's,  fighting  he  felt 
anxious,  and  went  up  into  the  steeple  of  the  theological 
seminary,  from  which  a  wide  view  could  be  obtained,  to 
see  if  the  First  Corps  was  in  sight.  One  division  of  it  was 
close  at  hand,  and  soon  Reynolds,  who  had  preceded  it, 
climbed  up  into  the  belfry  to  confer  with  him,  and  ex- 
amine the  country  around.  Although  there  is  no  positive 
testimony  to  that  effect,  his  attention  was  doubtless  at- 
tracted to  Cemetery  Ridge  in  his  rear,  as  it  was  one  of  the 
most  prominent  features  of  the  landscape.  An  aid  of 
General  Howard  —  presumably  Major  Hall — soon  after 
Reynolds  descended  from  the  belfry,  came  up  to  ask  if  he 
had  any  instructions  with  regard  to  the  Eleventh  Corps. 


front  and  attacked  Davis'  Mississippi  brigade  who,  up  to  this  time  had  been 
driving  the  three  regiments  before  them  on  our  left.  These  three  regiments 
retreated  down  the  Chambersburg  pike  to  the  eastern  slope  of  Seminary 
Ridge. 

"  When  Davis  found  himself  vigorously  attacked  in  flank,  his  command 
moved  a  little  further  to  the  left  and  rushed  into  an  unfinished  railroad  cut, 
which  extended  all  along  the  Chambersburg  pike  into  the  town.  Now,  when 
these  three  regiments,  who  had  been  driven  down  the  Chambersburg  pike  by 
Davis'  command,  leaving  their  battery  behind  them,  discovered  the  position 
he  was  in,  they  hastily  returned,  and  joining  their  former  associates  surround- 
ed the  Mississippians  in  that  plight  and  captured  some  six  hundred  of  them. 

"All  these  occurrences  had  taken  place  by  twelve  o'clock,  or  perhaps  a 
little  after,  and  they  may  properly  be  considered  as  the  beginning  of  the 
Gettysburg  conflict." 


SELECTION   OF   CEMETERY   HILL.  269 

Reynolds,  in  reply,  directed  that  General  Howard  bring 
his  corps  forward  and  form  them  on  Cemetery  Hill  as  a 
reserve.  General  Howard  has  no  recollection  of  having 
received  any  such  orders,  but  as  he  did  get  orders  to  come 
forward,  and  as  his  corps  was  to  occupy  some  place  in  the 
rear,  as  a  support. to  the  First  Corps,  nothing  is  more  prob- 
able than  that  General  Reynolds  directed  him  to  go  there; 
for  its  military  advantages  were  obvious  enough  to  any 
experienced  commander.  Major  Rosengarten,  of  General 
Reynolds'  staff,  states  positively  that  he  was  present  and 
heard  the  order  given  for  Howard  to  post  his  troops  on 
Cemetery  Ridge.  The  matter  is  of  some  moment,  as  the 
position  in  question  ultimately  gave  us  the  victory,  and 
Howard  received  the  thanks  of  Congress  for  selecting  it. 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  either  Howard  or  Rosengarten 
would  misstate  the  matter.  It  is  quite  probable  that  Rey- 
nolds chose  the  hill  simply  as  a  position  upon  which  to 
rally  his  force  if  driven  back,  and  Howard  selected  it  as  a 
suitable  battle  -  field  for  the  army.  It  has  been  universally 
conceded  that  it  was  admirably  adapted  for  that  purpose."  * 
Professor  Jacobs,  in  his  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  page  25, 
gays:  "Early  in  the  morning  the  hills  around  Gettys- 
burg had  been  carefully  examined  by  the  general  and  his 
signal  officers.  At  half  past  eight  o'clock  A.  M.,  one  of 
these  officers  was  on  the  college  cupola  making  observa- 
tions, when  his  attention  was  specially  directed  to  that  hill 
by  one  of  the  officers  of  the  college,  as  being  of  the  highest 
strategic  importance,  and  commanding  the  whole  country 
around  for  many  miles.  Doubtless  he  had  satisfied  himself 
of  the  pre  -  eminent  advantages  it  offered  as  a  position  of 

*  General  Doubleday's  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  pages  126,  127. 


270  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

offense  and  defense,  and  therefore  determined  to  take  and 
hold  it."  Professor  Jacobs  does  not  say  what  general  this 
was.  As  the  survey  of  the  surroundings  of  Gettysburg 
was  made  early  in  the  morning,  and  the  observations  from 
the  college  cupola  occurred  at  half  past  eight  o'clock  A.  M., 
it  could  not  have  been. either  Reynolds  or  Howard,  for  the 
former  did  not  reach  the  town  until  ten  o'clock  and  the 
latter  until  half  past  eleven.  The  only  general  then  in  or 
near  the  place  was  Buford,  and  the  suggestion  to  hold 
•Cemetery  Ridge  may  have  been1  first  made  by  him. 

General  Howard  at  once  saw  that  the  First  Corps  was 
contending  against  large  odds,  and  sent  back  for  the 
Eleventh  Corps  to  come  forward  as  quickly  as  possible. 
He  also  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Meade,  who  was  then 
at  Taneytown,  thirteen  miles  distant,  informing  him  of 
the  death  of  General  Reynolds,  of  the  large  Confederate 
force  present,  and  the  probability  that  Lee  was  concen- 
trating his  whole  army  at  that  point,  as  well  as  the  favor- 
able position  there  for  a  battle.  Dispatches  were  also  sent 
to  General  Slocum,  who,  with  the  Twelfth  Corps,  had  left 
Littlestown  early  in  the  morning  and  was  then  resting 
at  Two  Taverns,  five  miles  south  of  Gettysburg,  and  to 
General  Sickles,  who  had  marched  from  Bridgeport  to  Em- 
mittsburg,  informing  them  of  the  perilous  position  of  the 
First  and  Eleventh  Corps,  and  urgently  calling  upon  them 
to  hasten  to  their  assistance.  Owing  to  the  direction  of 
the  wind,  the  sound  of  the  guns  did  not  reach  Taneytown, 
and  General  Meade  was  not  aware  that  a  portion  of  his 
army  had  met  the  enemy,  and  that  Reynolds  had  fallen, 
until  one  o'clock  p.  M.,  when  Howard's  courier  arrived. 
Upon  the  reception  of  this  dispatch  he  sent  General  Han- 


GENERAL   HANCOCK   PLACED   IN   COMMAND.  271 

cock  to  the  front,  with  orders  to  assume  command  of  all 
the  troops,  and  to  report  to  him  concerning  the  nature  of 
the  ground  there,  and  the  practicability  of  fighting  a  suc- 
cessful battle  at  that  place.*  General  Meade  has  been 
blamed  for  sending  General  Hancock  to  supersede  officers 
who  were  his  superiors  in  rank.  His  justification  for 
doing  this  is  as  follows :  Congress  had  passed  an  act  author- 
izing the  President  to  put  any  general  over  any  other  su- 
perior in  rank  if,  in  his  judgment,  the  good  of  the  service 
demanded  it,  and  General  Meade  then  assumed  this  power 
in  the  name  of  the  President,  believing  that  the  exigencies 
of  the  situation  required  it.  That  there  was  not  the  best 
of  feeling  existing  between  some  of  the  general  officers 
then  at  the  front  is  painfully  evident  in  some  of  their 
actions  and  writings.  General  Buford  was  doubtless 
aware  of  this  when  he  penned  the  following  dispatch  to 
General  Meade: 

HEAD -QUARTERS  FIRST  CAVALRY  DIVISION, 

July  ist,  1863, — 3:20  p.  M. 

General  Reynolds  was  killed  early  this  morning.  In  my  opinion  there 
seems  to  be  no  directing  person.  JOHN  BfFORD.f 

*The  following  is  General  Meade's  order  to  Hancock,  through  his  chief 
of  staff,  General  Butterfield,  to  proceed  to  the  front  and  assume  command 
and  report  upon  the  position  there  for  a  battle: 

HEAD -QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

July  i,  1:10  P.  M.,  1863. 
COMMANDING  OFFICER  OF  THE  SECOND  CORPS  (HANCOCK): 

The  Major -General  Commanding  has  just  informed  me  that  General  Rey- 
nolds has  been  killed  or  badly  wounded.  He  diredls  that  you  turn  over  the 
command  of  your  corps  to  General  Gibbon;  that  you  proceed  to  the  front, 
and  by  virtue  of  this  order,  in  case  of  the  truth  of  General  Reynolds'  death, 
you  assume  command  of  the  corps  there  assembled,  viz. :  the  Eleventh,  the 
First,  and  the  Third,  at  Emmittsburg.  If  you  consider  the  ground  and  posi- 
tion there  a  better  one  to  fight  a  battle  under  existing  circumstances,  you  will 
so  advise  the  general,  and  he  will  order  all  the  troops  up.  You  know  the 
general's  views,  and  General  Warren,  who  is  fully  aware  of  them,  has  gone 
out  to  see  General  Reynolds.  D.  BUTTERFIELD, 

Major -General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

t  Colonel  James  G.  Biddle,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  210. 


272  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

General  Slocum  declined,  without  orders  from  Meade, 
to  go  to  the  assistance  of  the  Firot  and  Eleventh  corps. 
He  was  aware  of  the  commanding  general's  circular  fixing 
upon  Pipe  Creek  for  the  field  of  battle,  and  he  probably 
thought  it  unwise  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement  else- 
where. Not  so,  however,  with  Sickles.  He,  too,  had  re- 
ceived Meade's  circular,  and  when,  at  two  o'clock  p.  M., 
Howard's  dispatch  calling  for  assistance  was  received,  he 
was  for  a  time  perplexed.  From  indications  on  the  day 
previous,  it  was  feared  that  the  enemy  would  attempt  to 
flank  the  Union  line  by  its  left  by  way  of  F  airfield  and 
Emniittsburg,  and  he  was  under  orders  from  the  com- 
mander-in -chief  to  hold  the  latter  place  at  all  hazards. 
Through  General  Tremaine,  one  of  his  aids,  he  had  re- 
ceived but  a  short  time  before  a  suggestion  from  General 
Reynolds  that  he  had  better  come  to  the  front,  but  no 
positive  order  to  that  effect.  And  now  when  Howard's 
dispatch  was  received  he  at  once  determined  to  hasten  to 
the  rescue ;  and  leaving  two  brigades  and  a  battery  to  hold 
Emniittsburg,  he  put  the  balance  of  his  corps  in  motion 
for  Gettysburg,  arriving  there  after  the  broken  and  shat- 
tered survivors  of  the  First  and  Eleventh  corps  had  taken 
their  new  position  upon  Cemetery  and  Gulp's  hills.  A 
letter  was  also  sent  to  General  Meade,  informing  him  of 
what  he  had  done,  and  asking  his  approval  of  it,  which 
approval  was  subsequently  given.* 

We  turn  again  to  the  field  of  strife  to  note  what  was 
transpiring  there.  Nearly  two  hours  of  desperate  fighting 
had  taken  place  since  the  two  divisions  of  Reynolds'  Corps 

*It  has  recently  been  charged  that  General  Sickles  had  received,  at  one 
o'clock  A.  M.  of  this  day,  an  order  from  General  Reynolds  to  proceed  at  day- 
light to  Gettysburg,  which  he  deliberately  disobeyed.  This  subject  will  be 
considered  at  length  in  Appendix  C. 


APPROACH  OP  RODES  AND  EARLY.          273 

had  reached  the  field  in  aid  of  the  first.  During  this  time 
hundreds  were  slain  and  many  more  wounded,  but  the 
patriot  troops  were  holding  their  own.  At  length,  at  one 
o'clock  P.  M.,  the  head  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  reached  Get- 
tysburg. Schimmelpfennig's  division  led  the  way,  followed 
by  that  of  Schurz,  now  temporarily  commanded  by  Bar- 
low,—  Schurz  taking  command  of  the  corps  while  Rey- 
nolds commanded  the  field.  These  two  divisions  were 
directed  to  prolong  the  line  of  the  First  Corps  along  Sem- 
inary Ridge.  The  remaining  division  under  Steinwehr, 
with  the  reserve  artillery  under  Major  Osborne,  were  or- 
dered to  occupy  Cemetery  Hill,  in  the  rear,  or  south  of 
Gettysburg,  as  a  reserve. 

While  these  newly  arrived  troops  were  taking  the  posi- 
tions assigned  them,  Buford's  scouts  reported  the  approach 
of  a  large  Confederate  force  from  the  north,  directly  upon 
the  right  of  the  Federal  line.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
Rodes'  division  from  Carlisle  and  Early's  from  York  had 
reached  Heidlersburg,  ten  miles  north  of  Gettysburg,  the 
previous  evening.  These  were  the  troops  approaching. 
Lee's  orders  to  Ewell  were  to  recall  these  two  divisions 
and  have  them  concentrate  about  Cashtown.  In  accord- 
ance with  this  order  they  left  their  encampment  at  Heid- 
lersburg about  ten  o'clock  A.  M., — Early  proceeding  upon 
one  road  and  Hodes  by  the  one  diverging  to  the  right  and 
leading  by  Middletown  to  Cashtown.  While  en  route  to 
that  place,  the  sound  of  cannonading  in  the  direction  of 
Gettysburg  was  heard,  and  at  Middletown,  seven  miles 
north  -  west  of  the  first  named  place,  General  Ewell,  who 
was  traveling  with  Rodes,  hearing  that  Hill's  troops  were 
marching  toward  Gettysburg,  in  the  exercise  of  a  dis- 


274  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

cretion  which  is  sometimes  allowable,  turned  the  head 
of  his  column  in  the  same  direction.  The  increasing 
sound  of  the  guns,  as  he  approached  the  town,  convinced 
him  that  the  Federals  were  there  in  force,  and  caused  him 
to  make  immediate  preparation  for  the  battle.  * 

At  half  past  one  o'clock  P.  M.,  a  battery  belonging  to 
Rodes'  division  reached  Oak  Hill,  an  eminence  about  one 
mile  north-east  of  the  seminary,  and  opened  fire.  At  the 
same  time  Rodes'  infantry  moved  forward  into  position. 
They  were  formed  across  Seminary  Ridge,  facing  south, 
with  Iverson's  brigade  on  the  right,  supported  by  Daniels 
and  O'Neil  in  the  center,  and  Dole  on  the  left.  Ramseur 
was  held  in  reserve.  While  these  preparations  were  being 
hurriedly  made  by  the  Confederates,  similar  preparations 
were  being  made  by  the  newly  arrived  divisions  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  the  last  of  whom  only  reached  the  field  at 
forty -five  minutes  after  one  o'clock  P.  M.  Colonel  Taylor, 
of  Lee's  staff,  in  the  same  article  previously  referred  to. 
further  says:  "On  reaching  the  scene  of  conflict,  Gen- 
eral Rodes  made  his  dispositions  to  assail  the  force  with 
which  Hill's  troops  were  engaged,  but  no  sooner  were  his 
lines  formed  than  he  perceived  fresh  troops  of  the  enemy 
extending  their  right  flank,  and  deploying  in  his  immedi- 
ate front.  "With  this  force  he  was  soon  actively  engaged, 
and  the  contest  became  sharp  and  earnest." 

When,  it  was  known  that  Rodes  and  Early  were  approach- 
ing the  field,  General  Howard  sent  another  urgent  request 
to  General  Slocum,  who  with  his  magnificent  corps  was 
but  five  miles  distant  and  resting  in  the  fields,  to  hasten  to 
their  assistance;  and  as  these  powerful  accessions  to  the 

*  Colonel  W.  H.  Taylor,  of  Lee's  staff,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  307. 


SLOCUM'S   REFUSAL   OF   AID.  275 

Confederate  force  entered  into  the  engagement,  messenger 
after  messenger  bore  with  tremendous  speed  appeals  for 
help,  but  it  came  not.  At  length  when  Howard  saw  that 
the  crisis  was  approaching,  he  sent  his  brother,  Major 
Charles  Howard,  a  member  of  his  staff,  to  urge  Slocum 
to  come  in  person  if  he  would  not  send  his  troops.  To 
this  last  appeal  General  Slocum  replied  that  he  "  declined 
to  go  to  the  front  or  take  any  responsibility,  as  he  under- 
stood that  General  Meade  did  not  wish  to  bring  on  a 
general  engagement."*  General  Slocum  had  before  this 
proven  himself  to  be  a  good  soldier,  and  on  the  following 
two  days  did  excellent  service,  as  well  as  subsequently  to 
the  close  of  the  war.  He  doubtless  felt  that  he  had  suf- 
ficient reasons  for  his  course  that  day,  but  history  will 
record  his  refusal  to  hasten  to  the  relief  of  his  imperilled 
comrades  as  a  grave  error.  His  conduct  contrasts  widely 
with  that  of  Sickles.  General  Sickles  had  also  received 
Meade's  circular  indicating  Pipe  Creek  as  the  ground 
chosen  for  battle,  and  was  at  Emmittsburg  on  his  way  to 
Middleburgh  to  take  the  position  assigned  him  in  the  in- 
tended line,  when  he  received  at  that  place  Howard's 
dispatch  stating  the  situation  at  the  front  and  urgently 
calling  upon  him  for  assistance.  Had  he,  like  Slocum, 
adhered  to  the  letter  of  his  instructions,  which  were  only 
given  to  provide  for  a  possible  contingency,  he,  too,  would 
have  paid  no  attention  to  the  call  of  his  imperilled  com- 
rades ;  but  his  heroic  soul  responded  to  the  appeal,  and  he 
at  once  set  his  columns  in  motion. 

After  the  arrival  of  Rodcs  and  the  formation  of  his 

*  Charles  Carleton  Coffin,  in  "The  Boys  of  '61,"  page  272.  See  also  the 
"History of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,"  page  453,  and  Greeley's  "American 
Conflict,"  volume  2,  page  373. 


276  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

troops,  confronting  those  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  which 
had  reached  the  field  but  a  short  time  before,  the  battle 
raged  with  varied  results  for  over  an  hour,  when,  at 
three  o'clock  p.  M.,  Early  came  in  upon  Rodes'  left  and 
struck  the  Union  right.  Almost  simultaneously  with 
this,  Fender's  division  of  Hill's  Corps,  which  had  been  in 
reserve,  came  in  upon  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  and 
both  flanks  being  turned,  retreat  or  capture  became  in- 
evitable. Rodes,  observing  the  effect  of  Early's  attack, 
ordered  his  line  forward  and  the  Union  lines  were  broken. 
The  right,  which  was  considerably  wearied  by  their  hurried 
march  from  Emmittsburg,  and  had  borne  the  fierce 
onslaughts  of  Rodes'  and  Early's  divisions,  was  the  first 
to  yield.  It  fell  back  steadily  and  in  tolerable  order,  cov- 
ered to  some  extent  by  Buford's  cavalry,  until  the  town 
was  reached,  when  it  was  thrown  into  inextricable  con- 
fusion as  the  men  became  intermingled  in  the  various 
cross  streets,  during  which  several  thousand  of  them  were 
captured.  In  the  meantime  the  sturdy  left  wing,  which 
had  stood  like  a  wall  of  adamant  against  the  foe  since 
morning,  was  also  compelled  to  fall  back  before  Fender's 
tremendous  onslaught.  In  vain  the  heroic  Doubleday  and 
Robinson  and  Wads  worth  attempted  to  stay  the  tide.  To 
remain  longer  under  such  a  withering  fire,  with  their  left 
overlapped  by  Fender  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  was  certain 
death  or  capture.  The  retreat  of  this  part  of  the  force, 
however,  was  conducted  in  a  more  orderly  manner  than 
the  right,  the  men  firing  and  falling  back  and  at  length 
reaching  Cemetery  Hill  through  the  suburbs  of  the  town. 
Some  idea  of  the  losses  sustained  by  the  patriot  forces  that 
day  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  Wadsworth's  di- 


A   DEED   OF   HEROISM.  277 

vision  entered  the  fight  with  four  thousand  men  and  came 
out  of  it  with  but  sixteen  hundred.  Rowley's  division  also 
suffered  almost  as  severely,  and  Stone  reported  that  two 
thirds  of  his  brigade  had  fallen.  Severe  and  terrible,  how- 
ever, as  were  the  losses  of  the  Union  troops,  the  Con- 
federates suffered  as  severely  in  killed  and  wounded.*  In 
prisoners  taken",  the  Federals  lost  most,  chiefly  in  the  . 
numbers  taken  in  Gettysburg,  among  whom  were  their 
wounded,  who  had  been  tak^n  there  from  the  field. 

Deeds  of  heroism  were  displayed,  during  the  engagement 
of  this  day,  that  deserve  everlasting  remembrance.  The 
following  only,  related  by  Colonel  Swallow,  a  Confederate 
officer  and  eye -witness,  can  be  given.  The  Colonel  says: 

"  A  little  to  the  left  of  Hays'  command,  a  tattered  Federal 
regiment  faced  to  the  right  and  attempted  to  make  a  stand. 
But  in  a  very  few  moments,  overcome  by  the  hopelessness, 
if  not  the  folly,  of  their  position,  the  greater  part  turned 
.and  fled.  Just  at  this  moment  a  most  gallant  young  officer, 
riding  bravely  forward,  waving  his  hat  and  brandishing 
his  sword,  cried  out,  'Don't  run,  men;  none  but  cowards 
run.'  Some  of  our  men  cried  out,  'Don't  shoot  that 
man;  don't  shoot  him.'  Several  companies  swung  around 
with  the  intention  of  capturing  him  and  his  little  band 
of  heroes,  when  a  volley  fired  from  the  right  struck  him, 
and  he  tumbled  dead  from  his  horse,  to  fill  up  the  long,  sad 
roll  of  the  unknown.  General  Hays,  who  was  near  at  the 
time,  expressed  his  deep  regret  when  the  gallant  hero  fell." 

The  broken  and  defeated  but  not  demoralized  patriots, 
who  had  been  compelled  to  fall  back  before  overwhelm- 

*As  evidence  that  the  Confederates  also  lost  heavily  this  day,  I  quote  from 
General  Heth's  official  report.  The  general  himself  was  severely  wounded. 
He  says:  "In  less  than  twenty -five  minutes  my  division  lost,  in  killed  and 
wounded,  over  twenty  -  seven  hundred  men." 


278 


THE   GREAT   INVASION. 


ing  numbers,  at  length  reached  the  Hill  of  Refuge,  south 
of  Gettysburg,  where,  by  the  prudent  forethought  of  that 
Christian  soldier,  General  Howard,  a  rallying  place  had 
been  prepared.  Steinwehr's  division  had  been  formed  in 
double  lines,  and  artillery  placed  so  as  to  command  every 
approach  by  the  north,  and  as  our  wearied  men  approached 


EAST  CEMETERY  HILL,   UPON  WHICH  THE  UNION  FORCES  WERE 

RALLIED 
From  a  Photograph  by  Tipton. 

they  were  rallied  and  placed  in  position  by  Howard,  Stein- 
wehr,  Schurz,  and  Hancock,  who  had  now  come  up.  And 
as  the  pursuing  Confederates  pushed  up  through  the  fields  to 
the  northern  slope  of  the  hill,  Weidrick's  battery  poured 
grape  and  canister  upon  them,  compelling  them  to  halt. 
It  was  about  half  past  four  p.  M.  when  the  defeated 


FEDERAL  TROOPS  RALLY.  279 

troops  of  the  First  and  Eleventh  corps  reached  Cemetery 
Hill;  and  about  the  same  time  General  Hancock  arrived, 
who,  in  obedience  to  Meade's  order  directing  him  to  pro- 
ceed to  Gettysburg  and  examine  the  position  chosen  by 
Howard,  as  also  to  take  command  of  all  the  forces  there, 
had  huriied  to  the  front  and  arrived  at  this  most  critical 
period.  General  Hancock  informed  Howard  of  his  in- 
structions, and  at  once  set  about  rallying  the  men  and 
placing  them  in  position  to  meet  any  attack  the  enemy 
might  make.  * 

General  Hancock,  after  a  brief  survey  of  the  position 
chosen,  was  much  pleased  with  it,  and  immediately  dis- 
patched to  the  commander -in -chief  that  it  was  admirably 
adapted  for  fighting  a  defensive  battle,  but  liable  to  be 
turned  by  way  of  Emmittsburg,  and  that  he  would  hold 
on  until  he  could  arrive  and  judge  for  himself.  This  dis- 
patch reached  General  Meade  at  half  past  six  p.  M.  Be- 
fore it  arrived,  however,  General  Meade,  satisfied  from  the 
reports  brought  by  officers  returning  from  the  field,  that 
Lee  was  concentrating  his  whole  army  there,  issued  orders 
to  the  Fifth  and  Twelfth  corps  to  proceed  to  that  place; 

*  General  Doubleday,  in  his  "Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  page  151, 
says  that  when  General  Hancock  informed  Howard  of  General  Meade|s  order 
superseding  him,  that  quite  a  scene  occurred,  and  that  Howard  for  a  time 
refused  to  receive  any  orders  from  Hancock.  Charles  Carleton  Coffin,  in  his 
"Boys  of  "61,"  page  273,  states  it  differently,  as  follows:  "General  Hancock 
met  General  Howard  and  informed  him  of  his  instructions,  saying,  '  General 
Meade  undoubtedly  supposed  that  I  was  your  senior,  but  you  outrank  me.' 
'  It  is  no  time  to  talk  about  rank,'  replied  Howard,  '  I  shall  most  cheerfully 
obey  your  instructions  and  do  all  in  my  power  to  co-operate  with  you.'" 
Thus  readily  did  General  Howard  waive  the  command,  which  was  his  by 
right.  As  Mr.  Coffin  was  much  with  General  Howard,  and  enjoyed  oppor- 
tunities of  ascertaining  his  feelings  in  regard  to  the  matter  at  issue,  and  as  his 
statement  is  just  what  would  be  expected  from  a  Christian  and  patriot,  as 
General  Howard  has  proven  himself  to  be,  his  version  is  more  likely  to  be 
accepted. 


280  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

and  when  Hancock's  dispatch  arrived  he  sent  out  orders 
to  all  his  corps  commanders  to  move  to  Gettysburg.*  At 
seven  o'clock  General  Slocum  reached  the  field,  and,  being 
the  senior  officer,  Hancock  turned  over  the  command  to 
him  and  went  back  to  see  General  Meade  at  Tane}7town 
to  inform  him  of  the  condition  of  affairs  at  the  front. 


CUSP'S  HILL,  FROM  EVERGREEN  CEMETERY  AND  BALTIMORE  PIKE. 
From  a  Photograph  by  Tipton. 

Reaching  head  -  quarters  at  nine  P.  M.,  he  was  informed  by 
General  Meade  that  he  had  decided  to  fight  at  Gettysburg, 
and  had  given  orders  accordingly.  At  eleven  p.  M.  both 
generals,  with  the  head  -  quarters  staff,  left  Taneytown  and 
reached  the  front  at  one  A.  M.  of  the  second  of  July. 

During  the  brief  time  General  Hancock  was  upon  the 

*  Colonel  James  G.  Biddle,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  211. 


DISPOSITION   OF   THE   FEDERAL   FORCES.  281 

field  —  from  half  past  four  to  seven  p.  M. —  and  ably  as- 
sisted by  Generals  Howard,  Doubleday,  and  others,  he 
made  the  best  disposition  of  the  forces  at  his  command 
which  he  possibly  could,  ^ith  magnificent  judgment  his 
military  genius  took  in  the  whole  situation.  Gulp's  Hill, 
a  commanding  position  about  a  half  mile  to  the  east,  must 
be  held,  and  Wadsworth's  division  of  the  First  Corps,  or 
rather  what  was  left  of  it,  was  at  once  sent  there.  Round 
Top,  three  miles  to  the  south,  did  not  escape  his  eagle  eye, 
and  although  he  had  not  troops  enough  to  extend  the  line 
down  to  it,  he  at  once  sent  Geary's  division  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  when  it  arrived,  to  take  position  there,  one  brigade 
of  which  was  thrown  upon  that  eminence.  The  survivors 
of  the  Eleventh  Corps  were  placed  in  the  front  and  right 
center;  and  the  remaining  two  divisions  of  the  First  Corps 
joined  the  left  of  the  Eleventh  and  extended  the  line 
down  on  the  left,  toward  Round  Top.  To  this  the  cavalry 
were  joined.  The  line  thus  formed  made  a  considerable 
show  of  strength,  but  could  easily  have  been  broken,  or 
the  position  turned,  had  a  determined  effort  been  made. 
This  effort,  however,  was  not  made,  and  Sickles'  Corps 
from  Emmittsburg,  and  Slocum's  from  Two  Taverns,  com- 
ing up  about  seven  o'clock,  the  opportunity  was  lost. 
The  two  Confederate  divisions  of  Anderson  and  Johnson, 
which  soon  after  came  upon  the  ground,  again  gave  the 
enemy  the  preponderance,  but  it  was  then  too  late  in  the 
evening  to  make  the  attempt. 

The  new  position  chosen  by  the  Union  forces  was  one 
of  great  strength,  and  had  the  Confederates  followed  up 
the  advantages  gained,  and  stormed  Cemetery  Hill  at  once, 
the  results  of  the  next  two  days  fighting  might  have  been 


THE  CONFEDERATES  LOSE  AN  OPPORTUNITY.      283 

sadly  different  from  what  they  were.  That  this  position 
could  have  been  carried,  had  an  attack  been  promptly 
made,  is  asserted  by  one  entirely  competent  to  judge, — 
General  Doubleday,  who  says,  "Both  Hill  and  Ewell  had 
received  stunning  blows  during  the  day,  and  were  disposed 
to  be  cautious.  They,  therefore,  did  not  press  forward  and 
take  the  heights,  as  they  could  easily  have  done  at  this  time."  * 

The  failure  of  the  Confederates  to  attack  Cemetery  and 
Gulp's  hills  in  the  three  hours  which  intervened  between 
the  time  when  the  broken  and  shattered  Federals  took 
possession  of  them  and  the  darkness  of  evening,  was 
fraught  with  consequences  of  such  vast  importance  that 
the  reasons  for  it  deserve  special  consideration.  The  fol- 
lowing, taken  from  the  highest  and  most  important 
sources,  is  to  the  point.  General  Doubleday,  in  the  same 
connection  above  referred  to,  says: 

"  General  Lee  reached  the  field  before  Hancock  camer 
and  watched  the  retreat  of  the  First  and  Eleventh  corps, 
and  Hancock's  movements  and  dispositions,  through  his 
field  glass.  He  was  not  deceived  by  the  show  of  force, 
and  sent  a  recommendation  —  not  an  order — to  Ewell  to 
follow  us  up;  but  Ewell,  in  the  exercise  of  his  discretion 
as  a  corps  commander,  did  not  do  so.  He  had  lost  three 
thousand  men,  and  both  he  and  Hill  were  under  orders 
not  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement.  In  fact  they 
had  had  all  the  fighting  they  desired  for  the  time  being. 
Colonel  Campbell  Brown,  of  EwelPs  staff,  states  that  the 
latter  was  preparing  to  move  forward  against  the  height, 
when  a  false  report  induced  him  to  send  Gordon's  brigade 
to  reinforce  Smith's  brigade  on  his  extreme  left,  to  meet  a 

^General  Doubleday's  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  page  152. 


284  THE   GREAT  INVASION 

supposed  Union  advance  in  that  direction.  The  absence 
of  these  two  brigades  decided  him  to  wait  for  the  arrival 
of  Johnson's  division  before  taking  further  action.  When 
the  latter  came  up,  Slocum  and  Sickle^  were  on  the  ground, 
and  the  opportunity  for  a  successful  attack  had  passed." 
Colonel  "W.  H.  Taylor,  Lee's  adjutant -general,  says: 
"General  Lee  witnessed  the  flight  of  the  Federals  through 
Gettysburg,  and  up  the  hills  beyond.  He  then  directed  me 
to  go  to  General  Ewell,  and  say  to  him  that,  from  the  posi- 
tion which  he  occupied,  he  could  see  the  enemy  retreating 
over  those  hills,  without  organization,  and  in  great  confu- 
sion; that  it  was  only  necessary  to  press  'those  people'  in 
order  to  secure  possession  of  the  heights;  and  that,  if 
possible,  he  wished  him  to  do  this.  In  obedience  to  these 
instructions,  I  proceeded  immediately  to  General  Ewell, 
and  delivered  the  order  of  General  Lee ;  and,  after  receiv- 
ing from  him  some  message  for  the  commanding  general 
in  regard  to  the  prisoners  captured,  returned  to  the  latter, 
and  reported  that  his  order  had  been  delivered.  General 
Ewell  did  not  express  any  objection,  or  indicate  the  exist- 
ence of  any  impediment,  to  the  execution  of  the  order  con- 
veyed to  him,  but  left  the  impression  on  my  mind  that  it 
would  be  executed.  In  the  exercise  of  that  discretion, 
however,  which  General  Lee  was  accustomed  to  accord  to 
his  lieutenants,  and  probably  because  of  an  undue  regard 
for  his  admonition,  given  early  in  the  day,  not  to  precipi- 
tate a  general  engagement,  General  Ewell  deemed  it  un- 
wise to  make  the  pursuit.  The  troops  were  not  moved 
forward,  and  the  enemy  proceeded  to  occupy  and  fortify  the 
position  which  it  was  designed  that  General  Ewell  should 
seize.  Major -General  Edward  Johnson,  whose  division 


FATAL   MISTAKE   OF   CONFEDERATE   GENERALS.  285 

reached  the  field  after  the  engagement,  and  formed  on  the 
left  of  Early,  in  a  conversation  had  with  me,  since  the 
war,  about  this  circumstance,  in  which  I  sought  an  expla- 
nation ot  our  inaction  at  that  time,  assured  me  that  there 
was  no  hinderance  to  his  moving  forward;  but  that,  after 
getting  his  command  in  line  of  battle,  and  before  it  be- 
came seriously  engaged,  or  had  advanced  any  great  dis- 
tance, for  some  unexplained  reason,  he  had  received  orders 
to  halt.  This  was  after  General  Lee's  message  was  de- 
livered to  General  Ewell."  * 

General  Ewell,  in  his  official  report,  states  his  reasons 
for  not  ordering  the  attack,  which  are  as  follows: 

"  The  enemy  had  fallen  back  to  a  commanding  position 
that  was  known  to  us  as  Cemetery  Hill,  south  of  Gettys- 
burg, and  quickly  showed  a  formidable  front  there.  On 
entering  the  town  I  received  a  message  from  the  com- 
manding general  to  attack  the  hill  if  I  could  do  so  to  ad-- 
vantage.  I  could  not  bring  artillery  to  bear  on  it;  all  the 
troops  with  me  were  jaded  by  twelve  hours'  marching 
and  fighting,  and  I  was  notified  that  General  Johnson  was 
close  to  the  town  with  his  division,  the  only  one  of  my 
corps  that  had  not  been  engaged,  Anderson's  division  of 
the  Third  Corps  having  been  halted  to  let  them  pass. 
Cemetery  Hill  was  not  assailable  from  the  town,  and  I  de- 
termined, with  Johnson's  division,  to  take  possession  of  a 
wooded  hill  to  rny  left,  on  a  line  with  and  commanding 
Cemetery  Hill.  Before  Johnson  got  up,  the  Federals  were 
reported  moving  to  our  left  flank  —  our  extreme  left— 
and  I  could  see  what  seemed  to  be  his  skirmishers  in  that 
direction.  Before  this  report  could  be  investigated  by 

*  Colonel  W.  H.  Taylor,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  pages  308,  309. 


286  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

Lieutenant  T.  T.  Turner  of  my  staff  and  Lieutenant 
Robert  Early,  sent  to  investigate  it,  and  Johnson  placed 
in  position,  the  night  was  far  advanced."  * 

Kapier  Bartlett,  Esq.,  in  the  "  Military  Annals  of  Louisi- 
ana," speaking  of  the  subject,  says: 

"General  Hays  had  received  orders,  through  General 
Early,  from  General  Ewell  (though  Lee's  instructions  were 
subsequently  the  reverse),  to  halt  at  Gettysburg,  and  ad- 
vance no  further  in  case  he  should  succeed  in  capturing 
that  place.  But  Hays  now  saw  that  the  enemy  were  com- 
ing around  by  what  is  known  as  the  Baltimore  road,  and 
were  making  for  the  heights  —  Cemetery  Ridge.  This 
ridge  meant  life  or  death,  and  for  the  possession  of  it  the 
battles  of  the  second  and  third  were  fought.  *  *  * 
Owing  to  the  long  detour  the  enemy  was  compelled  to 
make,  it  was  obvious  that  he  could  not  get  his  artillery  in 
position  on  the  heights  for  one  or  two  hours.  The  imme- 
diate occupation  of  the  heights  by  the  Confederates,  who 
were  in  position  to  get  there  at  the  time  referred  to,  was  a 
matter  of  vital  importance.  Hays  recognized  it  as  such, 
and  presently  sent  for  Early.  The  latter  thought  as  Hays, 
but  declined  to  disobey  orders.  At  the  urgent  request  of 
General  Hays,  however,  he  sent  for  General  Ewell.  When 
the  latter  arrived,  many  precious  moments  had  been  lost. 
But  the  enemy,  who  did  not  see  its  value  until  the  arrival 
of  Hancock,  had  not  yet  appeared  in  force." 

General  Longstreet,  who  cites  the  foregoing  in  proof 
that  the  failure  to  follow  up  the  advantages  of  the  day  by 
attacking  Cemetery  Hill  at  once  was  one  of  the  great  mis- 
takes at  Gettysburg,  further  says: 

*  Annals  of  the  War,  page  435. 


RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  CONFEDERATE  DELAY.       287 

"  General  Hays  told  me,  ten  years  after  the  battle,  that 
he  could  have  seized  the  heights  without  the  loss  of  ten 
men.  Here,  then,  we  see  General  Early  adhering  to  orders 
when  his  own  conviction  told  him  he  should  not  do  so, 
and  refusing  to  allow  General  Hays  to  seize  a  point  recog- 
nized hy  him  as  of  vast  importance,  because  of  technical 
authority,  at  a  moment  when  he  admitted  and  knew  that 
disregard  of  the  order  would  only  have  made  more  secure 
the  point  at  issue  when  the  order  was  given." 

Colonel  Swallow,  of  the  Confederate  army,  in  the 
Southern  Bivouac  of  December,  1885,  says: 

"As  there  has  been  much  acrimonious  controversy  on 
the  question  as  to  why  General  Early  did  not  advance  and 
occupy  Culp's  Hill  on  Wednesday  evening,  the  writer, 
who  was  on  the  spot  and  witnessed  all  that  passed,  will 
relate  what  he  knows  of  it.  Before  we  met  Hays,  Captain 
Ilotehkiss,  who  saw  what  was  going  on  (the  efforts  of  the 
Federals  to  occupy  the  hill),  turned  to  the  writer  and  Cap- 
tain Brockenborough,  saying,  '  I  will  go  at  once  and  bring 
General  Early.'  But  when  told  that  General  Hays  was 
ahead  of  us,  he  rode  up  to  him.  The  General  was  watch- 
ing the  Federals  just  then  in  the  cemetery  and  trying  to 
reach  the  pike.  Hays  would  have  moved  his  brigade  and 
occupied  Culp's  Hill  had  it  not  been  that  he  and  Gordon 
had  received  positive  orders  from  General  Ewell,  through 
Early,  not  to  advance  beyond  the  town  if  they  should  suc- 
ceed in  capturing  it.  General  Hays  sent  for  Early  and 
pointed  to  him  the  importance  of  moving  the  whole 
division  on  Culp's  Hill,  and  occupying  not  only  it,  but  the 
Baltimore  pike.  General  Early  then  said:  'I  am  satisfied 
that  you  are  right;  it  should  be  occupied  on  the  spot,  but 


288  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

I  can  not  disobey  orders/  and  then,  turning  away  from  us  a 
few  yards,  said,  more  to  himself  than  to  Hays,  i  If  Jackson 
were  on  the  field  I  would  act  on  the  spot.'  General  Hays 
then  spoke  a  few  animated  words  to  Early,  when  the  latter 
said,  *  You  are  right,  General,  you  are  right.  I'll  send  to 
Ewell  for  orders  at  once.'  Early's  division  was  now  moved 
up  so  as  to  support  Hays  in  the  occupancy  of  Gulp's  Hill 
as  soon  as  the  orders  came  from  Ewell.  Moment  after 
moment  passed  away.  They  were  restless  and  anxious 
moments  to  us,  who  were  watching  what  was  going  on  in 
our  front.  We  saw  the  enemy  drag  a  battery  on  the  pike, 
followed  by  a  larg'e  force,  and  could  see  from  their  move- 
ments their  intentions.  Regiment  after  regiment  crossed 
the  pike  and  took  a  good  position.  They  were  lined  up 
in  short  order.  Ewell  arrived,  but  it  was  now  too  late. 
The  afternoon  was  far  spent,  and  Wadsworth's  division 
of  Reynolds'  Corps  were  on  the  heights  before  us  in  line  of 
battle.  These  were  the  same  men  who  opened  the  battle 
in  the  morning  at  Willoughby's  Run.  In  this  state  of 
things  it  was  decided  by  General  Ewell  that  it  was  not  ex- 
pedient to  attack  the  enemy.  While  these  things  were 
transpiring,  Generals  Lee  and  Longstreet  were  in  the  rear 
of  the  line  of  battle.  The  question  now  is,  why  was  not 
Gulp's  Hill  occupied  on  Wednesday  evening?  Where  does 
the  responsibility  rest  for  this  fatal  mistake,  the  first  among 
the  reasons  why  Lee  lost  Gettysburg?  Fatal  as  this  mis- 
take was,  it  was  followed  by  others  equally  disastrous  be- 
fore the  battle  ended."  * 

*  General  Meade,  in  a  letter  to  G.  G.  Benedict,  of  Burlington,  Vermont, 
dated  March  i6th,  1870,  and  published  in  the  Philadelphia  Press  of  August 
nth,  1886,  referring  to  a  conversation  he  had  with  General  Ewell  since  the 
war  upon  this  subject  of  occupying  Culp's  Hill,  says: 


LEE'S  PERPLEXITY.  289 

General  Lee  explains  his  reason  for  not  sending  positive 
orders  to  Ewell  to  attack  the  heights  at  once,  as  follows: 

"  The  attack  was  not  pressed  that  afternoon,  the  enemy's 
force  being  unknown,  and  it  being  considered  advisable  to 
await  the  arrival  of  the  rest  of  the  troops.  Orders  were 
sent  back  to  hasten  their  march,  and,  in  the  meantime, 
every  effort  was  made  to  ascertain  the  numbers  and  posi- 
tions of  the  enemy,  and  find  the  most  favorable  point  of 
attack." 

General  Lougstreet,  in  referring  to  some  of  the  causes 
of  their  failure  in  the  Pennsylvania  campaign,  cites  among 
others  General  Lee's  seeming  loss  of  decision  and  equa- 
nimity. The  following  are  his  words : 

"  There  is  no  doubt  that  General  Lee,  during  the  crisis 

"Lieutenant -General  Ewell,  in  a  conversation  held  with  me  shortly  after 
the  war,  asked  what  would  have  been  the  effecl  if,  at  four  p.  M.  on  the  ist, 
he  had  occupied  Gulp's  Hill,  and  established  batteries  upon  it.  I  told  him 
that,  in  my  judgment,  in  the  then  condition  of  the  Eleventh  and  First  corps, 
with  their  morale  affected  by  their  withdrawal  to  Cemetery  Ridge,  with  the 
loss  of  over  half  of  their  numbers  in  killed,  wounded  and  missing  (of  the 
six  thousand  prisoners  we  lost  on  the  field,  nearly  all  came  from  these  corps 
on  the  first  day),  his  occupation  of  Gulp's  Hill,  with  batteries  commanding 
the  whole  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  would  have  produced  the  evacuation  of  that 
ridge  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  there,  by  the  Baltimore  pike  and 
Taneytown  and  Emmittsburg  roads.  He  then  informed  me  that  at  four  P.  M. 
on  the  ist  he  had  his  corps,  twenty  thousand  strong,  in  column  of  attack, 
and  on  the  point  of  moving  on  Gulp's  Hill,  which  he  saw  was  unoccupied 
and  commanded  Cemetery  Ridge,  when  he  received  an  order  from  General 
Lee  directing  him  to  assume  the  defensive,  and  not  to  advance;  that  he  sent 
to  General  Lee  urging  to  be  permitted  to  advance  with  his  reserves,  but  the 
reply  was  a  reiteration  of  the  previous  order.  To  my  inquiry  why  Lee  had 
restrained  him,  he  said  our  troops  (Slocum's)  were  visible,  and  Lee  was  un- 
der the  impression  that  the  greater  part  of  my  army  was  on  the  ground,  and 
deemed  it  prudential  to  await  the  rest  of  his." 

Either  General  Meade's  or  Ewell's  memory  is  at  fault  in  the  foregoing 
statement.  Johnson's  division  did  not  reach  Gettysburg  until  about  eight 
o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  at  no  time  previous  to  that,  nor  at  any  time  that 
day,  were  the  two  divisions  on  the  ground — Early's  and  Rodes' — in  position 
as  General  Ewell  stated.  If  they  were,  all  the  authorities  quoted  are  at  fault. 
19 


290  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

of  that  campaign,  lost  his  matchless  equipoise  that  usually 
characterized  him,  and  that  whatever  mistakes  were  made 
were  not  so  much  matters  of  Deliberate  judgment  as  the 
impulses  of  a  great  mind  disturbed  by  unparalleled  condi- 
tions. General  Lee  was  thrown  from  his  balance  (as  is 
shown  by  the  statement  of  General  Fitzhugh  Lee)  by  too 
great  confidence  in  the  powers  of  his  troops,  and  (as  is 
shown  by  General  Anderson's  statement)  by  the  deplorable 
absence  of  General  Stuart  and  the  perplexity  occasioned 
thereby." 

•  The  statements  of  Generals  Fitzhugh  Lee  and  Ander- 
son, referred  to  by  General  Longstreet  in  the  foregoing, 
are  as  follows.  General  Fitzhugh  Lee  says: 

"  He  (General  Lee)  told  the  father  of  the  writer  (his 
brother)  that  he  was  controlled  too  far  by  the  great  confi- 
dence he  felt  in  the  fighting  qualities  of  his  people,  who 
begged  simply  to  be  '  turned  loose,'  and  by  the  assurances 
of  most  of  his  higher  oificers." 

General  Anderson  says: 

"About  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  (Wednesday,  July 
1st,)  I  received  a  message  (at  Cashtown,  where  I  was  rest- 
ing with  my  division,)  notifying  me  that  General  Lee  de- 
sired to  see  me.  I  found  General  Lee  intently  listening 
to  the  fire  of  the  guns,  and  very  much  depressed.  At 
length  he  said,  more  to  himself  than  to  me:  'I  can  not 
think  what  has  become  of  Stuart;  I  ought  to  have  heard 
from  him  long  before  now.  He  may  have  met  with  dis- 
aster, but  I  hope  not.  In  the  absence  of  reports  from  him 
I  am  in  ignorance  as  to  what  we  have  in  front  of  us  here. 
It  may  be  the  whole  Federal  army,  or  it  may  be  only  a 
detachment.  If  it  is  the  whole  Federal  force  we  must 


CLOSE    OF    FIRST    DAY. 


291 


•light  a  battle  here;  if  we  do  not  gain  a  victory,  those  de- 
iiles  and  gorges  through  which  we  passed  this  morning 
will  shelter  us  from  disaster.'"* 

Is  it  not  evident  that  the  reason  why  the  advantages 
gained  by  the  first  day's  battle  at  Gettysburg  were  not 
improved  by  an  immediate  attack  upon  Cemetery  and 


GENERAL  LEE'S  HEAD -QUARTERS. 
From  a  Photograph  by  Beidel. 

Gulp's  hills,  was  because  of  doubt  and  confusion  among 
the  leaders  of  the  Confederate  hosts?  Plainly  the  God 
of  Nations  was  in  it,  and  it  was  not  the  first  time  that 
He  caused  confusion  among  the  counsellors  of  rebellion, 
that  the  nation  they  sought  to  overthrow  might  live,  f 

*'  "Annals  of  the  War,"  pages  420,  421. 
fSee  II.  Samuel,  xvii:  1-16. 


292  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

After  the  battle  of  this  day,  General  Lee  established  his 
head  -  quarters  in  a  stone -house  on  the  Chambersburg 
road,  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  the  seminary,  in 
front  of  the  division  of  General  Heth.  The  position  gave 
him  a  full  view  of  Gettysburg,  of  his  own  army,  and  the 
Federal  line  of  battle.  The  General,  during  the  succeed- 
ing two  days,  took  observations  from  the  cupola  of  the 
college.  This  building  was  occupied  as  a  hospital,  and 
had  the  flag  denoting  that  service  at  the  time  he  so  used  it. 

Having  given  the  details  of  the  first  day's  engagement, 
as  well  as  stated  the  condition  existing  when  night  fell 
upon  the  scene,  we  next  turn  our  attention  to  another 
point  and  note  what  transpired  there.  As  soon  as  it  was 
known  at  Harrisburg  that  the  Confederates,  who  had  been 
threatening  that  place,  had  fallen  back  in  the  direction  of 
Gettysburg,  General  Smith,  with  several  regiments  of  New 
York  and  Pennsylvania  militia,  advanced  to  Carlisle. 
Shortly  after  the  arrival  of  these  troops  at  that  place,  and 
when  the  men  were  in  the  act  of  preparing  their  supper, 
about  three  thousand  cavalry -men  of  Stuart's  Corps,  under 
command  of  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  advanced  upon  the 
town  from  the  direction  of  York.  The  militia -men  at 
once  fled  to  arms,  and  cannon  were  planted  to  meet  the 
coming  foe.  Fitzhugh  Lee  was  evidently  disappointed 
in  finding  that  General  Rodes  had  left  the  place,  and 
much  disconcerted  in  finding  himself  confronted  by  a 
Federal  force,  and  at  once,  without  any  notice,  opened 
a  fire  of  shell,  round  shot,  and  grape  and  canister  upon  the 
town.  After  keeping  this  up  for  some  time  a  flag  of 
truce  was  sent  in,  demanding  the  surrender  of  the  place, 
to  which  a  most  decided  negative  was  given.  The  flag 


FEDERAL   MOVEMENTS.  293 

had  hardly  left  when  a  second  shelling  was  commenced, 
which  lasted  until  midnight.  At  ten  o'clock  the  several 
buildings  upon  the  outskirts  known  as  the  United  States 
Barracks,  were  fired  and  entirely  destroyed.  After  this 
unwarranted  act  of  firing  into  a  town  filled  with  helpless 
women  and  children,  without  previous  notice,  the  Con- 
federates withdrew  and  again  set  out  in  search  of  their 
arm}'.  Considerable  damage  was  done  by  the  shot  and 
shells  thrown  into  the  town,  but  no  lives  were  lost. 

Leaving  that  part  of  the  Federal  army  which  had 
reached  the  field  during  this  day  and  up  to  a  late  hour 
in  the  night,  actively  engaged  in  preparation  for  the  re- 
newal of  the  conflict,  we  turn  to  those  parts  of  it  which 
had  not  arrived,  and  note  their  location.  The  Second 
Corps  marched  from  Uniontown,  where  it  had  remained 
since  the  evening  of  Monday,  29th,  and  passing  through 
Tan  ey  town  reached  the  vicinity  of  Gettysburg,  where  it 
bivouacked  until  morning.  The  two  brigades  of  the 
Third  Corps,  which  General  Sickles  had  left  to  hold 
Emmittsburg,  when  he  marched  at  the  call  of  Howard  for 
the  field  of  battle  with  the  remainder  of  his  command, 
remained  at  that  place  until  an  early  hour  in  the  morning; 
the  Fifth  Corps  marched  from  Union  Mills  by  Hanover 
and  McSherrystown  to  Bonaughtown,  five  miles  from 
•Gettysburg,  and  there  encamped  over  night;  and  the  Sixth 
Corps  was  on  its  way  from  Manchester,  marching  all 
night.  Gregg's  cavalry  division,  having  left  the  same 
place,  encamped  over  night  at  Hanover,  fourteen  miles 
from  the  field,  while  Huey's  brigade  returned  to  Man- 
chester. Kilpatrick's  division  moved  from  Hanover  by 
Abbottsville  to  Berlin,  sixteen  miles  from  Gettysburg;  and 


294  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

Kenly's  and  Morris'  brigades,  of  French's  division,  from 
Maryland  Heights,  reached  Frederick,  where  they  re- 
mained as  a  reserve  until  Saturday,  July  4th,  when  they 
marched  to  Turner's  Pass  in  the  South  Mountain. 

The  Confederates  were  all  in  position  that  night  except 
the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  which  reached  the 
vicinity  of  Marsh  Creek,  four  miles  west  of  Gettysburg, 
about  midnight;  and  Pickett's  division,  which  remained 
about  three  miles  above  Chambersburg.  Imboden's  cav- 
alry were  about  Greenwood;  the  brigades  of  W.  E.  Jones 
and  Beverly  Robertson  were  below  Shippensburg,  and 
Stuart  was  about  Carlisle. 

Thus  the  curtain  of  night  fell  upon  the  scene,  hiding 
from  view  the  thousands  of  dead,  wounded,  and  suifering 
men  of  both  armies,  who  lay  scattered  over  the  field. 
The  telegraph,  meanwhile,  carried  the  news  of  the  sad  re- 
sults to  the  national  cause  all  over  the  loyal  North,  pro- 
ducing gloom,  anxiety  and  fear.  Here  we  close  this  chap- 
ter, proposing  to  resume  the  narrative  with  the  incidents 
of  the  morning. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   SECOND  DAY  OF  THE   BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG  —  THURSDAY, 

JULY  2D,  1863. 


order  to  a  correct  understandin     of  the  details  of 


,~i-3  the  two  days'  battles  which  are  yet  to  be  gi\7en,  it  is 

_  i  ^  essential  that  the  reader  have  an  idea  of  the  positions 
@Jks>      _  r 

A  occupied  by  the  two  great  contending  armies.  They 
I  may  be  described  as  follows:  Approaching  Gettys- 
burg from  the  south  -  east,  by  the  Baltimore  pike,  we  ascend 
by  a  gradual  slope  a  high  ridge,  which  is  in  shape  some- 
what like  a  horse  -  shoe,  with  its  left  side  or  flange  longer 
than  the  other.*  Upon  this  ridge,  and  conforming  to  its 
natural  outline,  the  Union. line  was  established.  The  toe 
of  this  horse -shoe  reaches  the  southern  outskirt  of  the 
town,  and  rests  upon  what  is  called  Cemetery  Hill,  because 
upon  it  the  local  cemetery  of  the  town  is  situated.  Its 
right  side,  or  flange,  extends  somewhat  eastward  and  then 
curves  sharply  to  the  south,  ending  with  Gulp's  Hill — a 
wooded  and  rocky  eminence. f  Rock  Creek,  a  stream  of 
some  considerable  size,  runs  by  its  eastern  base,  and  pass- 
ing south,  at  length  enters  the  Monocacy.  This  flank  was 
well  protected  by  the  nature  of  the  slope,  which  is  high 

*the  Federal  line  was  somewhat  in  the  shape  of  a  fi sh  hook  —  its  point 
resting  upon  Gulp's  Hill;  its  curve,  Cemetery  Hill,  and  its  heel,  Round  Top. 
f  A  view  of  this  place  was  given  in  the  previous  chapter.        - 

295 


THE    FEDERAL    POSITION.  297 

and  commands  the  entire  country  around  it.  The  distance 
from  the  toe  of  the  horse -shoe — the  Federal  center — to 
the  termination  of  the  line  at  Rock  Creek  is  about  three 
quarters  of  a  mile. 

The  left  side,  or  flange,  which  is  considerably  longer  than 
the  right,  follows  the  ridge  in  a  south-westward  direction, 
and  terminates  .at  two  .high,  well -defined,  and  rock -sided 
hills,  or  cones,  called  Round  Top  and  Big  Round  Top.* 
The  last  named  —  Big  Round  Top  —  was  the  Federal  left. 
It  is  high,  rocky,  rugged,  and  exceedingly  rough.  Its 
twin  —  Round  Top,  sometimes  called  Little  Round  Top, 
because  so  much  less  than  its  brother  by  its  side,  and  also 
Weed's  Hill,  because  General  Weed  was  killed  upon  it 
during  the  battle, — was  a  position  of  highest  importance. 
The  artillery  upon  its  summit  commanded  the  entire 
country  around.  In  front  of  these  two  strangely  formed 
hills  the  ground  is  exceedingly  rough,  and  covered  here 
and  there  with  immense  granite  boulders;  while  the 
western  faces  are  but  piles  upon  piles  of  the  same  rough 
stones,  making  the  scaling  of  them  almost  an  impossibility. 
Behind  these  hills  the  ground  gently  slopes  toward  the 
east,  and  afforded  an  excellent  protection  to  the  reserves 
and  ammunition  trains.  From  the  toe  of  the  horse -shoe 
—  the  Federal  center — to  this,  its  left  heel,  was  about 
three  miles.  The  ridge  between  the  center  and  the  ex- 
treme left  is  a  continuation  of  Cemetery  Hill,  and  di- 
minishes in  height  as  it  runs  southward.  Near  the  base 
of  Little  Round  Top  it  flattens  out  into  a  plain.  This 
was  the  weakest  point  in  the  Federal  position,  but  it 
was  completely  covered  by  the  guns  on  the  hill.  The 


*These  hills  are  finely  illustrated  in  the  preceding  chapter. 


SUPERIORITY   OF   THE   FEDERAL   POSITION.  299 

Baltimore  pike  runs  diagonally  from  the  south-east 
through  the  horse -shoe  and  comes  out  at  its  toe.  The 
Taneytown  road  enters  from  the  south  and  crosses  the 
ridge  and  extends  along  the  line,  intersecting  the  Balti- 
more pike  a  little  beyond  the  toe.  The  road  from  Em- 
mittsburg  comes  in  from  the  south-west,  and  runs  nearly 
parallel  with  the  Union  line,  and  unites  with  the  Baltimore 
pike  near  the  same  place. 

About  three  quarters  of  a  mile  west  of  Cemetery  Hill  is 
Seminary  Ridge,  which  runs  nearly  parallel  with  the  left 
of  the  Union  position,  to  its  center.  The  illustration 
given  affords  a  fine  view  of  this  ridge  down  to  the  right  of 
Hill's  Corps;  the  continuation  of  it  down  to  opposite  Big 
Round  Top  is  Driven  in  the  illustration,  "A  view  from  Lit- 
tle Round  Top,  looking  west,"  in  chapter  xni.  Along  the 
wooded  crest  of  this  ridge  the  Confederate  line  was  formed 
up  to  a  point  above  the  town,  and  from  thence  it  continued 
upon  elevated  ground  across  the  Federal  center  and  ter- 
minated at  Wolf  Hill,  opposite  Gulp's  Hill.  From  the  ex- 
treme right  of  this  line,  which  considerably  over -lapped 
the  Federal  left  opposite  Round  Top,  to  Wolf  Hill,  its  ex- 
treme left,  was  about  four  and  a  half  or  five  miles. 

The  superiority  of  the  Federal  position  will  be  readily 
seen  in  the  descriptions  of  the  two  thus  given.  Cemetery 
Hill  formed  the  apex  of  the  triangle  on  which  the  Union 
forces  were  stationed.  It  perfectly  commanded  the  town, 
and  the  entire  country  over  which  the  Confederates  must 
pass  to  attack  their  center,  as  well  as  the  right  or  left  of 
their  line.  The  Federal  lines  gradually  diverging  from  this 
central  tower  of  strength  to  the  south-west  and  south- 
east, formed  the  sides  of  this  triangle,  outside  of  which, 


300  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

and  therefore  upon  a  larger  triangle,  the  enemy  was  com- 
pelled to  operate.  This  gave  the  Federals  the  incalculable 
advantage  of  moving  on  an  interior  and  shorter  line,  arid 
enabled  them  to  throw  their  reserves  with  rapidity  to  any 
place  along  the  line,  either  east  or  west,  where  they  might 
be  needed.  Such,  then,  were  the  positions  of  the  two 
armies;  we  will  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  prepara- 
tions made  during  the  night  and  early  morning  for  the 
renewal  of  the  conflict. 

At  the  close  of  the  previous  day  the  Confederate  forces 
then  upon  the  field  were  posted  as  follows:  Ewell's  Corps 
occupied  Gettysburg,  the  line  extending  from  Hock  Creek 
on  the  south-east  to  Seminary  Ridge  on  the  west.  John- 
son's division,  which  had  come  up  by  way  of  Greenwood 
in  advance  of  the  great  wagon  train  referred  to  in  a  previ- 
ous chapter,  and  only  reached  the  front  about  dusk,  was 
placed  on  the  left,  opposite  Gulp's  Hill.  Early  joined 
Johnson  and  extended  the  line  to  the  Federal  Center; 
and  Rodes,  uniting  with  Early's  right,  and  occupying 
Middle  street  through  the  town,  extended  the  line  to 
Seminary  Ridge.  Hill's  Corps  took  position  on  the  ridge 
in  the  following  order:  On  the  left,  and  resting  on  the 
Chambersburg  road,  was  Ileth;  next  came  Pender,  and 
then  Anderson.  The  latter  had  been  halted  at  Cashtown, 
which  he  had  reached  the  evening  before,  to  permit 
Johnson  to  pass,  and  consequently  did  not  reach  the  field 
to  participate  in  the  engagement  of  that  day.  Such  were 
the  positions  of  the  Confederate  forces  that  night,  and 
up  to  the  time  in  the  afternoon  of  the  following  day 
(Thursday),  when  McLaws'  and  -Hood's  divisions  -arrived 
from  Marsh  Creek,  which  they  had  reached  about  mid- 


THE   FEDERALS   TAKE   THEIR   POSITIONS.  301 

night,  and  were  placed  upon  the  extreme  right,  opposite 
Little  and  Big  Round  Top. 

When  General  Hancock,  at  4:30  P.  M.,  reached  the  front, 
in  accordance  with  the  order  of  General  Meade,  after  as- 
sisting in  rallying  the  troops  as  they  fell  back  from  the 
field  west  and  north  of  Gettysburg  to  the  new  position, 
which  by  General  Howard's  happy  forethought  had  been 
selected  and  prepared  for  them,  he  at  once  saw  the  im- 
portance of  Gulp's  Hill  and  Round  Top,  and,  as  stated  in 
the  previous  chapter,  sent  "WadsWorth's  division  of  the 
First  Corps  to  occupy  the  first  named,  and  Geary's  division 
of  the  Twelfth  Corps  to  the  latter.  The  remainder  of  the 
First  Corps  and  the  Eleventh  were  placed  upon  Ceme- 
tery Hill, —  the  First  Corps  under  General  Newton,  who 
had  just  reached  the  front  and  had  been  assigned  the 
command  by  General  Meade,  on  the  right  center;  while  the 
Eleventh  under  Howard  occupied  the  center.  At  seven 
o'clock  Sickles'  Corps,  with  the  exception  of  two  brigades 
which  he  had  left  to  hold  Emmittsburg,  upon  receiving 
Howard's  dispatch  calling  for  assistance,  and  the  Twelfth 
Corps  under  Slocum,  reached  the  field,  and  were  assigned 
to  positions.  The  Third  filed  into  line  on  the  left  of  the 
Eleventh,  extending  the  line  along  the  left  centre,  and 
the  Twelfth,  with  the  exception  of  Geary's  division,  took 
position  on  Gulp's  Hill.  Stannard's  Vermont  brigade  also 
arrived  and  reported  to  the  commander  of  the  First  Corps, 
to  which  they  we.re  assigned,  and  were  placed  in  reserve 
behind  the  center. 

The  commander  in  chief,  as  stated  in  the  previous  chapter, 
arrived  upon  the  field  an  hour  after  midnight;  namely,  one 
o'clock  A.  M.  of  Thursday,  July  2d.  In  company  with  Howard 


302 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


and  other  general  officers,  he  rode  along  the  line  and  in- 
spected the  position.  He  also  directed  his  troops  to  erect 
such  defensive  works  as  were  possible  before  the  opening 
of  the  expected  battle;  wherever,  therefore,  the  ground 
was  sufficiently  open,  musketry  trenches  and  rifle  pits  were 
dug;  cover  for  the  artillery  was  thrown  up  wherever  it 


FEDERAL  BREASTWORKS  UPON  GULP'S  HILL. 
From  a  Photograph  by  Tipto-., 

was  practicable;  trees  were  felled,  stones  piled  up,  and 
every  possible  means  of  protection  was  -provided.*  Few, 
indeed,  were  the  moments  given  to  sleep  throughout  that 
night  by  cither  officers  or  privates,  although  they  were 

*Some  of  these  defensive  works  yet  remain.  The  breastworks  upon  Culp's 
Hill  are  shown  in  the  accompanying'  illustration.  The  marks  of  the  bullets 
are  also  seen. 


GENERAL    SEDGWICK'S    ARRIVAL.  303 

greatly  exhausted  by  the  marching  and  fighting  of  the 
previous  day.  The  full  moon,  veiled  by  thin  clouds,  shone 
down  upon  the  strange  scene.  The  silence  of  the  night 
was  only  broken  by  the  heavy  tramp  of  armed  men,  the 
neighing  of  horses,  the  rumbling  of  the  artillery  as  it  was 
hurried  into  position,  the  click  of  the  pick  and  spade, 
and  the  cutting  of  axes.  Thus  hour  by  hour  throughout 
the  entire  night,  and  until  the  shock  of  battle  again  broke 
forth  towards  evening  of  the  next  day,  these  energetic 
citizen  soldiers,  under  the  direction  of  skilled  engineers/ 
worked  and  dug  and  builded  until  the  position  they  held 
was  made  too  strong  to  be  carried  by  direct  assault. 

At  six  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  Second  Corps  and  the 
Reserve  Artillery  came  up;  and  an  hour  later  —  at  seven 
A.  M. — the  Fifth  Corps,  under  General  Sykes,  and  the  two 
brigades  of  the  Third  which  had  been  left  at  Emmitts- 
burg,  also  reached  the  field.  The  Second  Corps,  under 
Hancock,  was  assigned  the  place  held  during  the  night 
by  that  part  of  the  Third  which  had  come  up — the 
left  center,  —  and  the  Third  was  directed  to  form  below 
Hancock  and  down  to  and  upon  Round  Top.  The  Fifth 
Corps  was  placed  in  reserve  within  supporting  distance  of 
Slocum,  behind  the  Federal  right.  General  Sedgwick,  in 
command  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  received  at  Manchester, 
twenty-eight  miles  distant,  at  seven  P.  M.  the  previous 
evening,  Meade's  order  to  move  to  Taneytown,  and  after 
marching  seven  or  eight  miles,  a  second  order  was  re- 
ceived, requiring  him  to  proceed  at  once  to  Gettysburg, 
which  he  reached  by  an  all  night's  march  at  two  p.  M. 
General  Sedgwick  needed  no  other  motive  to  prompt  him 
to  hurry  forward  than  the  knowledge  that  the  enemy  was 


304  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

at  Gettysburg,  and  that  he  was  needed  there.  Promptly 
the  head  of  the  column  was  changed,  and  encouraged 
and  urged  forward  by  the  enthusiasm  of  their  heroic 
leader,  without  bivouac,  and  almost  without  rest,  these 
veteran  heroes  marched  throughout  the  entire  night  and 
the  greater  part  of  the  next  day,  and  reached  the  field, 
fifteen  thousand  four  hundred  strong,  in  time  to  insure 
victory  to  the  Union  forces.  Arriving  upon  the  field  a 
short  time  before  the  fierce  engagement  commenced,  these 
men  were  placed  in  reserve  in  the  rear  of  Round  Top. 
General  Sedgwick  says  of  his  march,  "I  arrived  at  Gettys- 
burg at  about  two  o'clock,  having  marched  thirty -five 
miles  from  seven  o'clock  the  previous  evening.  I  received 
no  less  than  three  messages  by  his  (Meade's)  aids,  urging 
me  on." 

General  Meade  in  the  early  morning  contemplated  an 
attack  upon  the  Confederate  left  by  throwing  the  Fifth 
and  Sixth  corps,  when  they  came  up,  in  connection  with 
the  Twelfth,  upon  Johnson  and  Early.  Slocum  and  War- 
ren, however,  after  a  careful  reconnoissance  of  the  ground 
in  front  of  Gulp's  Hill,  reported  that  such  an  attack  was 
impracticable,  and  it  was  abandoned.  General  Doubleday, 
in  speaking  of  this  proposed  attack,  says:  "It  seems  to  me 
that  this  would  have  been  a  very  hazardous  enterprise,  and 
I  am  not  surprised  that  both  Slocum  and  Warren  reported 
against  it.  The  Fifth  and  Sixth  corps  would  necessarily 
be  very  much  fatigued  after  making  a  forced  march.  To 
put  them  in  at  once,  and  direct  them  to  drive  a  superior 
force  of  Lee's  veterans  out  of  a  town  where  every  house 
would  have  been  loop-holed,  and  every  street  barricaded, 
would  hardly  have  been  judicious.  If  we  had  succeeded 


GENERAL    MEADE's    PLANS.  305 

in  doing  so,  it  would  simply  have  reversed  the  "battle  of 
Gettysburg,  for  the  Confederate  army  would  have  fought 
behind  Seminary  Ridge,  and  we  would  have  been  exposed 
in  the  plain  below.  ~Nor  do  I  think  it  would  have  been 
wise  strategy  to  turn  their  left,  and  drive  them  between  us 
and  Washington,  for  it  would  have  enabled  them  to 
threaten  the  capital,  strengthen  and  shorten  their  line  of 
retreat,  and  endanger  our  communications  at  the  same 
time."  * 

It  has  been  charged  that  General  Meade  was  dissatisfied 
with  the  position  chosen  at  Gettysburg,  and  contemplated 
a  retreat  to  the  position  selected  at  Pipe  Creek.  General 
IButterfield,  Meadc's  chief  of  staff,  says  that  General 
Meade  directed  him  to  make  out  in  the  morning  a  general 
order  of  retreat  from  Gettysburg,  prescribing  the  route 
each  corps  should  take.  General  Meade  earnestly  denied 
that  he  ever  intended  to  retreat,  and  that  this  order  was 
only  a  precautionary  measure  in  case  it  became  necessary 
to  withdraw.  This  seems  reasonable,  for  a  wise  general, 
while  determined  to  maintain  his  position  to  the  .utmost, 
would  take  all  necessary  preliminary  measures  in  time  for 
any  possible  emergency.  The  hurry  and  confusion  of  de- 
feat would  not  be  a  favorable  time  to  attend  to  these 
matters. 

After  the  project  to  attack  the  Confederate  left  had  been 
abandoned,  General  Meade,  thoroughly  understanding  the 
strength  and  advantages  of  his  position,  and  knowing  that 
Lee  could  not  afford  to  remain  quiet  in  the  midst  of  a 
hostile  country,  with  his  communications  constantly  in 
danger  of  being  severed,  determined  to  act  wholly  on  the 

*  General  Doubleday's  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  page  157. 
20 


306  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

defensive.  In  accordance  with  this  purpose  all  possible 
preparations  were  made  to  meet  the  enemy  wherever  he 
might  make  the  attack. 

After  the  battle  of  the  previous  day  the  Confederates 
were  jubilant  and  boastful.  They  entertained  the  idea 
that  they  could  easily  defeat  the  comparatively  small  num- 
ber of  men  in  their  front,  and  that  the  remaining,  corps 
and  divisions  coming  upon  the  field  separately,  and  worn 
down  by  long  and  weary  marches,  would  be  met  and  cut 
up  at  their  pleasure.  But  when  Thursday  morning  dawned, 
and  they  saw  that  the  little  band  upon  Cemetery  Hill  had 
been  largely  reinforced,  and  other  troops  were  yet  arriving, 
and  that  the  heights  had  been  fortified  and  were  bristling 
with  guns  at  every  point,  they  began  to  give  evidence  that 
their  minds  were  undergoing  a  change,  and  that  after  all 
they  might  have  some  hard  and  bloody  work  to  do.  Not- 
withstanding, however,  their  confidence  during  the  night, 
the  Confederates  also  improved  their  time  in  erecting  de- 
fenses all  along  their  line. 

Daylight  at  length  dawned;  the  hours  wore  away,  noon 
came,  and  the  afternoon,  and  yet  no  attack  was  made. 
The  morning  was  pleasant,  the  air  was  calm,  the  sun  shone 
mildly  through  a  smoky  atmosphere,  and  the  whole  outer 
world  was  quiet  and  peaceful.  There  was  nothing  to  fore- 
token the  sanguinary  struggle  that  was  to  ensue  ere  the 
closing  of  the  day.  What  was  the  cause  of  this  delay? 
It  will  be  given  shortly.  But  was  not  the  hand  of  God 
in  it?  Like  their  failure  to  drive  the  Federals  from  Ceme- 
tery Hill  the  evening  before,  this  delay  was  doubtless  the 
salvation  of  the  Nation.  Hon.  Edward  Everett,  in  his 
address  at  Gettysburg,  says : 


PROVIDENTIAL   DELAY.  307 

"I  can  not  but  remark  on  the  providential  inactivity  of 
the  Confederate  army.  Had  the  contest  been  renewed  by 
it  at  daylight  on  the  2d  of  July,  with  the  First  and 
Eleventh  corps '  exhausted  by  the  battle  and  retreat,  the 
Third  and  Twelfth  weary  from  their  forced  march,  and 
the  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  not  yet  arrived,  nothing  but  a 
miracle  could  have  saved  the  army  from  a  great  disaster. 
Instead  of  this  the  day  dawned,  the  sun  rose,  the  cool 
hours  of  the  morning  passed,  the  forenoon,  and  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  afternoon,  wore  away  without  the 
slightest  aggressive  movement  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 
Thus  time  was  given  for  half  of  our  forces  to  arrive  and 
take  their  place  in  the  lines,  while  the  rest  of  the  army 
enjoyed  a  much  needed  half  day's  repose." 

Evidently  the  delay  of  the  Confederates  in  renewing  the 
battle  was  because  of  the  difficulties  which  confronted 
them.  They  had  unexpectedly  come  upon  the  foe,  and  in 
such  position  that  a  successful  withdrawal  without  an  en- 
gagement was  impossible.  General  Lee,  in  his  official  re- 
port, says: 

"  It  had  not  been  intended  to  fight  a  general  battle  at 
such  a  distance  from  our  base,  unless  attacked  by  the 
enemy;  but,  finding  ourselves  unexpectedly  confronted  by 
the  Federal  army,  it  became  a  matter  of  difficulty  to  with- 
draw through  the  mountains  with  our  large  trains.  At 
the  same  time  the  country  was  unfavorable  for  collecting 
supplies  while  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy's  main  body, 
as  he  was  enabled  to  restrain  our  foraging  parties  by  occu- 
pying the  passes  .of  the  mountains  with  regular  and  local 
troops.  A  battle  thus  became,  in  a  measure,  unavoidable. 
Encouraged  by  the  successful  issue  of  the  engagement  of 


308  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

the  first  day,  and  in  view  of  the  valuable  results  that 
would  ensue  from  the  defeat  of  the  army  of  General 
Meade,  it  was  thought  advisable  to  renew  the  attack." 

General  Longstreet  relates  the  following: 

"When  I  overtook  General  Lee,  at  five  o'clock  that 
afternoon  (Wednesday,  July  1st,)  he  said,  to  my  surprise, 
that  he  thought  of  attacking  General  Meade  upon  the 
heights  the  next  day.  I  suggested  that  this  course  seemed 
to  be  at  variance  with  the  plan  of  campaign  that  had  been 
agreed  upon  before  leaving  Fredericksburg.  He  said: 
*  If  the  enemy  is  there  to  -  morrow,  we  must  attack  him.' 
I  replied,  'If  he  is  there,  it  will  be  because  he  is  anxious 
that  we  should  attack  him  —  a  good  reason,  in  my  judg- 
ment, for  not  doing  so.'  I  urged  that  we  should  move 
around  by  our  right  to  the  left  of  Meade,  and  put  our 
army  between  him  and  Washington,  threatening  his  left 
and  rear,  and  thus  force  him  to  attack  us  in  such  position 
as  we  might  select.  I  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  if, 
during  our  council  at  Fredericksburg,  we  had  described 
the  position  in  which  we  desired  to  get  the  two  armies, 
we  could  not  have  expected  to  get  the  enemy  in  a  better 
position  for  us  than  the  one  he  then  occupied;  that  he 
was  in  a  strong  position  and  would  be  awaiting  us,  which 
was  evidence  that  he  desired  that  we  should  attack  him. 
I  said,  further,  that  his  weak  point  seemed  to  be  his  left; 
hence  I  thought  that  we  should  move  around  to  his  left, 
that  we  might  threaten  it  if  we  intended  to  maneuver,  or 
attack  it  if  we  determined  upon  a  battle.  I  called  his  at- 
tention to  the  fact  that  the  country  was  admirably  adapted 
for  a  defensive  battle,  and  that  we  should  surely  repulse 
Meade  with  crushing  loss  if  we  would  take  position  so  as 


LONGSTREET  OPPOSES  THE  ATTACK.          309 

to  force  him  to  attack  us ;  and  suggested  that,  even  if  we 
carried  the  heights  in  front  of  us,  and  drove  Meade  out, 
we  should  be  so  badly  crippled  that  we  could  not  reap  the 
fruits  of  victory;  and  that  the  heights  of  Gettysburg  were, 
in  themselves,  of  no  more  importance  to  us  than  the 
ground  we  then  occupied,  and  that  the  mere  possession  of 
the  ground  was  not  worth  a  hundred  men  to  us;  that 
Meade's  army,  not  its  position,  was  our  objective.  General 
Lee  was  impressed  with  the  idea  that,  by  attacking  ^he 
Federals,  he  could  whip  them  in  detail.  I  reminded  him 
that  if  the  Federals  were  there  in  the  morning,  it  would 
be  proof  that  they  had  their  forces  well  in  hand,  and  that 
with  Pickett  in  Chambersburg,  and  Stuart  out  of  reach, 
we  should  be  somewhat  in  detail.  He,  however,  did  not 
seem  to  abandon  the  idea  of  attack  on  the  next  day.  He 
seemed  under  a  subdued  excitement,  which  occasionally 
took  possession  of  him  when  'the  hunt  was  up,'  and 
threatened  his  superb  equipoise.  *  *  *  On  the  night 
of  the  1st  I  left  General  Lee  without  any  orders.  On  the 
morning  of  the  2d  I  went  to  his  head  -  quarters  at  day- 
light, and  renewed  my  views  against  making  an  attack. 
He  seemed  resolved,  however,  and  we  discussed  the  proba- 
ble results.  "We  observed  the  position  of  the  Federals, 
and  got  a  general  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  ground.  About 
sunrise  General  Lee  sent  Colonel  Yenable,  of  his  staff,  to 
General  EwelPs  head  -  quarters,  ordering  him  to  make  a 
reconnoissance  of  the  ground  in  his  front,  with  a  view  of 
making  the  main  attack  on  his  left.  A  short  time  after- 
ward he  followed  Colonel  Venable  in  person.  He  returned 
at  about  nine  o'clock  and  informed  me  that  it  would  not 
do  to  have  Ewell  open  the  attack.  He  finally  determined 


310  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

that  I  should  make  the  main  attack  on  the  extreme  right. 
It  was  fully  eleven  o'clock  when  General  Lee  arrived  at 
this  conclusion  and  ordered  the  movement."* 

Colonel  W.  H.  Taylor,  of  Lee's  staff,  in  the  same  book, 
page  309,  says :  "  The  prevailing  idea  with  General  Lee 
was  to  press  forward  without  delay;  to  follow  up  promptly 
and  vigorously  the  advantage  already  gained.  Having 
failed  to  reap  the  full  fruit  of  the  victory  the  night  before, 
his  mind  was  evidently  occupied  with  the  idea  of  renewing 
the  assault  upon  the  enemy's  right  with  the  dawn  on  the 
second.  The  divisions  of  Major -Generals  Early  and 
Bodes,  of  EwelPs  Corps,  had  been  actively  engaged,  and 
had  sustained  some  loss,  but  were  still  in  excellent  condi- 
tion, and  in  full  enjoyment  of  the  prestige  of  success,  and 
consequent  elation  of  spirit,  in  having  so  gallantly  swept, 
the  enemy  from  their  front,  through  the  town  of  Gettys- 
burg, and  compelled  him  to  seek  refuge  behind  the  heights 
beyond.  The  division  of  Major -General  Edward  John- 
son, of  the  same  corps,  was  perfectly  fresh,  not  having 
been  engaged.  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  Corps  was 
also  now  up.  With  this  force  General  Lee  thought  that 
the  enemy's  position  could  be  assailed  with  every  prospect 
of  success;  but  after  a  conference  with  the  corps  and 
division  commanders  on  our  left,  who  represented  that,  in 
their  judgment,  it  would  be  hazardous  to  attempt  to 
storm  the  strong  position  occupied  by  the  enemy,  with 
troops  somewhat  fagged  by  the  marching  and  fighting  of 
the  first  day;  that  the  ground  in  their  immediate  front 
furnished  greater  obstacles  to  a  successful  assault  than  ex- 
isted at  other  points  of  the  line,  and  that  it  could  be 

*  General  lyongstreet,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  pages  417,  421,  422. 


OPINIONS   OF   CONFEDERATE   GENERALS.  311 

reasonably  concluded,  since  they  had  so  severely  handled 
the  enemy  in  their  front,  that  he  would  concentrate  and 
fortify  with  special  reference  to  resisting  a  further  advance 
just  there,  he  determined  to  make  the  main  attack  v.rell  on 
the  enemy's  left,  indulging  the  hope  that  Longstreet's 
Corps  would  be  up  in  time  to  begin  the  movement  at  an 
early  hour  on  the  second.  He  instructed  General  Ewell 
to  be  prepared  to  co-operate  by  a  simultaneous  advance  by 
his  corps." 

The  reconnoissance  made  upon  the  Confederate  left,  as 
referred  to  by  General  Lougstreet  and  Colonel  Taylor, 
was  as  follows,  as  reported  by  Colonel  Swallow,  in  the 
Southern  Bivouac  of  January,  1886: 

"  Immediately  after  the  interview  between  Generals  Lee 
and  Longstreet,  which  took  place  at  the  head  -  quarters  of 
the  commanding  general  early  in  the  morning,  Lee  sent 
Colonel  Venable,  of  his  sta,ff,  to  Ewell,  and  followed  him- 
self soon  after  in  order  to  make  preparations  for  an  im- 
mediate attack  upon  the  enemy.  Early,  Johnson,  and 
Kodes  were  summoned.  General  Hays,  who  was  present, 
told  the  writer  that  the  General  (meaning  Lee)  was  full 
of  fight.  He  appeared  to  be  deeply  impressed  with  the 
importance  of  an  immediate  attack.  He  frequently  re- 
peated the  expression,  '  The  attack  must  be  made  at  once, 
at  once.'  He  wanted  Ewell  to  lead  an  attack  on  the  spot. 
Ewell  and  all  his  division  commanders  dissented  from 
General  Lee  in  making  the  attack  first  on  his  left.  They 
pointed  out  to  the  commanding  general  the  almost  im- 
pregnable position,  both  of  Cemetery  Hill  and  Gulp's  Hill, 
and  submitted  to  General  Lee  a  plan  of  making  the  open- 
ing attack  on  the  Confederate  extreme  right,  held  by 


312  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

General   Longstreet,  where  the   Federal  line  was  much 
weaker  and  more  easily  broken. 

"  It  was  represented  to  General  Lee,  as  the  united  opinion 
of  all  present,  that  a  bold  and  spirited  attack  on  our  right 
by  Longstreet  would  undoubtedly  turn  the  left  flank  of  the 
enemy  and  gradually  endanger  the  rear  of  Meade's  army, 
that  the  events  consequent  upon  Longstreet's  attack 
would  compel  Meade  to  detach  many  troops  from  Ceme- 
tery Hill  and  Gulp's  Hill  and  send  them  to  his  left  and 
rear.  This  being  done,  EwelPs  Corps  might  then,  by  a 
bold  and  daring  onset,  assail  the  whole  line  on  Cemetery 
and  Gulp's  hills,  and  drive  the  enemy  from  these  strong- 
holds. To  this  reasoning  General  Lee  assented,  with  the 
modification  that  just  as  soon  as  Longstreet  opened  on  the 
right  Ewell  should  lose  no  time,  and  immediately  attack 
Cemetery  and  Gulp's  hills.  This  was  the  exact  under- 
standing, and  General  Lee,  as  he  mounted  his  horse,  re- 
marked, 'I  will  return  to  head -quarters  at  once  and  issue 
the  necessary  orders,  so  that  the  right  and  left  will  be  un- 
der fire  by  ten  o'clock.'  General  Lee  then  rode  back  to 
his  head  -  quarters." 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  capture  of  Cemetery  Hill, 
which  might  have  been  effected  the  evening  previous,  was ' 
now  considered  impracticable,  if  not  impossible,  and  an- 
other plan  of  attack  upon  some  other  part  of  the  line  had 
to  be  arranged  for,  and  this  arrangement  caused  several 
hours  of  delay.  At  length  General  Lee  had  his  plans 
matured,  and  issued  his  orders  as  follows :  General  Long- 
street  was  directed  to  place  the  two  divisions  of  his  corps 
then  up, — McLaws'  and  Hood's, —  upon  the  right  of  Hill, 
extending  the  line  down  a  little  below  Big  Round  Top. 


CAUSE  OF  DELAY  IN  ATTACK.  813 

McLaws  connected  with  Hill,  and  Hood  held  the  extreme 
right.  These  two  divisions  were  to  "  envelop  the  enemy's 
(Federal)  left,  and  begin  the  attack  there,  following  up,  as 
near  as  possible,  the  direction  of  the  Emmittsburg  road. 
Simultaneous  with  the  attack  upon  the  Federal  left,  Ewell 
was  directed  to  favor  this  attack  by  an  assault  upon  the 
right,  and  Hill,  who  held  the  center,  was  to  hold  himself 
in  readiness  to  throw  his  strength  where  it  would  have  the 
greatest  effect.  Such  was  the  plan  of  battle,  and  had,  it 
been  executed  at  any  time  prior  to  two  o'clock,  when  the 
Sixth  Corps  came  upon  the  field,  it  might,  and  the  proba- 
bility is  that  it  would,  have  been  successful.  But  delay 
occurred,  and  the  attack  was  not  made  until  near  four 
o'clock;  and  to  this  delay  the  failure  of  the  Confederate 
plan  has  been  attributed. 

It  is  claimed  by  several  Southern  officers  who  partici- 
pated in  the  Pennsylvania  campaign,  that  General  Lee 
ordered  Longstreet  to  commence  the  attack  at  nine  A.  M., 
and  to  his  delay  until  a  late  hour  in  the  afternoon  they 
attribute  their  failure.  General  Longstreet,  in  the  extract 
from  his  article  in  the  Annals  of  the  War,  previously 
quoted,  says  that  "  on  the  night  of  the  1st  I  left  him  (Lee) 
without  any  orders  at  all,"  and  that  it  was  nine  o'clock 
before  the  General  returned  from  the  conference  with  the 
corps  and  division  commanders  on  the  left,  and  eleven 
o'clock  before  he  had  so  far  matured  his  plans  as  to  issue 
his  orders  for  their  execution.  On  the  other  hand,  General 
A.  L.  Long,  in  an  article  in  the  Philadelphia  Weekly  Times 
of  November  1st,  1884,  says: 

"  Having  been  present  on  the  occasion  referred  to,  I  can 
speak  from  personal  knowledge.  General  Lee  had  no 


314  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

sooner  reached  the  field  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st  of  July 
than  he  determined  to  pursue  the  advantage  that  had  been 
gained  by  Generals  Ewell  and  Hill.  Finding  it,  however, 
unadvisable  to  renew  the  engagement  that  evening,  he  de- 
termined to  attack  as  early  as  practicable  the  next  morning, 
and  so  expressed  himself  to  Generals  Hill  and  Longstreet. 
His  visit  to  Ewell  was  to  learn  the  condition  of  his  troops 
arid  arrange  preliminaries  for  the  intended  battle.  Before 
retiring  for  the  night,  General  Lee  had  formed  his  order 
of  battle  based  on  reconnoissances  made  before  the  close  of 
the  afternoon.  About  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  2d 
General  Longstreet  received  his  final  instructions.  It  had 
always  been  General  Lee's  habit,  on  the  eve  of  battle,  to 
designate  the  work  to  be  done  by  each  corps  commander, 
leaving  the  manner  of  its  execution  to  their  discretion. 
This  confidence  had  never  been  abused,  and  he  had  then 
no  reason  to  doubt  the  faithful  execution  of  his  orders." 

The  Count  of  Paris,  in  his  recently  published  work  on 
the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  says: 

"  We  have  seen  how  important  it  is  for  him  (Lee)  to  carry 
out  this  determination  without  delay,  yet  when  he  returns 
from  his  conference  with  Ewell  on  the  evening  of  the  1st 
of  July  he  does  not  appear  to  have  as  yet  cleanly  decided 
upon  his  plan  of  battle  for  the  following  day.  He,  no 
doubt,  desires  to  wait  for  daylight  in  order  to  reconnoitre 
the  ground,  but  this  uncertainty  causes  him  to  lose  much 
precious  time.  At  daybreak  of  the  2d  he  is  in  the  saddle; 
he  has  decided  to  make  the  attack  on  the  right,  and  orders 
Longstreet  to  place  his  two  divisions  on  that  side  along 
the  prolongation  of  Hill's  line,  so  as  to  be  able  to  begin  it 
at  once.  But  he  does  not  appear  to  have  as  yet  determined 


OPINIONS    REGARDING   THE    DELAY.  315 

either  upon  the  hour  when  it  is  to  be  made,  the  point 
against  which  it  is  to  be  directed,  or  the  number  of  troops 
to  take  part  in  it. 

"  Accustomed  to  find  in  Jackson  a  lieutenant  to  whom 
it  was  not  necessary  to  give  any  precise  instructions  —  who 
upon  a  mere  suggestion  would  adopt  all  necessary  measures 
for  striking  the  point  designated  for  his  attack  with  the 
greatest  rapidity  and  with  the  utmost  possible  vigor — Lee 
on  this  occasion  did  not  take  into  consideration  Long- 
street's  character,  with  whose  strong  and  weak  points,  his 
energy  and  tardiness,  he  must,  however,  have  been  well 
acquainted.  It  is  evident  to  us  that  from  the  evening  of 
the  1st  of  July  there  was  a  misunderstanding  between 
these  two  generals." 

The  question  as  to  whether  or  not  General  Lee  ordered 
Longstreet  to  an  early  attack  is  one  of  recollection  and 
veracity,  with  the  probabilities  strongly  against  it,  but 
accepting  the  latter's  own  version,  which  seems  to  be 
the  most  reasonable,  that  he  received  his  orders  about 
eleven  A.  M.,  he  is  yet  open  to  the  charge  of  grave  tardi- 
ness. The  whole  plan,  it  will  be  seen,  was  dependent 
upon  the  two  divisions  of  Longstreet,  which,  according 
to  his  own  admission  had  reached  Marsh  Creek,  four 
miles  west  of  Gettysburg,  the  evening  previous.  From 
this  place  to  the  positions  assigned  them  in  the  line  was 
not  over  four  miles,  and  yet  for  some  reason  which  Gen- 
eral Longstreet  has  never  yet  satisfactorily  explained, 
these  troops  were  not  in  position  and  ready  for  the  part 
assigned  thm  until  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

General  Longstreet  states  a  number  of  causes  for  his 
delay  in  getting  his  troops  into  position.  He  says  that 


316  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

Law's  brigade  was  detached  by  permission  of  General 
Lee  for  special  duty  elsewhere,  and  although  ordered  "to 
move  with  the  portion  of  his  command  that  was  then  up," 
he  took  upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  postponing  the 
execution  of  this  order  of  the  commanding  general  until 
this  brigade  could  be  recalled.  He  says,  too,  that  the  en- 
gineers were  endeavoring  to  conduct  his  troops  into  their 
positions  unobserved  by  the  Federal  Signal  Station  upon 
Round  Top,  and  this  caused  considerable  delay.  Other 
causes,  also,  are  assigned,  but  none  of  them  seems  to  ex- 
plain the  delay. 

Colonel  "W".  II.  Taylor,  Lee's  adjutant -general,  says  of 
General  Longstreet's  tardiness: 

"It  is  generally  conceded  that  General  Longstreet,  on 
this  occasion,  was  fairly  chargeable  with  tardiness,  and  I 
have  always  thought  that  his  conduct,  in  this  particular, 
was  due  to  a  lack  of  appreciation,  on  his  part,  of  the  cir- 
cumstances which  created  an  urgent  and  peculiar  need  for 
the  presence  of  his  troops  at  the  front.  As  soon  as  the 
necessity  for  the  concentration  of  the  army  was  precipi- 
tated by  the  unexpected  encounter,  on  the  1st  of  July,  with 
a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  near  Gettysburg,  General  Long- 
street  was  urged  to  hasten  his  march;  and  this,  perhaps, 
should  have  sufficed  to  cause  him  to  push  his  divisions  on 
toward  Gettysburg,  from  which  point  he  was  distant  but 
four  miles,  early  on  the  2d.  But  I  can  not  say  that  he 
was  notified,  on  the  night  of  the  1st,  of  the  attack  pro- 
posed to  be  made  on  the  morning  of  the  2<1,  and  the  part 
his  corps  was  to  take  therein.  Neither  do  I  think  it  just 
to  charge  that  he  was  alone  responsible  for  the  delay  in 
attacking  that  ensued  after  his  arrival  on  the  field.  I  well 


GENERAL   SICKLES'    CHOICE   OF   POSITION.  317 

remember  how  General  Lee  was  chafed  by  the  non-ap- 
pearance of  the  troops,  until  he  finally  became  restless, 
and  rode  back  to  meet  General  Longstreet,  and  urge  him 
forward;  but,  then,  there  was  considerable  delay  in  putting 
the  troops  to  work  after  they  reached  the  field;  and  much 
time  was  spent  in  discussing  what  was  to  be  done, — which, 
perhaps,  could  not  be  avoided.  At  any  rate,  it  would  be 
unreasonable  to  hold  General  Longstreet  alone  accountable 
for  this.  Indeed,  great  injustice  has  been  done  him  in  the 
charge  that  he  had  orders  from  the  commanding  general 
to  attack  the  enemy  at  sunrise  on  the  second  of  July,  and 
that  he  disobeyed  these  orders.  This  would  imply  that 
he  was  in  position  to  attack,  whereas  General  Lee  but  an- 
ticipated his  early  arrival  on  the  second,  and  based  his 
calculations  upon  it.  I  have  shown  how  he  was  disap- 
pointed, and  I  need  hardly  add  that  the  delay  was  fatal."* 
As  already  stated,  upon  the  arrival,  at  six  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  of  the  Second  Corps,  General  Hancock  was  di- 
rected to  take  the  position  on  the  left  centre  occupied  dur- 
ing the  night  by  that  part  of  the  Third  Corps  which  had 
reached  the  field  the  evening  previous,  and  Sickles  was 
ordered  to  move  his  corps  down  below  Hancock's,  and 
occupy  the  ground  where  Geary's  division  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps  had  been  sent  by  Hancock  the  preceding  evening. 
At  a  later  hour,  when  General  Sickles  sought  more  definite 
instructions,  General  Meade  told  him  that  he  was  to  join 
his  right  with  Hancock's  left,  and  extend  his  left  down  to 
and  upon  Round  Top  if  practicable.  General  Sickles,  for 
some  unaccountable  reason,  concluded  that  there  was  no 
position  upon  Round  Top,  and  taking  advantage  of  the 

*  Annals  of  the  War,  page  311. 


318  TUB    GREAT    INVASION. 

discretion  given  him  concerning  his  occupying  that  place, — 
•or,  rather  construing  it  liberally,  so  as  to  include  his  whole 
position, — moved  forward  to  a  slight  ridge  about  three  quar- 
ters of  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  prolongation  of  Hancock's 
line,  and  wholly  disconnected  by  an  intervening  ravine 
from  the  proper  line.  His  reason  for  so  doing  was,  that 
the  ground  between  the  left  of  Hancock  and  Round  Top 
was  considerably  lower  than  that  along  the  Emmittsburg 
road,  and  his  position,  in  case  he  occupied  that  ground, 
would  be  untenable  if  the  enemy  was  permitted  to  occupy 
the  higher  ground  in  front.  General  Geary,  when  he  re- 
ceived Meade's  order  on  the  morning  of  the  second,  to  re- 
join his  own  corps  upon  Gulp's  Hill,  fearing  that  Round 
Top,  which  he  had  occupied  during  the  night  by  one  of 
Iris  brigades,  would  not  be  occupied,  sent  a  staff  officer  to 
General  Sickles  with  instructions  to  explain  the  position 
and  its  importance,  and  ask  for  troops  to  be  sent  to  take 
his  place  there.  No  troops,  however,  were  sent,  and  no 
officer  came  to  inspect  the  position,  and  after  waiting  as 
long  as  his  orders  permitted,  he  reluctantly  left  it.  * 


*  General  Meade,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  G.  G.  Benedict,  of  Burlington,  Vermont, 
dated  March  i6th,  1870,  and  recently  published,  says  :  "When  I  wrote  my 
report  of  the  battle  I  honestly  believed  General  Sickles  did  not  know  where 
I  wished  him  to  go,  and  that  his  error  arose  from  a  misapprehension  of  my 
orders,  but  I  have  recently  learned  from  General  Geary,  who  had  the  day  be- 
fore been  sent  by  Hancock  to  hold  the  left,  and  who  in  doing  so  had  seen  the 
great  importance  of  Round  Top  and  fasted  a  brigade  on  it,  that  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  ad,  when  he  received  my  order  that  he  would  be  relieved  by  the 
Third  Corps  and  on  being  relieved  would  rejoin  his  own  Corps,  (Twelfth,) 
on  the  right,  after  waiting  for  some  time  to  be  relieved,  he  sent  to  General 
Sickles  a  staff  officer  with  instructions  to  explain  the  position  and  its  im- 
portance, and  to  ask,  if  troops  could  not  be  sent  to  relieve  him,  that  General 
S.  would  send  one  of  his  staff  to  see  the  ground,  and  to  place  troops  there  on 
their  arrival.  He  received  for  reply  that  General  S.  would  attend  to  it  in  due 
time.  No  officer  or  troops  came,  and  after  waiting  till  his  patience  was  ex- 
hausted General  Geary  withdrew  and  joined  his  corps.  Now  my  first  orders 


GENERAL    SICKLES'    POSITION.  319 

General  Sickles  has  bceii  blamed  for  the  grave  error  he 
is  supposed  to  have  committed  in  this  matter.  It  is  due 
him  to  state  that  there  are  many  strong  reasons  in  favor  of 
the  position  he  chose,  and  military  men  arc,  it  is  said, 
about  equally  divided  in  opinion  as  to  the  wisdom  of  his 
choice.  Some  claim  that  had  he  not  taken  the  advanced 
position  he -did,  Hood's  division,  seeing  the  hopelessness 
of  an  attack  upon  Hound  Top,  would  have  turned  the 
Federal  left  and  interposed  between  their  army  and 
Washington,  and  thus  have  forced  them  to  abandon  their 
position.  Then,  too,  the  enemy  wasted  his  strength  in 
gaining  Sickles'  position,  without  any  particular  advantage 
to  him,  and  was  not  in  a  condition  for  much  further 
service,  and  in  this  way,  although  many  valuable  lives 
were  lost,  the  battle  fought  there  was  of  immense  value 
in  its  effect  upon  the  final  result.  It  should  also  be  stated 
that  General  Sickles  claims  to  have  had  the  implied  sanc- 
tion of  General  Meade,  who,  at  his 'request,  sent  General 
Hunt,  his  chief  of  artillery,  to  assist  him  in  locating  his 
line,  f 

Sickles'  line,  then,  was  as  follows:  The  center  was  at 
what  has  become  historically  known  as  the  Peach  Orchard. 
This  was  nearly  opposite  Little  Hound  Top,  and  about  one 

to  General  Sickles  were  to  relieve  the  Twelfth  Corps  Division  (Geary's)  and 
occupy  their  position.  Here  is  evidence  that  he  knew  the  position  occupied 
by  Geary's  division,  or  could  have  known,  and  yet  failed  to  occupy  it.  Furth- 
ermore, when  he  caine  to  my  head-quarters  at  about  noon  and  said  he  did  not 
know  where  to  go,  I  answered,  'Why,  you  were  to  relieve  the  Twelfth 
Corps. '  He  said  they  had  no  position  ;  they  were  massed,  awaiting  events. 
Then  it  was  I  told  him  his  right  was  to  be  Hancock's  left,  his  left  on  Round 
Top,  which  I  pointed  out." 

f  This  whole  matter  of  General  Sickles'  alleged  disobedience  of  the  orders 
of  the  commander  in  chief  on  this  day  will  be  considered  at  length  in  Ap- 
pendix D. 


320 


TIIE   GHEAT   INVASION. 


mile  distant  from  it.  It  occupied  the  angle  formed  by  the 
Emmittsburg  road,  and  a  narrow  road  or  lane  coming  in 
from  the  east.  The  right  wing,  which  was  under  General 
Humphreys,  extended  from  the  Peach  Orchard  some  dis- 
tance northward  along  the  Emmittsburg  road;  the  left 
wing,  under  General  Birney,  made  a  right  angle  at  the 


ENTRANCE  TO  THE  DEVIL'S  DEN. 
From  a  Photograph  by  Tipton.) 

orchard,  and  bent  around  south  -  eastwardly,  following  the 
conformation  of  the  ridge,  or  the  high  ground,  covering 
the  front  of  Little  Bound  Top  at  its  base  and  resting  at 
the  Devil's  Den,  a  rocky  formation  of  peculiar  shape.  This 
line,  in  military  parlance,  was  in  the  air,  for  neither  of  its 
flanks  was  protected.  About  three  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, General  Meade,  who  says  that  he  "was  in  doubt 


SICKLES'  LINE  WITHDRAWN.  321 

concerning  Sickles'  line,"  rode  to  the  left,  when  he  dis- 
covered the  advanced  position  he  had  taken.  Sending 
at  once  for  him,  the  commander  in  chief  expressed  his 
disapproval  of  his  position  and  pointed  out  the  line  he  ex- 
pected him  to  take.  Sickles  at  once  proposed  to  withdraw 
his  force  to  the  line  indicated,  but  Meade  told  him  that  he 
did  riot  think  the  enemy  would  permit  him  to  withdraw 
without  a  fight.  Simultaneously  almost  with  these  words,  - 
the  enemy's  batteries  opened  a  furious  fire,  and  General 
Sickles  put  spurs  to  his  horse  and  galloped  rapidly  to  the 
front.  General  Longstreet,  although  unaccountably  tardy, 
had  nevertheless  been  busily  engaged  in  perfecting  his 
arrangements  for  the  battle,  and  when  they  were  disclosed 
they  were  seen  to  be  admirable.  He  had  massed  nearly 
sixty  pieces  of  artillery  to  bear  upon  Sickles'  angle  at  the 
Peach  Orchard,  all  of  which  rained  a  perfect  torrent  of 
shot  and  shell  upon  that  part  of  the  line.  At  the  same 
time  massive  lines  of  infantry,  in  the  shape  of  a  crescent, 
and  about  a  mile  and  a  half  long,  came  into  view  as  they 
advanced  against  the  front  and  left  flank,  and  poured  into 
the  patriot  troops  a  terribly  destructive  fire. 

General  Meade  at  once  saw  that  Sickles  could  not  possi- 
bly maintain  his  position,  and  that  he  must  be  withdrawn 
to  a  new  line,  where  he  could  be  assisted,  or  else  he  must 
order  forward  supports,  abandon  his  strong  position,  and 
fight  the  enemy  in  the  open  plain.  He  wisely  decided 
upon  the  former,  and  at  once  hurried  the  Fifth  Corps, 
which  had  been  placed  in  reserve  in  the  rear  of  Gulp's 
Hill,  over  to  the  left,  where  it  was  formed  in  line  on  the 
left  of  Hancock  and  extended  down  to  Round  Top.  This 

21 


322 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


line,  formed  in  the  position  originally  intended  for  Sickles, 
was  to  be  the  rallying  place  for  the  Third  Corps. 

The  Confederate  force  engaged  in  the  eifort  to  crush 
General  Sickles,  was  composed  of  the  divisions  of  McLaws 
and  Hood,  of  Longstreet's  Corps,  and  the  brigades  of 
Wilcox,  Wright,  and  Perry,  of  Anderson's  division  of 


INSIDE  OF  THE  DEVIL'S  DEN. 
From  a  Photograph  by  Tipton. 

Hill's  Corps,  in  all  about  twenty  thousand  men.  Hood's 
division  occupied  the  right  of  this  line  next  to  Round 
Top,  with  McLaws  next,  and  the  brigades  of  Wilcox, 
"Wright,  and  Perry  on  the  left,  in  front  of  the  Emmittsburg 
road.  These  were  all  veteran  soldiers,  as  were  also  those 
of  Sickles'  command,  and  the  conflict  of  course  would  be 
terrific. 


STRUGGLE   FOR    LITTLE    ROUND   TOP.  323 

The  severe  artillery  fire  which  was  opened  against  the 
two  sides  of  the  angle  at  the  center,  was  but  the  prelude 
to  a  furious  and  determined  infantry  attack  against  the 
left.     This  part  of  the  line  was  held   by  the  brigade  of 
General  J.  Hobart  Ward, — his  left  resting  on  the  Devil's 
Den.     The  Confederate  line  overlapped  the  Federals'   at 
this  point  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  and  it  was  against 
Ward  that  the  enemy  made  his  first  efforts,  attempting  to 
outflank  him  and  to  seize  Little  Round  Top.     The  import- 
ance of  this  high  and  commanding  position  was  seen  by 
the  Confederates,  and  the  task  of  seizing  and  holding  it 
was   specially  committed   to  Hood's   men.     The   engage- 
ment here  was  most   determined   and  furious,   and  in  a 
short  time  it  extended   all   along  the   line  to  the   Peach 
Orchard,  where  it  became  specially  severe.     Against  the 
angle  at  that  place  the  fire  of  eleven  batteries  was  con- 
centrated, and  at  length  the  line  was  broken,  the  flanks 
of  both  wings  being  exposed.     This  disaster  was  irrepara- 
ble, and  a  backward  movement  was  unavoidable.     Hum- 
phreys' division,  threatened  upon  the  flank  and  pressed 
upon  the  front  by  Wilcox,  Wright  and  Perry,  fell  back 
slowly,  fighting  as  it  went.      Back,  back,  inch  by  inch, 
fighting,  falling,  cheering,  dying,  the   men  retired.     The 
enemy  came  on  more  furiously,  halting  at  intervals  and 
pouring  in  volleys  that  struck  down  the  troops  in  scores. 
At  length   the   enemy  came   within   reach  of  Hancock's 
guns,  when  volley  after   volley  was   sent   into   their   ad- 
vancing ranks.     Men  fell  as  leaves  fall  in  autumn  before 
these  terrible  discharges.    At  length  Perry's  brigade,  which 
occupied   the  center   of  the  Confederate   line,   hesitated, 
then  halted,  and  finally  fled  to  the  rear.     Wright  and 


324  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

Wilcox  pressed  on,  and  finally  the  former  pierced  the 
Federal  line.  It  was  a  fearful  crisis.  The  destiny  of  the 
Republic  hung  in  the  balance.  But  reinforcements  sprang 
into  the  breach,  and  the  foe  was  forced  to  relinquish  his 
hold  and  fall  back.  Humphreys  at  length  succeeded  in 
reaching  the  crest  of  the  hill  and  rallied  his  men  behind 
the  line  formed  by  the  Fifth  Corps.  He  had  lost  two 
thousand  men  of  the  six  thousand  he  had  taken  into  the 
action. 

Birney's  line,  also  assailed  in  flank  and  front,  was  like- 
wise compelled  to  recede.  Sickles  was  wounded  and 
Birney  succeeded  to  the  command.  The  batteries  along 
the  lane  poured  into  the  advancing  foe  torrents  of  iron 
hail,  before  which  they  quailed  and  faltered,  but  their 
officers  could  be  seen  through  the  smoke  galloping  and 
swinging  their  swords  and  urging  their  men  forward. 
Crash !  crash !  with  discharges  deafening,  terrible,  the  fire 
went  on,  and  the  enemy,  reforming  after  each  discharge, 
sprang  forward  as  if  to  break  through  the  lines  by  mere 
weight  of  numbers.  Colonel  McGilvery,  commanding  the 
artillery  of  the  Federal  Third  Corps,  seeing  that  a  further 
backward  movement  was  inevitable,  directed  the  artiller- 
ists to  hold  their  position  until  he  could  place  a  new  line  of 
batteries,  drawn  from  the  reserve,  in  the  rear  as  a  rallying 
place.  The  men  stood  to  their  guns  until  the  enemy 
pressed  up  to  the  very  muzzles,  when  they  were  blown  to 
pieces  by  the  terrible  discharges  of  grape  and  canister. 
Still  on  and  on  others  pressed  with  demoniacal  yells,  climb- 
ing upon  the  limbers  and  shooting  the  horses.  At  length 
McGilvery's  new  line  was  established,  and  the  men  who 
had  succeeded  in  maintaining  their  positio/h  commenced 


326  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

to  withdraw  their  pieces.  Some  guns  for  want  of  horses 
had  to  be  abandoned,  but  the  cannoneers  brought  away 
the  rammers,  and  the  pieces  could  not  be  turned  upon 
their  slowly  retreating  owners.  Others  were  withdrawn 
by  their  own  rebound.  A  single  shell  from  u  Federal  gun 
killed  and  wounded  thirty  Confederates  out  of  a  company 
of  thirty  -  seven.  At  length,  after  the  most  determined 
resistance,  Birney's  line  uras  forced  back  to  near  Trostle's 
house  —  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  front  of  Little  Hound 
Top  —  when  new  actors  came  upon  the  scene.  Barnes' 
division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  composed  of  Sweitzer's  and 
Tilton's  brigades,  came  to  the  assistance  of  the  sorely 
pressed  troops.  After  a  gallant  but  short  fight,  these  men 
were  forced  back  across  what  has  become  historic — the 
Wheat  Field.  iNext  came  Caldwell's  division  of  the  Second 
Corps.  Into  the  Wheat  Field  they  plunged,  and  after 
losing  General  Zook,  Colonel  Cross,  and  many  other  excel- 
lent men,  were  enfiladed  and  ilankcd  and  driven  back. 
Then  came  Ayrcs  of  the  Fifth  Corps  with  his  division  of 
Regulars.  These  men  were  the  hcrocn  of  many  battles. 
They  had  been  lying  cast  of  Little  Round  Top,  and  when 
the  order  to  advance  was  given,  they  moved  upon  the 
double  quick  through  the  woods  to  the  summit  of  the  hill. 
Said  one:  "The  whole  scene  was  before  them;  the  tur- 
moil and  commotion  in  the  woods  below, — Barnes  going 
in  and  the  shattered  regiments  of  the  Third  Corps  coming 
out.  Some  batteries  were  in  retreat  and  others  were  tak- 
ing new  positions.  They  dashed  down  the  hillside,  be- 
came a  little  disorganized  in  crossing  Plum  Run,  but  formed 
again  and  went  up  the  ridge  among  the  boulders,  disap- 
peared in  the  woods,  stayed  a  few  minutes,  and  then,  like 


THE  WHIRLPOOL  OF  THE  BATTLE. 


327 


a  shattered  wreck  upon  the  foaming  sea,  came  drifting  to 
the  rear."  An  officer  of  the  Seventeenth  Regulars,  who 
participated  in  this  charge,  says:  ""We  went  down  the  hill 
upon  the  run;  it  was  like  going  down  into  hell!  The 


JTHE  WHEAT  FIELD,  OR  THE  SCENE  OF  THE  WHIRLPOOL  OF  THE  BATTLE. 

This  view  is  from  the  west,  and  shows  the  lane,  Zook's  Monument,  and  Round  Top 

beyond  the  Valley  of  Death.     (From  a  Photograph  by  Tipton.) 

onemy  were  yelling  like  devils.  Our  men  were  falling 
back.  It  was  terrible  confusion:  smoke,  dust,  the  rattle 
of  musketry,  the  roaring  of  cannon,  and  the  bursting  of 
shells."  * 

•Charles  C.  Coffin  in  "Boys  of  '61,"  page  285. 


328  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

The  fighting  in  the  Wheat  Field  has  been  called,  "  The 
Whirlpool  of  the  Battle,"  because  of  the  confusion,  the 
surging  backward  and  forward,  the  whirling  round  and 
round,  which  prevailed.  It  is  said  that  regiments  from 
three  corps,  and  eight  or  ten  brigades,  were  fighting  there 
promiscuously.  The  Confederate  lines  were  also  in  con- 
fusion. The  ground  in  this  field  and  in  the  Peach  Orchard, 
after  the  battle,  was  drenched  with  human  gore,  and  cov- 
ered with'  the  dead  and  wounded.  Five  hundred  Con- 
federates were  found  dead  in  the  Wheat  Field  alone. 
With  the  probable  exception  of  the  Bloody  Angle  at 
Spottsylvania,  on  no  other  places  of  equal  extent  upon  this 
continent  has  so  much  human  blood  been  shed.  The 
fighting  here,  and  throughout  the  whole  of  the  engage- 
ment of  this  afternoon,  was  not  exceeded  by  any  in  all  the 
previous  history  of  war  for  stubborn  pertinacity  and  de- 
structiveness. 

At  about  five  o'clock  p.  M.,  while  this  terrible  conflict 
.was  going  on,  and  when  the  sound  of  the  strife  indicated 
that  the  National  troops  were  being  driven  back,  General 
Warren,  Meade's  Chief  Engineer,  rode  to  the  signal  sta- 
tion, which  had  been  established  upon  Little  Round  Top, 
to  get  a  better  view  of  the  field.  Arriving  there  he  saw  at 
once  the  immense  importance  of  that  elevated  position, 
and  at  the  same  time  he  beheld  the  long  line  of  the  enemy 
approaching  it.  Even  then  the  advance  of  Hood  enveloped 
the  Union  force  below.  They  had  skirted  the  base  of  the 
hill,  clambered  over  the  rocks  by  the  "Devil's  Den,"  and 
were  making  desperate  efforts  to  seize  the  hill.  Seeing 
the  danger  if  the  heights  were  taken,  and  knowing  that 
once  in  the  enemy's  possession  the  whole  line  would  be 


DEATH    OF  VINCENT.  329 

untenable  under  the  guns  that  would  be  planted  there, 
"Warren  determined  at  all  hazards  to  secure  the  position. 
Barnes'  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps  was  just  then  going- 
forward  to  the  charge  already  referred  to,  and  Warren 
with  the  utmost  speed  dashed  down  to  Barnes  and  de- 
tached Vincent's  brigade  and  hurried  it  up  the  hill.  The 
men  did  not  take  time  to  load  their  pieces,  but  advanced 
with  the  bayonet  and  reached  the  crest  in  time  to  save  it. 
But  still  on  came  the  enemy.  They  were  specially^  in- 
structed to  take  that  hill,  and  had  pledged  their  word  that 
they  would  do  so,  and  were  determined  at  all  hazards  to 
keep  their  pledge.*  The  rocks  around  the  heights  were 
swarming  with  the  defiant  enemy  and  the  contest  soon 
became  fearful.  An  eye-witness  thus  describes  the  scene: 
"At  the  base  of  the  hill  was  Barnes'  division  —  all  brave 
men  —  Michigan,  Maine,  Pennsylvania,  and  New  York. 
Furiously  the  enemy  threw  themselves  upon  them.  Round 
Top  must  be  held  if  the  battle  were  not  to  be  lost.  Loud, 
even  above  the  deadly  roar  of  the  cannon,  rang  out  the 
gallant  Vincent's  words,  '  Don't  yield  one  inch ! '  But,  at 
the  same  instant,  his  inspiring  voice  was  silenced.  Down, 
from  the  exposed  rock  on  which  he  had  leaped,  waving  his 
sword  in  the  air,  he  fell,  bleeding,  in  the  agonies  of  a  shat- 
tered thigh.  The  whole  division  of  Barnes  stood  as  firm 

*If,  as  is  alleged  by  Southern  writers,  Lee  and  Longstreet  had  seen  the 
importance  of  Little  Round  Top,  and  had  given  explicit  orders  to  Hood  to 
take  and  hold  it,  the  subordinate  officers  seem  to  have  been  ignorant  of  it, 
as  will  be  seen  in  the  following  statement  by  Colonel  Swallow,  who,  in  a 
letter  to  the  writer,  says : 

"The  Fifteenth  Alabama  Regiment,  Hood's  right  regiment,  passed  imme- 
diately over  the  summit  of  Round  Top.  I  had  this  not  only  from  General 
Hood  many  times  before  he  died,  but  I  was  on  the  ground  in  August,  1880, 
with  Colonol  Oats,  who  commanded  that  regiment.  But  its  value  at  the 
time  was  not  appreciated." 


330  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

as  the  ground  they  were  determined  to  hold.  The  enemy 
came  on  yelling  and  running  with  the  fixed  bayonet  charge 
which  so  few  troops  can  withstand;  but  the  patriots  did 
not  waver.  It  was  not  an  attack  in  line,  it  was  not  a 
charge,  it  was  a  melee,  a  carnival  of  death.  Men  hewed 
each  other's  faces;  they  grappled  in  close  embrace,  murder 
to  both ;  and  all  through  it  rained  shot  and  shell  from  one 
hundred  pieces  of  artillery  along  the  ridge."* 

Another  description  of  this  terrific  scene  is  thus,  given: 
"Before  Vincent  fell  he  sent  word  to  Barnes  that  the 
enemy  were  upon  him  in  overwhelming  numbers,  and 
Hazlett's  regular  battery,  supported  by  the  One  Hundred 
and  Fortieth  New  York,  under  Colonel  O'Rourke  of 
Weed's  brigade,  was  sent  as  a  reinforcement.  The  battery 
was  dragged  with  great  labor  to  the  crest  of  Little  Round 
Top,  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth  was  posted  on 
the  slope  on  Vincent's  right.  They  came  upon  the  field 
just  as  the  enemy,  after  -failing  to  penetrate  the  center, 
had  driven  back  the  right.  In  advancing  to  this  exposed 
position,  Colonel  O'Rourke,  a  brilliant  young  officer  who 
had  just  graduated  at  the  head  of  his  class  at  West  Point, 
was  killed,  and  his  men  thrown  into  some  confusion,  but 
Vincent  rallied  the  line  and  repulsed  the  assault.  In  doing 
so  he  exposed  himself  very  much,  and  was  soon  killed  by 
a  Confederate  sharp-shooter.  General  Weed,  who  was 
on  the  crest  with  a  battery,  was  mortally  wounded  in  the 
same  way,  and  as  Hazlett  leaned  over  him  to  hear  his  last 
message,  a  fatal  bullet  struck  him  also  and  he  dropped 
dead  on  the  body  of  his  chief."  f 

*  Abbott's  "Civil  War,"  volume  n,  page  407. 

fGeneral  Doubleday's  "Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  page  169. 


CONFEDERATE  ACCOUNT  OF  ROUND  TOP.        331 

It  will  be  of  interest,  after  having  descriptions  of  the 
terrific  struggle  for  the  possession  of  Round  Top  from 
Federal  witnesses,  to  have  a  statement  from  a  participant 
on  the  Confederate  side.  The  following  account  is  from 
an  article  contributed  to  the  Philadelphia  Weekly  Times, 
of  December  13th,  1884,  by  Colonel  R.  M.  Powell,  of  the 
Texas  brigade,  Hood's  division : 

"  Captain  Gorce,  of  Longstreet's  staff,  after  communi- 
cating -orders  to  General  Hood,  rode  down  the  line  and 
remarked  that  the  possession  of  Little  Round  Top — point- 
ing to  its  rugged  heights  —  was  necessary.  The  Texans 
were  expected  to  take  it. 

"  'We'll  do  it!'  was  the  reply. 

"  The  signal  was  given  and  a  sheet  of  flame  sprang  along 
the  enemy's  lines,  hurling  defiance  at  the  advancing  Con- 
federates. Smoke  from  either  side  rolled  in  billows,  meet- 
ing and  writhing  in  conflict  in  the  valley  midway  the 
engaging  armies.  Soon  the  artillery  duel  ceased  and 
rattling  musketry  announced  that  the  serious  work  had 
begun. 

"  On  rushed  the  Texans,  sweeping  from  their  path  cavalry 
which  met  them  on  the  Emmittsburg  pike,  on  through 
the  'Devil's  Den,' blazing  with  infernal  fire,  crushing  and 
destroying  opposing  forces  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain, 
onward  and  upward  they  struggled  over  precipitous  rocks, 
where  the  enemy,  lying  in  ambush,  was  surprised.  The 
ascent  was  so  difficult  as  to  forbid  the  u?e  of  arms.  At 
last,  weary  and  almost  exhausted,  we  reached  the  topmost 
defenses  of  the  enemy.  Now  the  conflict  raged  with  wild 
ferocity.  We  were  caught  in  a  cul-de-sac  or  depressed 
basin,  surrounded  on  three  sides  by  projecting  or  shelving 


332  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

rocks  surmounted  by  a  stone  fence.  Captain  Cleveland, 
with  a  voice  heard  above  the  din  of  battle,  offered  a  purse 
to  the  first  man  over  the  works.  Sergeant  Ross  sprang 
forward  to  earn  the  reward  when  Cleveland  ordered  him 
back  to  his  post,  remarking:  'File  closers  not  included.' 

'"Swing  up  the  left,  Major  Rogers.' 

"'I'll  do  it,  colonel,  by  jingo.' 

"Just  at  the  moment  of  these  utterances  there1  was  a 
sudden  cessation  of  firing,  and  the  last  words,  'by  jingo,' 
were  distinct  and  sounded  so  ludicrous  as  to  excite  laughter. 

"  The  scene  was  strikingly  like  a  devil's  carnival.  Another 
yell  and  desperate  charge  followed,  succeeded  by  a  sudden 
and  an  awful  hush,  just  as  if  every  one  had  been  stricken 
with  death.  I  raised  my  head  from  the  ground,  where  I 
lay  prostrated  by  a  wound.  The  only  moving  man  I  saw 
was  Sergeant  Ross.  He  leisurely  approached  the  enemy's 
line  and  taking  his  ramrod,  which  had  been  left  leaning 
against  a  rock,  he  walked  deliberately  to  the  rear.  I  could 
see  men  lying  around  in  every  direction  and  in  all  atti- 
tudes. This  desolate  silence  continued  at  least  thirty 
minutes;  to  me  it  seemed  like  thirty  hours.  The  twilight 
was  fading  into  night  before  the  victors  came  to  gather 
spoils  and  take  charge  of  the  wounded.  To  their  regret 
the  wounded  were  the  only  ones  who  had  crossed  the 
enemy's  works." 

But  the  contest  for  the  possession  of  Round  Top  was 
not  yet  ended.  The  enemy  had  stolen  around  and  were 
pressing  up  between  Little  and  Big  Round  Top.  Colonel 
Chamberlain  with  the  Twentieth  Maine,  who  held  the  ex- 
treme left,  seeing  them  coming  until  they  moved  past  his 
flank,  immediately  extended  his  own  left  flank  by  forming 


GENERAL   CRAWFORD'S   CHARGE.  333 

his  men  in  single  rank,  and  although  greatly  outnumbered 
he  still  maintained  his  position.  He  also  called  for  as- 
sistance, but  before  reinforcements  could  reach  him,  Hood's 
men  had  gained  the  eastern  side  of  the  hill  and  were 
pressing  him  from  that  direction.  The  Twentieth  Maine, 
in  order  to  meet  the  enemy  in  this  new  direction,  formed 
its  line  in  the  shape  of  the  letter  U,  with  the  yelling  and 
howling  Confederates  in  front,  on  their  left  flank,  and  in 
their  rear.  It  was  a  critical  moment.  The  crisis  had 
come.  If  Round  Top  was  taken  the  battle  was  lost,  and 
the  defeat  of  the  National  army  assured.  But  it  was  not 
lost.  Help  was  at  hand.  The  greater  part  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps  had  been  summoned  from  the  right,  and  leaving 
their  breastworks  they  went  upon  the  double-quick  to 
the  assistance  of  the  sorely  -  pressed  troops  upon  the  left. 
Stannard's  brigade  of  Yermonters,  up  to  that  time  held 
in  reserve,  went  with  a  -vyild  run  to  strengthen  Hancock's 
line.  But  the  grand  finale  was  left  to  the  gallant  sons  of 
Pennsylvania.  General  S.  "Wiley  Crawford,  who  com- 
manded the  third  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  composed 
of  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  was  ordered  to  drive  back  the 
foe.  General  Crawford  immediately  directed  Colonel  Mc- 
Candless,  commanding  the  first  brigade,  to  form  his  com- 
mand and  charge  down  the  slope.  McCandless  formed 
his  brigade  in  two  lines;  the  second  massed  on  the  first. 
General  Crawford,  in  a  few  well  chosen  words,  called  upon 
his  .men  to  defend  the  soil  of  their  native  state,  and  then 
seizing  the  colors  of  one  of  the  regiments,  led  the  way 
against  the  foe.  The  first  line,  after  advancing  some 
distance,  delivered  two  well-directed  volleys  upon  the 
enemy,  and  then  with  terrific  yells  dashed  upon  them,  and 


334  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

bore  the  whole  force  headlong  down  the  slope  and  across 
Plum  Run.  The  enemy  made  a  short  resistance  at  a  stone 
fence  some  little  distance  in  advance,  but  were  soon  driven 
from  it.  This  stone  wall,  thus  gained,  was  held  by  the 
Reserves.  This  gallant  charge  turned  the  fortune  of  the 
day,  but  it  was  attended  with  the  loss  of  many  men,  among 
whom  was  Colonel  Frederick  Taylor,  commander  of  the 
JBucktail  Regiment. 

Upon  the  repulse  of  Hood's  men  from  Round  Top, 
General  Longstreet,  who  had  Hood's  place — that  general 
having  been  wounded  —  rode  forward  to  reconnoitre,  and 
seeing  two  brigades  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  which  had  been 
called  into  position  to  meet  any  further  efforts  upon  that 
eminence,  became  discouraged  and  abandoned  the  contest. 
Round  Top  was  saved,  and  during  the  night  it  was  forti- 
fied and  transformed  into  a  Gibraltar.  Big  Round  Top, 
too,  although  not  so  important  as  its  lesser  companion, 
because  artillery  could  not  be  taken  to  its  summit,  was  also 
occupied  and  breastworks  thrown  up. 

An  incident  occurred  about  the  closing  hour  of  this  bat- 
tle that  deserves  special  mention.  Stannard's  Vermont 
brigade,  although  nearly  all  raw  and  inexperienced  soldiers, 
iiccomplished  prodigies  of  valor.  After  having  success- 
fully driven  back  Wright's  brigade,  it,  at  the  instigation 
of  General  Hancock,  retook  from  the  enemy  a  battery  of 
four  guns,  which  had  been  abandoned  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Gordon's  house.  After  bringing  these  guns  in,  pursued 
by  the  enemy,  the  brigade  was  reinforced  by  the  Four- 
teenth Maine  regiment,  when  it  recharged  upon  the  pur- 
suing Confederates,  and  captured  two  more  cannon  and 
•eighty  -  three  prisoners.  These  were  also  brought  into 


CONFEDERATE   ARITHMETIC.  335 

Hancock's  lines  amidst  the  cheers  and  congratulations  of 
his  men. 

As  has  been  said  before,  the  numbers  engaged  in  this 
battle  on  both  sides  have  been  greatly  exaggerated.  The 
truth  of  history  requires  that  facts  alone  should  be  stated. 
If  the  reader  would  see  a  specimen  of  Confederate  arithme- 
tic, he  has  only  to  refer  to  General  Longstreet's  second  con- 
tribution to  the  Annals  of  the  War,  pages  621,  622.  General 
Longstreet  states  the  number  of  his  own  forces  engaged  as 
thirteen  thousand;  and  in  a  foot  note  to  page  626,  he  says 
subsequent  information  showed  that  he  had  but  about  twelve 
thousand.  The  number  of  Federals  opposed  to  him  he 
places  at  sixty -five  thousand,  as  follows:  The  Third  Corps, 
eleven  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety -eight;  the 
Fifth  Corps,  ten  thousand  one  hundred  and  thirty- six; 
Sixth  Corps,  fifteen  thousand  four  hundred  and  eight; 
Pennsylvania  Reserves,  four  thousand  live  hundred;  Lock- 
wood's  Maryland  brigade,  two  thousand  five  hundred,  and 
detachments  from  the  Twelfth  and  other  corps,  about 
twenty  thousand.  The  fallacy  of  the  general's  estimate  will 
be  seen  in  this,  that  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  formed  part 
of  the  Fifth  Corps,  while  the  Sixth  and  Twelfth  corps  did 
not  participate  in  the  engagement  at  all.  Two  brigades 
of  the  Sixth  Corps  were  drawn  up  in  line  to  meet  any 
further  attempt  to  take  Round  Top  after  the  charge  by  the 
Reserves,  and  that  part  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  which  was 
sent  to  assist  the  left  arrived  there  too  late  to  fire  a  single 
gun.  Longstreet's  force  consisted  of  the  four  brigades  of 
McLaws' division,  four  of  Hood's,  and  three  of  Anderson's 
division  of  Hill's  Corps.  These  eleven  brigades  were  com- 
posed of  fifty  regiments.  Now  if  General  Longstreet's  esti- 


336  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

mate  is  correct,  these  regiments  averaged  but  two  hundred 
and  forty  men  each,  leaving  out  the  artillery  entirely. 
The  fallacy  of  the  general's  statement  is  too  apparent  to 
require  any  further  notice.  The  Federal  forces  engaged 
were  the  Third  and  Fifth  corps,  and  Caldwell's  division 
of  the  Second  Corps,  and  probably  a  few  others.  The 
total  number  did  not  exceed  thirty  thousand.  The  ad- 
vantage of  numbers  was  undoubtedly  with  the  Federals, 
but  not  to  the  extent  that  General  Longstreet  claims. 

In  this  terrific  engagement  of  about  three  hours,  the 
losses  on  both  the  Federal  and  Confederate  sides  were 
very  heavy.  General  Sickles  was  severely  wounded,  ne- 
cessitating the  amputation  of  one  of  his  limbs  above  the 
knee.  Generals  Zook,  Weed,  and  Vincent,  and  Colonels 
O'Rourke,  Taylor,  Cross,  Ellis,  and  several  other  eminent 
officers  were  killed,  and  many  others  wounded.  General 
Longstreet,  in  Annals  of  the  "War,  page  426,  admits  a  loss 
of  four  thousand  five  hundred  and  twenty- nine  in  his  two 
divisions  which  were  engaged.  The  losses  of  the  three 
brigades  of  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  Corps,  which  were 
also  in  the  engagement,  although  not  stated,  were  also 
very  heavy.  Among  the  distinguished  officers  who  suf- 
fered upon  the  Confederate  side,  were  General  Barksdale, 
of  Mississippi,  killed,  and  Generals  Hood,  Semmes,  and 
Heth,  wounded. 

As  a  striking  illustration  of  the  unnatural  and  fratricidal 
character  of  the  strife,  the  following  occurence  is  related: 
In  the  yard  attached  to  the  house  which  stands  in  the 
angle  of  the  read  across  the  lane  from  the  Peach  Orchard 
—  marked  upon  the  maps  of  the  battle  field,  "Wentz's 
House"  —  stood  a  Confederate  battery,  commanded  by 


EWELL'S  DELAY.  337 

Lieutenant  Wentz.  This  officer  was  brought  up  in  that 
house,  and  his  parents,  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  yet  resided 
there.  Some  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  he 
went  South,  and  now  came  back  in  command  of  a  Con- 
federate battery,  and  by  a  singular  coincidence,  his  battery 
was  ordered  into  position  in  his  father's  yard.  Before  his 
guns  opened  upon  the  patriot  troops,  some  of  whom  were 
his  former  neighbors  and  associates  (in  the  Pennsylvania 
Reserves  were  a  number  of  men  whose  homes  ^ere  in 
sight  of  Round  Top),  this  recreant  son  of  Pennsylvania 
placed  his  aged  parents  in  the  cellar  of  their  house  to  save 
them  from  the  missiles  of  death  which  his  guns  would 
draw  upon  them. 

It  will-  be  recollected  that  Lee's  plan  for  the  battle  of 
this  day  contemplated  a  simultaneous  attack  upon  both 
wings  of  the  Federal  army,  while  Hill,  who  occupied  the 
Confederate  center,  was  to  throw  his  force  in  whatever 
direction  he  could  accomplish  the  most.  But  for  reasons 
which  are  as  inexplicable  as  the  delay  of  Longstreet  in 
opening  the  battle  upon  the  left,  Ewell  delayed  his  attack 
upon  the  right  until  Longstreet's  assault  had  been  re- 
pulsed, and  the  engagement  upon  that  part  of  the  field  was 
over.  And  even  when  his  assault  was  made,  it  was  not 
made  in  concert,  but  disjointed  and  consequently  unsup- 
ported. 

It  was  nearly  eight  o'clock — one  hour  after  the  battle  had 
ended  on  the  Federal  left  —  before  E well's  troops  were  in 
position  to  commence  the  attack.  Previous  to  that  time 
there  had  been  some  sharp  firing  along  the  center  and  right, 
but  nothing  like  a  general  engagement  had  taken  place. 
General  Ewell  had  advanced  Johnson's  division,  which  had 

22 


338  THE    GKEAT    INVASION. 

been  posted  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  Confederate  line, 
and  had  been  directed  to  assail  the  right  of  Gulp's 
Hill;  and  with  the  purpose  of  preventing  reinforcements 
from  being  sent  from  the  center,  Early  was  directed  to 
carry  Cemetery  Hill  by  assault.  Rodes'  division  was  to  sup- 
port Early  in  this  attack.  Fender's  division  of  Hill's  Corps 
was  also  expected  to  take  part  in  the  engagement,  if  circum- 
stances made  it  necessary.  Early  moved  forward,  Hays' 
brigade  on  the'right,  Iloke's  brigade  on  the  left,  and  Gor- 
don's in  reserve.  As  these  troops  approached,  the  power- 
ful batteries  upon  the  hill  were  brought  to  bear  upon  them 
with  fearful  effect,  and  the  left  and  center  were  compelled 
to  fall  back.  The  right,  however,  composed  of  the  re- 
nowned fighters  known  as  "  The  Louisiana  Tigers,"  under 
the  shelter  of  the  houses  of  the  town,  were  enabled  to  ap- 
proach the  Federal  line,  and  after  driving  Von  Gilsa's 
brigade,  which  it  encountered  at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  they 
made  a  sudden  and  irresistible  rush  for  the  summit.  Weid- 
rick's  battery  was  captured,  and  two  of  Ricketts'  guns  were 
spiked.  These  captured  guns  were  about  being  turned 
upon  the  Federal  right,  when  a  brigade  of  Schurz's  troops 
fell  upon  the  temporarily  successful  Tigers,  and  a  most 
desperate  hand  to  hand  fight  ensued,  which  for  ferocity 
and  determination  had  no  parallel  in  all  the  war.  The 
bayonet  was  freely  used  on  both  sides,  and  brains  were 
beaten  out  with  clubbed  muskets,  hand -spikes,  cannon- 
rammers,  and  even  stones.  The  troops  occupying  this 
hill  had  been  addressed  by  their  officers,  and  the  import- 
ance of  holding  it  to  the  last  had  been  impressed  upon 
them.  At  length  General  Hancock,  seeing  that  no  demon- 
stration upon  his  lines  was  intended,  and  fearful  that  the 


DEFEAT   OF   THE   LOUISIANA   TIGERS.  339 

liill  would  be  carried  and  his  position  flanked,  and  thus 
the  army  compelled  to  retreat,  sent  Carroll's  brigade  to 
the  rescue.  Carroll  was  joined  by  the  One  Hundred  and 
Sixth  Pennsylvania  and  some  reinforcements  from  Schurz's 
division.  These  troops  went  in  upon  the  enemy  with  a 
cheer,  and  finding  that  they  were  about  to  be  overwhelmed, 
with  no  one  coming  to  their  assistance,  the  Confederates 
fell  back.  In  their  retreat  they  suffered  fearfully  from 
the  Federal  batteries,  which  poured  into  them  tremendous 
discharges  of  grape  and  canister.  The  Louisiana  Tigers 
had  met  their  match,  and  Howard's  Germans  redeemed 
themselves  from  the  reproach  of  Chancellorsville.  This 
whole  engagement  lasted  but  a  short  time,  but  in  that 
;short  space  these  noted  fighters  were  sadly  worsted.  The 
.severity  of  their  losses  may  be  seen  in  the  fact  that  Hays' 
.and  Hoke's  brigades,  which  were  engaged  in  the  assault, 
lost  respectively  three  hundred  and  thirteen  and  three 
hundred  and  forty -five  men.  The  Louisiana  Tigers  be- 
longed to  the  former. 

The  failure  of  General  Rodes  to  support  Early  in  this 
uttack  is  accounted  for  as  follows:  General -Rodes,  it  will 
be  remembered,  occupied  the  town  of  Gettysburg  from 
Early's  right  to  Seminary  Ridge.  His  explanation  of  his 
failure  to  be  on  hand  in  time  is  thus  stated  by  himself: 

"  After  I  had  conferred  with  General  Early  on  my  right 
and  General  Lane  upon  my  left,  and .  arranged  to  attack 
in  concert,  I  proceeded  at  once  to  make  the  necessary 
preparations ;  but  as  I  had  to  draw  my  troops  out  of  the 
town  by  the  flank,  change  the  direction  of  the  line  of 
battle,  and  then  traverse  a  distance  of  twelve  or  fourteen 
Jiundred  yards,  while  General  Early  had  to  move  only 


THE  CONFEDERATES  LOSE  AN  OPPORTUNITY.      341 

half  that  distance,  without  change  of  front,  it  resulted 
that,  before  I  drove  in  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  General 
Early  had  attacked  and  been  compelled  to  withdraw." 

Johnson's  division,  which  had  been  sent  to  attack  the 
Federal  right,  did  not  reach  a  position  to  become  engaged 
until  after  Early  had  been  repulsed  on  the  center,  and  con- 
sequently he  failed  to  receive  any  benefit  from  that  attack. 
The  part  of  the  Federal  line  which  he  assailed  had  been 
weakened  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  greater  \part  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps  to  assist  the  left  in  repelling  Longstreet, 
and  was  held  by  Greene's  brigade  alone,  and  of  course 
this  attack  upon  this  weakly  defended  position  was  suc- 
cessful. The  few  troops  there,  after  a  gallant  resistance, 
were  driven  from  their  intrenchments  before  reinforce- 
ments could  be  sent  to  their  assistance,  and  their  works 
were  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Had  Johnson  been  aware 
of  his  exact  position,  and  pushed  on  a  few  hundred  yards 
further,  he  would  have  taken  possession  of  the  Baltimore 
pike,  been  in  the  rear  of  the  Federal  center,  possibly  cap- 
turing General  Meade's  head  -  quarters,  and  the  ammu- 
nition trains,  which  were  parked  but  a  short  distance 
below.  But  he  did  not  know  the  full  extent  of  the  ad- 
vantage he  had  gained,  and  sat  down  and  waited  for  the 
morning,  expecting  then  to  push  forward.  How  he  suc- 
ceeded in  that  purpose  will  be  told  in  the  ensuing  chapter. 

At  about  ten  o'clock  at  night  the  series  of  battles  of  this 
day  closed,  and  the  situation  was  as  follows:  The  Federal 

NOTE. — The  illustration  on  the  opposite  page  represents  the  scene  upon 
Kast  Cemetery  Hill  immediately  upon  the  repulse  of  the  Louisiana  Tigers. 
General  Meade  and  staff  are  seen  to  the  right,  upon  Gulp's  Hill,  and  an  officer 
is  reporting  the  repulse  of  the  enemy.  The  poplar  tree  to  the  left,  amidst 
the  smoke,  stands  upon  the  summit  of  the  hill,  near  the  Cemetery  gate.  The 
•Christian  Commission  is  also  represented  ministering  to  the  wounded. 


342  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

line  was  intact  except  upon  the  right  where  Johnson  occu- 
pied a  portion  of  their  works.  Longstreet  on  the  left 
occupied  the  ground  taken  by  Sickles,  but  the  line  as  orig- 
inally intended  was  intact  and  firmly  held.  Evidently  no 
decided  advantage  had  been  gained  by  either  of  the  con- 
testants, but  the  results  upon  the  whole  were  favorable  to 
the  Federals,  and  the  Confederates  were  less  exultant  and 
boastful.  General  Lee,  in  his  official  report  of  this  day's 
operations,  says: 

"After  a  severe  struggle,  Longstreet  succeeded  in  gain- 
ing possession  of  and  holding  the  desired  ground.  Ewell 
also  carried  some  of  the  strong  positions  which  he  assailed; 
and  the  result  was  such  as  to  lead  to  the  belief  that  he 
would  be  able  to  dislodge  the  enemy.  The  battle  closed 
at  dark.  These  partial  successes  determined  me  to  con- 
tinue the  assault  next  day." 

General  Longstreet,  in  Annals  of  the  "War,  page  426, 
says  that  when  he  ordered  his  troops  to  withdraw  from 
the  contest,  he  "  dispatched  a  courier  to  General  Lee,  in- 
forming him  of  the  day's  work."  Colonel  Freemantle,  of 
the  British  army,  who  was  with  General  Longstreet  at  the 
battle,  says  in  his  communication  to  Blackwood' 's  Magazine? 
that,  the  message  Longstreet  sent  to  Lee  contained  these 
words:  "  We  are  doing  well."  General  Hill,  in  referring  in 
his  official  report  to  the  condition  of  Longstreet's  right  at 
the  close  of  the  battle,  says:  "Hood's  right  was  held  as  in 
a  vise."  There  seems  to  be  a  lack  of  unanimity  among 
these  distinguished  officers,  and  we  rather  think  General 
Hill  was  correct  in  his  statement,  for  in  the  attack  of  thc- 
following  day,  Longstreet's  right  was  held  so  tightly  that 
he  himself  concedes  that  he  could  not  use  it.* 

*  Annals  of  the  War,  page  627. 


MISTAKES    OF    THE   CONFEDERATES.  343 

The  mistakes  made  this  day  by  the  Confederates  may 
be  stated  thus: 

1.  The   delay   of   General    Longstreet   in  getting   his 

troops  into  position  and  commencing  the  attack. 

I 

Had  the  attack  upon  the  left  been  made  early  in  the 
day,  when  the  lines  were  but  weakly  held,  they  would 
most  certainly  have  been  broken.  Or  had  it  been  made 
soon  after  Lee  decided  upon  his  plan  and  issued  his  orders 
—  say  from  eleven  A.  M.  to  two  p.  M.,  when  the^ixth  Corps 
arrived,  —  success  might  have  been  reasonably  expected. 
It  seems  surprisingly  strange  that  ten  hours  —  say  from 
six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  when  the  divisions  of  McLaws 
and  Hood  could  have  been  put  in  motion,  until  four  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  when  the  battle"  began  —  were  consumed 
in  marching  four  miles  and  getting  ready  for  action.  Gen- 
eral Longstreet  will  have  to  offer  more  plausible  reasons 
for  this  delay  than  any  he  has  yet  given, 'or  history  will 
hold  him  accountable  for  the  failure  of  this  day. 

2.  The   failure    of  General    Hill   to  support   Wilcox, 
Perry,  and  Wright.     These  three '  brigades  formed  the  left 
of  Longstreet's  line,  and,  after  driving  Humphreys  back 
from  his  position  along  the  Eminittsburg  road,  they  not 
only  followed  him  up,  inflicting  heavy  losses  upon  him, 
but  actually  pierced  the  main  Federal  line.     Perry's  bri- 
gade, which  occupied  the  center  of  these  pursuing  forces, 
was  driven  backi)y  the  fire  from  the  main  line,  but  Wright 
and  Wilcox  pressed  on,  and  the  former  actually  pierced 
the  line  and  held  it  for  a  short  time,  but  was  compelled 
to  abandon  it  because  he  was  not  supported.     In  this  affair 
Wilcox  claims  to  have  captured  twenty  guns  and  Wright 
eight,  but  they  were  not  able  to  hold  them  or  take  them 


344  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

along  in  their  retreat.  Had  these  two  brigades  been 
promptly  supported,  as  Lee's  orders  to  Hill  contemplated, 
the  results  to  the  National  cause  would  have  been  disas- 
trous indeed;  but  for  want  of  support  they  were  compelled 
to  relinquish  the  hold  they  had  gained. 

A  correspondent  of  the  Richmond  Inquirer,  writing  from 
Hagerstown  on  July  8th,  1863,  —  a  few  days  after  the 
battle  —  speaking  of  this  failure  to  support  Wilcox  and 
"Wright,  says: 

"We  now  had  'the  key'  to  the  enemy's  stronghold,  and, 
apparently,  the  victory  was  won.  McLaws  and  Hood  had 
pushed  their  line  well  up  the  slope  on  the  right ;  Wilcox 
had  pierced  the  enemy's  main  line  on  the  summit  of  Mc- 
Pherson's  heights,  capturing  his  heavy  batteries,  thus 
breaking  the  connection  between  the  right  and  left  wings. 
I  said  that,  apparently,  we  had  won  the  victory.  It  re- 
mains to  be  stated  why  our  successes  were  not  crowned 
with  the  important  results  which  should  have  followed 
such  heroic  bravery.  Although  the  order  was  peremptory 
that  all  of  Anderson's  division  should  move  into  action 
simultaneously,  Brigadier -General  Posey,  commanding  a 
Mississippi  brigade,  and  Brigadier -General  Mahone,  com- 
manding a  Virginia  brigade,  failed  to  advance.  This 
failure  of  these  two  brigades  to  advance  is  assigned,  as  I 
learn  upon  inquiry,  as  the  reason  why  Pender's  division 
of  Hill's  corps  did  not  advance — the  order  being,  that  the 
advance  was  to  commence  from  the  right,'  and  be  taken  up 
along  the  whole  line.  Pender's  failure  to  advance  caused 
the  division  on  his  left — Heth's  —  to  remain  inactive. 
Here  we  have  two  whole  divisions,  and  two  brigades  of 
another,  standing  idle  spectators  of  one  of  the  most  des- 


FAILURE    TO    USE    PICKETT.  345 

perate  and  important  assaults  that  has  ever  been  made 
on  this  continent — fifteen  thousand  or  twenty  thousand 
men  resting  on  their  arms,  in  plain  view  of  a  terrible 
battle,  witnessing  the  mighty  efforts  of  two  little  brigades 
(Wright's  and  Wilcox's,  for  Perry  had  fallen  back  over- 
powered,) contending  with  the  heavy  masses  of  Yankee 
infantry,  and  subject  to  a  most  deadly  fire  from  the  enemy's 
heavy  artillery,  without  a  single  effort  to  aid  them  in  the 
assault,  or  to  assist  them  when  the  heights  were  carried." 

General  Hill's  failure  to  support  these  two~4)rigades  is 
as  inexplicable  as  Longstreet's  tardiness. 

3.  The  failure  to  send  into  the  .fight  Pickett's  division. 
Pickett  reached  the  field  about  three  o'clock,  and  had  his 
.division  been  thrown  into  the  engagement  about  six 
o'clock,  when  the  result  seemed  to  be  so  doubtful,  it  might 
have  enabled  Longstreet  to  drive  the  Federals  from  their 
position  a.nd  turn  their  left.  This  would  have  been  fatal 
to  them  and  insured  their  defeat.  In  the  event  that  Pickett 
had  been  thus  used,  the  only  troops  that  could  have  been 
brought  against  him  would  have  been  the  Sixth -Corps. 
This  corps  had  only  reached  the  field,  after  a  forced  march 
of  thirty-five  miles,  at  two  o'clock,  and  were,  like  Pickett's 
men,  tired  and  needing  rest.  Pickett's  division,  however, 
had  only  marched  twenty -five  miles,  and  had  not  lost  the 
previous  night's  rest,  as  did  Sedgwick's  men,  who  had  been 
upon  the  road  continuously  since  seven  o'clock  the  previous 
evening.  History  abounds  with  instances  in  which  wearied 
troops,  after  long  and  hard  marching,  have  been  thrown 
v  immediately  into  action  and  turned  the  tide  of  battle,  and, 
in  some  instances,  changed  the  course  of  history.  Dessaix, 
after  a  long  and  forced  -march-,  from  early  morning  until 


346  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  went  immediately  into  action 
and  changed  Napoleon's  defeat  into  the  splendid  victory 
of  Marengo.  Blucher  reached  the  field  of  Waterloo  at 
six.  o!clock  in  the  evening  from  a  long  and  fatiguing 
march,  and  changed  the  tide  of  battle  and  saved  the  allied 
armies  of  Europe  from  complete  overthrow.  And  Claudius 
Nero,  after  marching  day  and  night,  went  right  into  battle,, 
overthrew  the  Carthaginians  and  saved  Rome.  Pickettr 
however,  was  not  used  because  of  the  wearied  condition 
of  his  men. 

4.  The  failure  of  General  Ewell  to  attack  the  Federal 
center  and  right  simultaneously  with  Longstreet's  attack 
upon  the  left. 

Instead  of  opening  his  attack  upon  Cemetery  and  Gulp's 
hills  at  the  same  time  that  Longstreet  attacked  upon  the 
left  (about  four  o'clock  p.  M.),  General  Ewell  was  not  ready 
for  his  advance  until  nearly  dusk,  or  about  eight  p.  M.,  when 
the  battle  there  was  entirely  over.  If  Longstreet  is  charge- 
able with  inexcusable  tardiness  in  getting  his  t¥oops  into- 
position,  when  they  had  four  miles  to  march  from  the- 
vicinity  of  Marsh  Creek,  where  they  tarried  over  night,. 
what  must  be  thought  of  General  Ewell's  failure  to  be- 
ready  to  advance  to  the  assault  at  the  same  time  that  the- 
former  did,  when  his.  troops  were  resting  within  their 
lines  all  through  the  day  and  night  previous?  And  as  in- 
the  case  of  the  former,  so  with  the  latter,  the  excuses  and 
causes  assigned  are  entirely  inadequate  and  unsatisfactory. 
General  Longstreet,  in  retaliation  for  Swell's  complaints 
and  charges  against  him  touching  this  matter  of  his  tardi- 
ness, says  that  the  real  cause  of  the  latter's  failure  to  com- 
mence the  attack  at  the  same  time  he  did  was,  that  he  had 


GENERAL    EARLY's    MISTAKE.  347 

broken  his  lines  by  sending  ofi'two  of  his  brigades  on  some 
duty  up  the  York  road.  * 

5.  The  inexplicable  folly  of  General  Early  in  the  post- 
ing of  his  troops  for  the  assault  on  Cemetery  Hill,  Colonel 
Swallow,  in  his  letter  to  the  writer,  elsewhere  referred  tor 
says : 

"The  line,  which  was  formed  in  the  morning,  was  in  the 
following  order:  The  right  of  Early's  division  was  held 
by  Gordon,  the  center  by  Hays,  and  the  left  by  Smith. 
But  this  was  changed  in  the  attack  that  followed.  Early 
removed  Gordon  to  a  position  behind  the  railroad  running 
to  Hanover,  a  short  distance  from  the  York  pike.  Smith's 
brigade  was  sent  to  Stuart's  cavalry.  This  foolish  move 
on  the  part  of  Early  broke  our  line  of  battle.  The  attack 
was  really  made  on  Cemetery  Hill,  in  the  evening  of  the 
2d,  by  Hays'  and  Hoke's  brigades,  while  Gordon  was  in 
reserve  on  the  north  side  of  the  railroad,  and  Smith's  bri- 
gade was  guarding  the  York  pike  for  Stuart's  cavalry  ^ 
Although  upon  General  Rodes'  staff,  I  had  been  detached 
at  Hagerstown  by  order  of  General  Evvell  to  accompany 
Early's  division  to  Gettysburg  and  York,  by  reason  of 
my  familiarity  with  the -country,  the  roads,  cross-roads, 
and  many  of  the  people,  especially  in  and  about  York. 
In  the  evening,  just  before  the  attack  upon  Cemetery  Hill 
was  ordered-,  I  was  sent  fey  General  Hays  to  Rodes  to  ask 
him  to  rally  on  our  division  and  assist  us  in  the  attack.  I 
found  my  old  commander  completely  choked  up  in  the 
narrow  streets  of  the  town  with  his  division,  and  conse- 
quently he  could  not  aid  us." 

General  Early  would  do  well  to  satisfactorily  explain  his 

*  General  Longstreet,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  428. 


348  THE    GKEAT   INVASION. 

reasons  for  this  breaking  of  his  line  at  such  a  critical  time, 
before  his  criticisms  of  General  Longstreet  are  admissible. 
He  knew  that  he  was  expected  to  assault  the  Federal  cen- 
ter simultaneously  with  Longstreet's  assault  on  the  left, 
and  he  had  every  reason  to  believe  that  that  assault  might 
be  made  at  any  moment,  and  yet,  notwithstanding  these 
weighty  considerations,  he  broke  his  line,  and  was  unpre- 
pared to  act  simultaneously,  and  when  he  did  act  it  was 
not  done  with  sufficient  force.  Had  the  line  as  originally 
formed  been  intact,  and  the  assault  been  made  by  four 
brigades  instead  of  but  two,  the  result  might  have  been 
far  different  from  what  it  was.  If  Rodes  had  not  gotten 
into  confusion,  but  assisted  Early  in  the  assault,  the  re- 
sults might  have  been  still  more  disastrous  to  the  Federals. 
And  had  Rodes,  Early,  and  Johnson  all  attacked  simul- 
taneously, when  the  assault  was  made,  even  though  they 
did  not  act  in  concert  with  Longstreet  on  the  other  flank, 
success  would  have  been  highly  probable.  The  whole 
affair,  it  will  be  seen,  was  badly  managed  and  sadly  dis- 
jointed. There  was  an  utter  want  of  co-operation  and 
harmony  in  the  movements  of  the  several  commands,  and 
for  these  causes  no  decisive  results  were  achieved. 

6.  Another  very  serious  failure  of  the  Confederates 
was  in  not  taking  advantage  of  the  position  Johnson  had 
gained  within  the  Federal  lines  upon  their  right.  The 
position  won  was  of  immense  importance.  Its  capture 
was  an  open  breach  in  the  lino  of  defense,  through  which 
troops  might  have  been  passed  in  force,  and  the  strong- 
hold on  Cemetery  Hill  rendered  untenable.  General  Ewell 
certainly  was  not  aware  of  the  importance  of  this  position, 
or  he  undoubtedly  would  have  passed  Rodes'  division 


GENERAL    SICKLES'    MISTAKE.  349 

through  the  gap.  Had  he  done  so  the  consequences  might 
have  been  terribly  disastrous  to  the  Federals.  Says  an 
eminent  Southern  writer,  "  If  any  man  can  answer  truly 
and  give  the  reason  why  the  position  gained  by  Ewell's 
Corps,  under  General  Johnson,  on  Thursday  night,  was 
not  followed  up  and  reinforced,  he  will  give  one  of  the' 
strongest  reasons  why  Lee  lost  Gettysburg." 

Is  it  not  clear,  then,  that  the  confusion  in  the  counsels 
of  the  Confederate  chieftains,  which  was  so  conspicuous 
in  their  failure  to  follow  up  the  advantages^which  they 
gained  in  the  first  day's  fight,  by  carrying  and  occupying 
both  Cemetery  and  Gulp's  hills,  still  adhered  to  them,  and 
caused  them  to- blunder  on  until  their  final  defeat? 

But  the  mistakes  of  that  day  were  not  all  upon  the  Con- 
federate side.  The  Federal  commanders  committed  some 
grave  errors,  which  might  have  proved  fatal  to  the  Na- 
tional cause;  and  fidelity  to  the  truth  of  history  requires 
that  they  be  stated.  These  errors  were  as  follows: 

1.  General  Sickles  certainly  erred  in  .posting  his  corps 
upon  the  advanced  position  he  chose.  Suppose  that  Hood, 
instead  of  attacking  him  upon  the  line  he  was  expected 
to  take,  had  flanked  him  and  passed  around  and  below 
Big  Round  Top,  and  threatened  an  attack  from  that  di- 
rection, or  interrupted  the  Federal  communications,  was 
not  the  Sixth  Corps,  numbering  fifteen  thousand  men, 
sufficiently  able  to  have  attended  to  him?  And  was  not 
that  corps  in  precisely  the  right  place — in  reserve  behind 
Round  Top  —  to  meet  such  an  emergency  as  that?  And 
^suppose,  too,  that  Longstreet  had  occupied  the  high 
ground,  which  Sickles  supposed  would  render  the  line 
on  the  lower  ground  in  the  rear  untenable,  that  would 


•350  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

not  have  insured  him  the  advantage  which  Sickles  feared 
its  possession  would  give.  General  Longstreet  occupied 
that  very  ground  after  he  drove  Sickles  from  it,  and  yet 
he  could  not  use  it  to  much  advantage  in  the  battle  of 
the  third  day. 

2.  General   Meade  should   have   known   before  three 
o'clock   in  the  afternoon  just    where   Sickles'    line   was. 
Especially  is  this  true  when  he,  as  he  himself  says,  "  was 
in  doubt  concerning  his  left."     He  had  ample  time  —  from 
.seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  when  the  last  of  the  Third 
Oorps  reached  the  field  —  to  have  seen  to  this  matter.     It 
would   seem  that   a  judicious   commander   would   desire 
personally  to  see  after  so  important  a  matter  as  a  flank 
<of  his  army  in  the  presence  of  a  powerful  foe. 

3.  The    failure    to    perceive    the    importance    of,   and 
properly   occupy    Little   Round    Top,  until    it   was   acci- 
dentally   seen   and    occupied,   is   one  of  the   inexplicable 
wonders  of  that  day.     Hancock  and  Geary  discovered  its 
immense  importance  and  did  all  they  could  to  occupy  and 
hold  it,  but  their  efforts  seem  not  to  have  been  seconded  by 
either  General  Meade  or  Sickles.     The  Confederates  per- 
ceived the  importance  of  this  hill,  and  explicit  instructions 
were  given  the  men  to  seize  and  hold  it  at  all  hazards; 
but  the  discovery  of  its  importance  by  the  Federal  com- 
manders, especially   by  those   whose  special  duty   it  was 
to  see  after  such  things,  seems  to  have  been  entirely  acci- 
dental.    Nay,  worse  than  this:  that  position  was  rejected 
by  Sickles  as  of  no  account.     It  seems  that  General  Meade 
directed  General  Sickles  to  occupy  Little  Round  Top  "  if 
it  was  practicable   to  occupy  it,"  and   he  reported   that 
"  There  is  no  position  there."     And  yet  that  hill  was,  as  is 


IMPORTANCE    OF    LITTLE    ROUND    TOP.  351 

universally  admitted,  tlie  key  to  the  whole  position,  and 
the  issue  of  the  battle,  and  probably  the  destiny  of  the 
government  depended  upon  its  occupation.  General  Long- 
street  says: 

"  The  importance  of  Round  Top  as  a  point  d'appui  was 
not  appreciated  until  my  attack.  General" Meade  seems 
to  have  alluded  to  it  as  a  point  to  be  occupied  '  if  practica- 
ble,' but  in  such  slighting  manner  as  to  show  that  he  did 
not  deem  it  of  great  importance.  So  it  was  occupied  by 
an  inadequate  force.  As  our  battle  progressed,  pushing 
the  Federals  back  from  point  to  point,  subordinate  officers 
and  soldiers,  seeking  shelter  as  birds  fly  to  cover  in  a  tem- 
pest, found  behind  the  large  boulders  of  its  rock -bound 
sides,  not  only  protection,  but  rallying  points.  These  re- 
inforcements to  the  troops  already  there,  checked  our  ad- 
vance on  the  right,  and  some  superior  officers,  arriving 
just  then,  divined  from  effect  the  cause,  and  threw  a  force 
upon  Round  Top  that  transformed  it,  as  if  by  magic,  into 
a  Gibraltar."* 

4.  It  was  undoubtedly  an  error  to  withdraw  the  Twelfth 
Corps  from  so  important  a  position  as  the  right,  thereby 
exposing  it  to  easy  capture.  Reinforcements  should  have 
been  called  from  the  Sixth  Corps,  which  was  in  reserve 
within  convenient  distance.  The  weakening  of  the  line 
on  the  right  cost  hundreds  of  precious  lives  the  follow- 
ing day. 

Such  were   undoubtedly  some  of  the  mistakes   which 

were  made  on   the  memorable  day   under   consideration. 

The  God  of  Nations,  however,  overruled  all,  and  gave 

jvictory  to  the  right.     He  did  not  intend  that  the  Republic 

should  be  overthrown. 

*  Annals  of  the  War,  page  425. 


352 


THE    GREAT    INVASION. 


General  Meade  had  made  his  head -quarters  in  a  small 
frame  house,  sixteen  by  twenty  feet,  on  the  western  brow 
of  Cemetery  Ridge,  near  the  center  and  along  side  the 
Taneytown  road.  The  situation  was  such  that  it  seemed 
to  be  sheltered  from  exposure,  and  from  which  the  com- 
mander in  chief  could  easily  communicate  with  all  parts 


GENERAL   MEADE'S  HEAD -QUARTERS. 
From  a  Photograph  by  Beidel. 

of  his  lines.  In  that  unpretentious  cottage,  in  the  evening 
after  the  close  of  the  bloody  battles  of  this  day,  the  Union 
chieftains  were  assembled.  General  Meade  had  called 
them  together  to  take  into  consideration  the  situation  and 
advise  him  what  was  best  to  do.  The  questions  submitted 
to  them  were: 

First.   Under  existing  circumstances  is  it  advisable  for 


FEDERAL    COUNCIL   OF   WAR.  353 

this  army  to  remain  in  its  present  position,  or  to  retire  to 
another  nearer  its  base  of  supplies? 

Second.  It  being  determined  to  remain  in  its  present 
position,  shall  the  army  attack  or  wait  the  attack  of  the 
enemy? 

Third.     If  we  wait  attack,  how  long? 

To  these  momentous  questions  the  following  answers 
were  given,  as  recorded  by  General  Butterfield,  Meade's 
chief  of  staff: 

GENERAL  GIBBON.  —  First,  correct  the  position  of  the 
army,  but  would  not  retreat;  second,  in  no  condition  to 
attack  the  enemy;  third,  until  the  enemy  moves. 

GENERAL  NEWTON.  —  First,  correct  the  position  of  the 
army,  but  would  not  retreat;  second,  by  all  means  not  at- 
tack; third,  if  we  wait  it  will  give  them  a  chance  to  cut 
our  line. 

GENERAL  HANCOCK. —  First,  rectify  position  without  mov- 
ing so  as  to  give  up  the  field;  second,  not  attack  unless  our 
communications  are  cut;  third,  can  not  wait  long,  can  not 
be  idle. 

GENERAL  HOWARD.  —  First,  remain ;  second,*  wait  attack 
until  four  P.  M.  to-morrow;  third,  if  the  enemy  do  not  at- 
tack, attack  them. 

GENERAL  SEDGWICK.  —  First,  remain;  second,  wait  attack; 
third,  at  least  one  day. 

GENERAL  WILLIAMS.  —  First,  stay;  second,  wait  attack; 
third,  one  day. 

GENERAL  BIRNEY.  —  Same  as  General  Williams. 
V    GENERAL  SYKES.  —  Same  as  General  "Williams. 

GENERAL  SLOCUM.  —  Stay  and  fight  it  out. 

Of  the  corps  commanders,  two,  it  will  be  seen,  were  ab- 


23 


354  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

sent  from  this  meeting.  Keynolds  was  dead,  and  his 
honored  remains  were  at  his  former  home  at  Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania;  and  Sickles  was  undergoing  the  amputa- 
tion of  one  of  his  legs  in  a  neighboring  hospital. 

This  council  was  held  after  the  desperate  and  bloody 
battles  of  the  two  previous  days,  the  first  of  which  had 
been  a  disaster,  and  the  second  without  material  advantage 
to  the  Union  army.  It  was  reasonable  to  assume  that  as 
the  results  so  far  had  been  rather  in  favor  of  the  Confed- 
erates, that  they  would  repeat  their  attacks  the  next  day, 
and  that  their  most  desperate  and  deadly  blow  was  yet  to 
be  delivered !  With  such  momentous  results  hanging  over 
him,  with  the  destiny  of  a  nation  in  his  keeping,  it  was 
but  prudent  and  right  that  General  Meade  should  call 
together  the  men  upon  whom  he  would  have  to  depend, 
and  ascertain  their  views  and  secure  their  counsel.  And 
it  was  right  too  that  he  should  have  every  preparation 
made  to  carry  into  immediate  execution  the  decision  they 
arrived  at.  Hence  he  came  to  this  council  with  an  order 
to  retire  to  the  line  at  Pipe  Creek  previously  selected,  pre- 
pared by  his  chief  of  staff,  General  Butterfield,  to  be  used 
only  in  case  the  reports  from  his  corps  commanders  made 
evident  the  necessity  of  changing  the  field.  This  was  a 
wise  precaution,  but  General  Meade  has  been  unjustly 
criticised  for  it,  and  his  enemies  have  tried'  to  make  it  ap- 
pear that  he  was  timid  and  undecided.  But  when  this 
council  was  held,  and  the  universal  sentiment  was  to  re- 
main and  meet  the  issue  upon  that  field,  he  at  once  de- 
cided to  remain  at  Gettysburg  and  fight  the  battle  there, 
which  decided  the  fate  of  the  Confederacy. 

Before  closing  this  chapter  it  will  interest  the  reader  to 


AT  GENERAL  LEE'S  HEADQUARTERS.         355 

lake  a  look  into  General  Lee's  head  -  quarters  in  the  night 
after  this  day's  series  of  battles.  A  Southern  officer,  who 
was  present  there,  describes  the  scene  in  the  Southern 
Bivouac.  He  says: 

"  About  ten  o'clock  at  night  of  Thursday,  July  2d,  while 
conversing  with  General  Rodes,  the  writer  received  a  note 
from  Rev.  Dr.  Pryor,  a  chaplain  in  EwelFs  Corps,  inform- 
ing me  that  I  was  wanted  at  army  head  -  quarters.  These 
were  situated  near  the  Chambersburg  pike.  In  riding 
through  the  town  it  was  filled  with  Confederates,  who, 
soldier -like,  were  busy  in  preparing  their  meals  all  along 
the  streets.  They  appeared  to  be  in  the  highest  spirits. 
On  reaching  army  head  -  quarters  it  was  crowded  with 
staff  officers  from  all  quarters  of  the  field.  All  seemed 
gratified  with  the  results  of  the  day:  certainly  nobody 
looked  gloomy  or  despondent.  Pickett's  division  had  ar- 
rived from  Chambersburg  and  was  posted  in  line.  About 
eleven  p.  M.  all  faces  were  made  cheerful  and  all  hearts 
made  glad  by  the  arrival  at  head -quarters  of  Generals 
J.  E.  B.  Stuart  and  Fitzhugh  Lee.  General  A.  P.  Hill 
came  in,  shaking  hands  with  his  friends,  and  as  soon  as 
the  commanding  general  heard  the  voice  of  General  Hill 
he  moved  through  the  crowd  and,  shaking  Hill  by  the 
hand,  said,  'It  is  all  well,  General,  everything  is  all  well;* 
and  taking  Hill  aside  spoke  to  him  privately  for  nearly 
a  quarter  of  an  hour. 

"The  commanding  general  looked  well.  He  was  all  him- 
self, and  never  appeared  to  better  advantage.  This  was 
the  first  time  the  writer  had  seen  General  Lee  since  the 
night  of  the  battle  at  Beverly's  Ford,  June  9th.  It  was 
one  o'clock  before  Colonel  Marshall  announced  my  name, 


356  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

when  General  Lee  arose  and  said,  1 1  am  expecting  Gen- 
eral Imboden  in  the  morning,  and  I  am  desirous  to  send 
to  Virginia  at  once  as  many  of  our  wounded  as  possible. 
Doctor  Pryor  has  told  me  that  you  and  CaptainvBrocken- 
borough  are  acquainted  with  the  fords  of  the  upper  Poto- 
mac, and  I  want  you  both  to  report  to  General  Imboden 
at  ten  o'clock  to  -  morrow.  Colonel  Taylor  will  issue  the 
necessary  orders.'  I  informed  the  commanding  general 
that  Doctor  Pryor  was  mistaken,  that  neither  I  nor  Brock- 
enborough  knew  anything  of  these  fords,  except  the  ones 
at  Shepherdstown  and  Williamsport;  that  we  were  both 
well  acquainted  with  the  fords  of  the  Rappahannock,  but 
not  of  the  Potomac;  that  Mr.  Logan,  of  Winchester,  who 
was  in  Rodes'  command,  was  well  informed  on  the  subject. 
Turning  quickly  around,  the  commanding  general  said, 
'  Hunt  up  Mr.  Logan  and  send  him  to  me  at  once.'  He 
was  full  of  business,  and  his  strong  mind  and  intellectual 
energies  were  taxed  to  their  utmost.  The  fences  all  around 
the  head  -  quarters  were  lined  with  soldiers  who  had 
participated  in  the  struggle  of  the  day,  relating  their 
experiences.  The  writer  remained  with  these  until  the 
morning  sun  appeared  on  Friday,  July  3d,  when  he  re- 
turned to  his  command." 


CHAPTER  Yin. 

THE  THIRD  DAY  OF  THE  BATTLE  OP  GETTYSBURG  —  FRIDAY, 
JULY  3D,  1863. 


the  night  succeeding  the  terrible  battles 
which  have  been  described  in  the  previous  chapter, 
i     there  were  some  readjustments  made  in  the  lines 


r 


I.    preparatory  to  the  renewal  of  the  conflict  on  the 


succeeding  day.     Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's 


Corps,  which,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  been  left  in  the 
vicinity  of  Chambersburg  to  protect  the  rear,  left  its  en- 
campment early  on  Thursday  morning  and  reached  the 
field  of  battle  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  This 
division  was  placed  to  the  left  of  Anderson  and  to  the 
right  of  Heth,  and  directly  opposite  to  the  Federal  left 
center,  where  the  Second  Corps  under  Hancock  was  sta- 
tioned. Johnson's  division,  which  had  gained  a  foothold 
within  the  line  upon  the  Federal  right,  was  reinforced  with 
Daniel's  and  O'Neill's  brigades  of.  Rodes'  division.  This 
was  done  so  as  to  be  ready,  by  the  dawn  of  day,'  to  im- 
prove the  advantage  gained,  and,  if  possible,  obtain  com- 
plete possession  of  Gulp's  Hill  and  the  Baltimore  pike. 
Thus  massed,  General  Ewell  designed  to  throw  his  whole 
force  upon  the  Federal  right,  while  Longstreet  with  his 
newly  arrived  division,  assisted  by  large  detachments  from 
Hill's  Corps,  was  to  perform  a  similar  work  upon  the  left 

357 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

center.  Stuart's  cavalry,  which  had  only  reached  the  field 
from  its  erratic  course  around  the  Federal  army  about  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  day  previous,  was  placed 
near  the  Confederate  left.  The  Federal  forces  were  not 
inactive  during  the  night.  Round  Top  had  been  made 
invulnerable,  and  its  batteries  of  heavy  artillery  had  com- 
plete control  of  the  field.  The  Federal  cavalry,  too,  re- 
lieved from  the  pursuit  of  Stuart,  had  reached  the  field, 
and  were  judiciously  posted  upon  the  respective  flanks. 
But  the  point  which  required  the  first  and  most  careful 
attention  was  the  right.  Johnson's  position  there  en- 
dangered the  safety  of  the  whole  army,  and  General  Slo- 
cum  was  directed  to  storm  his  intrenchments.  Geary's 
division,  which  had  been  detached  the  evening  before  to 
assist  the  sorely  pressed  left,  returned  about  midnight  and 
joined  Green  who  had  remained.  Shaler's  and  Wheaton's 
brigades  of  the  Sixth  Corps  and  Lockwood's  Maryland 
brigade,  were  sent;  to  reinforce  the  Twelfth.  Batteries  of 
artillery  were  established  on  all  prominent  points,  and  all 
possible  preparations  were  made  to  renew  the  fight  at  the 
break  of  day.  General  Slocum,  seconded  by  Geary,  and 
others,  was  determined  to  drive  back  the  Confederates  at 
all  hazards.  General  Ewell,  too,  was  equally  determined, 
not  only  to  hold  the  position  he  had  gained,  but  to  push 
his  advantage  and  if  "possible  get  into  the  rear  of  the 
Federal  right  center.  The  immense  importance  of  the  oc- 
casion was  now  understood  by  both  the  contending  parties,, 
and  both  were  determined  to  do  their  utmost  in  the  ap- 
proaching struggle. 

As  soon  as  objects  could  be  discerned  in  the  early  day- 
light of  the  morning,  the  Federal  batteries  opened  upon 


GREEK  MEETS  GREEK.  359 

the  enemy.  As  Johnson,  on  account  of  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  had  not  been  able  to  bring  his  artillery  with  him, 
he  was  unable  to  reply,  and  he  determined  at  once  to 
charge  in  the  hope  of  driving  the  Federal  troops,  and 
securing  a  better  position  upon  higher  ground.  His  men 
— the  old  Stonewall  brigade  leading — rushed  forward,  but 
were  bravely  met  by  Kane's  brigade  of  Geary's  division. 
In  a  few  minutes  the  battle  became  general  along  the 
whole  of  Slocum's  line,  and  for  six  hours  it  raged  most 
furiously.  The  fighting  at  this  point,  like  that  of  the 
afternoon  preceding  upon  the  left,  was  regarded  as  the 
most  obstinate  and  deadly  of  the  war.  "With  fiendish  yell 
and  mad  contempt  of  death,  the  enemy  time  and  again 
hurled  his  solid  masses  against  the  Federal  lines,  but  they 
stood  like  a  wall  of  devouring  fire.  At  length,  at  about 
ten  A.  M.,  Johnson  was  compelled  to  fall  back  before  a 
charge  by  Geary's  division.  Slowly,  reluctantly,  inch  by 
inch,  fighting,  falling,  dying,  the  Confederates  were  pressed 
back  out  of  the  breast  -  works,  which  they  had  temporarily 
occupied,  and  up  to  Rock  Creek.  As  they  retreated  and 
came  under  nre  of  the  Federal  batteries,  they  were  merci- 
lessly cut  down  by  repeated  and  tremendous  discharges  of 
grape  and  canister.  Nothing  during  the  war  exceeded  this 
engagement  in  carnage.  The  slain  were  lying  literally  in 
heaps.  In  front  of  Geary's  position  were  more  Confed- 
erate dead  than  the  entire  list  of  casualties  in  the  whole 
of  the  Twelfth  Corps.  Human  beings,  mangled  and  torn, 
in  every  manner,  from  a  single  shot  through  the  body  or 
head  to  bodies  torn  to  pieces  by  exploding  shells,  were 
everywhere.  The  Stonewall  Brigade,  like  the  Louisiana 
Tigers  the  evening  before,  had  met  their  match.  Their 


360  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

reputation  for  invincible  courage  was  unimpeached,  but 
the  stone  -  wall  this  time  stood  in  their  way,  and  they 
had  to  yield  to  the  inevitable.  At  eleven  o'clock  the  bat- 
tle ceased,  and  the  Federal  line  was  once  more  intact.  * 

General  Longstreet,  who,  it  will  be  remembered,  did  not 
favor  an  attack  upon  the  Federal  position,  but  counseled 
Lee  to  move  around  by  the  left  and  get  between  them  and 
Washington,  and  thereby  compel  General  Meade  to  march 
out  and  meet  him  in  the  plain,  sought  at  an  early  hour  in 
the  morning  to  see  his  commander  and,  if  possible,  have 
him  adopt  this  plan.  General  Longstreet  says  of  this  in- 
terview: "I  did  not  see  General  Lee  that  night.  On  the 
next  morning  he  came  to  see  me,  and,  fearing  that  he  was 
still  in  his  disposition  to  attack,  I  tried  to  anticipate  him 
by  saying:  *  General.  I  have  had  my  scouts  out  all  night, 
and  I  find  that  you  still  have  an  excellent  opportunity  to 
move  around  to  the  right  of  Meade's  army,  and  maneuver 
him  to  attacking  us.'  He  replied,  pointing  with  his  fist  at 
Cemetery  Hill,  '  The  enemy  is  there,  and  I  am  going  to 
strike  him.'  I  felt  that  it  was  my  duty  to  express  my  con- 
victions. I  said:  'General,!  have  been  a  soldier  all  my 
life.  I  have  been  with  soldiers  engaged  in  fights  by 
couples,  by  squads,  companies,  regiments,  divisions,  and 
armies,  and  should  know,  as  well  as  any  one,  what  soldiers 
can  do.  It  is  my  opinion  that  no  fifteen  thousand  men 
ever  arrayed  for  battle  can  take  that  position,'  pointing  to 
Cemetery  Hill.  General  Lee,  in  reply  to  this,  ordered  mo 

*The  severity  of  this  engagement  upon  the  Federal  right  may  be  seen  in 
the  facl:,  that  Johnson's  division,  which  was  mainly  engaged,  lost  1,188  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  The  Twelfth  Corps,  which  opposed  Johnson, 
lost  1,081  men.  Other  troops  on  both  sides  who  were  also  engaged,  lost  as 
heavily  in  proportion. 


PREPARING  TO  ATTACK  THE  FEDERAL  CENTER.     861 

to  prepare  Piekett's  division  for  the  attack.  I  should  not 
have  been  so  urgent  had  I  not  foreseen  the  hopelessness  of 
the  proposed  assault.  I  felt  that  I  must  say  a  word  against 
the  sacrifice  of  my  men;  and  then  I  felt  that  my  record 
was  such  that  General  Lee  would  or  could  not  miscon- 
strue my  motives.  I  said  no  more,  however,  but  turned 
away.  The  plan  of  assault  was  as  follows:  Our  artillery 
was  to  be  massed  in  a  wood,  from  which  Pickett  was  to 
charge,  and  it  was  to  pour  a  continuous  fire  upon  the 
eirapy.  Under  cover  of  this  fire,  and  supported  by  it, 
Pickett  was  to  charge." 

O 

General  Lee,  having  now  attacked  both  flanks  of  the 
Federal  army,  and  failed  in  both,  had  but  two  alternatives, 
—  either  to  attack  the  center,  or  withdraw  his  forces.  He 
chose  the  former,  and  after  riding  along  his  line  with 
Longstreet,  and  reconnoitering  and  planning,  at  length 
committed  to  that  general  the  execution  of  his  plan.  Piek- 
ett's division,  which  was  supposed  to  be  the  flower  of  his 
army,  had  only  reached  the  field  the  afternoon  before, 
and  had  not  therefore  been  engaged.  With  this  choice 
division  of  well-tried  and  veteran  troops,  supported  by 
others  whom  we  shall  mention  hereafter,  it  was  proposed 
to  pierce  the  Federal  left  center.  Preparatory,  however, 
to  this  great  charge,  the  artillery  was  to  concentrate  its 
fire  upon  Cemetery  Hill  with  a  view  to  dismount  the  guns, 
demoralize  the  men,  and  thereby  prepare  the  way  for  the 
assault.  General  Alexander,  Longstreet's  chief  of  artil- 
lery, massed  several  batteries  close  together  on  the  elevated 
ground  near  the  Peach  Orchard,  (south  of  the  Emmitts- 
burg  road,)  which  had  been  taken  from  Sickles  the  day 
before.  All  along  the,  north  side  of  the  Ernmittsburg 


362  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

road,  extending  towards  Gettysburg,  as  far  as  Codori's 
house,  many  batteries  were  placed.  It  was  on  this  line 
that  the  celebrated  Washington  artillery,  under  Eshelmanr 
was  posted,  while  Deering's  artillery  was  still  further  to 
the  left  of  the  line  toward  the  town.  All  along  the  top  of 
Seminary  Ridge,  partly  concealed  by  a  skirt  of  woods,  and 
still  further  on  in  a  circle,  all  around  the  ridge  to  the  Har- 
risburg  road,  batteries  upon  batteries  were  placed,  ready  to- 
join  in  the  horrid  din  and  hurl  their  missiles  of  destruction 
upon  the  Federals.  It  is  said  that  General  Alexander,  in 
his  official  report,  shows  the  number  of  pieces  in  position 
to  have  been  nearly  two  hundred,  of  which  about  one 
hundred  and  forty  were  in  and  around  the  Confederate 
center,  while  the  remaining  sixty  pieces  were. on  the  right 
and  left  of  the  line.  This  number  is  probably  too  large. 
Federal  authorities  place  the  number  at  about  one  hundred 
and  twenty. 

Let  us  now,  before  proceeding  to  detail  the  greatest  and 
most  momentous  struggle  that  ever  occurred  upon  the 
American  continent,  pay  a  visit  to  General  Meade's  head- 
quarters and  see  what  is  transpiring  there,  and  what  pre- 
parations are  being  made  for  the  great  event.  Orderlies- 
were  gathered  about  the  door.  Others  were  continually 
coming  in  with  reports.  Signal  officers  were  sending  in 
reports  telegraphed  from  signal  stations.  The  staff  were 
about  the  commanding  general,  engaged  in  earnest  con- 
sultation. The  plan  of  the  enemy  was  well  understood,, 
and  the  gravity  of  the  situation  was  duly  appreciated. 
There  was  no  fear,  but  a  solemn  determination  to  resist 
the  expected  shock,  and  overcome  at  all  hazards.  Such, 
too,  was  the  spirit  which  prevailed  throughout  the  entire 


A   TERRIBLE   CONFLICT.  368 

army.     It  was  the  determination  of  all  to  repulse  the  at- 
tack or  die  in  the  effort. 

From  eleven  o'clock,  when  the  battle  ceased  upon  the 
right,  until  one  p.  M.  silence  prevailed.  It  was  the  solemn 
pause  of  preparation,  as  if  both  sides  were  nerving  for  the 
last,  the  supreme  effort.  At  length  at  precisely  seven 
minutes  past  one  o'clock,  the  awful  silence  was  broken  by 
a  signal  gun  upon  Seminary  Ridge.  This  was  immediately 
followed  by  the  terrific  roar  of  one  hundred  and  twenty 
guns,  the  fire  of  which  was  concentrated  upon  that  part  of 
the  line  commanded  by  General  Hancock.  This  command 
comprised  the  First,  Second,  Third,  and  Eleventh  Corps. 
Owing  to  the  convex  shape  of  the  Federal  line,  but  eighty 
guns  could  be  placed  to  answer  the  Confederate  fire.  These, 
however,  belched  forth  defiance  and  death.  This  horrid 
din  continued  for  nearly  two  hours,  and  was  not  ex- 
ceeded by  anything  like  it  that  ever  occurred  upon  this 
continent,  and  it  may  be  upon  the  entire  globe.*  The 
very  heavens  seemed  to  be  rent  asunder  by  a  succes- 
sion of  crashing  sounds  as  if  the  artillery  of  the  skies 
were  let  loose  upon  earth.  The  air  was  filled  with  whiz- 
zing, screaming,  bursting  shells,  which  sent  many  a  mortal 
to  his  last  account.  A  single  shell  which  exploded  in  the 
Cemetery,  killed  and  wounded  twenty -seven  men  in  one 
regiment.  .  Two  Federal  batteries  were  demolished,  and 
eleven  caissons  blown  up.  When  the  smoke  from  these 
explosions  was  seen  by  the  Confederates,  their  shouts  and 

*  It  may  surprise  the  reader  to  learn  that  the  sound  of  this  cannonading 
was  heard  one  hundred  and  forty  miles  from  Gettysburg.  This  fa<fl  will  be 
established  in  Chapter  XI.,  where  undoubted  testimony  will  be  given,  togeth- 
er with  philosophical  explanations  by  Professors  Spencer  F.  Baird,  of  the 
Smithsonian  Institute,  and  A.  B.  Johnson,  of  the  United  States  Light  -  House 
Board. 


364  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

yells  of  exultation  could  at  times  be  heard  above  the  roar 
of  the  guns.  Horses  were  blown  to  pieces,  trees  were  rid- 
dled and  cut  down,  rocks  were  splintered  sending  their 
fragments  in  all  directions,  tombstones  and  iron  railing  in 
the  Cemetery  were  shivered,  the  ground  was  scored  and 
furrowed,  and  men  were  killed,  but  the  batteries  were  not 
silenced.  The  infantry  sought  shelter  behind  ledges  and 
stone  fences,  but  the  artillerists  at  the  guns  suffered  most. 
The  destruction  on  both  sides  was  terrible,  but  the  Feder- 
als were  damaged  most,  because  of  the  concentration  of 
the  enemy's  fire  and  their  superior  number  of  guns. 

Mr.  Wilkinson,  of  the  New  York  Tribune,  who  was  at 
General  Meade's  head  -  quarters,  thus  describes  the  awful 
scene : 

"  In  the  shadow  cast  by  the  tiny  farm  house,  sixteen  by 
twenty,  which  General  Meade  had  made  his  head  -  quarters, 
lay  wearied  staff*  officers  and  tired  correspondents.  There 
was  not  wanting  to  the  peacefulness  of  the  scene  the  sing- 
ing of  a  bird,  which  had  a  nest  in  a  peach  tree  within  the 
tiny  yard  of  the  whitewashed  cottage.  In  the  midst  of  its 
warbling  a  shell  screamed  over  the  house,  instantly  fol- 
lowed by  another,  and  another,  and  in  a  moment  the  air 
was  full  of  the  most  complete  artillery  prelude  to  an  in- 
fantry battle  that  was  ever  exhibited.  Every  size  and 
form  of  shell  known  to  British  and  American  gunnery 
shrieked,  whirled,  moaned,  wh'stled,  and  wrathfully  flut- 
tered over  our  ground.  As  many  as  six  in  a  second,  con- 
stantly two  in  a  second,  bursting  and  screaming  over  and 
around  the  head  -  quarters,  made  a  very  hell  of  fire  that 
amazed  the  oldest  officers.  They  burst  in  the  yard — burst 
next  to  the  fence  on  both  sides,  garnished  as  usual  with 


A    STORM    OF    SHELLS.  365 

the  hitched  horses  of  aides  and  orderlies.  The  fastened 
animals  reared  and  plunged  with  terror.  Then  one  fell, 
then  another  —  sixteen  lay  dead  and  mangled  before  the 
fire  ceased,  still  fastened  by  their  halters,  which  gave  the 
expression  of  being  wickedly  tied  up  to  die  painfully. 
These  brute  victims  of  a  cruel  war  touched  all  hearts. 
Through  the  midst  of  the  storm  of  screaming  and  ex- 
ploding shells  an  ambulance,  driven  by  its  frenzied  con- 
ductor at  full  speed,  presented  to  all  of  us  the  marvelous 
spectacle  of  a  horse  going  rapidly  on  three  legs.  A  hinder 
one  had  been  shot  off'  at  the  hock.  A  shell  tore  up  the 
little  step  at  the  head  -  quarters  cottage,  and  ripped  bags 
of  oats  as  with  a  knife.  Another  soon  carried  off'  one  of 
its  two  pillars.  Soon  a  spherical  case  burst  opposite  the 
open  door — another  ripped  through  the  low  garret.  The 
remaining  pillar  went  almost  immediately  to  the  howl  of  a 
fixed  shot  that  Whitworth  must  have  made.  During  this 
fire  the  horses  at  twenty  and  thirty  feet  distant  were  re- 
ceiving their  death,  and  soldiers  in  Federal  blue  were  torn 
to  pieces  in  the  road,  and  died  with  the  peculiar  yells  that 
blend  the  extorted  cry  of  pain  with  horror  and  despair. 
Not  an  orderly,  not  an  ambulance,  not  a  straggler  was  to 
be  seen  upon  the  field  swept  by  this  tempest  of  orchestral 
death,  thirty  minutes  after  it  commenced.  Were  not  one 
hundred  and  twenty  pieces  of  artillery  trying  to  cut  from 
the  field  every  battery  we  had  in  position  to  resist  their 
proposed  infantry  attack,  and  to  sweep  away  the  slight 
defenses  behind  which  our  infantry  were  waiting?  Forty 
minutes  —  fifty  minutes  —  counted  watches  that  ran,  O  so 
languidly!  Shells  through  the  two  lower  rooms.  A  shell 
into  the  chimney  that  did  not  explode.  Shells  in  the  yard. 


366  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

The  air  thicker  and  fuller,  and  more  deafening  with  the 
howling  and  whirring  of  these  infernal  missiles.  The 
chief  of  staff  struck —  Seth  Williams  —  loved  and  respected 
through  the  army,  separated  from  instant  death  by  two 
inches  of  space  vertically  measured.  An  aid  bored  with 
a  fragment  of  iron  through  the  bone  of  the  arm.  And 
the  time  measured  on  the  sluggish  watches  was  one  hour 
and  forty  minutes." 

It  will  be  of  interest  to  know  what  was  transpiring 
during  this  time  within  the  Confederate  lines.  The  fol- 
lowing accounts  by  Confederate  officers  will  be  read  with 
interest.  Colonel  W.  H.  Swallow,  in  the  Southern  Bivouac, 
February,  1886,  says: 

"It  was  on  the  western  slope  of  Seminary  Ridge  and 
between  it  and  Wil  lough  by  Run  that  the  assaulting  column 
was  formed.  *  *  *  Immediately  after  the  column  was 
formed  Generals  Lee,  Longstreet,  and  Pickett  rode  along 
the  lines  several  times  inspecting  the  different  alignments. 
They  then  rode  aside  and  had  an  earnest  and  animated 
conversation  together.  After  this  conversation  all  three 
again  rode  along  the  column  and  then  retired  together. 
Their  whole  conduct  showed  in  a  manner  not  to  be  mis- 
taken, how  extremely  dangerous  and  full  of  doubt  these 
officers  regarded  the  proposed  assault.  As  General  Lee 
rode  away  he  looked  mournfully  at  the  column  and  mut- 
tered more  to  himself  than  to  others,  'The  attack  must 
succeed.' " 

The  following  graphic  account  by  Captain  H.  T.  Owen, 
of  the  Eighteenth  Virginia  regiment,  written  for  the  Phil- 
adelphia Weekly  Times,  of  March  26th,  1881,  reveals  the 
effect  of  the  Federal  cannonade  upon  the  Confederate 


PREPARING   FOR   THE    ASSAULT.  367 

lines.  Captain  Owen  says:  " On  Friday  morning,  July  3d. 
Pickett's  division  left  its  bivouac  at  dawn  of  day  and  mov- 
ing around  to  the  right  reached  the  position  assigned  it  in 
the  ravine  behind  Seminary  Ridge  soon  after  six  o'clock. 
Long  dark  lines  of  infantry  were  massed  along  the  bot- 
tonis,  concealed  from  the  enemy's  view,  and  orders  were 
given  '  to  lie  down  and  keep  still  to  avoid  attracting  the 
-attention  of  the  enemy.'  About  eight  o'clock  Generals 
Lee,  Longstreet  and  Pickett,  in  company,  rode  slowly  along 
up  and  down  in  front  of  the  long  lines  of  prostrate  infan- 
try, viewing  them  closely  and  critically  as  they  rode  along. 
They  were  not  greeted  with  the  usual  cheers,  as  orders  had 
preceded  them  forbidding  this,  but  the  men  voluntarily 
rose  up  and  stood  in  line  with  uncovered  heads  and  hats 
held  aloft  while  their  chieftains  rode  by.  This  review  over, 
strong  detachments  were  thrown  forward  to  support  the 
artillery  stationed  along  the  crest  of  Oak  Ridge  and  Sem- 
inary Ridge,  composed  of  about  one  hundred  and  twenty 
cannon,  and  stretching  along  the  brow  of  these  ridges  for 
a  mile.  The  supporting  detachments  were  placed  about  a 
hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of  this  line  of  batteries  and  lay 
down  in  the  tall  grass  under  a  cloudless  sky  and  with  a 
bright  July  sun  pouring  its  scorching  rays  almost  vertically 
upon  them  for  five  long,  weary  hours,  while  they  listened  and 
watched  in  painful  suspense  for  some  sound  or  some  move- 
ment to  break  that  profound  stillness  which  rested  over 
the  vast  battle-field  and  depressed  the  spirits  like  a  dread- 
ful nightmare.  At  one  o'clock  this  awful  stillness  was 
suddenly  broken  and  the  men  startled  by  the  discharge  of 
a  couple  of  signal  guns  fired  in  quick  succession,  followed 
by  a  silence  of  half  a  minute,  and  then,  while  their  echo 


368  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

was  yet  rolling  along1  the  distant  defiles  and  mountain 
gorges,  an  uproar  began  as  wonderful  as  had  been  the  pre- 
vious silence.  General  Lee's  one  hundred  and  twenty 
guns  opened  at  once  with  a  crash  and  thunder  sound  that 
shook  the  hills  for  miles  around  from  crest  to  base,  and 
were  instantly  replied  to  by  about  eighty  guns  ranged  by 
General  Meade  along  the  front  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  about 
one  mile  in  front. 

"  No  sound  of  roaring  waters,  nor  wind,  nor  thunder, 
nor  of  these  combined,  ever  equaled  the  tremendous  up- 
roar, and  no  command,  no  order,  no  sound  of  voice,  could 
be  heard  at  all  above  the  ceaseless  din  of  thousands  of 
shrieking  shot  and  shell  falling  thick  and  fast  on  every 
side  and  bursting  with  terrific  explosions,  while  others  by 
thousands  came  bounding,  skipping,  racing  and  chasing- 
each  other  over  the  hill  and  down  the  slope,  hissing,  scoff- 
ing, spitting  and  moaning  like  relentless  demons  as  they 
dashed  through  the  detachments  and  went  onward  to  crash 
among  the  reserves  far  back  in  the  rear.  The  bursting 
shell  in  mid  -  heaven  or  upon  the  earth  scattered  death 
wherever  its  fragments  flew,  and  the  shrill  shot  over  head 
or  bounding  madly  across  the  field  would  both  alike  dip 
through  a  line  of  prostrate  men  and  tear  away  with  a  wail 
to  the  rear,  leaving  a  wide  track  of  blood  behind.  The  air 
was  filled  with  clouds  of  dust  and  volumes  of  sulphurous, 
suffocating  smoke  rolled  up  white  and  bluish -gray  like 
frightful  storm  clouds,  and  hung  like  a  pall  over  the  field, 
through  the  rifts  and  rents  of  which  the  sun  with  dim  light 
looked  down  upon  the  ghastly  scene. 

"  After  two  hours  the  firing  suddenly  ceased,  and  silence 
again  rested  for  half  an  hour  over  the  battle-field,  during 


THE  SCENE  OF  THE  ASSAULT.  369 

which  time  the  Confederates  were  rapidly  forming  an  at- 
tacking column  just  below  the  brow  of  Seminary  Ridge. 
Long  double  lines  of  infantry  came  pouring  out  of  the 
woods  and  bottoms,  across  ravines  and  little  valleys,  hurry- 
ing on  to  the  positions  assigned  them  in  the  column.  Two 
separate  lines  of  double  ranks  were  formed  a  hundred 
yards  apart,  and  in  the  center  of  the  column  was  placed 
the  division  of  Pickett,  said  to  be  'the  flower  of  Lee's 
army,'  —  4,481  privates,  244  company  officers,  32  field 
officers,  and  four  general  officers,  making  4,761  all  told. 
In  the  front  line  were  placed  Kemper's  and  Garnett's  bri- 
gades side  by  side,  covered  by  Armistead's  brigade  in  the 
second  line." 

Before  describing  the  great  assault  which  followed  this 
terrible  artillery  prelude,  the  reader's  attention  is  specially 
called  to  the  illustration  given  on  the  next  page,  which 
shows  the  ground  over  which  the  assaulting  columns 
moved,  as  well  as  the  point  where  the  Federal  line  was 
pierced.  The  Federal  line  from  the  center  to  its  extreme 
left  was  from  the  north-east  to  the  south-west;  but  owing 
to  a  curve  toward  the  west  at  the  point  where  this  view 
was  taken,  the  prospect  is  south  -  west.  The  inside  of  the 
line,  and  the  breast -works  of  stone  which  yet  remain,  are 
here  seen.  The  house  and  barn  to  the  right  are  Codori's. 
They  stand  beside  the  Emmittsburg  road,  which  is  seen 
running  south -westwardly.  This  house  marked  about 
the  center  of  the  assaulting  column.  The  Confederate 

O 

position  from  which  the  columns  of  assault  proceeded,  was 
about  a  half  mile  further  to  the  right  of  this  house,  which 
will  be  to  the  west.  The  umbrella -shaped  tree  by  the  side 
of  the  tablet  on  the  left,  which  yet  remains,  was  the  ob- 


A   YANKEE    RUSE.  371 

jective  point  at  which  General  Pickett  directed  his  men 
to  aim,  and  it  was  at  this  place  that  the  Confederates 
pierced  the  Federal  line.  There  the  Confederate  General 
Arrnistead  received  his  mortal  wound,  and  a  little  to  the 
right  Hancock  was  wounded.  This  place,  by  general  con- 
ifiant,  has  been  designated  the  High  water -mark  of  the  Re- 
bellion. There  it  reached  its  highest — its  supreme  effort, 
and  there  it  received  its  death -wound. 

The  Federal  commanders  well  understood  what  the  ob- 
ject of  this  tremendous  fire  was,  and  calmly  prepared  to 
meet  it.  After  it  had  continued  about  an  hour  and  a 
half,  the  artillerists  were  ordered  to  slacken  their  fire  so 
as  to  give  their  guns  time  to  cool  for  the  final  effort,  as 
well  as  to  induce  the  enemy  to  suppose  that  he  had 
silenced  them,  and  thus  bring  on  the  expected  attack 
sooner.*  The  ruse  succeeded,  and  soon  the  enemy  in  three 
massive  lines  were  seen  to  emerge  from  the  wooded  crest 
of  Seminary  Ridge,  and  to  move  steadily  over  the  inter- 
vening space  towards  the  Federal  left  center.  This  assault- 
ing force  consisted  of  Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's 
Corps,  Heth's  division  of  Hill's  Corps,  —  under  the  tempo- 
rary command  of  General  Pettigrew,  Heth  having  been 
wounded,  —  and  the  brigades  of  Wilcox,  Lane  and  Scales, 
also  of  Hill's  Corps,  the  whole  amounting  to  from  twelve 

*  Another  cause  for  the  cessation  of  the  Federal  fire  has  been  given,  which 
is,  that  General  Warren,  Meade's  chief  engineer,  who  was  holding  a  position 
on  Round  Top  with  some  of  the  signal  corps,  constructed  a  temporary  tele- 
graph from  the  heights  of  the  mountain  to  Meade's  head-quarters.  A  little 
after  two  o'clock  he  notified  General  Meade  that  he  was  doing  the  enemy  but 
little  injury,  and  that  he  was  filling  the  valley  between  the  two  ridges  with 
smoke,  under  cover  of  which  the  Confederates  would  make  their  expected 
assault.  He  also  advised  him  to  discontinue  the  firing  and  get  ready  for  the 
assault.  By  Meade's  permission  General  Hunt,  the  chief  of  artillery,  arrest- 
ed the  firing  all  along  the  line. 


372  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

to  fifteen  thousand  men.*  Two  brigades  of  Pickett's  di- 
vision formed  the  front,  and  one  in  the  second  line  as  a 
support)  with  the  brigade  of  Wilcox  in  the  rear  of  the 
right,  to  protect  that  flank.  Heth's  division  moved  on 
Pickett's  left,  and  Lane  and  Scales  were  placed  in  the  rear 
of  its  right.  Its  left  was  without  reserve  or  support. 
While  these  lines  were  being  formed  General  Meade  moved 
his  head  -  quarters  from  its  exposed  position,  to  Power's 
Hill,  where  General  Slocum  was  already  established. 
General  Hunt  also  took  advantage  of  the  opportunity  to 
withdraw  such  -of  the  guns  as  had  been  injured  by  the 

*  Colonel  W.  H.  Swallow,  who  participated  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  on 
the  Confederate  side,  in  response  to  a  letter  of  inquiry  from  the  writer,  as  to 
the  frontage  of  this  great  assaulting  column,  replies  as  follows  : 

"  If  I  were  to  speak  from  the  impression  made  while  the  column  was  mov- 
ing' before  my  eyes,  I  should  say  that  from  Brockenborough's  brigade  on  the 
left  of  Pettigrew's  division  to  Kemper's  right  brigade  of  Pickett's  division, 
which  measured  the  distance  of  the  assaulting  column,  the  frontage  was 
about  three  fourths  of  a  mile.  But  if  you  also  include  the  brigades  of  Thomas 
and  McGowan,  which  covered  the  left  flank  of  Pettigrew's  division,  to  the 
brigades  of  Wilcox  and  Perry  that  covered  the  right  flank  of  Pickett's  divis- 
ion, the  distance  was  fully  one  mile. 

"I  make  the  depth  1,372  yards.  My  measurements,  which  were  afterwards 
made,  were  from  line  of  battle  to  line  of  battle. 

"Now  it  should  be  remembered  that  Trimble's  division  lay  in  line  of  bat- 
tle, on  the  western  slope  of  Seminary  Ridge,  in  the  rear  of  the  artillery. 
Now  from  Trimble's  left  to  the  right  of  Hays'  division,  the  distance  was  1,733 
yards  ;  and  from  the  right  of  Trimble's  division  to  the  central  point  of  attack 
on  the  Union  line,  the  distance  was  1,400  yards.  From  the  left  of  Pickett's 
division  to  the  central  point  of  attack  on  the  Union  line,  the  distance  was 
only  i, 066  yards.  From  Pickett's  right  to  the  left  of  General  Stannard's  left 
regiment  was  1,350  yards.  You  will  see  that  these  figures  will  give  an  aver- 
age of  about  1,375  yards. 

"The  troops  in  the  column  that  received  the  heaviest  artillery  fire  were 
Pettigrew's  own  brigade,  commanded  by  Jones.  The  right  of  Trimble's  com- 
mand also  reached  the  point  of  attack  as  far  as  Pickett's,  but  then  Trimble's 
men  got  there  about  fifteen  minutes  later  than  Pickett.  General  Kemperwas 
up  to  the  works  when  repulsed.  General  Kemper  writes  to  me:  'I  was 
nearly  up  to  the  Federal  line,  so  near  that  I  could  easily  see  the  faces  and 
the  expression  on  the  countenances  of  the  Union  men,  and  I  thought  I 
could  identify  the  individual  soldier  that  shot  me.'  " 


AN  IMPOSING   BATTLE  -  COLUMN.  373 

cannonading  and  replace  them  with  others.  The  ammuni- 
tion boxes  were  also  replenished,  and  it  was  arranged  that 
Nas  the  foe  came  forward  he  should  be  met  first  with  solid 
shot,  next  with  shell,  and  when  he  came  to  close  quarters 
with  double  charges  of  canister.  When  this  attacking 
^orce,  preceded  by  a  line  of  skirmishers,  came  into  view, 
cries  of  admiration  were  extorted  from  all  who  witnessed 
it.  It  was  probably  the  most  imposing  battle  -  column 
seen  during  the  war.  "Here  they  come!"  was  uttered  by 
the  men  as  the  Confederates  were  seen  to  emerge  from  their 
place  of  shelter.  When  this  grand  moving  mass  had 
crossed  about  one  third  of  the  space  between  the  two 
armies, —  about  three  quarters  of  a  mile, —  the  Federal  bat- 
teries, which  by  a  clever  Yankee  ruse  the  Confederates 
were  led  to  suppose  they  had  silenced,  opened  upon  them 
in  terrible  and  destructive  discharges.  Howard's  guns  on 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  the  powerful  batteries  upon  Hound 
Top,  opened  with  terrible  fury,  ploughing  through  their 
ranks  from  right  to  left  and  from  left  to  right,  tearing  fear- 
ful lanes  through  them,  which  were  quickly  closed  again. 
Still  on  they  came, yelling  like  demons;  and  when  the  Em- 
mittsburg  road  was  reached  the  Federal  skirmishers  behind 
a  stone  wall  were  driven  in.  The  Confederates  leaped  over 
this  wall  and  dashed  forward,  running  at  full  speed  until 
they  came  within  range  of  the  infantry,  when  from  twenty 
thousand  muskets  a  blinding-,  zig-zag  flame  burst  upon 
them.  General  Gibbon,  now  in  command,  —  Hancock 
having  been  wounded,  —  directed  his  men  to  make  room 
for  the  fatal  grape,  and  volley  after  volley,  in  quick  suc- 
cession of  double  -  shotted  guns,  poured  their  deadly  con- 
tents of  iron  hail  upon  the  advancing  foe.  Sheets  of  flame 


374 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


and  smoke  and  swiftly  flying  death  beat  in  their  faces, 
until  Pettigrew's  men  began  to  waver  on  the  left  and  fall 
behind.  Pickett's  division,  however,  yet  pressed  on,  and 
when  within  about  flve  hundred  yards  of  the  Federal  line, 
Pickett  halted  and  changed  his  direction  somewhat  obli- 
quely. "Wilcox  and  Lane,  who  guarded  his  right  flank,  did 


GROUND  OVER  WHICH  PICKETT'S  MEN  CHARGED. 

(From  a  Photograph  by  Tipton.) 

The  house  and  barn  which  stand  by  the  side  of  the  Emmittsburg  road  are  Codori's, 
The  elevated  ground  to  the  right,  as  seen  above  the  fence,  was  the  Con- 
federate position,  and  from  it  Pickett's  assaulting  column  came. 

not  make  a  corresponding  change,  but  kept  straight  on, 
and,  as  a  consequence,  a  wide  interval  between  the  two 
forces  was  soon  made,  and  Pickett's  flank  was  exposed. 
General  Stannard,  seeing  his  opportunity  for  a  flank  move- 
ment, immediately  changed  the  front  of  his  brigade  so  a& 


THE    BRAVERY    OF   WEBB.  375 

to  place  it  perpendicular  with  the  Confederate  line  of 
march,  and  poured  into  them  a  terribly  destructive  fire  at 
short  range.  This  caused  many  to  surrender  and  others  to 
retreat,  but  the  division  still  pressed  forward.  Here  now 
I  will  permit  an  eye  -  witness  and  participant  to  detail  the 
^terrible  struggle  which  followed.  General  Doubleday  says: 

"  Armistead's  brigade,  united  to  Garnett's,  pressed  on, 
overpowered  Hays'  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps,  and  drove 
it  from  its  advanced  position  at  the  fence,  back  through 
the  batteries  on  the  crest,  and  in  spite  of  death  -  dealing 
bolts  on  all  sides,  Pickett  determined  to  break  Gibbon's 
line  and  capture  his  guns.  Although  Webb's  front  was 
the  focus  of  the  concentrated  artillery  fire,  and  he  had 
already  lost  fifty  men  and  some  valuable  officers,  his  line 
remained  firm  and  unshaken.  It  devolved  upon  him  now 
to  meet  the  great  charge  which  was  to  decide  the  fate  of 
the  day.  It  would  have  been  difficult  to  find  a  man  better 
fitted  for  such  an  emergency.  He  was  nerved  to  great 
deeds  by  the  memory  of  his  ancestors,  who  in  former  days 
had  rendered  distinguished  services  to  the  Republic,  and 
felt  that  the  results  of  the  war  might  depend  upon  his 
holding  his  position.  His  men  were  equally  resolute. 
Cushing's  battery,  'B,'  Fourth  United  States  Artillery, 
which  had  been  posted  on  his  left,  and  Brown's  Rhode 
Island  Battery  on  his  right,  were  both  practically  destroyed 
by  the  cannonade.  The  horses  were  prostrated,  every 
officer  but  one  struck,  and  Gushing  had  but  one  serviceable 
gun  left. 

"  As  Pickett's  advance  came  very  close  to  the  first  line, 
young  Gushing,  mortally  wounded,  holding  on  to  his  in- 
testines with  one  hand,  ran  his  only  gun  down  to  the  fence 


376  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

with  the  other,  and  said :  *  Webb,  I  will  give  them  one  more 
shot!'  At  the  moment  of  the  last  discharge  he  called  out, 
' Good  by!'  and  fell  dead  at  the  post  of  duty.  Webb  sent 
for  fresh  batteries  to  replace  the  two  that  were  disabled, 
and  Wheeler's  First  New  York  Independent  Battery  came 
up  just  before  the  attack,  and  took  the  place  of  Cushing's 
battery  on  the  left.  Armistead  pressed  forward,  leaped 
the  fence,  waving  his  sword  with  his  hat  on  it,  followed 
by  about  a  hundred  of  his  men,  several  of  whom  carried 
battle  flags.  He  shouted,  'Give  them  cold  steel,  boys  ! ' 
and  laid  his  hands  upon  one  of  the  guns.  The  battery 
for  a  few  minutes  was  in  his  possession,  and  the  Con- 
federate flag  flew  triumphantly  over  our  line.  But  Webb 
was  at  the  front  very  near  Armistead,  animating  and  en- 
couraging his  men.  He  led  the  Seventy  -  second  Pennsyl- 
vania Regiment  against  the  enemy,  and  posted  a  line  of 
wounded  men  in  the  rear  to  drive  back  or  shoot  every  man 
that  deserted  his  duty.  A  portion  of  the  Seventy -first 
Pennsylvania,  behind  a  stone  wall  on  the  right,  threw  in  a 
deadly  fire,  while  a  great  part  of  the  Sixty -ninth  Penn- 
sylvania and  the  remainder  of  the  Seventy -first  made 
stern  resistance  from  a  copse  of  trees  on  the  left,  near 
where  the  enemy  had  broken  the  line,  and  where  our  men 
were  shot  with  the  Confederate  muskets  touching  their 
breasts.  Then  came  a  splendid  charge  of  two  regiments 
led  by  Colonel  Hall,  which  passed  completely  through 
Webb's  line,  and  engaged  the  enemy  in  a  hand  to  hand 
conflict.  Armistead  was  shot  down  by  the  side  of  the  gun 
he  had  taken.  *  *  *  Both  Gibbon  and  Webb  were 
wounded,  and  the  loss  in  officers  and  men  was  very  heavy; 
two  Confederate  brigadier- generals  were  killed,  and  more 


PETTIGREW'S    RETREAT.  377 

prisoners  were  taken  than  twice  Webb's  brigade;  six 
battle  flags  and  fourteen  hundred  and  sixty  -  three  muskets 
were  gathered,  in.  *  *  *  •  When  Pickett — the  great 
leader — looked  around  the  top  of  the  ridge  he  had  tem- 
porarily gained,  he  saw  it  was  impossible  to  hold  the  posi- 
tion. Troops  were  rushing  in  on  him  from  all  sides.  The 
Second  Corps  was  engaged  in  a  furious  assault  on  his 
front.  His  men  were  fighting  with  clubbed  muskets,  and 
even  banner  staves  were  intertwined  in  a  fierce  and  hope- 
less struggle.  My  division  of  the  First  Corps  was  on 
his  right  flank,  and  the  Third  Corps  was  closing  up  to 
attack.  Pettigrew's  forces  on  his  left  had  given  way,  and 
a  heavy  skirmish  line  began  to  accumulate  on  that  flank. 
He  saw  his  men  surrendering  in  masses,  and,  with  a  heart 
full  of  anguish,  ordered  a  retreat.  Death  had  been  busy 
on  all  sides,  and  few,  indeed,  now  remained  of  that  mag- 
nificent column  which  had  advanced  so  proudly,  led  by 
the  Key  of  the  Confederate  army,  and  these  few  fell  back 
in  disorder,  and  without  organization,  behind  Wright's 
"brigade,  which  had  been  sent  forward  to  cover  the  retreat. 
At  first,  however,  when  struck  by  Stannard  on  the  flank, 
iind  when  Pickett's  charge  was  spent,  they  rallied  in  a 
little  slashing,  where  a  grove  had  been  cut  down  by  our 
troops  to  leave  an  opening  for  our  artillery.  There  two 
regiments  of  Rowley's  brigade  of  my  division,  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fifty -first  Pennsylvania  and  the  Twentieth 
Xew  York  State  Militia,  under  Colonel  Theodore  B.  Gates, 
of  the  latter  regiment,  made  a  gallant  charge,  and  drove 
them  out.  Pettigrew's  division,  it  is  said,  lost  two  thous- 
and prisoners  and  fifteen  battle  flags  on  the  left.* 

*In  this  charge  Pickett's  division  alone  lost  in  killed,  wounded,  and  cap- 
tured, two  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty -eight  men.     Taking  the  Con- 


378  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

"  While  this  severe  contest  was  going  on  in  front  of 
Webb,  Wilcox  deployed  his  command  and  opened  a  feeble 
lire  against  Caldwell's  division  on  my  left.  Stannard  re- 
peated the  maneuver  which  had  been  so  successful  against 
Kemper's  brigade  by  detaching  the  Fourteenth  and  Six- 
teenth Vermont  to  take  Wilcox  in  flank.  Wilcox,  thus 
attacked  on  his  right,  while  a  long  row  of  batteries  tore 
the  front  of  his  line  to  pieces  with  canister,  could  gain  no- 
foot-hold.  He  found  himself  exposed  to  a  tremendous, 
cross  -  tire,  and  was  obliged  to  retreat,  but  a  great  portion 
of  his  command  were  brought  in  as  prisoners  by  Stannard, 
and  battle  flags  were  gathered  in  sheaves. "f 

As  this  great  charge  was  the  culmination  in  the  series 
of  great  and  mighty  efforts  made  by  the  Confederates  to 
overthrow  the  National  forces,  and  as  everything  concern- 
ing it  will,  in  all  the  years  to  come,  prove  of  the  highest 
interest,  and  as  some  of  the  best  descriptions  of  it  were 
written  by  participants  and  eye-witnesses  for  the  newspa- 
pers, which  will,  if  not  preserved  in  some  substantial  form, 
soon  be  lost  to  the  world,  I  will  introduce  here  several 
graphic  descriptions  from  both  Confederate  and  Federal 
sources.  The  following  was  written  by  a  correspondent 
under  the  title  of  "  Agate: " 

"  The  great,  desperate,  final  charge  came  at  four  o'clock. 
The  Confederates  seemed  to  have  gathered  up  all  their 
strength  and  desperation  for  one  fierce,  convulsive  effort, 
that  should  sweep  over  and  wash  out  our  obstinate  resist- 
ance. They  swept  up  as  before ,  the  flower  of  their  army 

federate  estimate  as  to  its  strength  when  it  went  into  the  fight,  as  about  four 
thousand  six  hundred,  it  will  be  seen  that  Pickett  lost  over  one  half  of  his 
command. 
|General  Doubleday's  " Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  pages  193-197. 


THE   CONFEDERATE   CHARGE.  379 

to  the  front,  victory  staked  upon  the  issue.  In  some  places 
they  literally  lifted  up  and  pushed  back  our  lines;  but, 
that  terrible  'position'  of  ours!  —  whenever  they  entered 
it,  enfilading  fires  from  half  a  score  of  crests  swept  away 
their  columns  like  merest  chaff.  Broken  and  hurled  back, 
they  easily  fell  into  our  hands;  and,  on  the  center  and  left, 
the  last  half  hour  brought  more  prisoners  than  all  the  rest. 
"  So  it  was  all  along  the  whole  line;  but  it  was  on  the 
Second  Corps  that  the  flower  of  the  Confederate  army  was 
concentrated;  it  was  there  that  the  heaviest  shock  beat, 
and  shook,  and  even  sometimes  crumbled,  our  line.  We 
had  some  shallow  rifle  -  pits,  with  barricades  of  rails  from 

the  fences.     The  Confederate  line,  stretching  away  miles 

• 
to  the  left,  in  magnificent  array,  but  strongest  here, — Pick- 

ett's  splendid  division  of  Longstreet's  Corps  in  front,  the 
best  of  A.  P.  Hill's  veterans  in  support, — came  steadily,  and 
as  it  seemed  resistlessly,  sweeping  up.  Our  skirmishers 
retired  slowly  from  the  Emmittsburg  road,  holding  their 
ground  tenaciously  to  the  last.  The  Confederates  reserved 
their  fire  till  they  reached  the  same  Emmittsburg  road, 
then  opened  with  a  terrific  crash.  From  a  hundred  iron 
throats,  meantime,  their  artillery  had  been  thundering  on 
our  barricades. 

"Hancock  was  wounded;  Gibbon  succeeded  to  the  com- 
mand,—  approved  soldier,  and  ready  for  the  crisis.  As  the 
tempest  of  fire  approached  its  height,  he  walked  along  the 
line,  and  renewed  his  orders  to  the  men  to  reserve  their 
fire.  The  Confederates, — three  lines  deep, —  came  steadily 
up.  They  were  in  point  blank  range.  At  last  the  order 
came!  From  thrice  six  thousand  guns,  there  came  a  sheet 
of  smoky  flame,  a  crash,  a  rush  of  leaden  death.  The 


380  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

line  literally  melted  away;  but  there  came  the  second,  re- 
sistless still.  It  had  been  our  supreme  effort, —  on  the  in- 
stant we  were  not  equal  to  another.  Up  to  the  rifle-pits, 
across  them,  over  the  barricades, —  the  momentum  of  their 
charge,  the  mere  machine  strength  of  their  combined 
action, —  swept  them  on.  Our  thin  line  could  fight,  but  it 
had  not  weight  enougli  to  oppose  this  momentum.  It  was 
pushed  behind  the  guns.  Right  on  came  the  enemy.  They 
were  upon  the  guns, — were  bayoneting  the  gunners, — were 
waving  their  flags  above  our  pieces.  But  they  had  pene- 
trated to  the  fatal  point.  A  storm  of  grape  and  canister 
tore  its  way  from  man  to  man,  and  marked  its  track  with 
corpses  straight  down  their  line.  They  had  exposed  them- 
selves to  the  enfilading  fire  of  the  guns  on  the  western 
slope  of  Cemetery  Hill;  that  exposure  sealed  their  fate. 
The  line  reeled  back, —  disjointed  already, —  in  an  instant 
in  fragments.  Our  men  were  just  behind  the  guns.  They 
leaped  forward  upon  the  disordered  mass;  but  there  was 
little  need  of  fighting  now.  A  regiment  threw  down  its 
arms,  and,  with  colors  at  its  head,  rushed  over  and  surren- 
dered. All  along  the  field,  smaller  detachments  did  the 
same.  Webb's  brigade  brought  in  eight  hundred;  taken 
in  as  little  time  as  it  requires  to  write  the  simple  sentence 
that  tells  it.  Gibbon's  old  division  took  fifteen  stand  of 
colors.  Over  the  fields  the  escaped  fragments  of  the 
changing  line  fell  back,—  the  battle  there  was  over.  A 
single  brigade,  Harrow's,  (of  which  the  Seventh  Michigan 
is  part,)  came  out  with  fifty  -  four  less  officers  and  seven 
hundred  and  ninety -three  less  men,  than  it  took  in!  So 
the  whole  corps  fought, —  so  too  they  fought  further  down 
the  line.  It  was  a  fruitless  sacrifice.  They  gathered  up 


.382  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

their  broken  fragments,  formed  their  lines,  and  slowly 
marched  away.  It  was  not  a  rout,  it  was  a  bitter,  crush- 
ing defeat." 

The  following  graphic  account  is  by  Mr.  Charles  C. 
Coffin,  in  his  "Boys  of  '61:" 

"As  soon  as  the  approach  of  the  enemy  was  perceived 
every  man  was  on  the  alert.  The  cannoneers  sprung  to 
their  feet.  The  long  lines  emerged  from  the  woods  and 
moved  rapidly  but  steadily  over  the  fields  toward  the  Em- 
mittsburg  road.  Howard's  batteries  burst  into  flame, 
throwing  shells  with  the  utmost  rapidity.  There  are  gaps 
in  the  Confederate  ranks,  but  onward  still  they  come. 
They  reach  the  Emmittsburg  road.  Pickett's  division  ap- 
pears by  Klingel's  house.  All  of  Howard's  guns  are  at 
work  now.  Pickett  turns  to  the  right,  moving  north, 
driven  in  part  by  the  fire  rolling  in  upon  his  flank  from 
Weed's  Hill  (Little  Bound  Top)  and  from  the  Third,  Fifth 
and  Sixth  Corps  batteries.  Suddenly  he  faces  east,  de- 
scends the  gentle  slope  from  the  road  behind  Codori's, 
crosses  the  meadow,  comes  in  reach  of  the  muskets  of  the 
Vermonters.  The  three  regiments  rise  from  their  shallow 
trench.  The  men  beneath  the  oak  trees  leap  from  their 
low  breast -works  of  rails.  There  is  a  ripple,  a  roll,  a 
deafening  roar.  Yet  the  momentum  of  the  Confederate 
.column  carries  it  on.  It  is  becoming  thinner  and  weaker, 
but  they  still  advance.  The  Second  Corps  is  like  a  thin 
blue  ribbon.  "Will  it  withstand  the  shock?  *  Give  them 
canister!  Pour  it  into  them! '  shouts  Major  Charles  How- 
ard, running  from  battery  to  battery.  The  Confederate 
line  is  almost  up  to  the  grove  in  front  of  Robinson's.  It 
has  reached  the  clump  of  scrub  waks.  It  has  drifted  past 


THE  WHIRLPOOL  OF  BATTLE.  383 

the  Vermont  boys.  Onward  still,  'Break  their  third  line! 
Smash  their  supports!'  cries  General  Howard,  and  Os- 
borne  and  Wainwright  send  the  fire  of  fifty  guns  into  the 
column,  each  piece  fired  three  times  a  minute!  The  Cem- 
etery is  lost  to  view, —  covered  with  sulphurous  clouds, 
flaming  and  smoking  and  thundering  like  Sinai  on  the 
great  day  of  the  Lord!  The  front  line  of  Confederates  is 
melting  away, —  the  second  is  advancing  to  take  its  place; 
but  beyond  the  first  and  second  is  the  third,  which  reels, 
and  breaks,  and  flies  to  the  woods  from  whence  it  came, 
unable  to  withstand  the  storm.  Hancock  is  wounded,  and 
Gibbon  is  in  command  of  the  Second  Corps.  'Hold  your 
fire,  boys;  they  are  not  near  enough  yet,'  says  Gibbon,  as 
Pickett  comes  on.  The  first  volley  staggers,  but  does  not 
stop  them.  They  move  upon  the  run, —  up  to  the  breast- 
works of  rails, —  bearing  Hancock's  line  to  the  top  of  the 
ridge, — so  powerful  their  momentum.  Men  fire  into  each 
other's  faces,  not  five  feet  apart.  There  are  bayonet  thrusts, 
sabre  strokes,  pistol  shots;  cool,  deliberate  movements  on 
the  part  of  some, —  hot,  passionate,  desperate  efforts  with 
others;  hand  to  hand  contests;  recklessness  of  life;  tenacity 
of  purpose;  fiery  determination;  oaths,  yells,  curses,  hur- 
rahs, shoutings;  men  go  down  on  their  hands  and  knees, 
spinning  round  like  tops,  throwing  out  their  arms,  gulping 
up  blood,  falling,  legless,  armless,  headless.  There  are 
ghastly  heaps  of  dead  men.  Seconds  are  centuries;  min- 
utes, ages ;  but  the  thin  line  does  not  break.  The  Confed- 
erates have  swept  past  the  Vermont  regiments.  '  Take 
them  in  flank,'  says  General  Stannard.  The  Thirteenth 
and  Sixteenth  swing  out  from  the  trench,  turn  a  right 
angle  to  the  main  line,  and  face  to  the  north.  They  move 


384  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

forward  a  few  steps,  pour  a  deadly  volley  into  the  backs 
of  Kemper's  troops.  "With  a  hurrah  they  rush  on  to  drive 
home  the  bayonet.  The  Fifteenth,  Nineteenth,  Twentieth 
Massachusetts  and  Seventh  Michigan,  Twentieth  New 
York,  Nineteenth  Maine,  One  Hundred  and  Fifty -first 
Pennsylvania,  and  other  regiments  catch  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  moment,  and  close  upon  the  foe.  The  Confederate 
column  .has  lost  its  power.  The  lines  waver.  The  soldiers 
of  the  front  rank  look  around  for  their  supports.  They 
are  gone,  —  fleeing  over  the  field,  broken,  shattered, 
thrown  into  confusion  by  the  remorseless  fire  from  the 
cemetery  and  from  cannon  on  the  ridge.  The  lines  have 
disappeared  like  a  straw  in  a  candle's  flame.  The  ground 
is  thick  with  dead,  and  the  wounded  are  like  the  withered 
leaves  of  autumn.  Thousands  of  Confederates  throw 
down  their  arms  and  give  themselves  up  as  prisoners." 

Having  given  these  three  accounts  of  this  great  assault 
by  Federals,  it  is  but  fair  to  follow  them  by  the  following 
two  by  Confederates.  The  first  is  by  a  participant,  Cap- 
tain H.  T.  Owen,  from  whose  article  in  the  Philadelphia 
Weekly  Times,  I  have  before  quoted.  Captain  Owen  says: 

"  The  column  of  attack,  composed  of  Wilcox's  brigade, 
Pickett's  and  Heth's  divisions,  and  several  other  com- 
mands, detached  for  this  duty,  has  been  variously  esti- 
mated, but  probably  numbered  about  thirteen  thousand 
troops,  the  command  of  the  whole  line  given  to  General 
Pickett,  a  brave  and  fearless  ofiicer  and  a  fit  leader  of  this 
forlorn  hope,  thrown  forward  to  retrieve  disaster  or  turn 
by  fierce  conflict  the  waning  fortunes  of  a  dying  cause. 
Biding  out  in  front,  Pickett  made  a  brief,  animated  ad- 
dress to  the  troops,  and  closed  by  saying  to  his  own 


PICKETT'S  ASSAULT.  385 

division:  'Charge  the  enemy,  and  remember  old  Virginia/ 
Then  came  the  command  in  a  strong,  clear  voice:  'For- 
ward! Guide  center!  March!'  and  the  column,  with  a 
front  of  more  than  half  a  mile,  moved  grandly  up  the 
slope.  Meade's  guns  opened  upon'  the  column  as  it  ap- 
peared above  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  but  it  neither  paused 
nor  faltered.  Round  shot,  bounding  along  the  plain,  tore 
through  their  ranks  and  ricochetted  around  them;  shells 
exploded  incessantly  in  blinding,  dazzling  flashes  before 
them,  behind  them,  overhead  and  among  them.  Fright- 
ful gaps  were  made  from  center  to  flank,  yet  on  swept  the 
column,  and  as  it  advanced  the  men  steadily  closed  up  the 
wide  rents  made  along  the  line  in  a  hundred  places  at 
every  discharge  of  the  murderous  batteries  in  front.  A 
long  line  of  skirmishers,  prostrate  in  the  tall  grass,  firing 
at  the  column  since  it  came  within  view,  rose  up  within 
fifty  yards,  fired  a  volley  into  its  front,  then  trotted  on  be- 
fore it,  turning  and  firing  back  as  fast  as  they  could  reload. 
The  column  moved  on  at  a  quick  step  with  shouldered 
arms,  and  the  flfe  of  the  skirmish  line  was  not  returned. 
Half  way  over  the  field  an  order  ran  down  the  line,  '  Left 
oblique,'  which  was  promptly  obeyed,  and  the  direction  is 
changed  forty -five  degrees  from  the  front  to  the  left.  Men 
looking  away,  far  off"  toward  the  left  flank,  saw  that  the 
supporting  columns  there  were  crumbling  and  melting 
rapidly  away.  General  Pickett  sent  his  brother,  Major 
Charles  Pickett,  galloping  swiftly  to  rally,  if  possible,  the 
wavering  lines,  saying  to  him:  'Unless  they  support  us 
on  the  left,  my  division  will  be  cut  to  pieces.'  Major 
Pickett  and  other  officers  rode  among  the  breaking  bat- 
talions and  vainly  attempted  to  restore  order,  but  hundreds 


25 


386  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

and  thousands  of  fugitives  from  the  front  could  be  seen 
fleeing  from  the  field  and  went  rushing  pell  -  mell  toward 
the  rear  like  dry  leaves  before  a  gale.  Order  was  not  re- 
stored upon  the  left  and  Pickett's  support  there  was  gone 
excepting  some  brave  Tennesseeans  and  North  Carolinians, 
who  never  wavered  in  the  storm,  but  closing  up  by  the 
side  of  Pickett's  Virginians  went  as  far,  fought  as  long, 
bled  as  freely,  and  fell  as  thick  as  Pickett's  men. 

"The  command  now  came  along  the  line,  *  Front,  for- 
ward!' and  the  column  resumed  its  direction  straight 
down  upon  the  center  of  the  enemy's  position.  Some  men 
now  looking  to  the  right  saw  that  the  troops  there  had 
entirely  disappeared,  but  how  or  when  they  left  was  not 
known.  The  enemy  in  front,  occupying  an  elevated  posi- 
tion and  watching  closely  every  movement  of  the  ad- 
vancing columns,  say  '  the  right  gave  way  first,  then  the 
left  broke  up  and  fled  the  field,  but  the  massive  center, 
composed  of  Pickett's  veterans  of  iron  nerve,  wounded  in 
scores  of  battles,  were  coming  sternly  on.'  Guns  hitherto 
employed  in  firing  at  the  troops  on  the  right  and  left  sent 
a  shower  of  shells  after  the  fleeing  fugitives,  and  then 
trained  upon  the  center,  where  the  storm  burst  in  ten -fold 
fury,  as  converging  batteries  sent  a  concentrated  tire  of 
shot  and  shell  in,  through,  and  around  the  heroic  column. 
The  destruction  of  life  in  the  ranks  of  that  advancing  host 
was  fearful  beyond  precedent,  officers  going  down  by 
dozens  and  the  men  by  scores  and  fifties.  Kemper  has 
gone  down  terribly  mangled,  but  Garnett  still  towered 
unhurt,  and  rode  up  and  down  the  front  line,  saying  in  a 
strong,  calm  voice:  'Faster,  men!  faster!  Close  up  and 
step  out  faster,  but  don't  double  quick!'  The  column 


fc 
A   FLANK   MOVEMENT.  387 

• 

was  approaching  the  Emmittsburg  road,  where  a  line  of 
infantry,  stationed  behind  a  stone  fence,  was  pouring  in  a 
heavy  fire  of  musketry.  A  scattering  fire  was  opened 
along  the  front  of  the  division  upon  this  line,  when  Gar- 
nett  galloped  along  the  line  and  called  out :  '  Cease  firing,' 
and  his  command  was  promptly  obeyed,  showing. the  won- 
derful discipline  of  the  men,  who  reloaded  their  guns, 
shouldered  arms  and  kept  on  without  slackening  their 
pace,  which  was  still  a  '  quickstep.' 

"The  stone  fence  was  carried  without  a  struggle,  the 
infantry  and  the  skirmish  line  swept  away  before  the 
division  like  trash  before  the  broom.  Two  thirds  of 
the  distance  was  behind,  and  the  one  hundred  cannon  in 
the  rear  were  dumb  and  did  not  reply  to  the  hotly  worked 
guns  in  our  front.  We  were  now  four  hundred  yards 
from  the  foot  of  Cemetery  Hill,  when  away  oft'  to  the 
right,  nearly  half  a  mile,  there  appeared  in  the  open  field 
a  line  of  men  at  right  angles  with  our  own,  a  long,  dark 
mass,  dressed  in  blue,  and  coming  down  at  a  *  double 
quick'  upon  the  unprotected  right  flank  of  Pickett's  men, 
with  their  muskets  upon  *  the  right  shoulder  shift,'  their 
battle  flags  dancing  and  fluttering  in  the  breeze  created 
by  their  own  rapid  motion,  and  their  burnished  bayonets 
glistening  above  their  heads  like  forest  twigs  covered  with 
sheets  of  sparkling  ice  when  shaken  by  a  blast.  Garnett 
galloped  along  the  line  saying:  ' Fastarr  men !  faster!'  and 
the  front  line  broke  forward  into  a  double  quick,  when 
Garnett  called  out:  *  Steady,  men !  steady!  Don't  double 
quick.  Save  your  wind  and  your  .  ammunition  for  the 
final  charge!'  and  then  went  down  among  the  dead,  and 
his  clarion  voice  was  no  more  heard  above  the  roar  of 


388  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

battle.  The  enemy  were  now  seen  strengthening  their 
lines,  where  the  blow  was  expected  to  strike,  by  hurrying 
up  reserves  from  the  right  and  left,  the  columns  from  op- 
posite directions  passing  each  other  double  along  our  front 
like  the  fingers  of  a  man's  two  hands  locking  together. 
The  distance  had  again  shortened  and  officers  in  the 
lines  could  be  distinguished  by  their  uniforms  from  the 
privates.  Then  was  heard  behind  that  heavy  thud  of  a 
muffled  tread  of  armed  men  that  roar  and  rush  of  tramp- 
ling feet  as  Armistead's  column  from  the  rear  closed  up 
behind  the  front  line  and  he  (the  last  brigadier)  took  com- 
mand, stepped  out  in  front  with  his  hat  uplifted  on  the 
point  of  his  sword  and  led  the  division,  now  four  ranks 
deep,  rapidly  and  grandly  across  that  valley  of  death, 
covered  with  clover  as  soft  as  a  Turkish  carpet. 

"  There  it  was  again !  and  again !  A  sound  filling  the 
air  above,  below,  around  us,  like  the  blast  through  the  top 
of  a  dry  cedar,or  the  whirring  sound  made  by  the  sudden 
flight  of  a  flock  of  quail.  It  was  grape  and  canister,  and 
the  column  broke  forward  into  a  double-quick  and  rushed 
toward  the  stone  wall  where  forty  cannon  we*e  belching 
forth  grape  and  canister  twice  and  thrice  a  minute.  A 
hundred  yards  from  the  stone  wall  the  flanking  party  on 
the  right,  coming  down  on  a  heavy  run,  halted  suddenly 
within  fifty  yards  and  poured  a  deadly  storm  of  musket 
balls  into  Pickett's  men,  double-quicking  across  their 
front,  and  under  this  terrible  cross-fire  the  men  reeled  and 
staggered  between  falling  comrades,  and  the  right  came 
pressing  down  upon  the  center,  crowding  the  companies 
into  confusion.  "We  all  knew  the  purpose  to  carry  the 
heights  in  front,  and  the  mingled  mass,  from  fifteen  to 


A   DESPERATE   CHARGE.  389 

thirty  deep,  rushed  toward  the  stone  wall,  while  a  few 
hundred  men,  without  orders,  faced  to  the  right  and 
fought  the  flanking  party  there,  although  fifty  to  one,  and 
for  a  time  held  them  at  bay.  Muskets  were  seen  crossed 
as  some  men  fired  to  the  right  and  others  to  the  front,  and 
the  fighting  was  terrific, —  far  beyond  all  other  experience 
even  of  Pickett's  men,  who  for  once  raised  no  cheer,  while 
the  welkin  rang  around  them  with  the  *  Union  triple 
huzza.'  The  old  veterans  saw  the  fearful  odds  against 
them,  and  other  hosts  gathering  darker  and  deeper  still. 

"The  time  was  too  precious,  too  serious  for  a  cheer; 
they  buckled  down  to  the  heavy  task  in  silence,  and  fought 
with  a  feeling  like  despair.  The  enemy  were  falling  back 
in  front,  while  officers  were  seen  among  their  breaking 
lines  striving  to  maintain  their  ground.  Pickett's  men 
were  within  a  few  feet  of  the  stone  wall  when  the  artillery 
delivered  their  last  fire  from  guns  shotted  to  the  muzzle. 
A  blaze  fifty  feet  long  went  through  the  charging,  surging 
host  with  a  gaping  rent  to  the  rear;  but  the  survivor? 
mounted  the  wall,  then  over  and  onward,  rushed  up  the 
hill  close  after  the  gunners,  who  waved  their  rammers  in 
the  face  of  Pickett's  men  and  sent  up  cheer  after  cheer  as 
they  felt  admiration  for  the  gallant  charge.  On  swept  the 
column  over  ground  covered  with  dead  and  dying  men, 
where  the  earth  seemed  to  be  on  fire,  the  smoke  dense  and 
suffocating,  the  sun  shut  out,  flames  blazing  on  every  side, 
friend  could  hardly  be  distinguished  from  foe,  but  the 
division,  in  the  shape  of  an  inverted  V,  with  the  point 
flattened,  pushed  forward,  fighting,  falling  and  melting 
away,  till' half  way  up  the  hill  they  were  met  by  a  power- 
ful body  of  fresh  troops  charging  down  upon  them,  ar*<l 


390  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

this  remnant  of  about  a  thousand  men  was  hurled  back 
out  into  the  clover -field.  Brave  Armistead  was  down 
among  the  enemy's  guns,  mortally  wounded,  but  was  last 
seen  leaning  upon  one  elbow,  slashing  at  the  gunners  to- 
prevent  them  from  firing  at  his  retreating  men.  Out  in 
front  of  the  breast  -  works  the  men  showed  a  disposition 
to  return  for  another  charge,  and  an  officer  looking  at  the 
frowning  heights,  with  blood  trickling  down  the  side  of 
his  face,  inquired  of  another,  'What  shall  we  do?'  The 
answer  was, '  If  we  get  reinforcements  soon  we  can  take 
that  hill  yet/  But  no  reinforcements  came,  none  were  in 
sight,  and  about  a  thousand  men  fled  to  the  rear  over  dead 
and  wounded,  mangled,  groaning,  dying  men,  scattered 
thick,  far  and  wide,  while  shot  and  shell  tore  up  the  earth 
and  minnie  balls  flew  around  them  for  more  than  a  thou- 
sand yards." 

One  other  Confederate  account  is  also  given.  It  was 
written  by  Colonel  W.  H.  Swallow  for  the  Southern  Bivouac 
of  February,  1886.  It  is  somewhat  lengthy,  but  it  is  the 
most  circumstantial  and  interesting  account  of  that  great 
climax  of  the  rebellion  yet  laid  before  the  public.  By 
permission  of  Colonel  Swallow  and  the  publishers  of  the 
Bivouac,  I  give  part  of  this  interesting  and  valuable  article. 
Colonel  Swallow  says: 

"  The  distance  from  Seminary  Ridge,  where  Heth's  di- 
vision crossed  the  plain,  to  the  Federal  works  on  Cemetery 
Hill,  where  a  part  of  Archer's  Tennessee  brigade  burst  into 
them,  is  exac.tly  one  thousand  two  hundred  and  seventy- 
three  yards.  In  the  months  of  July  and  August,  1880, 
the  writer  measured  the  relative  distances  passed  over  by 
the  column  of  attack  a  number  of  times  with  due  regard 


ARRANGEMENT   OF   CONFEDERATE   FORCES.  391 

to  the  speed  of  Heth's  division,  from  which  he  reached 
the  conclusion  that  the  division  must  have  passed  from  the 
top  of  Seminary  Ridge  to  the  Emmittsburg  road  in  about 
eight  minutes.  It  was  on  the  western  slope  of  Seminary 
Ridge  and  between  it  and  "Willoughby's  Run  that  the  as- 
saulting column  was  formed.  Pickett's  division,  composed 
of  the  three  brigades  of  Garnett,  Kemper,  and  Armistead, 
held  the  right  of  the  column  in  the  following  order:  On 
the  right  of  the  division  was  Kemper's  brigade,  next  Gar- 
nett's,  and  to  the  rear,  and  in  support  of  the  other  two, 
was  placed  the  brigade  of  Armistead.  Heth's  division, 
commanded  by  General  Pettigrew,  formed  the  left  of  the 
assaulting  column  and  was  placed  in  the  following  order: 
Archer's  Tennessee  brigade,  commanded  by  the  brave 
Colonel  Frey,  held  the  right  of  Heth's  division  and  hooked 
on  to  Garnett' s  brigade,  who  formed  the  left  of  Pickett's. 
Next  to  Archer's  brigade  came  Pettigrew's  North  Carolina 
brigade,  then  Davis'  Mississippi  brigade,  and  then  Brock- 
enborough's  Virginia  brigade,  that  held  the  left  of  Heth's 
division,  which  in  the  attack  that  followed  was  commanded 
by  General  Pettigrew.  Scales'  and  Lane's  North  Carolina 
brigades  of  Pender's  division,  commanded  by  General 
Trimble,  of  Maryland,  were  placed  in  the  rear  of  Heth's 
division,  and,  with  Armistead,  formed  the  second  line  of 
the  assaulting  column.  The  two  remaining  brigades  of 
Pender's  division,  under  McGowaii  and  Thomas,  were 
placed  on  the  left  flank  of  the  assaulting  column,  covering 
the  advance  of  Pettigrew's  division. 

"Wilcox's  Alabama  and  Perry's  Florida  brigades  of 
Anderson's  division  were  placed  on  the  right  flank  of 
Pickett's  line,  while  Wright's  Georgia  brigade  of  the  same 


392  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

division  was  suitably  posted  in  reserve.  It  will  be  seen 
from  the  above  statement  that  all  of  A.  P.  Hill's  Corps  was 
more  or  less  concerned  in  the  movement,  partly  in  the 
direct  column  of  attack,  and  partly  on  its  flanks.  It  would 
seem,  from  this  disposition  of  the  force,  that  the  move- 
ment ought  more  properly  to  be  called  the  'Assault  of 
A.  P.  Hill's  Corps'  than  by  any  other  name.  But  as  Gen- 
eral Lee  thought  fit  to  place  the  entire  movement  under 
the  direction  and  management  of  General  Longstreet,  it 
is  properly  called  'Longstreet's  Assault.'  It  would  be  a 
misnomer  to  call  this  assault,  as  many  writers  have  done, 
'The  charge  of  Pickett's  division,'  for  that  would  be  to 
strip  the  entire  movement  of  much  of  its  greatest  signifi- 
cance. 

"Equally  erroneous  is  the  generally  accepted  statement 
that  the  charge  was  made  by  Pickett,  supported  by  Heth's 
division,  commanded  by  Petti  grew,  and  that  the  disaster 
which  followed  was  solely  attributable  to  the  failure  of  the 
supporting  division.  The  truth  is  that  neither  of  those 
divisions  was  specially  assigned  to  support  the  other.  That 
peculiar  curve  in  the  ridge  which  rendered  it  necessary  to 
place  Armistead  in  the  rear  of  Kemper  and  Garnett,  also 
compelled  Longstreet  to  place  Scales  and  Lane  under 
Trimble,  in  the  rear  of  Heth's  division. 

"  Hence  the  entire  column  of  attack  moved  in  different 
directions  with  one  end  in  view,  over  different  portions  of 

the  earth's  surface  to  a  common  center. 

**  *  *  *  *  *  * 

"  These  men  who  composed  the  assaulting  column  proper, 
by  which  the  writer  means  the  divisions  of  Heth  and 
Pickett  with  the  brigades  of  Scales  and  Lane,  were  brought 


THE    BATTLE    OPENED.  393 

together  under  different  circumstances,  and  the  column  was 
composed  of  troops  from  five  States,  —  Virginia,  Tennes- 
see, North  Carolina,  Alabama,  and  Mississippi.  Thei: 
strength  was  as  follows:  Pickett's  division,  three  brigades, 
aggregating  four  thousand,  five  hundred;  Heth's  division, 
four  brigades,  five  thousand;  while  the  two  brigades  of 
Scales  and  Lane,  of  Fender's  division,  commanded  by 
General  Trimble,  mustered  about  two  thousand,  five  hun- 
dred. The  assaulting  column,  therefore,  contained  about 
twelve  thousand  men.  * 

"  There  were  nine  brigades  engaged  in  the  direct  column 
of  attack. 

"  At  precisely  seven  minutes  past  one  o'clock  the  awful 
silence  was  broken,  when  two  signal  guns  from  Eshelman's 
"Washington  Artillery  announced  the  opening  of  the  can- 
nonade. In  a  few  moments  all  the  Confederate  batteries, 
extending  from  our  extreme  right  at  the  Peach  Orchard  on 
the  Emmittsburg  read,  in  a  circle  around  the  ridge  to  the 
Harrisburg  road,  belched  forth  one  inextinguishable  flame 
of  fire,  to  which  the  enemy  responded  from  Cemetery  Hill, 

*  Both  Federals  and  Confederates  have  a  peculiar  kind  of  arithmetic  by 
which  they  overestimate  the  number  of  the  opposing  force  and  minify  their 
own.  The  time  has  come  for  fairness  in  these  statements.  It  is  with  pleasure 
then  that  I  recall  the  fact  that  Colonel  Swallow  estimates  this  assaulting  force 
at  twelve  thousand  men,  and  Captain  Owen,  in  the  preceding  account,  at 
thirteen  thousand.  If,  as  Colonel  Swallow  says,  "All  of  A.  P.  Hill's  Corps 
was  more  or  less  concerned  in  the  movement,  partly  in  the  direct  column  of 
attack,  and  partly  on  its  flanks,"  it  is  evident  that  the  Federal  estimate  of 
about  fifteen  thousand  is  nearly  correct.  Colonel  Swallow  also  protests 
against  calling  this  great  episode  "Pickett's  Charge,"  or  "The  Charge  of 
Pickett's  Division,"  saying  that  it  might  more  properly  be  called  "The  As- 
sault of  A.  P.  Hill's  Corps,"  or  "Ixmgstreet's  Assault."  While  entirely  con- 
curritig  in  this  remark,  I  have  yet  followed  the  general  custom  and  term  it 
"Pickett's  Charge,"  thereby  avoiding  the  misunderstanding  a  new  term 
would  produce  with  many  readers. 


394  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

and  all  around  Cemetery  Hill  to  Round  Top.  As  soon  as 
the  cannonade  opened,  Pickett's  division,  under  cover  of 
cue  artillery,  with  its  right  flank  protected  by  the  brigades 
of  Wileox  and  Perry,  was  shifted  forward  a  little  to  the 
right  and  placed  in  position  in  the  rear  of  the  artillery,  at 
a  distance  of  nine  hundred  yards  from  Cemetery  Hillr 
where  it  lay  during  the  cannonade,  while  the  divisions  of 
Pettigrew  and  Trimble  remained  very  nearly  on  the  ground 
where  they  formed.  The  writer  and  many  staff  officers 
and  officers  of  the  corps  of  engineers  were,  during  the 
whole  cannonade,  in  an  elevated  position  from  which  an 
unobstructed  view  could  be  had  of  Seminary  Ridge,  from 
the  town  to  Longstreet's  right. 

******** 
"When  the  order  for  the  assault  was  given,  Pickett's 
division,  which  held  a  somewhat  advanced  line,  moved 
forward;  the  right  of  the  division  under  General  Kemper, 
after  passing  through  the  Washington  Artillery,  crossed 
the  Emmittsburg  road,  and,  had  Kernper  moved  onward 
in  a  straight  line,  he  would  have  struck  Stannard's  bri- 
gade, who  was  posted  in  a  grove  a  little  in  front  and  on 
the  left  of  Hancock's  Corps.  But  no  sooner  had  General 
Kemper  crossed  the  road  than  he  moved  on  the  left  flank,, 
having  changed  front,  his  brigade  after  passing  south  of 
Codori's  house  and  out -buildings,  marched  eastward  to- 
wards Gettysburg.  In  this  movement  of  Kemper's  bri- 
gade his  command  passed  between  the  Emmittsburg  road 
and  Cemetery  Ridge  in  the  march  to  the  center  of  attack. 
As  Kemper's  right  was  passing  Stannard's  brigade  on 
Hancock's  left,  and  at  a  distance  of  several  hundred  yards, 
the  latter  officer  ordered  his  command  to  move  also  by  the 


MOVEMENT   OF   THE   FORCES.  395 

left  flank,  and  closing  to  the  left  until  Kemper's  right 
assumed  the  direct  assault  in  his  front,  when  by  order  of 
Hancock  (who  was  on  this  part  of  the  ground  watching 
the  movement),  Stanuard's  command  changed  front,  for- 
ward in  the  first  battalion,  and  delivered  several  volleys  of 
musketry  into  the  flank  and  rear  of  Kemper's  brigade,  but 
the  latter  officer,  under  orders  from  Pickett,  moved  on- 
ward to  the  center  of  attack,  not  stopping  to  return  the 
fire. 

"  General  Garnett,  with  his  brigade,  held  the  left  of  the 
division,  and  started  with  Kemper  to  the  enemy's  works  at 
the  same  time.  Garnett  moved  on  Cemetery  Hill  by 
marching  eastward  towards  Gettysburg,  north  of  Codori's 
house  and  out  -  buildings.  The  fences  of  the  Einmittsburg 
road,  near  Codori's  house,  had  been  nearly  destroyed  the 
day  before  in  the  battle  on  our  right. 

"  No  sooner  had  Garnett  and  Kemper  started  with  the 
right  and  left  of  Pickett's  division  than  General  Armi- 
stead,  whose  brigade  was  in  the  rear  of  both,  followed 
closely  after  them.  Armistead,  however,  started  from  a 
different  position  and  passed  over  a  different  portion  of 
the  earth's  surface  to  the  same  point  of  attack.  Almost 
simultaneously  with  the  advance  of  Garnett  and  Kemper, 
and  while  the  writer  was  intently  watching  their  onward 
march,  his  attention  was  directed  to  adeiise  column  whose 
front  seemed  to  cover  twice  the  front  of  Pickett's  division. 
This  part  of  the  column  of  attack  had  just  .burst  through 
a  fringe  of  timber  along  Seminary  Ridge,  where  our 
artillery  had  been  firing. 

"  When  the  writer  first  saw  it  this  force  was  moving  in 
a  direct  line  for  Cemetery  Hill,  and  both  the  assaulting 


396  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

column  at  this  point  and  the  enemy  were  now  in  full  view 
of  each  other.     It  proved  to  be  Ileth's  division  under  Gen- 
eral Pettigrew,  with  the  brigades  of  Scales  and  Lane,  of 
Fender's  division,  commanded  by  General  Trimble.     All 
our  little  group  thought,  from  its  appearance,  that  it  was 
A.  P.  Hill's   whole   corps,   and   shouted   out,   'Here  they 
come!  Here  they  are!!   Hurrah!!!'     This  part  of  the  at- 
tacking column  was  moving  in  a  straight  line  over  a  differ- 
ent portion  of  the  earth's  surface  from  that  of  Pickett's 
division,  but  to  the  same  center  of  attack.     The   writer 
would  here  remark  that  the  lay  of  the  ground  around  the 
ridge,  which  obliged  Longstreet  to  place  Armistead  to  the 
rear  of  Garnett  and  Kemper,  also  compelled  him  to  form 
Heth  a  little  behind  the  ridge  and  place  Trimble's  com- 
mand in  the  second  line  of  the  assaulting  column.     The 
column  of  attack,  now  under  way,  moved   steadily  and 
firmly  to  the  enemy's  works,   distant  one   thousand  two 
hundred   and    seventy  -  three   yards.      The   works  of  the 
enemy,  in  front  of  the  assaulting  column,  lay  at  an  average 
distance  of  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  south  of  the 
Emmittsburg  road,  and  formed  the  defense  of  Hancock's 
Oorps  on  Meade's  left  center.     These  works  consisted  of 
an  irregularly  formed  old  stone  fence,  but  not  of  the  same 
height.     At  intervals  there  were  breaks  in  the  fence,  and 
these  were  filled  up  by  temporary  breast  -  works,  composed 
of  rails  and  old  logs,  behind  which  earth  was  thrown  to 
the  depth  of  several  feet. 

"  That  part  of  the  enemy's  works  that  stretched  to  the 
right  of  the  attacking  column,  was  longer  and  stood  for- 
ward, advanced  about  one  hundred  and  twenty  feet,  while 
that  part  of  the  works  on  the  left  of  the  column  of  attack 


EFFECTIVE   WORK   OF  FEDERAL   BATTERIES.  397 

beut  inwardly,  forming  an  angle,  giving  to  the  enemy's 
line  of  defense  an  echelon  formation,  or  horse -shoe  ap- 
pearance. 

"Nothing  occurred  to  the  divisions  of  Pettigrew  and 
Trimble  in  their  march  from  the  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge 
to  Cemetery  Hill,  until  the  column  of  attack  was  half-  way 
over  the  plain,  when  all  of  a  sudden  the  enemy's  artillery 
opened  upon  our  advancing  lines  a  most  terrific  fire  from 
Cemetery  Hill. 

"On  the  right  of  our  column  Round  Top  and  Little 
Round  Top  were  in  a  perfect  blaze,  and  sent  forth  one 
continuous  and  inextinguishable  flame  of  fire,  hurling 
their  missiles  of  destruction  into  our  advancing  lines.* 

"  Seminary  Ridge  to  the  rear  of  the  column,  with  the 
Confederate  batteries  to  the  right  and  left  of  it,  sent  forth 
their  commingling  smoke  of  fire  and  thunder,  laden  with 
their  messengers  of  death,  into  the  enemy's  left  center. 

"  The  first  fire  of  the  Federal  artillery  on  the  advancing 
lines  of  Pettigrew  and  Trimble  seemed  to  smite  the  column 
of  attack  as  if  it  had  been  struck  by  some  unseen  power, 
some  great  physical  body,  causing  the  column  to  waver, 
reel,  and  for  a  moment  halt. 

"It  was  only  for  a  moment;  in  a  few  seconds  the  smoke 
lifted,  when  deep  gaps  which  extended  through  our  lines 
to  the  rear  of  the  column  could  be  seen.  The  brave 
Confederates  closing  up  those  gaps,  over  the  dead  and 
bleeding  bodies  of  their  companions,  moved  forward  un- 
flinchingly to  the  Emmittsburg  road.  Solid  shot  now 
plowed  through  their  ranks,  grape  and  canister  were  doing 

*  Colonel  Swallow  is  in  error  here.  Big  Round  Top  had  no  artillery:  it  was 
inaccessible  to  cannon. 


398  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

their  fatal  work  in  the  game  of  death,  and  sweeping  away 
hundreds  from  our  advancing  lines.  Undismayed  by  the 
blood  and  terror  of  the  conflict,  the  assaulting  column 
pushed  on. 

"  Some  mighty,  unseen  power,  over  which  they  had  no 
-control  and  whose  influence  they  could  not  resist,  impelled 
them  forward.  As  the  column  neared  the  road  it  was 
within  reach  of  the  enemy's  musketry,  which  poured 
volley  after  volley  into  the  column  of  attack,  greatly  thin- 
ning its  ranks. 

"General  Garnett,  with  the  left  of  Pickett's  division, 
reached  the  road  about  the  same  time  with  Pettigrew, 
while  Armistead  and  Trimble  were  following  closely  after. 
On  the  extreme  right  General  Kemper's  brigade  was  south 
of  the  end  of  the  road  and  near  the  works.  Archer's  Ten- 
nessee brigade,  holding  the  right  of  Pettigrew's  division, 
hooked  on  to  the  left  of  Garnett,  and  thus  united  the 
whole  column  made  a  break  to  get  over  the  first  fence  on 
the  Emmittsburg  road. 

"  Scores  of  the  survivors  often  related  their  anxious  sus- 
pense and  the  length  of  time  it  seemed  to  climb  to  the  top 
of  the  fence.  As  soon  as  the  top  of  the  fence  was  lined 
with  troops  the  whole  line  tumbled  over,  falling  flat  into 
the  bed  of  the  road,  while  the  enemy's  bullets  buried 
themselves  in  the  bodies  of  the  falling  victims.  Just 
here  at  this  point  the  brave  General  Garnett,  of  Virginia, 
rode  along  his  line  covered  with  blood,  with  his  head 
bowed  almost  to  his  horse's  neck.  In  a  moment  the  Gen- 
-eral  and  his  horse  fell  to  the  ground  riddled  with  bullets 
in  all  parts  of  their  bodies.  The  assaulting  column  only 
remained  in  the  road  a  few  seconds.  It  could  scarcely  be 


TEMPORARY   SUCCESS   OF    THE    CONFEDERATES.  399 

•called  a  halt,  when  it  rose  and  pushed  over  the  second 
fence,  leaving  many  of  their  comrades  dead  and  wounded 
behind  them.  Just  as  the  column  crossed  the  second 
fence  it  received  a  most  withering  fire  of  musketry,  a  per- 
fect shower  of  lead;  it  staggered  for  a  few  seconds,  halted, 
returned  the  fire,  and  with  one  wild  shout  rushed  forward 
to  the  works.  From  the  road  to  the  works  the  column  of 
attack  was  for  a  few  moments  lost  to  view,  being  com- 
pletely enveloped  by  the  enemy's  fire.  The  right  of  Petti- 
grew's  division  —  Archer's  Tennessee  brigade  and  Garnett's 
brigade  of  Pickett's  division  —  charged  right  on  amid  fire 
and  flame  to  the  enemy's  works,  while  Arrnistead  and 
the  brigades  of  Scales  and  Lane,  commanded  by  General 
Trimble,  followed  closely  after.  Archer's  Tennessee  bri- 
gade and  Garnett's  Virginia  brigade  struck  the  enemy's 
fortifications  at  the  same  moment,  when  Lieutenant  Finley, 
of  the  Thirty  -  eighth  Virginia,  sprang  to  the  left  and 
grasping  one  of  Archer's  captains  by  the  hand  exclaimed, 
^Virginia  and  Tennessee  will  stand  together  on  these 
works  to-day!' 

"The  left  of  the  column,  under  Davis  and  Brocken- 
borough,  passed  the  advanced  line  of  the  wall  where  it 
formed  an  angle,  and  moving  forward  in  that  direction 
threatened  to  assault  the  right  flank  of  Gibbon's  division, 
which  held  the  advanced  line  of  the  enemy's  defense,  sup- 
ported by  the  Federal  division  of  General  Hays,  one  of 
the  strongest  and  best  divisions  in  the  Federal  army.  The 
First  Tennessee  and  the  greater  part  of  the  Seventh,  with 
the  Thirty  -  eighth  Virginia,  and  other  portions  of  Garnett's 
brigade  rushed  over  the  enemy's  breast -works,  driving  the 
-enemy  before  them  on  his  reserves.  While  he  was  beaten 


THE.  GREAT    INVASION. 

back  the  enemy  contested  the  ground  most  stubbornly, 
and  the  scenes  that  followed  during  those  few  moments 
baffle  description.  A  hand  to  hand  encounter  now  took 
place.  They  fired  into  each  other's  faces  at  the  distance 
of  five  and  ten  feet,  and  -struck  each  other  over  the  head 
with  the  butt  of  the  musket.  *  *  *  * 

The  struggle  was  soon  ended,  and  a  deadly  fire  from  the 
right  of  Hays'  division  compelled  the  shattered  remnants 
of  Garnett's  and  Archer's  brigades  to  fall  back  to  the 
point  where  they  had  entered  the  enemy's  fortifications. 
As  they  did  so  they  saw  hundreds  of  their  companions 
dead  and  wounded  upon  the  ground — boys  in  blue  with 
boys  in  gray,  crawling  over  each  other,  all  smeared  with 
blood. 

"As  part  of  Archer's  brigade  and  Garnett's  entered  the 
works  the  rest  of  Archer's  men  on  the  left  of  his  line  also 
crowded  to  the  right,  but  received  a  heavy  fire  from  the 
two  brigades  of  the  enemy  posted  on  the  left  of  the  column 
and  commanded  by  General-  Smyth,  of  Delaware,  whose 
name  afterward  obtained  a  melancholy  celebrity.  Petti- 
grew's  brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Jones,  now  united 
with  Archer's  regiment,  which  had  not  entered  the  fortifi- 
cations, and  attacked  the  enemy  with  the  most  desperate 
determination. 

"  While  the  writer  lay  wounded  with  General  Smyth  at 
Gettysburg,  that  officer  told  him  that  Pettigrew's  brigade, 
all  along  his  front,  were  within  thirty  or  forty  feet  of  his 
line  and  fought  with  a  fiery  determination  that  he  had 
never  seen  equalled.  Some  of  Scales'  brave  fellows  took 
part  in  this  assault.  Three  weeks  after  the  battle  General 
Smyth  showed  the  writer  the  exact  spot  where  the  First 


A   FLANK   ATTACK.  401 

Delaware  volunteers  rushed  to  the  front  and  broke  the  left 
of  Pettigrew's  line. 

"  If  any  find  fault  with  the  falling  off —  or,  rather,  break 
—  that  took  place  on  the  left  of  Pettigrew's  brigade,  the 
answer  is,  that  there  were  scarcely  any  left  to  stand.  One 
company  of  North  Carolina  troops  in  Pettigrew's  brigade 
lost  every  man  (eighty  -four  strong)  in  killed  and  wounded. 

"As  another  act  of  simultaneous  occurrence,  while 
Archer  and  Garnett  were  in  the  works  and  Pettigrew  and 
others  attacking  them  from  the  outside,  General  Hays 
noticed  Davis  and  Brockenborough  trying  to  get  their  work 
in  on  Gibbon's  right  flank.  He  instantly  detached  three 
regiments  from  his  division  with  a  number  of  batteries  and 
attacked  our  left,  already  weakening  and  beginning  to 
break  before  the  assault  of  Sherrill  and  Smyth. 

"  The  assaulting  column  on  the  left  and  center  was  now 
completely  broken,  and  in  the  confusion  and  terror  that 
followed,  thousands  fell  upon  the  ground  between  the 
works  and  the  road  and  threw  up  their  arms  in  token  of 
surrender,  while  the  iron  and  leaden  hail  rushing  from  the 
mouths  of  a  hundred  cannon  was  blazing  over  them  like 
the  lightning's  fiery  scourge. 

"  On  the  right  of  the  assaulting  column  General  Kemper's 
brigade  was  cut  to  pieces  and  its  commander  seriously 
wounded;  nearly  all  his  command  were  killed,  wounded, 
and  captured. 

"  General  Armistead,  who  was  before  the  works  with  his 
brigade  toward  the'closing  scenes  of  the  assault,  rushed  up 
to  a  part  of  the  wall  which  had  been  abandoned  by  Webb's 
right,  which  was  at  the  time  falling  back  before  Archer 
and  Garnett,  and  seeing  that  his  men  were  using  the  works 


26 


402  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

as  a  line  of  defense,  as  some  of  the  first  line  to  the  right 
and  left  were  doing,  cried  out, '  Come  forward,  Virginians!' 
He  then  drew  his  sword  and,  placing  his  hat  on  the  top  of 
it,  raised  it  high  up  into  the  air  and,  jumping  over  the 
wall,  again  cried  out,  '  Come  on,  boys,  we  must  give  them 
the  cold  steel;  who  will  follow  me?' 

"  Lieutenant  -  Colonel  Martin,  with  over  a  hundred  men, 
responded  to  the  call  and  followed  their  brave  General. 
Many  brave  men,  however,  weakened,  and  looked  into 
each  other's  faces  with  awe  and  astonishment.  At  this 
moment  the  Federal  brigades  of  Hall  and  Harrow  rushed 
to  the  right  (Kemper  having  been  repulsed  in  their  front) 
and  attacked  Armistead  in  flank,  and  at  the  same  time 
"Webb's  second  line  advanced  and  fired. 

"  General  Armistead  fell  dead,  and  Colonel  Martin  and 
all  that  followed  were  instantly  shot  down.  Of  those  that 
entered  the  fortification,  fifty  lay  dead  on  the  ground  and 
the  remainder  were  terribly  wounded.  Not  a  soul  escaped 
to  tell  the  tale  to  their  companions. 

"  The  Emmittsburg  road  was  literally  choked  up  with 
the  dead  and  wounded,  while  the  space  between  the  Fed- 
eral fortifications  and  the  road  was  covered  with  the  dead 
and  dying  victims  of  the  struggle,  to  which  might  be 
added  thousands  who  lay  upon  the  ground  extending  their 
arms  i»  token  of  surrender. 

"  The  cries  of  the  wounded  for  water,  mingled  with  their 
shrieks  of  agony  from  pain,  greatly  intensified  the  horror 
of  the  scene.  Three  fourths  of  the  assaulting  column 
were  killed,  wounded,  or  captured  in  less  than  half  an 
hour. 

"  The  left  of  Pettigrew's  old  brigade,  commanded  by 


COVERING  THE  RETREAT.  403 

•Colonel  Jones,  began  to  fall  off  almost  simultaneously  with 
the  right  of  the  column  under  Kemper.  The  center  of  the 
column,  composed  of  part  of  Archer's  Tennessee  brigade, 
commanded  by  the  brave  Colonel  Frey,  and  part  of  Gar- 
nett's  Virginia  brigade,  were  the  only  men  in  the  column 
of  attack  that  carried  their  standards  into  the  enemy's 
fortification  on  Cemetery  Hill.  It  is  idle  to  ask  such  fool- 
ish questions  as  who  gave  way  first?  which  imply  a  want 
of  devotion  and  duty.  Any  intelligent  soldier,  accustomed 
to  the  hardships  of  battle,  who  shall  even  at  this  day  visit 
Gettysburg  and  make  himself  acquainted  with  the  ground 
and  insurmountable  obstacles  that  lay  in  the  front  of  the 
assaulting  column,  will  not  be  very  much  surprised  that 
the  attack  failed;  but  his  surprise  will  be  greater  still  that 
any,  even  the  bravest  soldiers,  could  have  reached  the 
point  they  did  and  live.  In  the  Federal  lines  Generals 
Hancock,  Webb,  Stannard,  Sherrill,  and  Smyth  lay  wound- 
ed on  the  ground.  Of  the  Confederates,  Generals  Armi- 
stead  and  Garnett  were  killed,  while  Generals  Kemper, 
Trimble,  and  Pettigrew  were  wounded,  with  thousands  of 
others.  General  Alexander,  after  the  repulse,  ordered  up 
Wright's  Georgia  brigade  to  attack  as  a  relief  to  Pickett, 
but  Longstreet  stopped  him,  observing  'that  the  attack 
had  failed.'  Longstreet  then  ordered  Wright  to  rally  and 
•collect  the  scattered  troops  behind  Anderson's  division. 
About  twenty  minutes  after  the  repulse  of  the  assaulting 
column,  General  Wilcox  with  his  brigade  and  Perry's 
Florida  brigade,  who  were  on  Pickett's  right,  had,  by 
some  mistake  that  has  never  been  explained,  received 
orders  to  advance,  but  as  he  reached  the  middle  ridge  in 
front  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  he  could  see  nothing  of  Pickett's 


404  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

division,  whose  right  Wilcox  and  Perry  were  covering,  and 
concluding  that  Pickett  had  actually  passed  over  Cemetery 
Ridge,  he  also  commenced  to  follow  after,  but  he  was  met, 
with  a  deadly  fire  of  artillery  in  his  front,  while  General 
Stannard's  brigade  wheeled  about  and  attacked  "Wilcox 
and  Perry  in  flank,  by  which  the  Confederate  line  was 
broken  and  great  numbers  of  our  men  killed  and  wounded. 
Wilcox  and  Perry  then  fell  back  and  forming  with  Wright's 
Georgia  brigade,  completed  Anderson's  division. 

"  This  division  of  Anderson,  of  A.  P.  Hill's  Corps,  now 
presented  a  line  of  defense  on  Seminary  Ridge,  behind 
which  the  squads  and  detachments  who  survived  in  the 
columns  of  attack,  and  reached  the  ridge,  found  shelter  and 
rest.  Orders  were  instantly  issued  to  Longstreet's  divisions 
on  the  right — Hood's  and  McLaws' — to  be  ready  to  move 
to  the  ridge  at  a  given  signal.  The  same  was  done  to  the 
division  of  Rodes,  to  fall  back  on  Anderson  immediately 
if  the  enemy  attempted  to  follow  up  the  disaster." 

While  the  terrible  conflict,  which  we  have  just  narrated, 
was  going  on  along  the  front,  important  operations  were 
in  progress  at  other  parts  of  the  line,  which  had  an  im- 
portant effect  upon  the  final  result.  To  these  we  will  now 
direct  the  attention  of  the  reader.  It  was  intended  by 
General  Lee  that  the  assault  upon  the  Federal  front 
should  take  place  simultaneously  with  an  attack  General 
Ewell  was  to  make  upon  the  right.  Johnson's  division 
was  already  in  possession  of  the  Federals'  lines  upon  Gulp's 
Hill,  and  it  was  expected  that  a  determined  advance  of  his 
troops,  supported  by  others  of  Ewell's  Corps,  would  enable 
him  to  come  in  upon  the  Federal  rear  while  Pickett  cut 
through  the  line  in  front.  But  this  purpose  was  not  car- 


ATTACK  BY  STUART'S  CAVALRY.          405 

ried  out,  for  the  reason  that  Longstreet  again  failed  to  exe- 
cute the  part  assigned  him.  He  was  not  ready  to  attack 
at  the  early  hour  when  the  engagement  on  the  right  be- 
gan. Indeed,  for  this  he  cannot  be  blamed,  for  the  attack 
was  commenced  by  the  Federals.  Johnson  was  within  the 
Federal  line,  and  he  was  compelled  to  defend  himself  from 
the  efforts  made  to  dislodge  him.  In  this  way  Lee's  plans 
were  frustrated,  and  when  he  learned  that  Johnson  had 
been  driven  out  of  the  position  he  had  gained  the  night 
before,  and  could  not  co-operate  with  Pickett  upon  the 
front,  new  plans  had  to  be  made.  Stuart's  cavalry,  which 
had  reached  the  field  the  evening  previous,  reinforced  by 
Jenkins'  brigade,  were  sent  around  the  Federal  right  to 
accomplish  the  same  purpose.  The  object  was  to  take 
possession  of  the  Baltimore  pike  and  other  roads  in  the 
Federal  rear;  and,  besides  creating  a  diversion  in  favor  of 
Pickett,  to  be  in  a  position  to  take  advantage  to  capture 
or  destroy  the  army  in  case  the  assault  in  front  was  suc- 
cessful. The  movement  of  these  troops  was  fortunately 
discovered  by  General  Howard  from  his  elevated  position 
upon  Cemetery  Hill,  and  General  Meade  was  promptly 
notified.  The  Federal  cavalry,  which,  during  the  pre- 
ceding days  of  the  battle,  had  done  excellent  service  in 
protecting  tbe  flanks  and  in  repelling  and  driving  the 
enemy's  cavalry,  were  again  called  upon  to  meet  this 
movement  of  Stuart;  and  General  D.  McM.  Gregg,  with 
two  brigades  of  his  cavalry  division,  commanded  respec- 
tively by  Colonels  Mclntosh  and  Irvin  Gregg,  and  Cus- 
ter's  brigade  of  the  Third  Division,  was  sent  to  repel  this 
threatened  danger.  When  these  two  forces  came  into  col- 
lision, one  of  the  most  desperate  cavalry  engagements 


406  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

took  place  that  occurred  during  the  war.  The  design  of 
Stuart  was  well  understood,  and  the  Federal  cavalry -men 
appreciated  the  responsibility  that  was  upon  them,  and 
determined  to  repel  the  enemy  or  die  in  the  effort. 

Colonel  William  Brooke  -  Rawle,  who  was  present  at 
that  engagement  and  participated  in  it,  in  a  contribution 
to  the  .Annals  of  the  War,  pages  467-484,  gives  a  detailed 
and  highly  interesting  description  of  this  terrific  affair. 
His  account  is  too  lengthy  to  give  in  full,  but  as  full  justice 
has  not  been  done  in  previous  histories  to  the  Federal 
cavalry  for  their  excellent  services  at  Gettysburg,  I  will 
insert  here  the  colonel's  description  of  the  great  charge 
and  hand  to  hand  conflict  which  occurred  when  Hampton's 
brigade,  which  had  been  held  in  reserve,  came  upon  the 
field  and  threatened  to  turn  the  tide  in  favor  of  the  enemy. 
The  colonel's  account  is  as  follows : 

"Just  then  there  appeared  in  the  distance,  turning  the 
point  of  woods  on  the  cross  -  road  by  the  Stallsmith  farm, 
a  brigade  of  cavalry.  It  was  manifest  to  every  one  that 
unless  this,  the  grandest  attack  of  all,  was  checked,  the 
day  would  go  hard  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It 
was  Stuart's  last  reserve  and  his  last  resource,  for,  if  the 
Baltimore  pike  was  to  be  reached,  and  havoc  created  in 
our  rear,  the  critical  moment  had  arrived,  as  Pickett  was 
even  then  moving  up  to  the  assault  of  Cemetery  Ridge. 

"In  close  columns  of  squadrons,  advancing  as  if  in  re- 
view, with  sabres  drawn  and  glistening  like  silver  in  the 
bright  sunlight,  the  spectacle  called  forth  a  murmur  of 
admiration.  It  was  indeed  a  memorable  one.  Chester 
being  nearest  opened  at  once  with  his  section,  at  the  dis- 
tance of  three  quarters  of  a  mile.  Pennington  and  Kinney 


A   BATTLE   OF   CENTAURS.  407 

soon  did  the  same.  Canister  and  percussion  shell  were 
put  into  the  steadily  approaching  columns  as  fast  as  the 
guns  could  fire.  The  dismounted  men  fell  back  to  the 
right  and  left,  and  such  as  could  got  to  their  horses.  The 
mounted  skirmishers  rallied  and  fell  into  line.  Then 
Gregg  rode  over  to  the  First  Michigan,  which,  as  it  had 
come  upon  the  field  some  time  before,  had  formed  close 
column  rof  squadrons  between  and  supporting  the  batte- 
ries, and  ordered  it  to  charge.  As  Town  ordered  sabres  to 
be  drawn  and  the  column  to  advance,  Ouster  dashed  up 
with  similar  orders,  and  placed  himself  at  its  head.  The 
two  columns  drew  nearer  and  nearer,  the  Confederates 
outnumbering  their  opponents  as  three  or  four  to  one. 
The  gait  increased, —  first  the  trot,  then  the  gallop.  Hamp- 
ton's battle -flag  floated  in  the  van  of  the  brigade.  The 
orders  of  the  Confederate  officers  could  be  heard  by  those 
in  the  woods  on  their  left:  'Keep  to  your  sabres,  men, 
keep  to  your  sabres!'  for  the  lessons  they  had  learned  at 
Brandy  Station  and  at  Aldie  had  been  severe.  There  the 
cry  had  been:  *  Put  up  your  sabres!  Draw  your  pistols  and 
fight  like  gentlemen!'  But  the  sabre  was  never  a  favorite 
weapon  with  Confederate  cavalry,  and  now,  in  spite  of  the 
lessons  of  the  past,  the  warnings  of  the  present  were  not 
heeded  by  all. 

"As  the  charge  was  ordered  the  speed  increased,  every 
horse  on  the  jump,  every  man  yelling  like  a  demon.  The 
column  of  the  Confederates  blended,  but  the  perfect  align- 
ment was  maintained.  Chester  put  charge  after  charge  of 
canister  into  their  midst,  his  men  bringing  it  up  to  the 
guns  by  the  armful.  The  execution  was  fearful,  but  the 
long  rent  closed  up  at  once.  As  the  opposing  columns 


408  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

drew  nearer  and  nearer,  each  with  perfect  alignment,  every 
man  gathered  his  horse  well  under  him,  and  gripped  his 
weapon  the  tighter.  Though  ordered  to  retire  his  guns, 
towards  which  the  head  of  the  assaulting  column  was 
directed,  Chester  kept  on  until  the  enemy  were  within 
fifty  yards,  and  the  head  of  the  First  Michigan  had  come 
into  the  line  of  his  fire.  Staggered  bj-  the  fearful  execu- 
tion from  the  two  batteries,  the  men  in  the  front  line  of 
the  Confederate  column  drew  in  their  horses  and  wavered. 
Some  turned,  and  the  column  fanned  out  to  the  right  and 
left,  but  those  behind  came  pressing  on.  Custer,  seeing  the 
front  men  hesitate,  waved  his  sabre  and  shouted,  *  Come 
on,  you  Wolverines!'  and  with  a  fearful  yell,  the  First 
Michigan  rushed  on,  Custer  four  lengths  ahead. 

"  Mclntosh,  as  he  saw  the  Confederate  column  advanc- 
ing, sent  his  adjutant -general,  Captain  Walter  S.  Newhall, 
to  the  left  with  orders  to  Treichel  and  Rodgers  to  rally 
their  men  for  a  charge  on  the  flank  as  it  passed.  But  six- 
teen men  could  get  their  horses,  and  with  five  officers  they 
made  for  the  battle  -  flag.  Kewhall,  back  once  more  with 
the  men  of  his  own  regiment,  who,  as  he  knew  well,  would 
go  anywhere,  and  sharing  the  excitement  of  the  moment, 
rushed  in  by  the  side  of  Treichel  and  Badgers  at  the  head 
of  the  little  band.  Miller,  whose  squadron  of  the  Third 
Pennsylvania  was  already  mounted,  and  had  rallied,  fired 
a  volley  from  the  woods  on  the  right,  as  the  Confederate 
column  passed  parallel  with  his  line,  but  one  hundred 
yards  off,  and  then,  with  sabres  drawn,  charged  down  into 
the  overwhelming  masses  of  the  enemy. 

"  The  small  detachment  of  the  Third  Pennsylvania, 
under  Treichel  and  Eodgers,  struck  the  enemy  first,  all 


"KEEP  TO  YOUR  SABRES,  MEN!"  409 

making  for  the  color -guard.  Newhall  was  about  seizing 
the  flag  when  a  sabre  blow,  directed  at  his  head,  compelled 
him  to  parry  it.  At  the  same  moment  the  color -bearer 
lowered  his  spear  and  struck  Newhall  full  in  the  face,  tear- 
ing open  his  mouth  and  knocking  him  senseless  to  the 
ground.  Every  officer  and  nearly  every  man  in  the  little 
band  was  killed  or  wounded,  although  some  succeeded  in 
cutting  their  way  clear  through.  Almost  at  the  same 
moment  Miller,  with  his  squadron  of  the  Third  Pennsyl- 
vania, struck  the  left  flank  about  two  thirds  of  the  way 
down  the  column.  Going  through  and  through,  he  cut 
off  the  rear  portion  and  drove  it  back  past  Rummel's, 
almost  up  to  the  Confederate  battery,  and  nothing  but  the 
heavy  losses  which  he  had  suffered  and  the  scattering  of 
his  men  prevented  his  going  further,  wounded  though 
he  was. 

"  In  the  meantime,  the  two  columns  had  come  together 
with  a  crash  —  the  one  led  by  Hampton  and  Fitzhugh  Lee 
(for  he,  too,  was  there,)  and  the  other  by  Ouster  —  and  were 
fighting  hand  to  hand,  Mclntosh,  with  his  staff  and  or- 
derlies, and  such  scattered  men  from  Michigan  and  other 
regiments  as  he  could  get  together,  charged  in  with  their 
sabres.  For  minutes,  which  seemed  like  hours,  amid  the 
clashing  of  the  sabres,  the  rattle  of  the  small  arms,  the 
frenzied  imprecations,  the  demands  for  surrender,  the  un- 
daunted replies,  and  the  appeals  for  mercy,  the  Confederate 
column  stood  its  ground.  Captain  Thomas,  of  the  staff, 
seeing  that  a  little  more  was  needed  to  turn  the  tide,  cut 
his  way  over  to  the  woods  on  the  right,  where  he  knew 
he  could  find  Hart,  with  his  fresh  squadron  of  the  First 
Jersey.  In  the  melee,  near  the  colors,  was  an  officer 


CAVALRY  SHAFT. 
This  column  marks  the  place  where  the  great  cavalry  engagement  behind  the  right  of 

the  Federal  line  occurred  in  the  afternoon  of  the  3d,  simultaneous  with  Pickett's 
Uiol  charge  in  front  (*™m  a  Photograph  by  Tipton.1 


THE  CONFEDERATE  CAVALRY  RETREAT.        411 

of  high  rank,  and  the  two  headed  the  squadron  for  that 
part  of  the  fight.  They  came  within  reach  of  him  with 
their  sahres,  and  then  it  was  that  "Wade  Hampton  was- 
wounded. 

"  By  this  time  the  edge  of  the  Confederate  column  had 
begun  to  fray  away,  and  the  outside  men  to  draw  back. 
As  Hart's  squadron,  and  the  other  small  parties  who  had 
rallied  and  mounted,  charged  down  from  all  sides,  the- 
enemy  turned.  Then  followed  a  pell-mell  rush,  our  men 
in  close  pursuit.  Many  prisoners  were  captured,  and  many 
of  our  men,  through  their  impetuosity,  were  carried  away 
by  the  overpowering  current  of  the  retreat. 

"  The  pursuit  was  kept  up  past  Rummel's,  and  the 
enemy  were  driven  back  into  the  woods  beyond.  The 
line  of  fences  and  the  farm  buildings  which  constituted 
the  key -point  of  the  field,  and  which,  in  the  beginning  of 
the  fight,  had  been  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  re- 
mained in  ours  until  the  end.  All  serious  fighting  for  the 
day  was  over,  for  Pickett's  simultaneous  assault  had  also- 
been  repulsed,  and  the  victory  along  the  line  was  complete. 
Skirmishing  and  some  desultory  artillery  firing  was  kept  up 
at  intervals  by  both  forces  until  after  nightfall,  these  dis- 
turbances being  caused  by  the  enemy's  endeavor  to  recover 
their  killed  and  wounded,  who  were  lying  thickly  strewed 
over  the  field  in  our  possession.  At  dark  Stuart  withdrew 
to  the  York  pike,  preparatory  to  covering  the  retreat  of 
Lee's  army  toward  the  Potomac.  In  the  evening,  Ouster's 
brigade  was  ordered  to  join  its  division.  Gregg  remained 
all  night  in  possession  of  the  field,  and  in  the  morning 
started  in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  enemy." 

The   force    under   General    Gregg  in  this   engagement 


412  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

numbered  about  five  thousand  men;  while  Stuart's  force 
has  been  estimated  by  reliable  Confederate  authority  as 
between  six  and  seven  thousand.  The  Count  of  Paris, 
however,  who  is  generally  conceded  to  be  entirely  reliable, 
estimates  Stuart's  force  as  considerably  greater  than  the 
Confederate  estimate.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  had  not 
Stuart  been  defeated  in  his  purpose  and  driven  back,  the 
results  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  would  have  been  entirely 
different  from  what  they  were. 

But  this  brilliant  affair  behind  the  Federal  right  was 
not  the  only  occasion  in  which  their  cavalry  did  excellent 
service  during  the  series  of  engagements  upon  this  his- 
toric field.  The  left  was  the  scene  of  the  following  dash 
upon  the  foe.  General  Longstreet  had  given  orders  to 
that  part  of  his  corps  which  was  opposite  Round  Top,  to 
make  a  demonstration  upon  that  position  for  the  purpose 
of  preventing  reinforcements  being  sent  from  there  to 
meet  Pickett's  charge.  In  accordance  with  this  order, 
the  brigades  of  Benning,  Robertson,  and  Law  advanced  to 
the  attack,  when  they  were  unexpectedly  called  to  meet  a 
dash  of  the  Federal  cavalry.  The  brigades  of  Farnsworth 
and  Merritt,  accompanied  by  Graham's  and  Elder's  batter- 
ies, under  the  gallant  Kilpatrick,  came  sweeping  around 
Big  Round  Top,  screaming  and  yelling  like  demons,  and 
dashed  upon  the  astonished  foe.  A  terrific  fight  ensued  in 
which  General  Farnsworth  was  killed.  He  had  been 
promoted  to  the  command  of  a  brigade  on  the  Sunday 
previous,  at  General  Meade's  request,  and  now  thus  early 
fell  at  the  head  of  his  brave  troopers.  Kilpatrick  not 
only  came  near  capturing  Longstreet's  ammunition  train, 
but  compelled  the  troops,  who  were  advancing  towards 


THE   CHARGE   OF   THE   RESERVES.  413 

Round  Top,  to  fall  back  to  protect  their  own  flank.  It  is 
altogether  likely,  too,  that  this  dash  upon  the  Confederate 
flank,  prevented  any  part  of  the  forces  there  from  partici- 
pating in  the  great  attack  upon  the  Federal  left  center. 
Of  course  two  brigades  of  cavalry  could  not  be  expected 
to  accomplish  much  against  a  greatly  superior  number 
of  veteran  infantry,  such  as  these  troopers  met  on  that 
occasion,  but  having  accomplished  what  has  been  stated, 
Kilpatrick  withdrew. 

Shortly  after  the  repulse  of  Pickett,  General  Meade 
rode  down  to  Round  Top,  and  seeing  the  enemy  in  front, 
and  learning  that  they  had  been  annoying  his  men  by 
their  fire,  he  ordered  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  to  charge 
upon  them.  Colonel  McCandless,  who  still  occupied  the 
position  he  had  seized  and  fortified  the  evening  before, 
dashed  across  the  Wheat  Field  and  into  the  woods  beyond. 
The  Confederates  fled  before  him.  Bartlett's  brigade  of 
the  Sixth  Corps  advanced  to  the  position  reached  by 
McCandless,  and  other  troops  were  moved  up  on  the  right. 
The  panic  created  by  the  repulse  of  Pickett  seemed  to 
have  seized  upon  the  enemy  upon  this  part  of  the  line,  for 
they  fled  before  the  Reserves,  leaving  three  hundred  pris- 
oners, one  stand  of  colors,  and  five  thousand  stands  of 
arms  in  their  possession.  The  Confederates,  although 
greatly  outnumbering  the  Reserves,  fell  back  nearly  a 
mile,  and  the  ground  lost  by  Sickles  the  day  before  was 
recovered,  with  the  wounded  of  the  battle  of  the  day 
previous,  that  had  lain  there  uncared  for. 

"With  this  brilliant  and  successful  charge  by  the  Penn- 
sylvania Reserves  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  was  ended; 
and  it  is  but  right  that  while  heroic  and  patriotic  men 


414  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

from  many  of  the  states  of  the  Union  participated  in  this 
decisive  engagement,  its  closing  and  final  charge  should 
be  made  by  the  gallant  sons  of  the  state  upon  whose  soil 
it  was  fought. 

The  plan  decided  upon  by  General  Lee  for  the  battle 
of  this  day,  was-  evidently  not  carried  out.  This  will  ap- 
pear in  the  following  statements.  General  Lee,  in  his 
report  of  the  campaign,  speaking  of  this  day,  says: 

"The  result  of  this  day's  operations  (Thursday,  July  2d,) 
induced  the  belief  that,  with  proper  concert  of  action,  and 
with  the  increased  support  that  the  position  gained  on  the 
right  would  enable  the  artillery  to  render  the  assaulting 
columns,  we  should  ultimately  succeed;  and  it  was  accord- 
ingly determined  to  continue  the  attack.  The  general 
plan  was  unchanged.  Longstreet,  reinforced  by  Pickett's 
three  brigades,  which  arrived  near  the  battle  field  the  after- 
noon of  the  2d,  was  ordered  to  attack  the  next  morning; 
and  General  Ewell  was  directed  to  assault  the  enemy's 
right  at  the  same  time." 

The  following  facts  are  clear  from  the  statement  of 
General  Lee: 

1.  The  attack  upon  the  Federal  left  center  was  to  have 
been  made  simultaneously  with  EwelVs  assault  upon  the  right. 

2.  It  was  to  take  place  in  the  morning,  and  not  in  the 
afternoon. 

3.  It  was  to  have  been  made  with  the  two  divisions  of 
Longstreet's  Corps  previously  upon  the  field  —  Hood's  and 
McLaws' — reinforced  by  Pickett. 

Why,  now,  was  not  this  arrangement  of  the  command- 
ing general  carried  into  execution  ?  As  in  the  delay  of  the 
previous  day,  so  in  the  departure  from  General  Lee's  or- 


RESPONSIBILITY   FOR   CONFEDERATE   FAILURE.  415 

ders  in  this,  the  blame  is  laid  upon  General  Longstreet. 
Colonel  "W.  H.  Taylor,  of  General  Lee's  staff,  in  Annals 
of  the  War,  page  312—316,  says: 

"General  Longstreet's  dispositions  were  not  completed 
as  early  as  was  expected.  It  appears  that  he  was  delayed 
*by  apprehensions  that  his  troops  would  "be  taken  in  reverse 
as  they  advanced;  General  Ewell,  who  had  orders  to  co- 
operate with  General  Longstreet,  and  who  was,  of  course, 
not  aware  of  any  impediment  to  the  main  attack  arranged 
to  be  made  on  the  enemy's  left,  having  reinforced  General 
Johnson,  whose  division  was  upon  our  extreme  left,  during 
the  night  of  the  2d,  ordered  him  forward  early  the  next 
morning.  In  obedience  to  these  instructions,  General 
Johnson  became  hotly  engaged  before  General  Ewell 
«ould  be  informed  of  the  halt  which  had  been  called  on 
our  right.  After  a  gallant  and  prolonged  struggle,  in 
which  the  enemy  was  forced  to  abandon  part  of  his  in- 
trenchments,  General  Johnson  found  himself  unable  to 
carry  the  strongly  fortified  crest  of  the  hill.  The  projected 
attack  on  the  enemy's  left  not  having  been  made,  he  was 
enabled  to  hold  his  right  with  a  force  largely  superior  to 
that  of  General  Johnson,  and  finally,  to  threaten  his  flank 
and  rear,  rendering  it  necessary  for  him  to  retire  to  his 
original  position.  General  Lee  then  had  a  conference 
with  General  Longstreet,  and  the  mode  of  attack,  and  the 
troops  to  make  it,  were  thoroughly  debated.  I  was  present, 
and  understood  the  arrangement  to  be  that  General  Long- 
street  should  endeavor  to  force  the  enemy's  line  in  his  front. 
That  front  was  held  by  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws. 
To  strengthen  him  for  the  undertaking,  it  was  decided  to 
reinforce  him  by  such  troops  as  could  be  drawn  from  the 


416  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

center.  Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's  Corps  was  then 
up,  fresh  and  available.  Heth's  division  of  Hill's  Corps 
was  also  mentioned  as  available,  having  been,  in  a  great 
measure,  recuperated  since  its  active  engagement  of  the 
first  day;  so,  also,  were  the  brigades  of  Lane  and  Scales, 
of  Fender's  division,  Hill's  Corps;  and  as  our  extreme 
right  was  comparatively  safe,  being  well  posted,  and  not 
at  all  threatened,  one  of  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  Mc- 
Laws,  and  the  greater  portion  of  the  other,  could  be  re- 
moved out  of  the  lines  and  be  made  to  take  part  in  the 
attack.  Indeed,  it  was  designed,  originally,  that  the  two 
divisions  last  named,  reinforced  by  Pickett,  should  make 
the  attack;  and  it  was  only  because  of  the  apprehensions 
of  General  Longstreet  that  his  corps  was  not  strong 
enough  for  the  movement,  that  General  Hill  was  called 
on  to  reinforce  him.  Orders  were  sent  to  General  Hill  to 
place  Heth's  division  and  two  brigades  of  Fender's  at 
General  Longstreet's  disposal,  and  to  be  prepared  to  give 
him  further  assistance  if  requested.  The  assault  was  to 
have  been  made  with  a  column  of  not  less  than  two  di- 
visions, and  the  remaining  divisions  were  to  have  been 
moved  forward  in  support  of  those  in  advance.  This  was 
the  result  of  the  conference  alluded  to,  as  understood  by 
me.  Lieutenant  -  General  A.  P.  Hill  appears  to  have  had 
the  same  impression,  for  he  says  in  his  report  of  the  oper- 
ations of  his  corps  at  this  time:  'I  was  directed  to  hold 
my  line  with  Anderson's  division  and  the  half  of  Fender's, 
now  commanded  by  General  Lane,  and  to  order  Heth's 
division,  commanded  by  Pettigrew,  and  Lane's  and  Scales' 
brigades,  of  Fender's  division,  to  report  to  Lieutenant- 
General  Longstreet,  as  a  support  to  his  corps,  in  the  assaul  t 


RESPONSIBILITY   OF    CONFEDERATE    FAILURE.  417 

on  the  enemy's  lines/  *  *  *  !JsTo  more  could  be  ex- 
acted, or  expected,  of  those  men  of  brave  hearts  and  nerves 
of  steel;  but  where  are  their  supports  to  reap  the  benefit 
of  their  heroic  efforts,  and  gather  the  fruits  of  a  victory  so 
nobly  won?  Was  that  but  a  forlorn  hope,  on  whose  suc- 
cess, not  only  in  penetrating  the  enemy's  lines,  but  in 
maintaining  its  hold  against  their  combined  and  united 
efforts  to  dislodge  it,  an  entire  army  was  to  wait  in  quiet 
observation?  "Was  it  designed  to  throw  these  few  brigades 
—  originally,  at  the  most,  but  two  divisions, —  upon  the 
fortified  stronghold  of  the  enemy,  while,  full  half  a  mile 
away,  seven  ninths  of  the  army,  in  breathless  suspense,  in 
ardent  admiration  and  fearful  anxiety,  watched,  but  moved 
n,ot?  I  maintain  that  such  was  not  the  design  of  the  com- 
manding general.  Had  the  veteran  divisions  of  Hood  and 
McLaws  been  moved  forward,  as  was  planned,  in  support 
of  those  of  Pickett  and  .Pettigrew,  riot  only  would  the 
latter  division,  in  all  probability,  have  gained  the  enemy's 
works,  as  did  that  of  Pickett,  but  these  two  would  have 
been  enabled,  with  the  aid  of  Hood  and  McLaws,  to  resist 
all  efforts  of  the  enemy  to  dislodge  them.  *  *  *  It 
appears  that  General  Longstreet  deemed  it  necessary  to 
defend  his  right  flank  and  rear  with  the  divisions  of  Mc- 
Laws and  Hood.  These  divisions,  as  before  stated,  con- 
stituted all  of  the  Confederate  line  held  by  Longstreet's 
troops,  and  it  is  not  apparent  how  they  were  necessary  to 
defend  his  flank  and  rear.  The  nearest  infantry  force  of 
the  enemy,  to  our  right,  occupied  the  hills — Round  Top 
and  Little  Round  Top  —  and  the  only  force  that  could  be 
said  to  threaten  our  flank  and  rear  consisted  of  a  few  bri- 
gades of  cavalry,  so  posted  as  to  protect  the  enemy's  left. 

27 


418  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  here  to  undertake  to  establish  the 
wisdom  of  an  attack  on  the  enemy's  position  on  the  third 
day,  which  General  Longstreet  contends  was  opposed  to 
his  judgment,  and  of  which  he  says  he  would  have  stayed 
the  execution,  had  he  felt  that  he  had  the  privilege  so  to 
do;  nor  do  I  propose  to  discuss  the  necessities  of  the  po- 
sition, which  he  represents  to  have  been  such  as  to  forbid 
the  employment  of  McLaws'  and  Hood's  divisions  in  the 
attack;  neither  do  I  seek  any  other  than  a  just  explana- 
tion of  the  causes  of  our  failure  at  that  time;  but  well 
recalling  my  surprise  and  disappointment  when  it  was 
ascertained  that  only  Pickett's  division,  and  the  troops 
from  Hill's  Corps  had  taken  part  in  the  movement,  and 
with  positively  distinct  impressions  as  to  the  occurrence^ 
just  related,  I  deem  it  proper  to  record  them  for  confirma- 
tion or  refutation  as  the  undisputed  facts  of  the  case,  and 
the  testimony  of  others,  may  determine." 

In  justice  to  General  Longstreet  I  place  on  record  here 
what  he  has  said  in  reply  to  the  serious  charges  of  Colonel 
Taylor.  This  reply  will  be  found  in  Annals  of  the  War, 
pages  431,  432.  General  Longstreet  says: 

"  I  may  mention  here  that  it  has  been  absurdly  said  that 
General  Lee  ordered  me  to  put  Hood's  and  McLaws'  divis- 
ions in  support  of  Pickett's  assault.  General  Lee  never 
ordered  any  such  thing.  After  our  troops  were  all  arranged 
for  assault,  General  Lee  rode  with  me  twice  over  the  lines 
to  see  that  everything  was  arranged  according  to  his 
wishes.  He  was  told  that  we  had  been  more  particular  in 
giving  the  orders  than  ever  before;  that  the  commanders 
had  been  sent  for,  and  the  point  of  attack  had  been  care- 
fully designated,  and  that  the  commanders  had  been 


GENERAL  LONGSTREET's  DEFENSE.  419 

directed  .to  communicate  to  their  subordinates,  and  through 
them  to  every  soldier  in  the  command,  the  work  that  was 
before  them,  so  that  they  would  nerve  themselves  for  the 
attack,  and  fully  understand  it.  After  leaving  me,  he 
again  rode  over  the  field  once,  if  not  twice,  so  that  there 
was  really  no  room  for  misconstruction  or  misunderstand- 
ing of  his  wishes.  He  could  not  have  thought  of  giving 
any  such  an  order.  Hood  and  McLaws  were  confronted 
by  a  largely  superior  force  of  the  enemy  on  the  right  of 
Pickett's  attack.  To  have  moved  them  to  Pickett's  sup- 
port, would  have  disengaged  treble  their  own  number  of 
Federals,  who  would  have  swooped  down  from  their  rocky 
fortresses  against  the  flank  of  our  attacking  column,  and 
swept  our  army  from  the  field." 

In  a  foot  -  note  to  the  same  article  from  which  the  fore- 
going has  been  taken,  General  Longstreet  further  says: 

"  Colonel  Taylor  says  that  General  Lee,  in  his  presence, 
gave  me  orders  to  put  Hood's  and  McLaws'  divisions  in 
this  column  of  attack.  This  I  deny,  and  do  not  suppose 
he  will  claim  that  any  one  else  heard  the  order.  If  the 
reader  will  examine  any  of  the  maps  of  Gettysburg,  he 
will  see  that  the  withdrawal  of  these  two  divisions  from 
their  line  of  battle  would  have  left  half  of  General  Lee's 
line  of  battle  open,  and  by  the  shortest  route  to  his  line  of 
supplies  and  retreat.  Fully  one  half  of  his  army  would 
have  been  in -the  column  of  assault,  and  half  of  Meade's 
army  would  have  been  free  to  sally  out  on  the  flank  of  our 
column,  and  we  should  have  been  destroyed  on  that  field 
of  battle,  beyond  a  doubt.  *  *  The  only  way  for  these 
divisions  to  have  been  moved,  was  to  have  attacked  the 
lieights  in  front.  But  this  attack  had  been  tried,  and 


420  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

failed  the  day  before.  If  Pickett  had  shown  signs  of 
getting  a  lodgment,  I  should,  of  course,  have  pushed  the 
other  divisions  forward  to  support  the  attack.  But  I  saw 
that  he  was  going  to  pieces  at  once.  *  *  To  have  rushed 
forward  my  two  divisions,  then  carrying  bloody  noses  from 
their  terrible  conflict  the  day  before,  would  have  been 
madness." 

In  this  conflict  of  statements  in  regard  to  this  subject, 
the  only  authority  that  could  settle  the  question  would  be 
General  Lee  himself.  lie,  however,  has  gone,  but  he  has 
left  a  brief  but  significant  remark,  made  to  General  Imbo- 
den  during  the  night  after  the  battle  of  this  day,  which 
seems  to  decide  against  General  Longstreet.  General 
Imboden,  in  an  article  contributed  by  him  to  the  Galaxy 
of  April,  1871,  says  that  the  night  after  this  battle  (Friday, 
July  3d,  1863,)  he  met  General  Lee  in  the  rear  of  his  line. 
After  describing  the  General's  fatigued  and  depressed  con- 
dition, and  detailing  some  conversation  which  passed  be- 
tween them,  General  Imboden  says  that  Lee  addressed  him 
thus:  "General,  I  never  saw  troops  behave  more  magnifi- 
cently than  Pickett's  division  of  Virginians  did  to  -  day  in 
their  grand  charge  upon  the  enemy.  And  if  they  had  been 
supported,  as  they  were  to  have  been, —  but,  for  some  reason  not 
yet  fully  explained  to  me,  they  were  not, — we  would  have 
held  the  position  they  so  gloriously  won  at  such  a  fearful 
loss  of  noble  lives,  and  the  day  would  have  been  ours." 

"Whether  charged  rightly  or  wrongly  with  delaying  the 
attack  of  this  day  as  he  clearly  did  delay  the  assault  of  the 
day  before,  and  with  failing  to  make  it  with  the  whole  of 
the  force  that  Lee  intended  and  ordered,  one  thing  is  cer- 
tain,—  General  Longstreet  disapproved  of  making  the 


GENERAL  LONGSTREEl'S  RELUCTANCE.         421 

attack  at  all,  and  when  forced  by  the  command  of  his 
superior  to  make  it,  he  did  so  with  the  utmost  reluctance 
and  fully  assured  of  its  hopelessness.  This  he  does  not 
attempt  to  conceal.  The  subject  is  so  important  that  I 
transcribe  here  the  General's  own  statement  in  Annals  of 
the  "War,  pages  429-431.  General  Longstreet  says: 

"  Our  artillery  was  in  charge  of  General  E.  P.  Alexan- 
der, a  brave  and  gifted  officer.  Colonel  Walton  was  my 
chief  of  artillery;  but  Alexander  being  at  the  head  of  the 
column,  and  being  first  in  position,  and  being,  beside,  an 
officer  of  unusual  promptness,  sagacity,  and  intelligence, 
was  given  charge  of  the  artillery.  The  arrangements 
were  completed  about  one  o'clock.  General  Alexander 
had  arranged  that  a  battery  of  seven  eleven-pound  howitz- 
ers, with  fresh  horses  and  full  caissons,  were  to  charge 
with  Pickett,  at  the  head  of  his  line,  but  General  Pendle- 
ton,  from  whom  the  guns  had  been  borrowed,  recalled  them 
just  before  the  charge  was  made,  and  thus  deranged  this 
wrise  plan.  !Never  was  I  so  depressed  as  upon  that  day. 
I  felt  that  my  men  were  to  be  sacrificed,  and  that  I  should 
have  to  order  them  to  make  a  hopeless  charge.  I  had  in- 
structed General  Alexander,  being  unwilling  to  trust 
myself  with  the  entire  responsibility,  to  carefully  observe 
the  effect  of  the  fire  upon  the  enemy,  and  when  it  began  to 
tell  to  notify  Pickett  to  begin  the  assault.  I  was  so  much 
impressed  with"  the  hopelessness  of  the  charge,  that  T 
wrote  the  following  note  to  General  Alexander:  *  If  the 
artillery  fire  does  not  have  the  effect  to  drive  oft'  the  enemy 
or  greatly  demoralize  him,  so  as  to  make  our  efforts  pretty 
certain,  I  would  prefer  that  you  should  not  advise  General 
Pickett  to  make  the  charge.  I  shall  rely  a  great  deal  on 


422  THE  GREAT  INVASION. 

your  judgment  to  determine  the  matter,  and  shall  expect 
you  to  let  Pickett  know  when  the  moment  offers.'  To  my 
note  the  General  replied  as  follows:  'I  will  only  be  able  to 
judge  the  effect  of  our  fire  upon  the  enemy  by  his  return 
fire,  for  his  infantry  is  but  little  exposed  to  view,  and  the 
smoke  will  .obscure  the  whole  field.  If,  as  I  infer  from" 
your  note,  there  is, an  alternative  to  this  attack,,  it  should 
be  carefully  considered  befo.re  opening  our  fire,  for  it  will 
take  all  of  the  artiljery  ammunition  we  have  left  to  test 
this  one  thoroughly;  and,  if  the  result  is  unfavorable,  we 
will  have  none  left  for  another  effort;  and,  even  if  this  is 
entirely  successful,  it  can  only  be  at  a  very  bloody  cost.' 
I  still  desired  to  save  my  men,  and  felt  that  if  the  artillery 
did  not  produce  the  desired  effect,  I  would  be  justified  in 
holding  Pickett  off*.  I  wrote  this  note  to  Colonel  Walton 
at  exactly  half  past  one  P.  M. :  'Let  the  batteries  open. 
Order  great  precision  in  firing.  If  the  batteries  at  the 
Peach  Orchard  can  not  be  used  against  the  point  we  intend 
attacking,  let  them  open  on  the  enemy  at  Rocky  Hill 
(Round  Top).'  The  cannonading  which  opened  along 
both  lines  was  grand.  In  a  few  moments  a  courier  brought 
a  note  to  General  Pickett  (who  was  standing  near  me) 
from  Alexander,  which,  after  reading  he  handed  to  me. 
It  was  as  follows:  *If  you  are  coming  at  all,  you  must 
come  at  once,  or  I  can  not  give  you  proper  support;  but 
the  enemy's  fire  has  not  slackened  at  all;  at  least  eighteen 
guns  are  still  firing  from  the  Cemetery  itself.'  After  I  had 
read  this  note,  Pickett  said  to  me,  *  General,  shall  I  ad- 
vance?' My  feelings  had  so  overcome  me  that  I  would 
not  speak,  for  fear  of  betraying  my  want  of  confidence  to 
him.  I  bowed  affirmation,  and  turned  to  mount  my  horse. 


LONGSTREET'S  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  CHARGE.  423 

Pickett  immediately  said,  '  I  shall  lead  my  division  for- 
ward, sir.'  I  spurred  my  horse  to  the  wood  where  Alex- 
ander was  stationed  with  artillery.  When  I  reached  him, 
he  told  me  of  the  disappearance  of  the  seven  guns  which 
were  to  have  led  the  charge  with  Pickett,  and  that  his 
ammunition  was  so  low  that  he  could  not  properly  support 
the  charge.  I  fit  once  ordered  him  to  stop  Pickett  until 
the  ammunition  had  been  replenished.  He  informed  me 
that  he  had  no  ammunition  with  which  to  replenish.  I 
then  saw  that  there  was  no  help  for  it,  and  that  Pickett 
must  advance  un^ler  his  orders.  He  swept  past  our  artil- 
lery in  splendid  style,  and  the  men  marched  steadily  and 
compactly  down  the  slope.  As  they  started  up  the  ridge, 
over  one  hundred  cannon  from  the  breast  -  works  of  the 
Federals  hurled  a  rain  of  canister,  grape,  and  shell  down 
upon  them;  still  they  pressed  on  until  halfway  up  the 
slope,  when  the  crest  of  the  hill  was  lit  with  a  solid  sheet 
of  flame  as  the  masses  of  infantry  rose  and  fired.  When 
the  smoke  cleared  away,  Pickett's  division  was  gone. 
Nearly  two  thirds  of  his  men  lay  dead  on  the  field,  and 
the  survivors  were  sullenly  retreating  down  the  hill. 
Mortal  man  could  not  have  stood  that  fire.  In  half  an 
hour  the  contested  field  was  cleared,  and  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg  was  over." 

When  Pickett's  great  charge  was  repulsed,  all  of  the 
men  that.had  engaged  in  it,  and  were  not  killed,  wounded, 
or  captured,  went  streaming  back  to  their  own  line.  There 
they  were  met  and  rallied  by  their  officers,  with  the  view 
to  be  in  readiness  for  a  counter  charge,  which  all  sup- 
posed would  certainly  follow.  The  condition  of  the  Con- 
federates at  that  part  of  their  line  is  thus  given  by  Colonel 


424  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

Freernantle, — the  English  officer  previously  referred  to, — 
in  Elackwood's  Magazine  of  September,  1863: 

"  I  soon  began  to  meet  many  wounded  men  returning 
from  the  front;  many  of  them  asked  in  piteous  tones  the 
way  to  a  doctor,  or  an  ambulance.  The  further  I  got  the 
greater  became  the  number  of  the  wounded.  At  last  I 
came  to  a  perfect  stream  of  them  flocking  through  the 
woods  in  numbers  as  great  as  the  crowd  in  Oxford  Street 
in  the  middle  of  the  day.  *  *  They  were  still  under  a 
heavy  fire;  the  shells  were  continually  bringing  down 
great  limbs  of  trees,  and  carrying  further  destruction 
amongst  their  melancholy  procession.  I  saw  all  this  in 
less  time  than  it  takes  to  write  it,  and  although  astonished 
to  meet  such  a  vast  number  of  wounded,  I  had  not  seen 
enough  to  give  an  idea  of  the  real  extent  of  the  mischief. 

"When  I  got  close  up  to  General  Longstreet,  I  saw  one 
of  his  regiments  advancing  through  the  woods  in  good 
order;  so,  thinking  I  was  just  in  time  to  see  the  attack,  I 
remarked  to  the  General  that '  I  wouldn't  have  missed  this 
for  anything.'  Longstreet  was  seated  on  the  top  of  a 
snake  -  fence,  in  the  edge  of  the  wood,  and  looking  per- 
fectly calm  and  unperturbed.  He  replied,  '  The  d 1  you 

wouldn't!  I  would  like  to  have  missed  it  very  much;  we've 
attacked  and  been  repulsed.  Look  there!'  For  the  first 
time  I  then  had  a  view  of  the  open  space  between  the  two 
positions,  and  saw  it  covered  with  Confederates  slowly  and 
sulkily  returning  towards  us  in  small  broken  parties.  *  * 
I  remember  seeing  a  general  (Pettigrew  I  think  it  was) 
come  up  to  him  and  report  that  he  was  unable  to  bring 
his  men  up  again.  Longstreet  turned  upon  him  and  re- 
plied with  some  sarcasm:  *  Very  well,  never  mind,  then, 


LEE   AT  THE   FKOXT.  425 

General;  just  let  them  remain  where  they  are.  The  enemy 
is  going  to  advance,  and  will  spare  you  the  trouble.'  *  *  * 
Soon  afterward  I  joined  General  Lee,  who  had  in  the 
meanwhile  come  to  the  front,  on  becoming  aware  of  the 
disaster.  He  was  engaged  in  rallying  and  in  encouraging 
the  troops,  and  was  riding  about  a  little  in  front  of  the 
woods  quite  alone,  the  whole  of  his  staff'  being  engaged  in 
a  similar  manner  further  to  the  rear.  His  face,  which  is 
always  placid  and  cheerful,  did  not  show  signs  of  the 
slightest  disappointment,  care,  or  annoyance;  and  he  was 
addressing  to  every  soldier  he  met  a  few  words  of  encour- 
agement, such  as,  'All  this  will  come  right  in  the  end;  we 
will  talk  it  over  afterwards, —  but  in  the  meantime  all  good 
men  must  rally.  We  want  all  good  men  and  true  men 
just  now,'  etc.  *  *  He  said  to  me,  'This  has  been  a  sad 
day  for  us,  Colonel,  —  a  sad  day;  but  we  can't  expect 
always  to  gain  victories.'  *  *  I  saw  General  Wilcox  (an 
officer  who  wears  a  short  round  jacket  and  a  battered 
straw  hat)  come  up  to  him,  and  explain,  almost  crying, 
the  state  of  his  brigade.  General  Lee  immediately  shook 
hands  with  him,  and  said,  cheerfully,  'Never  mind,  General. 
All  this  has  been  my  fault, —  it  is  I  that  have- lost  the  fight, 
and  you  must  help  me  out  of  it  in  the  best  way  you  can.' ' 
Captain  Owen,  from  whom  I  have  previously  quoted, 
gives  the  following  account  of  what  transpired  within  the 
Confederate  lines  after  Pickett's  repulse,  and  the  demorali- 
zation among  the  men  which  prevailed.  Owen's  account 
is  as  follows:  "  Colonel  Freemantle  says, '  General  Lee  rode 
among  Pickett's  men  after  the  repulse,  and  with  a  few 
kindly  words  rallied  the  broken  troops;  that  he  saw  many 
men  with  an  empty  sleeve  seize  a  musket  and  turn  readily 


426  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

into  line;  that  there  was  less  noise  and  confusion  than  oil 
an  ordinary  review.'  Here  are  the  facts  of  this  rally  of 
Pickett's  division.  An  attempt  was  made  on  the  brow  of 
Seminary  Ridge,  in  front  of  the  Confederate  batteries,  by  a 
couple  of  officers,  to  rally  the  fugitives,  but  the  effort 
(under  a  heavy  cross-fire  from  both  sides)  failed,  and  then 
commenced  a  rout  that  soon  increased  to  a  stampede  and 
almost  demoralization  of  all  the  survivors  of  this  noted 
charge  without  distinction  of  regiments  or  commands. 

"A  few  hundred  yards  behind  the  Confederate  batteries- 
there  is  a  ravine  along  which  runs  a  country  road  that 
makes  at  one  place  an  abrupt  angle  by  turning  or  bending 
to  the  left.  At  this  point  there  is  a  bluff  on  one  side  and 
a  slight  swamp  on  the  other,  creating  a  narrow  pass 
through  which  the  fugitives,  without  distinction  of  rank,, 
officers  and  privates  side  by  side,  pushed,  poured  and  rush- 
ed in  a  continuous  stream,  throwing  away  guns,  blankets,, 
and  haversacks  as  they  hurried  on  in  confusion  toward  th& 
rear.  Here  another  effort  was  made  to  rally  the  broken 
troops,  and  all  sorts  of  appeals  and  threats  made  to  officers- 
and  men  who  turned  a  deaf  ear  and  hurried  on,  some  of 
the  officers  even  jerking  loose  with  an  oath  from  the  hand 
laid  on  their  shoulders  to  attract  attention.  At  last  a  few 
privates  hearkening  to  the  appeals  halted  and  formed  a 
nucleus  around  which  about  thirty  others  soon  rallied,  and 
with  these  a  picket  was  formed  across  the  road  as  a  barrier 
to  further  retreat  and  the  stream  of  stragglers  dammed  up 
several  hundred  strong. 

"  General  Pickett  came  down  from  the  direction  of  the 
battle  -  field  weeping  bitterly,  and  said  to  the  officer  com- 
manding the  picket:  'Don't  stop  any  of  my  men.  Tell 


ARRESTING   THE   FUGITIVES.  427 

them  to  come  to  the  camp  we  occupied  last  night;'  and 
passed  on  himself  alone  toward  the  rear.  Other  officers 
passed  by,  but  the  picket  was  retained  at  this  point  until 
Major  Charles  Marshall  came  galloping  up  from  the  rear, 
and  inquired  what  this  guard  was  for  and  who  placed  it 
here;  and  finding  the 'officer  without  orders,  he  moved 
the  picket  back  a  few  hundred  yards  and  extended  the  line 
along  the  stream  or  little  creek  found  there.  Here  the 
guard  did  duty  until  sundown,  arresting  all  stragglers  from 
the  battle-field,  and  Colonel  Marshall  took  them  forward 
himself,  with  no  other  help,  to  where  General  Lee  was  on 
the  field,  and  it  was  to  these  men  that  Colonel  Freemantle 
heard  General  Lee  address  his  kindly  words,  but  none  of 
them  had  empty  sleeves,  as  all  the  wounded  were  allowed 
to  pass  to  the  rear.  When  Colonel  Marshall  first  came 
up  to  the  picket  across  the  road  he  had  come  from  a 
point  still  farther  in  rear,  where  he  had  been  sent  by 
General  Lee  to  rally  the  stragglers,  if  possible,  and  failing 
to  do  so  was  returning  to  report  to  General  Lee.  Colonel 
Marshall  came  down  several  times  before  sundown  after 
the  stragglers  collected  by  the  picket,  and  carried  up  to- 
the  field  probably  a  total  of  four  or  five  hundred  men 
during  the  evening." 

There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  among  those  who  par- 
ticipated in  the  "battle  of  Gettysburg,  as  well  as  among 
historians  who  have  written  of  that  engagement  since,  as 
to  whether  or  not  Pickett's  repulse  should  have  been  fol- 
lowed by  a  counter- charge  by  the  Federal  forces.  As  it  is 
simply  a  question  of  opinion,  it  may  be  well  to  give  here 
the  views  expressed  by  the  following  eminent  persons: 

General  Longstreet  says:     "  When  this  charge  failed,  I 


428  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

expected  that,  of  course,  the  enemy  would  throw  himself 
against  our  shattered  ranks  and  try  to  crush  us.  I  sent 
my  staff  officers  to  the  rear  to  assist  in  rallying  the  troops, 
and  hurried  to  our  line  of  batteries,  as  the  only  support 
that  I  could  give  them,  knowing  that  my  presence  would 
impress  upon  every  one  of  them  the  necessity  of  holding 
the  ground  to  the  last  extremity.  I  knew  if  the  army  was 
to  be  saved,  those  batteries  must  check  the  enemy.  *  *  * 
The  enemy's  skirmishers  were  then  advancing  and  threat- 
ening assault.  For  unaccountable  reasons,  the  enemy  did 
not  pursue  his  advantage."* 

In  his  second  contribution  to  the  same  work  from  which 
the  foregoing  is  taken  (page  627),  General  Longstreet 
further  says: 

"The  charge  (Pickett's)  was  disastrous,  and  had  the 
Federal  army  been  thrown  right  upon  the  heels  of  Pick- 
ett's retreating  column,  the  results  might  have  been  much 
more  serious." 

Mr.  Swinton,  in  his  "History  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac," quotes  General  Longstreet  somewhat  differently. 
Mr.  Swinton  says: 

"  I  have  become  convinced  from  the  testimony  of  Gen- 
eral Longstreet  himself,  that  that  attack  would  have  re- 
sulted disastrously.  '  I  had,'  said  that  officer  to  the  writer, 
*Hood  and  McLaws,  who  hud  not  been  engaged;  I  had  a 
heavy  force  of  artillery;  I  should  have  liked  nothing 
better  than  to  have  been  attacked,  and  have  no  doubt  I 
should  have  given  those  who  tried  as  bad  a  reception  as 
Pickett  received.' " 

General  Alexander,  the  same  officer  to  whom  General 

*  Annals  of  the  War,  page  431. 


GENERAL   ALEXANDER'S   OPINION.  429 

Longstreet  referred  to  in  a  previous  quotation,  as  having 
charge  of  his  artillery,  says  in  a  communication  to  the 
"  Southern  Historical  Papers  " : 

"  I  have  always  believed  that  the  enemy  here  lost  the 
greatest  opportunity  they  ever  had  of  routing  Lee's  army 
by  a  prompt  offensive.  They  occupied  a  line  shaped  some- 
what like  a  horse -shoe.  I  suppose  the  greatest  diameter 
of  this  horse -shoe  was  not  more  than  one  mile,  and  the 
ground  within  was  entirely  sheltered  from  our  observa- 
tion and  fire,  with  communications  by  signals  all  over 
it,  and  they  could  concentrate  their  whole  force  at  any 
point  and  in  a  very  short  time  without  our  knowledge. 
Our  line  was  an  enveloping  semi -circle,  over  four  miles  in 
development,  and  communication  from  flank  to  flank,  even 
by  courier,  was  difficult,  the  country  being  well  cleared 
and  exposed  to  the  enemy's  view  and  fire,  the  roads  all 
running  at  right  angles  to  our  lines,  and  some  of  them  at 
least  broad  turnpikes,  where  the  enemy's  guns  could  rake 
for  two  miles.  Is  it  necessary  now  to  add  any  statement 
as  to  the  superiority  of  the  Federal  force,  or  the  exhausted 
and  shattered  condition  of  the  Confederates  for  a  space  of 
at  least  a  mile  in  their  very  center,  to  show  that  a  great 
opportunity  was  thrown  away?  I  think  General  Lee  him- 
self was  quite  apprehensive  that  the  enemy  would  riposte, 
and  that  it  was  that  apprehension  which  brought  him 
alone  out  to  my  guns,  where  he  could  observe  all  the  indi- 
cations." 

, General  Trimble,  who  commanded  a  division  of  Hill's 
Corps,  which  supported  Pickett  in  his  charge,  says: 

"  By  all  the  rules  of  warfare  the  Federal  troops  should 
(as  I  expected  they  would)  have  marched  against  our  shat- 


430  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

tered  columns  and  sought  to  cover  our  army  with  over- 
whelming defeat." 

The  views  of  Federal  officers  are  as  follows.  General 
Doubleday  says: 

"  When  Pickett's  charge  was  repulsed,  and  the  whole 
plain  covered  with  fugitives,  we  all  expected  that  Welling- 
ton's command  at  Waterloo  of, 'Up,  guards,  and  at  them!' 
would  be  repeated,  and  that  a  grand  counter -charge 
would  be  made.  But  General  Meade  had  made  no  ar- 
rangements to  give  a  return  thrust.  It  seems  to  me  that 
he  should  have  posted  the  Sixth  and  part,  of  the  Twelfth 
corps  in  rear  of  Gibbon's  division  the  moment  Pickett's 
infantry  were  seen  emerging  from  the  woods,  a  mile  and  a 
half  oft'.  If  they  broke  through  our  center  these  corps 
would  have  been  there  to  receive  them,  and  if  they  failed 
to  pierce  our  line  and  retreated,  the  two  corps  could  have 
followed  them  up  promptly  before  they  had  time  to  rally 
and  reorganize.  An  advance  by  Sykes  would  have  kept 
Longstreet  in  position.  In  all  probability  we  would  have 
•cut  the  enemy's  army  in  two,  and  captured  the  long  line 
of  batteries  opposite  us,  which  were  but  slightly  guarded."* 

General  Hancock,  whose  brilliant  services  during  this 
.great  engagement  and  elsewhere,  justly  entitle  him  to  the 
honorable  distinction  of  "the  superb  soldier,"  subsequently 
bestowed  upon  him,  favored  a  counter -charge.  Lying 
wounded  in  an  ambulance,  he  penned  a  few  lines  to  Gen- 
eral Meade,  recommending  that  it  be  done.f 

General  Howard,  too,  favored  an  immediate  advance 
upon  the  enemy.  In  an  article  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly, 

*  General  Doubleday's  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  page  202. 
•j-General  Doubleday's  "Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  page  202. 


FEDERAL   CBITICISMS   ON   MEADE.  431 

this  excellent  officer  says  that  the  fearful  exposure  to  which 
General  Meade  was  subjected  during  the  nearly  two  hours 
of  terrific  cannonading  preparatory  to  the  charge,  seemed 
to  have  confused  him  so  that  he  did  not  at  first  realize  the 
victory  he  had  won,  and  therefore  he  failed  to  follow  up 
the  advantage  gained. 

General  Pleasanton  says: 

"From  the  suddenness  of  the  repulse  of  the  last  charge 
on  July  3d,  it  became  necessary  for  General  Meade  to  de- 
cide at  once  what  to  do.  I  rode  up  to  him,  and,  after  con- 
gratulating him  on  the  splendid  conduct  of  the  army,  1 
said:  '  General,  I  will  give  you  half  an  hour  to  show  your- 
self a  great  general.  Order  the  army  to  advance,  while  I 
will  take  the  cavalry  and  get  in  Lee's  rear,  and  we  will 
finish  the  campaign  in  a  week.'  He  replied:  'How  do 
you  know  Lee  will  not  attack  me  again;  we  have  done 
well  enough.'  I  replied  that  Lee  had  exhausted  all  his 
available  men;  that  the  cannonade  of  the  last  two  days 
had  exhausted  his  ammunition;  he  was  far  from  his  base 
of  supplies;  and  by  compelling  him  to  keep  his  army  to- 
gether, they  must  soon  surrender,  for  he  was  living  on  the 
country.  To  this  the  general  did  not  reply,  but  asked  me 
to  ride  up  to  Round  Top  with  him;  and,  as  we  rode  along 
the  ridge  for  nearly  a  mile,  the  troops  cheered  him  in  a 
manner  that  plainly  showed  they  expected  the  advance." 

Horace  Greeley,  in  his  "American  Conflict,"  volume  II., 
page  388,  presents  the  other  side  of  this  question  in  the 
following  language : 

"Nor  is  General  Meade  justly  blamable  for  not  pushing 
forward  at  once  on  the  heels  of  his  beaten  foes.  Around 
.him  lay  nearly  or  quite  one  .fourth  of  his  army  killed  or 


432  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

wounded;  he  knew  that  his  own  ammunition  was  running 
low;  he  did  not  know  that  Lee's  was  even  more  completely 
exhausted.  If  he  had  ordered  a  general  advance,  and 
been  repelled  from  Seminary  Ridge  by  such  a  fire  as  had 
met  and  crushed  the  Confederate  assailants  of  Cemetery 
Hill,  he  would  have  been  reproached  as  rash  and  fool- 
hardy by  many  who  have  deemed  him  deficient  in  courage 
and  heartiness  because  he  did  not  make  the  Union  a 
Fourth  of  July  present  of  the  remnant  of  Lee's  army." 

Colonel  James  C.  Biddle,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  pages 
215,  216,  says: 

"  It  had  been  General  Meade's  intention  to  order  a  gen- 
eral advance  from  our  left,  after  the  close  of  the  action; 
but,  owing  to  the  lateness  of  the  hour,  and  the  wearied 
condition  of  the  army,  with  a  'wisdom  that  did  guide  his 
valor  to  act  in  safety,'  ho  abandoned  the  movement  he 
contemplated.  For  this  he  has  been  severely  censured. 
*  *  General  Meade  was  not  in  the  least  'demoralized' 
by  the  enemy's  fire,  but  realized  fully  the  exact  condition 
of  afiairs.  Lee  had  been  repulsed,  not  routed,  and,  if 
Meade  had  yielded  to  his  own  inclination  to  attack,  he 
would  have  been  repulsed  himself,  and  would  thus  have 
thrown  away  the  fruits  of  his  great  victory." 

General  McLaws,  in  an  article  contributed  by  him  to  the 
Philadelphia  Weekly  Press,  of  April  21st,  1886,  says: 

"  Some  have  asserted  the  belief  that  if  General  Meade 
had  assaulted  immediately  after  'Pickett's  charge'  he 
would  have  gained  an  easy  victory.  I  can  see  no  reason 
for  such  an  opinion.  It  was  a  saying  of  General  Jackson, 
based  on  his  observation  of  results  in  many  encounters, 
'that  our  men  sometimes  fail  to  drive  the  enemy  from 


A   CONFEDERATE   OPINION.  433 

their  positions,  but  they  always  fail  to  drive  us  from  our 
positions.' 

"For  General  Meade  to  have  made  an  assault  with  suffi- 
cient force  to  have  gained  a  victory  over  Lee's  army,  just 
after  Pickett's  repulse,  following  Pickett's  men,  it  would 
have  been  necessary  for  him  to  have  known  beforehand 
where  the  assault  was  to  be  made,  to  know  that  General 
Lee  had  no  preparations  to  assault  elsewhere,  and  to  have 
given  orders  to  his  commanders  that  in  the  event  of  Pick- 
ett's repulse  an  immediate  advance  was  to  be  made  by  his 
army.  But  could  General  Meade  know  that  only  his 
center  was  to  be  assaulted?  Could  he  believe  that  after  a 
grand  artillery  display  of  hours,  calling  his  attention  to 
the  preparations  for  an  assault  somewhere,  that  in  the 
middle  of  the  day  his  left  center  was' to  be  the  point. of 
attack,  and  that  it  was  to  be  made  by  .two  divisions  only, 
one  coming  after,  but  not  following,  the  other,  rand  -with 
their  flanks  unprotected?  Had  General  Meade  any  reason 
to  think  that  there  was  nothing  else  ^o  follow? 

"  "Was  it  not  more  reasonable  for  him  to  suppose  that 
the  force  in  the  woods  opposite  his  left,  which,  on  the  day 
before,  had  made  such  a  'terrific  attack,'  would  take  part 

in  the  engagement? 

*  *  ^  *  *  *  * 

"He  could  see  Pickett  coming  for  at  least  a  half  mile 
over  an  open  country,  and  had  every  reason  to  think  that 
it  was  a  demonstration  to  cover  some  other  and  more 
formidable  and  better  arranged  assault,  for  it  was  not 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  General  Lee  expected  to  defeat 
his  army  with  two  divisions,  coming  one  on  the  left  of  the 
other,  each  in  line,  but  one  in  the  rear,  without  support 

28 


434  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

and  being  pelted  with  over  two  hundred  guns  from  the 
flanks  and  in  front  from  the  moment  it  formed  while  on 
the  march  until  it  reached  his  works, —  all  this,  besides  the 
work  of  destruction  in  its  flanks  from  the  infantry  fire.  I 
repeat  that  General  Meade  had  every  reason  to  think  that 
something  more  serious  than  this  was  to  follow,  and  to 
come  at  once  or  very  soon,  and  it  was  but  an  act  of  good 
judgment  for  him  to  keep  his  troops  couchant,  waiting  the 
denouement. 

"  That  nothing  else  came,  that  no  other  assault  was 
made,  is  no  reason  why  an  attempt  should  be  made  to 
blame  General  Meade  for  not  attacking  in  turn.  For  if  he 
had  followed  Pickett's  flying  troops  with  a  large  portion 
of  his  force  he  would  have  given  his  flanks  to  that  force 
in  the  woods,  the  amount  of  which  he  could  not  know; 
but  it  was  his  good  reason  to  think,  when  seeing  the  com- 
position of  that  attacking  his  left  center  that  a  very  large 
force  was  there  concentrated,  and  besides  he  would  have 
attempted  to  do  that  which  the  Confederates  had  failed  to 
do;  that  is,  assault  his  enemy  in  position  without  due  pre- 
paration, and  his  advance  would  have  T)een  over  the  same 
open  country  and  exposed  to  the  fire  of  over  two  hundred 
guns. 

"  I  have  stated  that  unless  orders  had  been  given  before- 
hand for  a  general  advance,  should  Pickett's  assault  prove 
:a  failure,  no  movement  could  have  been  made  in  time  and 
with  sufficient  force  to  meet  the  occasion.  Such  has  not 
been  the  practice  in  war.  It  is  not  among  the  possibili- 
ties. I  do  not  recollect  of  an  instance  in  our  war,  when 
an  assault  on  any  position  of  the  enemy's  line  having  been 
made,  the  enemy  being  in  position  entrenched  to  receive 


PARALLEL    INSTANCES.  435 

an  attack,  had  risen  en  masse  on  failure  of  that  assault 
and  attacked  the  whole  opposing  army,  nor  was  it  ever 
done  by  our  own  troops.  There  are  doubtless  numerous 
instances  when  the  troops  immediately  opposed  to  the 
assaulting  forces  have  rushed  out  and  made  a  short  pursuit, 
but  that  is  done  on  an  impulse  and  with  small  bodies  with- 
out previous  orders  from  commanding  general  and  never 
amounts  to  a  general  movement. 

"In  the  charge  of  Federals  against  Jackson's  line  at 
Fredericksburg,  when  that  charge  failed,  and  it  failed  for 
the  same  reason  our  assaults  failed  at  Gettysburg,  —  that 
is,  because  there  was  not  a  supporting  force  ample  to  take 
advantage  of  the  first  success  and  push  it, — it  was  ex- 
pected that  Jackson's  force,  the  whole  force,  would  have 
jumped  forward  in  pursuit,  and  in  the  language  of  the 
time,  'Drive  the  enemy  into  the  river.'  But  it  was  not 
done.  I  was  on  Lee's  Hill,  looking  at  the  retiring  Feder- 
als, and  saw  but  Hoke's  North  Carolina  Brigade  dash  out 
in  pursuit;  but  it,  being  unsupported,  returned  after  going 
a  short  distance.  I  have  read  that  some  of  General 
Early's  command  did  the  same  as  Hoke's,  but  I  could  not 
see  that  part  of  the  line.  The  truth  is,  it  is  an  impossi- 
bility for  different  commands  to  co-operate  in  such  a  con- 
tingency depending  on  so  many  chances.  General  Lee, 
with  his  point  of  attack  selected  hours  beforehand,  with 
his  intentions  well  known  to  his  staff,  to  the  corps  com- 
mande'rs,  to  those  who  were  to  take  part  in  the  assault, 
and  to  others,  failed  to  get  the  co-operation  needed,  even 
with  the  two  divisions  engaged  in  the  charge  on  the  3d  of 
July. 

"  On  the  2d  of  July  General  Lee  reports  that  General 


436  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

Longstreet  was  ordered  to  place  the  divisions  of  McLaws 
and  Hood  on  the  right  of  Hill,  partially  enveloping  the 
enemy's  left,  which  he  was  to  drive  in,  etc.  No  time  was 
stated,  but  he  evidently  intended  that  it  should  be  done 
much  earlier  than  it  was  done,  and  General  Ewell  was  in- 
structed to  make  a  simultaneous  demonstration  upon  the 
enemy's  right,  to  be  converted  into  a  real  attack  should  an 
opportunity  offer.  But  it  seems  that  there  was  a  want  of 
co-operation  between  the  corps,  and  we  read  that  Early 
fell  back  from  his  assault  for  want  of  expected  support. 

"  It  would  thus  appear  that  if  General  Lee,  with  his 
points  of  attack  agreed  upon  beforehand  and  known  to 
all  concerned,  failed  to  get  co-operation  between  his  dif- 
ferent commands,  General  Meade,  who  could  not  say 
where  the  attack  was  to  be  made  or  what  would  be  the 
result,  could  hot  give  orders  in  advance,  of  that  private 
nature  which  could  possibly  secure  co-operation  among 
his  commanders. 

"  And  even  if  orders  had  been  given  before  the  assault 
to  be  prepared  to  advance,  should  the  intended  assaults  be 
unsuccessful,  the  commanding  general  alone  would  be  the 
judge  of  the  situation.  He  alone  could  give  orders,  when 
and  how  to  move  the  different  commands,  and  to  send 
staff  officers  to  conduct  the  troops  to  the  positions  they 
would  be  called  on  suddenly  to  take.  This  would  cause 
so  much  delay,  and  probably  so  much  confusion,  as  the 
accidents  of  war  would  have  changed  many  commanders, 
some  incompetent,  that  it  would  be  nearly  impossible  to 
make  a  successful  attack,  for  enough  time  would  be  con- 
sumed for  the  Confederates  to  have  regained  their  de- 
fensive lines,  reorganized  and  recuperated,  and  be  prepared 


CONDITION   OF   CONFEDERATE   ARMY.  437 

for  an  attack,  and  to  be  assaulted  was  just  what  General 
Lee  wanted. 

"The  failure  of  'Pickett's  charge'  was  not  the  defeat 
of  General  Lee's  array.  The  assaulting  column  was  not 
greater  than  that  under  Longstreet  on  the  2d. 

"  The  Confederate  army  was  not  in  retreat,  but  was  now 
in  their  turn  'at  bay,'  waiting  in  position  and  eager  for 
an  assault  to  be  made,  and  waited  all  of  the  4th  wishing 
for  it,  and  the  army  had  about  enough  ammunition  on 
hand  for  another  battle,  but  none  to  waste  on  experiments, 
and  thus  could  not  make  another  assault. 

"  Therefore,  it  looks  as  if  General  Lee,  while  ordering 
an  assault,  had  great  hopes  .that  he  might  be  assaulted  in 
turn,  as  he  was  ready  for  it,  and  believed  that  if  one  was 
made  it  would  have  been  disastrous  to  the  Federals. 

"I  think  that  the  record  of  that  battle  will  warrant  the 
assertion  that  General  Lee  was  not  at  any  time  during  it 
unprepared  for  an  attack  on  his  lines,  and  that  on  the  3d, 
•during  and  after  Pickett's  charge,  he  was  stronger  on  the 
defensive  than  at  any  other  time." 

Mr.  Thomas  Robins,  jr.,  in  the  same  paper,  of  April  18th, 
says :  "  Between  four  and  five  o'clock  on  the  evening  of 
July  3d  the  last  shot  was  fired  by  General  Webb's  Phila- 
delphia brigade,  and  the  men  composing  the  Confederate 
assaulting  column  against  the  Federal  center  were  either 
retreating  across  the  Emmittsburg  road  or  rushing  into 
the  Federal  lines  with  hands  thrown  above  their  heads  as 
a  sign  of  surrender.  At  that  moment  General  Meade  rode 
up  to  the  spot.  His  staff  was  scattered  in  all  directions  in 
quest  of  reinforcements  to  strengthen  the  threatened  point, 


438  THE   GEEAT   INVASION. 

and  the  General  was  accompanied  only  by  his  son,  who 
was  serving  as  his  aid.  The  whole  field  was  covered  with 
smoke,  through  which  the  combatants  could  be  seen  indis- 
tinctly moving  backwards  and  forwards.  General  Meade 
was  unable  to  see  whether  or  not  the  enemy  had  been  re- 
pulsed, and,  turning  to  an  officer  who  commanded  a  sec- 
tion of  Woodruffs  battery,  he  inquired  of  him  whether 
the  assaulting  column  had  turned.  The  officer  answered 
that  the  Confederates  were  just  about  turning,  and,  in 
proof  of  this,  pointed  to  General  Alexander  Hays,  com- 
manding the  third  division  of  the  Second  Corps,  who  was 
waving  a  captured  flag.  The  commanding  general,  how- 
ever, soon  had  a  more  convincing  demonstration  of  the 
fact,  for  within  a  minute  he  was  surrounded  by  a  howling 
mob  of  Confederate  prisoners  who  recognized  him  as  an 
officer  of  authority  who  could  tell  them  where  to  go  to 
escape  from  the  fire  of  their  own  guns. 

"General  Meade,  having  satisfied  himself  that  the 
assault  was  repulsed,  turned,  and  rode  to  the  summit  of 
Cemetery  Hill  to  ascertain  wh'ether  the  Confederates  had 
renewed  upon  the  right  wing  the  desperate  assaults  of  the 
evening  before.  At  the  Cemetery  he  was  soon  surrounded 
by  a  large  cavalcade  of  officers,  who  came  to  offer  their 
congratulations  and  to  ascertain  his  intentions.  He  found 
that  the  enemy  had  undertaken  no  active  operations 
against  either  the  Cemetery  or  Gulp's  Hill.  The  decision 
of  General  Meade  was  quickly  made.  He  determined  to 
make  an  assault  against  the  Confederate  right  wing,  which 
the  repulse  of  Pickett  had  left  exposed,  and  to  endeavor  to 
break  it  before  the  gap  in  the  lines,  caused  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Virginia  division,  could  be  closed  up.  Having 


GENERAL    MEADE   ORDERS   AN   ADVANCE.  439 

formed  this  resolution,  the  General  proceeded  in  person  to 
give  the  necessary  orders  to  General  Sykes,  who  was  in 
command  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  This  corps  was  posted  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  Round  Tops;  and  General  Meade,  fol- 
lowed by  a  large  number  of  officers,  rode  out  in  front  of 
the  lines,  and  proceeded  at  a  hard  gallop  along  the  entire 
Federal  front.  The  effect  upon  the  men  was  electrical. 
The  enthusiastic  cheers  of  the  entire  army  greeted  this 
appeal  to  their  enthusiasm;  and  the  effect  upon  the  dispirit- 
ed Confederates  is  mentioned  by  Colonel  Freemantle,  of 
the  British  Guards,  who  accompanied  General  Longstreet 
during  the  campaign. 

"Arriving  on  Little  Hound  Top,  General  Meade  person- 
ally directed  General  Sykes  to  advance  his  corps  across 
the  same  country  which  had  been  fought  over  the  day 
before,  and  to  attack  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws, 
which  formed  the  extreme  right  wing  of  the  Confederate 
army.  General  Meade's  action  in  ordering  this  attack 
from  the  left  instead  of  advancing  from  the  center  of  his 
line  has  been  sharply  criticised;  but  its  wisdom  is  be- 
yond question.  To  advance  over  the  same  ground  as 
that  covered  in  Pickett's  charge  would  have  been  only  a 
repetition'of  the  Confederate  General's  mistake.  Any  one 
who  has  seen  the  ground  can  not  but  recognize  the  danger 
of  such  an  operation.  Commanded  as  it  is  by  Seminary 
Ridge  in  front,  and  by  the  high  ground  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  Peach  Orchard  on  the  flank,  the  plain  between 
the  lines  of  the  two  armies  is  a  veritable  death  trap  for  an 
assaulting  column  from  either.  As  the  writer  knows  from 
personal  experience,  the  distance  between  the  two  ridges 
can  not  be  covered  by  brisk  walking  in  less  than  twenty 


440  THE    GREAT   INVASION'. 

minutes,  and,  allowing  for  halts  to  reform  broken  lines  and 
to  clear  away  obstructions,  not  less  than  half  an  hour 
would  have  been  occupied  in  advancing  an  assaulting 
column  from  Ziegler's  Grove  to  the  Confederate  position. 
In  that  time  an  advancing  column  would  have  been  sim- 
ply annihilated.  Besides,  as  Swinton  points  out  in  his 
'  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,'  the  necessity 
of  strengthening  the  point  at  which  Pickett's  charge  was 
directed  led  to  the  mixing  up  of  brigades,  divisions,  and 
corps  to  such  a  degree  that  an  organized  advance  from  the 
center  immediately  after  the  repulse  of  Pickett  was  quite 
impossible. 

"On  the  left,  however,  the  advance  of  an  assaulting 
column  is  more  or  less  covered  by  woods  and  inequalities 
in  the  ground,  and  it  is  probable  that,  had  the  assault  been 
made  promptly,  General  Lee  would  have  suffered  severely, 
and  might  have  lost  much  of  his  artillery.  What  General 
Meade  said  to  General  Sykes  is  not  known.  No  record  of 
it  exists.  This  much,  however, is  certain:  That  the  assault 
was  not  made  in  force  sufficient  to  accomplish  decisive  re- 
sults. General  Warren,  Meade's  chief  engineer,  who  was 
in  his  confidence,  and  who  was  probably  present  at  the 
time  when  the  order  was  given  to  General  Sykes,  states 
positively  in  his  testimony  before  the  Congressional  Com- 
mittee on  the  conduct  of  the  war  that  it  was  General 
Meade's  intention  to  move  forward  all  the  forces  he  could 
get  in  line  and  assault  the  enemy  in  turn.  What  prevented 
this  assault?  We  have  the  answer  at  hand  in  General 
Warren's  testimony.-  *  Many  officers  were  killed  and 
wounded,'  he  says.  *  We  were  much  shattered  in  this  re- 
spect, and  there  was  a  tone  among  most  of  the  prominent 


THE   FAILURE    TO   ADVANCE.  441 

officers  that  we  had  quite  saved  the  country  for  the  time, 
and  that  we  had  done  enough;  that  we  might  jeopardize 
all  that  we  had  won  by  trying  to  do  too  much.' 

"All  that  was  done  in  pursuance  of  General  Meade's 
orders  was  a  gallant  advance  by  the  division  of  Pennsyl- 
vania Reserves  against  General  Hood's  position.  This 
attack  resulted  in  the  recapture  of  the  battle-field  of  the 
second,  together  with  a  number  of  prisoners.  Darkness 
then  put  an  eud  to  the  movement." 

Mr.  J.-R.  Sypher,  in  his  "History  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,"  page  471,  says: 

"  As  soon  as  General  Meade  saw  that  success  attended 
his  troops  in  the  center,  lie  rode  to  the  left  to  order  an 
advance  in  support  of  the  Reserves,  who  had  marched  so 
promptly  in  obedience  to  his  instructions.  It  was  nearly 
sunset,  and  before  the  forces  could  be  sufficiently  concen- 
trated to  make  a  charge  on  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy, 
darkness  ensued,  and  it  was  too  late  to  follow  up  the  vic- 
tory." 

It  was  not  too  late  to  accomplish  decisive  results  by  a 
vigorous  charge  upon  the  Confederate  right,  as  Mr.  Sypher 
seems  to  suppose,  for  nearly  three  hours  of  daylight  yet 
remained;  nor  were  the  troops,  who  would  have  led  in  the 
charge,  too  much  wearied,  for  the  Sixth  Corps  had  scarcely 
been  engaged  during  all  the  day,  and  the  Fifth  had  been 
but  little  engaged.  Had  an  advance  been  made  from  the 
Federal  left  center  directly  upon  the^  heels  of  the  retreat- 
ing ibe,  success  might  have  resulted,  but  only  at  a  fearful 
cost  of  life.  But  had  it  been  made  from  the  left,  as  it 
seems  General  Meade  contemplated,  by  the  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,  backed  by  the  remainder  of  the  Fifth  Corps  and 


442  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

the  whole  of  the  Sixth,  all  of  whom  were  within  con- 
venient distance,  the  discomfiture  and  rout,  if  not  the  en- 
tire destruction  of  the  Confederate  army  would  most  likely 
have  been  effected.  That  such  might  have  been  the  result,. 
had  the  advance  been  made  from  the  left,  seems  to  be 
assured  in  the  fact  that  the  enemy  fled  before  the  Reserves,, 
in  the  charge  made  upon  them,  with  scarcely  any  resist- 
ance. This  probability  is  further  strengthened  in  the  fol- 
lowing statement  made  to  General  Crawford  by  Colonel 
Semmes,  who  commanded  a  Georgia  brigade  in  the  en- 
gagement with  the  Reserves  already  referred  to. 

Colonel  Semmes,  says :  "  There  was  much  confusion  in 
our  army  so  far  as  my  observation  extended,  and  I  think 
we  would  have  made  but  feeble  resistance  if  you  had 
pressed  on,  on  the  evening  of  the  third." 

General  Meade,  it  should  be  remembered,  had  been  in 
chief  command  of  the  army  but  six  days.  The  responsi- 
bility which  was  thrust  upon  him  was  great  indeed.  A 
false  step  at  the  juncture  under  consideration  would  have 
resulted  most  disastrously.  He  had  to  decide,  not  simply 
for  the  time,  nor  for  the  army  under  his  command,  but  for 
the  whole  country,  for  the  Government,  and  for  all  time 
to  corne.  If  he  did  not  possess,  as  some  have  alleged,  the 
grasp  of  mind,  the  quickness  of  comprehension,  which  are 
essential  in  great  commanders  when  called  upon  to  meet 
sudden  emergencies,  and  decide  upon  important  move- 
ments, he  at  least  should  be  judged  for  what  he  had  done,, 
not  for  what  some  think  he  should  have  done.  In  the  case 
under  consideration  he  doubtless  saw  and  felt  the  import- 
ance of  some  counter  action,  but  his  caution,  his  in- 
clination to  be  on  the  safe  side,  led  him  to  defer  the  order 


THE    CRISIS    OF    HISTORjT.  443 

for  an  aggressive  movement  until  he  had  further  tested 
the  matter,  and  in  the  seemingly  justifiable  delay  the  op- 
portunity for  its  successful  accomplishment  passed  away. 
Perhaps  he  acted  wisely  in  not  putting  in  jeopardy  all  he 
had  already  gained,  but  great  results  are  seldom  gained 
except  by  great  risks.  Had  Grant,  or  Sherman,  or  Sheri- 
dan, or  some  other  commander  been  in  General  Meade's 
position,  the  risk  might  have  been  taken,  and  the  results 
might  have  justified  it.  If  failure  had  followed,  their 
names  would  not  shine  as  brightly  in  history  as  does  that 
of  General  George  G.  Meade. 

The  battle  of  Gettysburg,  as  is  universally  conceded, 
was  the  turning  point  in  the  great  war  of  the  rebellion, 
for  from  it  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  cause  for  which  the 
South  fought  was  assured.  And  as  .that  battle  was  the 
culmination,  the  crisis  of  the  war,  so  the  last  great  effort  of 
the  Confederate  chieftain,  when  he  hurled  fifteen  thous- 
and of  his  choicest  troops  against  the  Federal  line,  was 
the  culmination,  the  supreme  crisis  of  that  battle.  The 
rebellion  at  that  point  reached  its  high -water  mark,  and 
from  that  period  it  gradually  receded.  That  charge, 
then,  was  the  supreme  crisis  in  our  country's  history, 
and  the  turning  point  in  its  destiny.  It  failed,  and  with 
its  failure  the  fact  was  demonstrated  that  a  government 
founded  upon  oppression  and  wrong,  could  not  succeed 
in  the  light  of  the  civilization  and  Christianity  of  this  age. 
The  Republic  was  saved,  redeemed,  baptized,  and  conse- 
crated anew  to  the  coming  ages. 

It  is  a  singular  coincidence  that  the  rebellion  should  re- 
ceive its  most  decisive  defeat  in  the  east  and  west  at  the 
same  time;  for  the  same  shadow  on  the  dial  which  marked 


444 


THE   GREAT   INVASION. 


the  time  of  the  crushing  overthrow  at  Gettysburg,  also 
indicated  a  similar  event  in  the  great  drama  twelve  hun- 
dred miles  away  at  Vicksburg. 

The  casualties  of  the  two  armies  during  the  three  days 
of  battle,  are  officially  stated  by  a  publication  from  the 
adjutant -general's  office,  Washington,  bearing  date,  1886, 
as  follows: 

CASUALTIES  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE   POTOMAC. 


COMMAND. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Captured 
or  Missing. 

Aggregate. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 
Men. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 
Men. 

Officers. 

Enlisted 
Men. 

2 

257 
269 

251 
129 

120 

43 
37 
15 

2 

2,952 

2.91? 

2,775 
1,482 
171 
1,802 
767 

315 
172 

4 
6,024 

4,350 
4,210 

2,187 

242 
3,801 
1,081 

849 
242 

First  Army  Corps  

42 
67 

50 
28 

2 

33 

18 

5 

2 

729 
528 
337 
25 
335 
186 

85 
40 

82 
13 

I 
62 

2 

'    8 

2,140 
355 
592 

2IO 
30 

i,449 
65 
399 
13 

Third  Army  Corps  

Fifth  Army  Corps  ....          

Sixth  Army  Corps    

Eleventh  Army  Corps  

Twelfth  Army  Corps  

Total  

247 

2,816 

i,i37 

13,355 

182 

5,253 

22,990 

CASUALTIES   OF  THE   ARMY    OF   NORTHERN   VIRGINIA. 


•d 

8  . 

•0  bo 

l) 

HI 

v  - 

8 

COMMAND. 

-o 

HI 

T3 

B 
B 

I] 

bo 
P 

*-< 

o 

M*  H 

hS 

M 

P 

O 

< 

First  Army  Corps  

QIO 

A    1l(> 

2  2QO 

7  c-»6 

8oq 

1  821 

S  Q17 

Third  Army  Corps  

A  A.Q7 

I  AQI 

6  715 

l6 

IA.O 

64. 

2A.O 

Grand  total... 

2.SQ2 

I2.706 

<?.  ISO 

•20.  MS 

It  will  be  seen  in  the  foregoing,  that  the  losses  of  the 
Confederates  at  this  battle,  contrary  to  the  general  opinion. 


THE   LOSSES   OF   THE   ARMIES.  445 

were  less  than  those  of  the  Federals.  The  records  of  pris- 
oners of  war  on  file  in  the  office  of  the  Adjutant -General 
of  the  United  States  Army  bear  the  names  of  twelve 
thousand  two  hundred  and  twenty -seven  wounded  and 
unwounded  Confederates  captured  by  the  Federal  forces 
.at  and  about  Gettysburg  from  July  1st  to  the  5th  inclusive. 
This  large  number  of  prisoners,  in  connection  with  the 
fact  that  the  number  of  casualties  reported  by  the  Con- 
federate officers  does  not  entirely  harmonize  with  those  of 
the  medical  director,  whose  estimate  is  thus  given,  leads 
to  the  inference  that  the  report  is  not  entirely  correct.  It 
may  be  safely  assumed,  I  think,  that  the  losses  of  the  two 
armies  were  about  equal. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


KETREAT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY. 


'HE  Confederate  army  had  remaining  fit  for  duty,  at 
.     the  close  of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,    about   fifty 
thousand    men.     This    force,   with    its    ammunition 


nearly  exhausted,  with  its  immense  trains,  amidst  a 
I  terrific  rain  storm,  which  swelled  the  streams  and 
made  the  roads  almost  impassable,  with  a  hostile  people 
all  about  it,  and  a  swollen  and  impassable  river  in  its 
rear,  was  about  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  presence  of  its 
victorious  enemy  and  make  its  way  back  to  Virginia,  from 
which  it  had  come.  The  distance  it  had  to  traverse  by  the 
route  it  chose  —  by  Monterey  Pass  and  Hagerstown  to 
Williamsport  —  was  about  forty  miles.  The  task,  it  will 
readily  be  seen,  was  an  exceedingly  difficult  one,  and  could 
not  have  been  made  except  at  a  great  loss,  had  the  pursuit 
been  vigorous  and  determined  as  it  should  have  been. 

The  Federal  army  had  remaining  fit  for  duty,  at  the 
close  of  the  battle,  about  seventy  -two  thousand  men.  This 
force,  with  its  ammunition  somewhat  exhausted,  but  an 
inexhaustible  supply  near  at  hand,  elated  with  victory,  in 
the  midst  of  its  friends,  and  with  reinforcements  nearly 
equal  in  number  to  its  own  that  could  have  been  called 
upon  for  assistance,  was  about  to  be  employed  according 

446 


FEDERAL    RESOURCES    AFTER   THE    BATTLE.  447 

to  the  best  judgment  of  its  commander,  in  preventing  the 
escape  of  its  enemy.  That  it  should  have  succeeded  in 
effecting  this  all  -  important  object,  with  all  these  advan- 
tages, will  scarcely  be  denied. 

In  addition  to  the  seventy -two  thousand  who  remained 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at  the  close  of  the  great 
struggle  at  Gettysburg,  there  were  available  arid  within 
reach,  the  following  troops :  In  the  defenses  of  Washing- 
ton and  Baltimore  probably  from  fifty  thousand  to  sixty 
thousand;*  General  Couch's  emergency  me:i  about  Car- 
lisle and  Pine  Grove,  two  divisions  under  Generals  Dana 
and  Smith,  about  twenty  thousand;  French's  division  at 
Frederick  and  Tennallytown,  ten  thousand;  Milroy's  refu- 
gees in  Bedford  and  Fulton  counties,  about  three  thousand; 
and  several  thousand  under  General  Kelly  in  West  Vir- 
ginia. By  a  proper  use  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail- 
road a  force  equal  and  probably  superior  in  numbers  to 
Lee's,  could  and  should  have  been  drawn  from  Baltimore, 
Washington,  and  West  Virginia,  and  placed  upon  the 
south  bank  of  the  Potomac.  This  would  have  effectually 
prevented  the  enemy  from  recrossing  that  river.  Couch's 
t\vo  divisions  could  and  should  have  been  ordered  at  an 
earlier  period  to  advance  to  the  vicinity  of  Hagerstown, 
where  Milroy's  men  from  the  west  of  the  mountain,  could 
have  joined  them.  Thus  hemmed  in  on  every  side,  with  a 
vigorous  pursuit  made  by  the  army  under  General  Meade, 
either  upon  the  line  the  enemy  took,  or  the  longer  one 
which  Meade  chose,  the  destruction  or  capture  of  Lee's 
army  must  have  ensued.  But  these  combinations  were 
* 

*  General  Pleasanton,  in  Annals  of  the  War,  page  458,  says  that  there  were 
at  that  time  seventy  thousand  troops  in  the  defenses  of  Washington  alone. 


448  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

not  made,  and  the  army  of  the  Potomac  was  not  sent  for- 
ward at  once,  and  when  it  was  sent  in  pursuit,  it  went  by 
a  long  and  round-about  way,  and  moved  so  slowly,  that 
the  enemy  was  enabled  to  effect  his  escape.  This  failure 
to  follow  up  the  advantages  gained  in  the  battle  of  Gettys- 
burg, both  immediately  after  the  repulse  of  Pickett's  great 
assault  and  subsequently  upon  the  withdrawal  of  Lee,  has 
caused  some  even  to  question  whether  or  not  after  all  the 
Federals  gained  the  victory.  Colonel  W.  H.  Taylor,  in 
Annals  of  the  War,  pages  316,  317,  says: 

"Notwithstanding  the  brilliant  achievements  of  Ewell 
and  Hill  on  the  first  day,  and  the  decided  advantage  gained 
by  Longstreet  on  the  second,  the  failure  of  the  operations 
of  the  third  day,  involving  as  they  did,  but  two  divisions 
of  the  army,  deprived  us  of  the  prestige  of  our  previous 
successes,  and  gave  a  shadow  of  right  to  our  adversary's 
claim  of  having  gained  a  victory.  Their  exultation,  how- 
ever, should  be  tempered  with  moderation,  when  we  con- 
sider that,  after  one  day  of  absolute  quiet,  the  Confederates 
withdrew  from  their  front  without  serious  molestation,  and 
with  bridges  swept  away,  and  an  impassable  river  in  the 
rear,  stood  in  an  attitude  of  de£ance  until  their  line  of  re- 
treat could  be  rendered  practicable,  after  which  they  safely 
recrossed  into  Virginia." 

As  soon  as  night  closed  in  after  the  battle  of  the  3d 
day  of  July,  arrangements  were  made  by  the  Confeder- 
ates to  return  to  Virginia.  Generals  Lee  and  Hill,  seated 
on  camp-stools  in  the  latter's  tent,  under  the  dim  and 
flickering  light  of  a  single  candle,  examined  a  map  which 
they  had  spread  out  upon  their  knees,  and  decided  upon 
the  routes  to  be  taken.*  As  many  of  the  wounded  as 

*See  General  Imboden's  account  in  the  succeeding  chapter. 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE   RETREAT.  449 

were  unable  to  walk,  and  for  whom  transportation  could 
be  provided,  were  to  be  sent  under  a  cavalry  escort  across 
the  mountain  by  Cashtown  and  Greenwood,  and  thence  by 
a  side  -  road  directly  across  the  country  to  the  Potomac  at 
"Williamsport.  Those  of  the  wounded  who  were  able  to 
walk  were  to  accompany  this  train  on  foot.  The  army 
was  to  proceed  by  Fairfield  and  Monterey  Pass  to  Hagers- 
town  and  Williamsport.  At  about  four  o'clock  on  the 
following  afternoon  this  wagon -train  was  in  readiness  to 
move.  It  was  about  twenty -five  or  thirty  miles  in  length, 
and  contained  about  ten  or  twelve  thousand  wounded  and 
suffering  men.  A  description  of  this  immense  aggregate 
of  human  agony  and  distress,  as  well  as  some  of  the 
thrilling  incidents  which  befell  it  by  the  way,  will  be  given 
in  the  ensuing  chapter. 

Sometime  during  this  night  (Friday,  3d,)  Ewell's  Corps 
was  withdrawn  from  its  exposed  position  in  the  town  and 
east  of  it,  and  placed  behind  Seminary  Ridge.  On  the 
next  day  field -works  were  thrown  up  to  conceal  their 
intention  of  retreating,  and  to  protect  their  rear  in  case 
of  an  attack.  Shortly  after  noon  a  heavy  rain  set  in, 
and  in  a  short  time  the  fields  were  covered  with  water, 
the  streams  swollen,  and  the  roads  rendered  almost  im- 
passable. At  night,  under  cover  of  the  darkness  and 
rain,  the  army  began  to  retire  by  the  road  leading  to 
Fairfield  and  Monterey  Pass,  and  shortly  after  daylight 
in  the  morning  of  Sunday,  July  5th,  the  last  of  them  left. 
Suspecting  that  the  enemy  were  about  to  retreat,  General 
Mead  directed  General  Pleasanton  to  send  out  reconnoit- 
ering  parties  of  cavalry.  These,  upon  returning,  reported 
that  the  enemy  were  moving  toward  the  Potomac  in  some 


2-J 


450  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

confusion.  General  D.  B.  Birney,  who  had  succeeded 
General  Sickles  in  the  command  of  the  Third  Corps, 
(General  Sickles  having  been  wounded,)  says: 

"  I  was  ordered  (on  the  4th)  to  send  out  a  recorinoissance 
at  daylight  to  ascertain  the  position  of  the  enemy.  I  did 
so  early  on  Sunday  morning,  and  reported  that  the  enemy 
were  in  full  retreat.  I  also  sent  back  for  permission  to 
open  upon  the  enemy  with  my  rifled  batteries  as  they 
were  crossing  a  point  very  near  me,  upon  the  turnpike 
going  toward  Hagerstown ;  and  the  staff  officer  brought 
me  permission  to  do  so.  I  had  commenced  the  move- 
ment to  attack,  when  another  staff  officer  arrived  from 
General  Meade  with  a  written  order  from  him  to  make 
jpo  attack;  which  was  done.  My  skirmishers  advanced 
and  took  possession  of  their  hospitals,  with  a  large  number 
of  their  wounded.  I  had  sent  some  twenty  orderlies  with 
a  staff  officer,  who  led  the  reconnoissance;  and  I  reported 
these  facts  constantly  to  General  Meade;  but  his  peremp- 
tory order  not  to  open  fire  at  all  prevented  any  pursuit 
of  the  enemy." 

About  eleven  o'clock,  when  there  could  no  longer  be 
any  doubt  that  the  enemy  were  in  full  retreat,  an  order 
was  issued  for  pursuit.  Mclntosh's  brigade  of  Gregg's  cav- 
alry division  was  sent  to  Emmittsburg,  and  J.  I.  Gregg's 
brigade  \vas  directed  to  proceed  by  Cashtown  and  across 
the  mountain  to  Greenwood.  General  Sedgwick  was 
ordered  to  follow  directly  on  the  track  of  the  fugitives, 
and  after  marching  about  eight  miles  he  came  upon  the 
rear  guard  under  Early  in  the  neighborhood  of  Fairfield. 
After  a  considerable  cannonade  at  long  range,  Sedgwick 
reported  to  Meade  that  the  enemy's  position  was  too 


THE    DILATORY    PURSUIT.  451 

•strong  to  be  carried.  General  Sedgwick  was  acting  under 
instructions  from  the  commander  in  chief,  and  he  doubt- 
less understood  that  a  general  engagement  was  not  in- 
tended. The  spirit  in  which  Sedgwick  was  constrained  to 
construe  General  Meade's  orders,  is  thus  given  by  General 
A.  P.  Howe,  commanding  a  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
in  his  testimony  before  the  committee  of  Congress  on  the 
conduct  of  the  war.  General  Howe,  says: 

"  On  the  4th  of  July,  it  seemed  evident  enough  that  the 
enemy  were  retreating.  How  far  they  were  gone,  we 
could  not  see  from  the  front.  We  could  see  but  a  com- 
paratively small  force  from  the  position  where  I  was.  On 
Sunday,  the  5th,  the  Sixth  Corps  moved  in  pursuit.  As 
we  moved,  a  small  rear  guard  of  the  enemy  retreated. 
We  followed  them,  with  this  small  rear  guard  of  the 
enemy  before  us,  up  to  Fairfield,  in  a  gorge  of  the  mount- 
ains. There  we  again  waited  for  them  to  go  on.  There 
seemed  to  be  no  disposition  to  push  this  rear  guard  when 
we  got  up  to  Fairfield.  A  lieutenant  from  the  enemy 
came  into  our  lines  and  gave  himself  up.  He  was  a 
Northern  Union  man,  in  service,  in  one  of  the  Georgia 
regiments;  and,  without  being  asked,  he  unhesitatingly 
told  me,  when  I  met  him  as  he  was  being  brought  in,  that 
he  belonged  to  the  artillery  of  the  rear  guard  of  the 
enemy,  and  that  they  had  but  two  rounds  of  ammunition 
with  the  rear  guard.  But  we  waited  there  without  receiv- 
ing any  orders  to  attack.  It  was  a  place  where,  as  I  in- 

• 
formed    General  Sedgwick,   we   could    easily   attack   the 

enemy  with  advantage.  But  no  movement  was  made  by 
us  until  the  enemy  went  away.  Then  one  brigade  of  my 
•division,  with  some  cavalry,  was  sent  to  follow  on  after 


452  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

them,  while  the  remainder  of  the  Sixth  Corps  moved  to 
the  left." 

Two  separate  expeditions,  under  command  of  bold  and 
daring  commanders,  away  from  the  main  army,  and  act- 
ing according  to  their  own  judgment,  were  undertaken 
about  this  time,  which  are  worthy  of  mention  here.  They 
illustrate  what  should  have  been  the  spirit  in  which  to 
conduct  the  pursuit,  and  what  important  results  can  be 
accomplished  if  prosecuted  with  the  proper  force.  Gen- 
eral French,  on  Saturday,  July  4th,  marched  from  Fred- 
erick City,  Maryland,  where  he  had  remained  during  the 
series  of  engagements  at  Gettysburg,  to  Turner's  Pass  in 
the  South  Mountain,  and  held  that  important  point  for 
the  National  army.  He  also  sent  a  detachment  to  Fall- 
ing Waters,  on  the  Potomac  river,  a  few  miles  east  of 
Williamsport,  Maryland,  and  destroyed  the  pontoon  bridge 
erected  there  by  the  Confederates.  On  this  same  day 
(Saturday,-  4th,)  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  division,  reinforced 
by  Huey's  brigade,  of  Gregg's  division,  moved  from  Em- 
mittsburg  up  to  Monterey  Pass,  with  the  purpose  of  strik- 
ing the  enemy's  line.  The  following  thrilling  and  graphic 
account  of  the  terrific  night  attack  by  that  bold  and  in- 
trepid leader,  has  been  furnished  me  by  Dr.  H.  G.  Chritz- 
man,  who  was  connected  with  Huey's  brigade.  So  far  as 
I  am  aware  no  account  of  that  affair  has  ever  before  been 
published.  Dr.  Chritzman,  says: 

"  July  4th,  we  moved  to  Emmittsburg  and  reported  to 
Kilpatrick;  moved  same  evening  to  intercept  Ewell's 
wagon -train  which  was  reported  to  be  near  Monterey 
Springs.  The  brigade  moved  rapidly  up  the  mountain - 
road,  striking  Ewell's  wagon -train  about  three  o'clock  in 


KILPATRICK'S  DASH  UPON  THE  ENEMY.  453 

the  morning  of  July  5th,  in  the  midst  of  a  furious  thunder 
storm,  whilst  on  its  retreat  from  Gettysburg. 

'At  once  there  rose  so  wild  a  yell 
Within  that  dark  and  narrow  dell, 
As  if  all  the  fiends  from  heaven  that  fell, 
Had  pealed  the  banner  cry  of  hell. ' 

This,  combined  with  the  Plutonic  darkness  made  it  one  of 
the  nights  long  to  be  remembered.  When  we  came  up  with 
the  wagon  -  train,  Federal  and  Confederate  cavalry,  wagons, 
ambulances,  drivers  and  mules  became  a  confused  mass  of 
pursued  and  pursuing  demons  whose  shouts  and  carbine 
shots,  mingled  with  the  lightning's  red  glare  and  the 
thunder's  crash,  made  it  appear  as  if  we  were  in  the  in- 
fernal regions.  Especially  so  as  the  cries  of  the  wrounded 
often  rose  high  above  the  din  of  the  conflicting  forces. 

"  Frequently  a  driver  would  be  shot  or  leave  his  mule 
team,  when  the  unrestrained  animals  would  rush  wildly 
down  the  narrow  road,  and  in  many  instances  the  wagons 
with  the  mules  attached  would  be  found  at  daylight  at 
the  bottom  of  some  deep  ravine  crushed  to  pieces,  witn 
the  mules  dead  or  dying.  It  was  a  fearful  ride  suiting 
well  the  fearless  intrepidity  of  our  daring  commander. 
A  Confederate  brigade,  then  a  long  train  of  wagons  and 
ambulances,  then  our  brigade  in  the  center,  with  Ewell's 
corps  in  our  rear,  going  down  that  narrow  mountain  road 
upon  the  principle  of  the  devil  take  the  hindmost, — you 
have  Kilpatrick'0  dash  across  Monterey  Pass. 

"The  result  of  this  brilliant  movement  was  the  capture 
of  a  large  number  of  wagons,  ambulances,  and  mules  with 
fifteen  hundred  prisoners.  The  brigade  reached  the  foot 
of  the  mountain  about  daylight;  leaving  the  Baltimore 
pike  where  it  turns  toward  Waynesborough,  the  column 


454  THH   GREAT   INVASION. 

moved  on  to  Smitbsburg,  Maryland,  where  the  wagons 
and  ambulances  were  burned.  The  command  rested  at  this 
place  during  the  day.  As  the  '  shades  of  evening  drew 
nigh  we  were  treated  to  a  compliment  of  shot  and  shell  by 
Stuart,  who  appeared  at  Raven  Rock  Gap,  above  the  little 
village.  Soon  our  battery  got  into  position,  when  Stuart 
was  compelled  to  retire;  our  brigade  taking  up  the  line 
of  march  for  Boonsborough,  where  it  arrived  about  mid- 
night without  furthers  interruption." 

The  pursuit  of  Lee  upon  the  same  line  he  went  having- 
been  abandoned,  and  a  movement  by  the  round-about 
way  of  the  eastern  base  of  the  mountain  through  Emmitts- 
burg,  Frederick,  Middletown,  and  Turner's  Pass,  having 
been  decided  upon,  it  will  be  of  interest  to  the  reader  to 
see  the  movements  of  the  several  corps  of  the  pursuing 
army,  to  note  the  places  of  their  encampments,  as  well  as 
the  leisurely  manner  of  the  march,  and  to  observe  the  time 
and  place  when  they  again  confronted  their  old  antagonist. 
These  are  given  from  reliable  surces : 

Sunday,  5.  The  Second  Corps  marched  from  Gettys- 
burg to  Two  Taverns;  the  Fifth  Corps  to  Marsh  Run;  the 
Sixth  Corps,  as  previously  stated,  to  Fairfield;  the  Eleventh 
Corps  to  Rock  Creek;  and  the  Twelfth  to  Littlestown. 
As  already  said,  Gregg's  cavalry  brigade  moved  out  on 
the  Chambersburg  road  to  Greenwood;  Buford's  division 
reached  Frederick  City,  and  Kilpatrick,  reinforced  by 
Huey's  brigade,  of  Gregg's  division,  moved  from  Emmitts- 
burg  upon  the  enemy  by  Monterey  Pass. 

Skirmishes  took  place  this  day  between  the  Federal 
cavalry  and  the  retreating  enemy  at  or  near  Smithsburg,, 
Maryland,  and  at  Fairfield,  Caledonia  Iron  Works,  Green- 


MOVEMENTS    OF    THE   FEDERALS.  455 

castle,  and  Cearfoos'  Cross  Roads,  Pennsylvania. .  That  at 
Caledonia  Iron  "Works  was  between  Gregg's  cavalry  and 
the  rear  guard  of  Imboden's  force  in  charge  of  the  great 
wagon  train  of  wounded,  and  the  one  at  Cearfoos'  Cross 
Roads  was  between  Captain  Jones'  command  and  this 
same  force,  as  detailed  in  the  succeeding  chapter.  The 
skirmish  at  or  near  Smithsburg  was  between  Kilpatrick 
and  a  part  of  Stuart's  command. 

Monday,  6.  The  First  Corps  marched  from  Gettysburg 
to  Emmittsburg;  the  Fifth  Corps  from  Marsh  Run  to 
Moritz  Cross  Roads;  the  Sixth  Corps  went  from  Fairfield, 
whither  it  had  gone  the  day  previous  in  pursuit  of  Lee,  to 
Emmittsburg,  except  Neill's  brigade  of  Howe's  division, 
which,  in  conjunction  with  Mclntosh's  brigade  of  cavalry, 
was  left  at  Fairtield  to  pursue  the  enemy;  the  Eleventh 
Corps  went  from  Rock  Creek  to  Emmittsburg.  Buford's 
cavalry  division  went  from  Frederick  to  Williamsport  and 
thence  back  to  Jones'  Cross  Roads;  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  and 
Huey's  brigade  went  from  Boonsborough  via  Hagerstown 
to  Williamsport.  At  Hagerstown  a  spirited  engagement 
took  place  between  these  forces  and  Stuart's  cavalry,  after 
which  they  went  on  to  Williamsport,  where  they  engaged 
both  Stuart  and  Imboden,  in  charge  of  the  wagon  train, 
as  detailed  in  the  succeeding  chapter.  After  this  engage- 
ment they  returned  and  went  into  camp  at  Jones'  Cross 
Roads. 

^Mclntosh's  brigade,  of  Gregg's  division,  marched  froib 
Emmittsburg  to  Fairfield;  and  J.  I.  Gregg's  brigade,  of 
Gregg's  division,  moved  from  Greenwood  to  Marion. 
Smith's  division,  of  General  Couch's  command  of  emer- 
gency men,  moved  from  Pine  Grove  in  the  South  Monn- 


456  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

tain,  which  it  had  reached  on  the  evening  of  Saturday, 
4th,  direct  from  Carlisle  hy  Mount  Holly,  to  Newman's 
Pass,  where  the  road  from  Chambersburg  to  Gettysburg 
crosses  the  mountain.  Kenly's  brigade,  of  French's  di- 
vision, marched  from  Frederick  en  route  to  Maryland 
Heights;  and  Elliott's  and  Smith's  brigades,  of  the  same 
division,  left  Tennallytown  via  Washington  and  the  Balti- 
more and  Ohio  Railroad  en  route  to  Frederick. 

Tuesday,  7.  The  Head  -  quarters  of  the  Army  were 
moved  this  day  from  Gettysburg  to  Frederick  City,  and 
the  Reserve  Artillery  from  Littlestown  to  Woodsborough. 
The  First  Corps  marched  from  Emmittsburg  to  Ham- 
burgh; the  Second  Corps  from  Two  Taverns,  at  which 
place  it  remained  since  the  5th,  to  Taneytown ;  the  Third 
Corps,  which  up  to  this  time  had  remained  at  Gettysburg, 
marched  by  way  of  Enmiittsburg  to  Mechanicstown;  the 
Fifth  Corps  from  Moritz  Cross  Roads  via  Emmittsburg  to 
Utica;  the  Sixth  Corps  from  Emmittsburg  to  Mountain 
Pass,  near  Hamburgh;  the  Eleventh  Corps  from  Emmitts- 
burg to  Middletown;  and  the  Twelfth  Corps  from  Littles- 
town,  where  it  had  remained  since  the  5th,  to  Walkersville. 
Buford's  and  Kilpatricks  cavalry  divisions  and  Huey's 
brigade,  of  Gregg's  division,  moved  from  Jones'  Cross 
Roads  to  Boonsborough;  J.  I.  Gregg's  cavalry  brigade  was 
moving  en  route  from  Marion  to  Middlefown;  Macintosh's 
brigade  of  cavalry  and  Neill's  brigade,  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
which  followed  in  the  rear  of  the  retreating  Confederates, 
moved  across  the  Mountain  by  Monterey  Pass  to  Waynes- 
borough;  Smith's  division,  of  Couch's  emergency  men, 
marched  from  Newman's  Pass  to  Altodale;  Kenly's  bri- 
gade, of  French's  division,  with  other  troops  forwarded  by 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  FEDERALS.  457 

General  Scheuck  from  Baltimore,  reoccupied  Maryland 
Heights;  and  Elliott's  and  Smith's  brigades,  of  French's 
division,  reached  Frederick  City  from  Washington. 

Skirmishes  took  place  at  Downsville  and  Funkstown, 
Maryland,  and  at  Harper's  Ferry,  West  Virginia. 

Wednesday,  8.  Head  -  quarters  moved  from  Frederick 
City  to  Middletown,  and  the  Reserve  Artillery  from  Woods- 
borough  to  Frederick  City.  The  First  Corps  marched 
from  Hamburgh  to  Turner's  Gap,  in  South  Mountain;  the 
Second  Corps  from  Taneytown  to  Frederick;  the  Third 
Corps  from  Mechanicstowii  to  a  point  three  miles  south- 
west of  Frederick;  the  Fifth  Corps  from  Utica  to  Mid- 
dletown; the  Sixth  Corps  from  near  Hamburgh  to  Middle- 
town;  the  Eleventh  Corps  from  Middletown  to  Turner's 
Gap, —  Schurz's  division  being  advanced  to  Boonsborough ; 
and  the  Twelfth  Corps  from  Walkers ville  to  Jefferson. 
Smith's  division  of  Couch's  command,  moved  from  Alto- 
dale  to  Waynesborough.  Campbell's  and  Mulligan's  bri- 
gades, of  Kelly's  command,  department  of  West  Virginia, 
were  concentrated  at  Hancock,  whence  they  moved  to 
Fairview,  on  North  Mountain. 

Actions  occurred  this  day  at  Boonsborough  and  Wil- 
liamsport.  • 

Thursday,  9.  Head  -  quarters  moved  from  Middletown 
to  Turner's  Gap  of  the  South  Mountain,  and  the  Reserve 
Artillery  from  Frederick  City  to  Bocnsborough.  The 
Second  Corps  marched  from  Frederick  City  to  Rohrers- 
ville;  the  Third  Corps  from  near  Frederick  City  to  Fox's 
Gap  in  the  South  Mountain;  the  Fifth  Corps  from  Mid- 
dletown, by  way  of  Fox's  Gap,  to  near  Boonsborough; 
the  Sixth  Corps  from  Middletown  to  BoonsborOtigh ;  and 


458  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

the  Twelfth  Corps  from  Jefferson  to  Rohrersville.  Elliott's 
and  Smith's  brigades  of  French's  division,  marched  from 
Frederick  to  Middletown. 

•  Skirmishes  this  day  at  Benevola  (Beaver  Creek),  after- 
ward General  Meade's  head  -  quarters.  • 

Friday,  10.  Head -quarters  moved  from  Turner's  Gap 
to  Beaver  Creek,  beyond  Boonsborough,  where  it  remained 
until  the  enemy  recrossed  the  Potomac  river;  the  First 
Corps  marched  from  Turner's  Gap  to  Beaver  Creek,  where 
it  was  joined  by  Kenly's  brigade,  of  French's  division,  from 
Maryland  Heights;  the  Second  Corps  from  Rohrersville 
to  near  Tilghmanton;  the  Third  Corps  from  Fox's  Gap 
through  Boonsborough  to  Antietam  Creek,  in  the  vicinity 
of  Jones'  Cross-  Roads,  where  it  was  joined  by  'Elliott's  and 
Smith's  brigades,  of  French's  division,  which  marched  from 
Turner's  Gap;  the  Fifth  Corps  from  near  Boonsborough 
to  Delaware  Mills,  on  Antietam  Creek;  the  Sixth  Corps, 
from  Boonsborough  to  Beaver  Creek;  the  Eleventh  Corps 
from  Turner's  Gap  to  Beaver  Creek;  and  the  Twelfth 
Corps  from  Rohrersville  to  Bakersville.  Buford's  and 
Kilpatrick's  cavalry  divisions  moved  from  Boonsborough 
to  Funkstown,  and  Iluey's  brigade,  of  Gregg's  division, 
moved  from  Boonsborough  to  Jones'  Cross -Roads. 

Saturday,  11.  The  Reserve  Artillery  was  this  day 
brought  forward  from  Boonsborough  to  Benevola.  The 
Second  Corps  moved  from  near  Tilghmantown  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Jones'  Cross- Roads;  the  Twelfth  Corp* 
from  Bakersville  to  Fairplay  and  Jones'  Cross  -  Roads ;. 
Gamble's  and  Devin's  brigades,  of  Buford's  cavalry,  from 
Funkstown  to  Bakersville;  J.  I.  Gregg's  brigade  from  Mid- 
dletown to  Boonsborough;  and  Kilpatrick's  division  from 


THE    FEDERAL    PURSUIT. 

Fuukstown  to  near  Hagerstown.  Xeill's  brigade  of  the 
Sixth  Corps,  and  Macintosh's  cavalry  brigade,  that  had 
crossed  the  mountain  in  the  rear  of  the  Confederates  by 
Monterey  Pass,  reached  Waynesborough  on  the  7th,  where 
they  were  joined  by  Smith's  division  of  Couch's  emergency 
men,  which  had  advanced  from  Harrisburg  by  way  of  Mt. 
Holly,  Pine  Grove,  Newman's  Pass,  Greenwood,  Funks- 
town,  and  Quincy,  and  the  whole  command,  except  one 
brigade,  marched  to  Leitersburg. 

Skirmishes  occurred  at  or  near  Old  Antietam  Forge 
(near  Leitersburg),  Clear  Spring,  Hagerstown,  Jones' 
Cross- Roads  (near  "VVilHamsport),  and  Funkstown. 

Sunday,  12.  The  First,  Sixth,  and  Eleventh  Corps 
moved  from  Beaver  Creek  to  Funkstown;  Mclntosh's  cav- 
alry brigade  from  Leitersburg  to  Boonsborough;  Kilpat- 
rick's  cavalry  division  and  Ames'  division  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps,  occupied  Hagerstown ;  XeilPs  brigade  of  the  Sixth 
Corps,  moved  from  Leitersburg  to  Funkstown,  where  it 
rejoined  its  corps;  Smith's  division  (except  one  brigade 
left  at  "Waynesborough)  marched  from  Leitersburg  to 
Cavetown;  Dana's  division,  of  Couch's  emergency  men. 
which  had  advanced  from  Harrisburg  by  Carlisle,  Ship- 
pensburg,  and  Chambersburg,  simultaneously  with  Smith's 
advance  by  the  mountain  route,  this  day  reached  Green- 
castle.  General  Couch  himself-.reached  Chambersburg  on 
Friday,  10th,  where  he  established  his  head  -  quarters. 
Ayerell's  cavalry  brigade,  from  West  Virginia,  were  en 
route  from  Cumberland  to  Fairview. 

Skirmishes  occurred  this  day  at  or  near  Hagerstown,. 
Jones'  Cross  -  Roads,  and  Funkstown. 

Monday,  13.     The  two  great  armies  were  again  together,. 


460  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

face  to  face.  Being  in  such  close  proximity,  the  move- 
ments were  necessarily  but  few,  and  these  with  great  cau- 
tion. The  Sixth  Corps  moved  from  Funkstown  to  the 
vicinity  of  Hagerstown;  Smith's  division  of  Couch's  com- 
mand, moved  from  Waynesborough  and  Cavetown  to 
Hagerstown  and  Beaver  Creek;  and  Averill's  cavalry  bri- 
gade joined  Kelly's  infantry  at  Fairview. 

Skirmishes  occurred  at  Hagerstown,  Jones'  Cross  Roads, 
and  Funkstown. 

During  these  days  the  Confederates  had  been  busy  and 
had  reached  advanced  positions.  As  previously  stated, 
the  Southern  army  withdrew  from  their  lines  behind  Sem- 
inary Ridge  during  the  night  of  Saturday,  July  4th,  and 
the  morning  of  Sunday,  5th,  and  by  marching  day  and 
night  reached  Hagerstown  on  the  afternoon  of  Monda}T, 
6th,  and  the  morning  of  Tuesday,  7th.  Finding  that  the 
almost  continuous  rains  had  swollen  the  river  so  that  he 
could  not  recross  it,  Lee  took  up  a  strong  position  on 
Marsh  Run,  below  the  town,  completely  covering  the 
fords  at  Williamsport  and  Falling  Waters.  The  four  or 
five  days  which  intervened  before  the  Federal  army  came 
up,  were  spent  in  the.  vigorous  use  of  the  spade  and  axe, 
and  by  the  time  that  army  reached  the  field,  the  posi- 
tion was  almost  impregnable.  In  addition  to  this  the 
stock  of  ammunition,  which  was  nearly  exhausted,  was 
replenished  by  supplies  ferried  across  the  river.*  This 

•:-.- persons  residing  in  Williamsport,  who  lived  there  at  the  time,  say  that 
the  Confederate  army  received  some  ammunition  while  it  lay  in  battle  line 
about  Williamsport  and  Falling  Waters,  but  not  much.  It  was  ferried  across 
the  river.  Professor  J.  Fraise  Richard,  the  historian,  in  order  to  ascertain 
from  reliable  sources  to  what  extent  that  army  was  supplied  with  ammuni- 
tion after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  addressed  a  letter  to  General  I<ongstreet 
upon  this  subject,  to  which  the  following  is  the  reply.  A  copy  of  this  letter 
has  been  kindly  placed  at  my  disposal : 


REASONS   FOR   MEADE'S   DELAY.  461 

fact  has  been  explicitly  stated  by  General  Imboden,  whose 
account  will  be  found  in  the  ensuing  chapter. 

The  distance  which  the  Confederate  army  traversed  from 
Gettysburg  to  Hagerstown  was  about  thirty -four  miles. 
The  distance  by  the  route  the  Federal  army  went  was 
about  seventy  miles.  The  former  occupied  but  two  days  in 
marching  this  distance,  while  the  latter  spent  eight  days  in 
its  march.  This  evident  want  of  haste  in  the  pursuit  can 
only  be  accounted  for  by  one  of  two  reasons:  either  Gen- 
eral Meade  did  not  recognize  the  necessity  of  haste,  sup- 
posing that  Lee  could  not  recross  the  river  because  of  its 
swollen  condition,  or  he  did  not  desire  again  to  engage 
him  in  battle  north  of  the  river.  That  the  latter  seems  to 

GAINESVILLE,  GEORGIA.,  27th  April,  1886. 
J.  FRAISE  RICHARD: 

Dear  Sir —  *  *  Replying  to  your  question  of  supplies,  I  think  I  should 
say  that  General  Lee  went  into  Pennsylvania  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  war 
in  its  full  import.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  he  was  fully  supplied  with 
the  necessary  supplies. 

Besides  the  eighty  to  one  hundred  rounds  in  the  cartridge  boxes.  I  guess 
there  were  as  many  more  in  the  ordnance  train. 

I  am  truly  yours,  JAMES  LONGSTREET. 

General  Early,  in  response  to  a  letter  of  inquiry  upon  this  same  subjedl 
from  the  same  person,  says : 

With  regard  to  our  supply  of  ammunition,  I  have  to  say  that  the  cartridge 
boxes  used  by  our  troops  were  capable  of  carrying  only  about  sixty  rounds. 
If  the  one  you  mention  [one  that  was  found  upon  the  field]  contained  eighty 
rounds,  then  the  cartridges  must  have  been  packed  in  very  closely.  [This 
box  had  no  tin  case  for  the  cartridges;  the  latter  having  been  crowded  closely 
into  the  leather  openings. — J.  F.  Richard.]  Besides  the  cartridges  carried  in 
the  boxes,  we  had  ammunition  wagons,  in  which  an  extra  supply  was  carried ; 
but  in  a  battle  lasting  three  days  much  more  than  eighty  rounds  of  cartridges 
w<suld  be  easily  exhausted. 

On  the  first  day's  fight  at  Gettysburg  one  of  my  brigades — the  first  engaged 
—  exhausted  all  of  its  ammunition  before  the  others  got  into  the  fight,  and 
had  to  send  back  to  the  wagons  for  a  fresh  supply,  as  well  as  appropriate 
that  taken  from  the  cartridge  boxes  of  the  dead,  wounded,  and  prisoners  of 
the  enemy. 

After  the  three  days  fighting  at  Gettysburg,  our  ammunition,  especially  for 
the  artillery,  certainly  did  get  short;  and  if  we  had  had  no  more  than  eighty 


462  THK    GREAT   INVASION. 

have  been  the  case  will  appear  in  the  following  additional 
statement  of  General  Howe,  in  his  testimony  before  the 
•Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  General  Howe 
says: 

"  We  moved  on  through  Boonsborough,  and  passed  up 
-on  the  pike  road  leading  to  Hagerstovvu.  After  passing 
Boonsborough  it  came  to  my  turn  to  lead  the  Sixth  Corps. 
That  day,  just  before  we  started,  General  Sedgvvick  ordered 
me  to  move  on  and  take  up  the  best  position  I  could  over 
u  little  stream  on  the  Frederick  side  of  Funkstown.  As 
I  moved  on,  it  was  suggested  to  me  by  him  to  move  care- 
fully. 'Don't  come  into  contact  with  the  enemy;  we  don't 
want  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement,'  It  seemed  to  be 
the  current  impression  that  it  was  not  desired  to  bring  on 

rounds  of  cartridges  for  the  infantry,  it  would  have  been  exhausted.  But, 
nevertheless,  General  L,^e  halted  his  army  near  Hagerstown,  on  the  retreat, 
and  offered  battle  to  Meade,  which  the  latter  failed  to  accept.  As  we  were 
entirely  dependent  on  the  country  in  which  we  were  operating  for  provisions 
for  the  men  and  provender  for  the  horses,  and  the  Potomac  was  rapidly  rising 
in  our  rear,  we  had  to  move  across  it.  It  was  impossible  for  us  to  carry  pro- 
visions into  Pennsylvania  sufficient  to  last  for  any  length  of  time,  and  there- 
fore we  had  to  gather  them  in  the  country  through  which  we  passed.  When 
the  armies  confronted  each  other  at  Gettysburg  it  was  .impossible  for  us  to 
send  out  foraging  parties,  even  if  we  had  an  abundant  supply  of  ammunition 
We  had  no  railroads  or  navigable  water  courses  to  bring  up  supplies  for  us, 
and  the  retreat  across  the  Potomac  was  therefore  an  absolute  necessity. 

Respectfully,  J.  A.  EARLY. 

Colonel  W.  H.  Taylor,  of  General  I^ee's  staff,  writes  as  follows: 

NORFOLK,  VIRGINIA,  May  ijth,  1886. 
PROF.  J.  FRAISE  RICHARD: 

Dear  Sir —  *  *  It  is  true  that  our  supply  of  ammunition  was  seriously 
reduced  after  the  several  days  engagements  at  Gettysburg;  but  it  was  not 
exhausted.  We  had  a  sufficient  supply  for  another  general  engagement,  and 
we  were  anxious  to  be  assailed  in  the  lines  taken  near  Funkstown  [the  same 
referred  to  by  General  Early].  Had  such  engagement  occurred,  it  would 
have  been  absolutely  necessary  then  to  have  replenished  our  supply;  and  this 
admonished  General  l,ee  not  to  risk  a  fight,  except  on  terms  of  his  own,  so 
far  removed  from  his  base  of  supplies. 

Yours  respectfully,  W.'  H.  TAYLOR. 


GENERAL    HOWE'S    TESTIMONY.  463 

a  general  engagement.  I  moved  on  until  we  came  near 
Funkstown.  General  Buford  was  along  that  way  with 
his  cavalry.  I  had  passed  over  the  stream  referred  to,  and 
found  a  strong  position,  which  I  concluded  to  take  and 
wait  for  the  Sixth  Corps  to  come  up.  In  the  meantime, 
General  Buford,  who  was  in  front,  came  back  to  me  and 
said,  'I  am  pretty  hardly  engaged  here;  I  have  used  a 
great  deal  of  my  ammunition;  it  is  a  strong  place  in  front; 
it  is  an  excellent  position.'  It  was  a  little  further  out  than 
I  was  —  nearer  Funkstown.  He  said,  'I  have  used  a  great 
deal  of  my  ammunition,  and  I  ought  to  go  to  the  right; 
suppose  you  move  u  p  there,  or  send  up  a  brigade,  or  even 
a  part  of  one,  and  hold  that  position.'  Said  I,  'I  will  do 
so  at  once,  if  I  can  just  communicate  with  General  Sedg- 
wick;  I  am  ordered  to  take  up  a  position  over  here  and 
hold  it,  and  the  intimation  conveyed  to  me  was  that  they 
did  not  want  to  get  into  a  general  engagement;  I  will  send 
to  General  Sedgwick,  and  ask  for  permission  to  hold  that 
position  and  relieve  you.'  I  accordingly  sent  a  staff'  officer 
to  General  Sedgwick,  with  a  request  that  I  might  go  up 
at  once  and  assist  General  Buford;  stating  that  he  had  a 
strong  position,  but  his  ammunition  was  giving  out.  Gen- 
eral Buford  remained  with  me  until  I  should  get  an  an- 
swer. The  answer  was,  *No,  we  do  not  want  to  bring  on 
a  general  engagement.'  *  Well,'  said  I,  '  Buford,  what  can  I 
dp? '  He  said,  '  They  expect  me  to  go  farther  to  the  right  j 
my  ammunition  is  almost  out.  That  position  is  a  strong 
one,  and  we  ought  not  to  let  it  go.'  I  sent  down  again  to 
General  Sedgwick,  stating  the  condition  of  General  Buford, 
and  that  he  would  have  to  leave  unless  he  could  get  some 
assistance;  that  his  position  was  not  far  in  front,  and  that 


464  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

it  seemed  to  me  that  we  should  hold  it,  and  I  should  like 
to  send  some  force  up  to  picket  it  at  least.  After  a  time  I 
got  a  reply  that,  if  General  Buford  left,  I  might  occupy 
the  position.  General  Buford  was  still  with  me,  and  I 
said  to  him,  '  If  you  go  away  from  there,  I  will  have  to 
hold  it.'  '  That's  all  right,'  said  he, '  I  will  go  away.'  He 
did  so,  and  I  moved  right  up.  It  was  a  pretty  good  posi- 
tion, where  you  could  cover  your  troops.  Soon  after 
relieving  Buford,  we  saw  some  Confederate  infantry  ad- 
vancing. I  do  not  know  whether  they  brought  them  from 
Hagerstown,  or  from  some  other  place.  They  made  three 
dashes,  not  in  heavy  force,  upon  our  line  to  drive  it  back. 
The  troops  that  happened  to  be  there  on  our  line  were 
what  we  considered  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  unusu- 
ally good  ones.  They  quietly  repulsed  the  Confederates 
twice;  and  the  third  time  they  came  up,  they  sent  them 
flying  into  Funkstown.  Yet  there  was  no  permission  to 
move  on  and  follow  up  the  enemy.  We  remained  there 
sometime,  until  we  had  orders  to  move  on  and  take  a 
position  a  mile  or  more  nearer  llagerstown.  As  we  moved 
up,  we, saw  that  the  Confederates  had  some  light  field- 
works, —  hurriedly  thrown  up,  apparently, — to  cover  them- 
selves while  they  recrossed  the  river.  I  think  we  remained 
there  three  days,  and  the  third  night,  I  think,  after  we  got 
up  into  that  position,  it  was  said  the  Confederates  recrossed 
the  river." 

On  Sunday,  July  12th,-- the  army  having  nearly  all  come 
up, — reconnoissances  were  'made,  and  the  different  corps 
placed  in  position.  The  Eleventh,  First,  and  Sixth  corps 
were  placed  on  the  right,  the  Fifth  and  Third  in  the  center, 
and  the  Second  and  Twelfth  on  the  left.  The  situation  was 


SITUATION    OF    THE    TWO    ARMIES.  465 

about  this:  The  Confederate  army  was  in  a  strong  posi- 
tion. Their  numbers,  however,  had  not  been  increased, 
for  no  reinforcements  had  reached  them.  That  they  were 
in  a  precarious  condition,  and  that  General  Lee  was  im- 
pressed with  the  danger  which  threatened  him,  and  was 
looking  to  the  contingency  of  attempting  the  recrossing  of 
the  river  higher  up,  even  as  far  as  Cumberland,  Maryland, 
will  fully  appear  in  General  Imboden's  account  of  his  in- 
terview with  him,  as  found  in  the  ensuing  chapter.  Gen- 
eral Imboden,  in  his  statement,  says  that  their  situation 
then  "  was  very  precarious." 

Upon  the  part  of  the  Federal  army,  the  situation  may 
be  stated  as  follows:  The  army  had  been  reinforced  by 
French's  division,  and  Smith's  division  of  Couch's  emer- 
gency men.  That  is  to  say,  General  Meade  confronted 
Lee's  fifty  thousand  men  with  about  eighty-six  or  eighty-seven 
thousand,  with  the  conditions  of  Gettysburg,  so  far  as 
positions  are  concerned,  reversed.  The  great  question 
which  Meade  was  now  called  upon  to  decide  was,  "  Shall  I 
order  an  attack,  and  run  the  risk  of  defeat,  and  thus  not 
only  lose  all  we  gained  at  Gettysburg,  but  endanger  the 
National  capital,  and  probably  the  very  life  of  the  Gov- 
ernment?" It  was  a  tremendous  question,  and  the  com- 
mander in  chief  was  unwilling  to  bear  the  responsibility 
of  deciding  it  alone,  and  he  called  into  council  the  honored 
chiefs  upon  whom  he  would  have  to  rely  in  case  of  or-,/ 
dering  an  attack.  The  council  convened  on  the  evening 
of  Sunday,  July  12th,  and  was  composed  of  General 
Wadsworth,  commanding  the  First  Corps,  General  Hays, 
of  the  Second,  General  French,  of  the  Third,  General 
Sykes,  of  the  Fifth,  General  Sedgwick,  of  the  Sixth, 


466  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

General  Howard,  of  the  Eleventh,  General  Slocum,  of  the 
Twelfth,  and  General  Pleasanton,  of  the  Cavalry.  After 
a  long  and  careful  consideration  of  the  situation,  the  vote 
was  taken  on  the  expediency  of  attacking  the  enemy  next 
morning,  which  resulted  as  follows:  Generals  Howard, 
Wadsworth,  and  Pleasanton  voted  to  attack,  but  Generals 
Sedgwick,  Slocum,  Sykes,  French,  and  Hays  opposed  it. 
General  Meadc,  having  heard  the  decision,  stated  that 
whilst  he  could  have  but  a  limited  knowledge  of  the 
enemy's  strength  or  position,  he  was  yet  in  favor  of  attack- 
ing him,  but  that  he  would  not  do  so  against  the  opinion 
and  advice  of  a  majority  of  his  corps  commanders.  The 
situation  of  General  Meade  was  an  exceedingly  trying  one. 
He  had  been  in  the  chief  command  of  the  army  but  a 
short  time,  and  he  was  urged  by  repeated  orders  from 
President  Lincoln  to  attack  the  enemy,  but  now  he  was 
called  upon  either  to  disregard  these  orders,  or  execute 
them  against  the  judgment  of  a  majority  of  his  coun- 
sellors. The  responsibility  was  indeed  a  grave  one,  and  he 
decided  not  to  order  the  attack. 

This  decision  of  General  Meade  not  to  advance  upon 
the  enemy,  has  been  severely  censured.  Certainly  the 
judgment  of  the  eminent  soldiers  who  were  upon  the 
ground,  and  were  better  able  to  form  an  intelligent  opinion 
than  persons  at  a  distance,  should  have  due  weight  in  the 
solution  of  this  question.  These  men,  and  others  as 
eminent,  but  then  absent  because  of  their  wounds,  favored 
an  advance  upon  the  heels  of  the  enemy  after  the  repulse 
of  Pickett's  assault.  It  was  not  indifference  nor  cowardice, 
then,  which  influenced  their  judgment  on  this  occasion. 
Plainly  they  saw  that  the  opportunity  had  been  lost,  and 
now  the  conditions  were  not  favorable. 


GENERAL  LEE  CROSSES  THE  POTOMAC.         467 

It  is  said  that  after  the  retreat  of  the  Confederates,  the 
•engineers  examined  the  line  of  their  works,  and  found 
them  very  strong,  and  gave  it  as  their  opinion  that  an  as- 
sault would  have  resulted  disastrously  to  the  Federal  army. 
This  view  seems  to  be  supported  by  the  fact  that  in  the 
great  battles  between  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  an  assault  by  either  upon  a 
strongly  fortified  position  held  by  its  opponent,  was  almost 
without  exception  a  failure.  This  fact  is  adduced  by  Gen- 
eral Longstreet  as  the  principal  argument  he  used  in  his 
discussion  with  General  Lee,  when  deciding  upon  the 
policy  to  be  pursued  in  the  Pennsylvania  campaign,  and 
when  it  was  decided,  as  he  claims,  that  the  campaign  was 
to  be  "  offensive  in  strategy,  but  defensive  in  tactics." 

The  day  following  the  consultation  between  General 
Meade  and  his  corps  commanders  (Monday,  13th)  was 
rainy  and  misty,  so  that  but  little  could  be  learned  of 
the  enemy's  position.  That  night,  however,  General 
Meade  decided  to  attack  him  the  next  morning,  and  or- 
ders to  that  effect  were  issued  accordingly.  The  river  in 
the  meantime  had  fallen,  and  upon  examination  by  the 
Confederate  engineers  it  was  found  that  it  fcould  be  forded. 
This  fact  was  reported  to  General  Lee,  as  well  as  that  of 
the  replacing  of  the  pontoon  at  Falling  Waters,  and  the 
army  withdrew  from  its  lines  during  that  night  and  re- 
crossed  into  Virginia.  EwelPs  Corps  waded  the  river  up 
to  their  arm -pits  at  Williamsport,  and  Longstreet  and 
Hill  crossed  upon  the  pontoon  at  Falling  Waters.*  Gen- 

*The  artillery  and  wag-on  -  trains  were  driven  across  the  river  on  the  pon- 
toon at  Falling  Waters  which  had  been  replaced.  Old  citizens  residing  at 
Williamsport,  who  saw  the  Confederates  fording  the  river  at  that  place,  say 
that  two  lines,  composed  of  the  tallest  men,  were  placed  in  the  river  from 


468  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

eral  Kilpatrick,  commanding  the  Federal  cavalry  on  the 
left,  learning  at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  that  the 
Confederate  pickets  in  his  front  were  retiring,  started 
after  them,  and  at  half  past  seven  A.  M.  came  up  with  their 
rear  guard  under  General  Pettigrew,  about  two  miles 
from  their  bridge  at  Falling  Waters.  After  a  short,  but 
hotly  contested  action,  the  enemy  was  driven  to  the  river 
with  a  loss  of  one  hundred  and  twenty -five  killed,  and 
fifteen  hundred  prisoners.  General  Pettigrew  was  mortally 
Bounded  in  this  engagement.  The  Federal  loss  was  one 
hundred  and  five.  It  is  a  singular  circumstance  that  the 
same  Confederate  officer  who  led  the  reconnoissance  to- 
ward Gettysburg  on  the  day  preceding  the  battle,  partici- 
pated in  the  opening  of  the  first  day's  engagement,  and 
led  part  of  the  great  assaulting  column  in  the  attack  of 
the  third,  should  lose  his  life  in  the  last  struggle  north  of 
the  Potomac. 

When  the  intelligence  was  flashed  over  the  country 
that  the  Confederates  had  succeeded  in  escaping  across 
the  Potomac  river  without  another  battle,  disappoint- 
ment and  dissatisfaction  were  felt  and  expressed  on  every 
hand.  The  Government  too  was  dissatisfied,  as  the  fol- 
lowing dispatch  from  General  Halleck  to  General  Meade 
shows : 

.  "  I  need  hardly  say  to  you  that  the  escape  of  Lee's  army 
without  another  battle  has  created  great  dissatisfaction  in 
the  mind  of  the  President,  and  it  will  require  an  active, 
energetic  pursuit  on  your  part  to  remove  the  impression 
that  it  has  not  been  sufficiently  active  heretofore." 

shore  to  shore,  with  their  guns  interlocked  so  as  to  give  strength  and  stability 
to  the  lines.  Between  these  the  remainder  of  the  infantry  made  their  way 
through  the  water  up  to  their  necks. 


GENERAL   SEDGWICK'S   PURSUIT.  469 

Whether  or  not  the  dissatisfaction  with  General  Meade, 
as  expressed  in  this  dispatch,  was  deserved,  has  been,  and 
ever  will  be,  a  subject  of  dispute.  That  he  was  not  wholly 
at  fault,  and  that  the  causes,  of  the  delay  in  the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  were  not  wholly  his  own,  will  appear  in  the 
following  article,  contributed  to  the  Philadelphia  Weekly 
Press  by  Mr.  Thomas  Robins,  jr.  Mr.  Robins  says: 

"On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  signal  officers  and  recon- 
noitering  parties  reported  to  General  Meade  Lee's  move- 
ment by  way  of  the  Cash  town  and  Fairfield  roads,  acd 
the  southerly  direction  of  the  latter  seemed  to  indicate 
that  the  Potomac  and  not  the  Susquehanna  was  the 
enemy's  objective.  How  should  he  be  pursued?  There 
were  two  ways  open,  one  a  direct  pursuit  by  way  of  the 
Cashtown  and  Fairfield  roads,  the  other  a  pursuit  by  the 
flank  through  Taneytown  and  Emmittsburg  to  Frederick, 
and  then  over  the  southerly  passes  in  the  South  Mountain 
chain.  General  Meade  was  not  content  simply  to  start 
blindly  after  the  enemy  by  the  flank  without  some  efibrt 
to  open  a  way  through  the  mountains  by  the  Fairfield 
Pass.  He  did  not  entirely  abandon  the  chance  of  striking 
in  the  rear  of  the  retreating  Confederates  by  means  of  a 
direct  pursuit.  He  accordingly  directed  General  Sedgwick 
with  the  Sixth  Corps  —  which  had  been  comparatively  un- 
engaged during  the  battle,  and  was  therefore  in  full  force 
and  strength  —  to  advance  on  the  Fairfield  road,  pursue 
the  enemy  vigorously,  ascertain  his  intentions,  and  trans- 
mit whatever  information  he  might  acquire  to  vhead- 
quarters.  At  the  same  time  a  detachment  of  cavalry  was 
sent  along  the  Cashtown  road  in  order  that  intelligence 
might  be  given  of  any  move  toward  the  north  on  the  part 


470  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

of  General  Lee.  In  the  meantime  orders  for  the  move- 
ments of  the  various  corps  were  prepared,  in  order  that 
the  advance  by  the  flank  toward  Middletown  might  be 
begun  just  as  soon  as  General  Sedgwick  should  report; 
and  a  message  was  sent  to  General  French  at  Frederick 
to  push  on  and  occupy  Boonsborough  and  the  passes  in 
the  mountains. 

"  General  Sedgwick's  column  started  at  half  past  twelve 
p.  M.  on  the  fifth.  It  was  intended  that  the  Third  and 
Fifth  corps  should  support  his  movement,  and  that  the 
rest  of  the  army  should  remain  at  Gettysburg  or  in  that 
vicinity.  General  Butterfield,  the  chief  of  staff',  however, 
without  any  authority  from  the  commanding  general, 
issued  the  provisional  orders  for  the  movement  of  the 
other  corps  in  the  direction  of  Middletown;  and  they 
made  more  or  less  progress  in  that  direction  throughout 
the  day.  General  Sedgwick  occupied  the  remainder  of 
the  fifth  in  getting  as  far  as  Fairfield.  There  was  no  more 
gallant  officer  or  persistent  fighter  in  the  whole  army;  but 
the  afternoon  of  the  fifth  wears  away  and  night  comes. 
At  two  A.  M.  on  the  sixth  General  Meade  implores  him  to 
send  some  intelligence  of  the  enemy;  at  nine  A.  M.  he  tells 
him  that  he  must  push  his  reconnoissance,  for  the  whole 
army  is  waiting  to  know  whether  the  Fairfield  road  can 
be  opened  or  not.  Finally  a  reply  is  received.  General 
Sedgwick  says  that  he  has  reason  to  believe  that  Lee's 
whole  army  is  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Fairfield  Pass, 
and  that  it  is  possible  that  another  engagement  may  be 
had  with  the  enemy  in  the  mountains. 

"  By  this  time  some  of  the  corps  were  on  the  march  to 
Middletown  under  the  orders  issued  by  General  Butter- 


ANOTHER    OPPORTUNITY    LOST.  471 

field.  Was  a  chance  to  fight  another  battle  to  be  thrown 
away?  Was  it  possible  that  General  Lee  was  not  going 
to  recross  the  Potomac  after  all  ?  Although  beaten,  never- 
theless the  Confederate  army  was  still  an  invading  force, 
and  while  it  remained  on  Northern  soil  the  general  in 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  must  not  indulge 
in  any  gambling  military  operations,  but  must  act  strictly 
within  his  instructions  to  cover  Washington  and  Balti- 
more. He,  therefore,  sent  in  hot  haste  and  arrested  the 
progress  of  the  Third  and  First  corps,  which  had  not  moved 
very  far,  and  detained  them  to  support  General  Sedgwick 
in  case  of  necessity.  And  then,  after  all  this  time  had 
been  lost,  General  Sedgwick  finally  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  Fairfield  Pass  was  too  strong  to  be  attacked,  and 
so  reported  to  his  commander.  The  latter  immediately 
concluded  that  it  would  involve  delay  and  waste  of  time 
to  pursue  the  enemy  any  further  on  that  road,  and  he  con- 
sequently directed  the  whole  army  to  move  down  toward 
Middletown. 

"  At  this  time  an  occurrence  placed  the  Confederate  gen- 
eral in  a  position  of  the  greatest  peril.  On  the  3d  of  July 
General  French's  cavalry  surprised  the  Confederate  guard 
of  the  pontoon  bridge  over  the  Potomac  at  Falling  Waters, 
and  succeeded  in  burning  the  platform  and  cutting  loose 
the  boats,  so  that  they  were  swept  away  by  the  current. 
The  following  day  it  began  raining;  the  waters  of  the  Po- 
tomac rose  rapidly,  and  when  Lee's  army  arrived  on  the 
7th  at  Hagerstown  it  found  itself  blockaded,  the  pontoon 
bridge  gone,  and  all  the  fords  submerged.  Intelligence  of 
this  was  soon  transmitted  to  the  Union  commander.  Here 
was  another  opportunity  which  he  was  quick  to  appreciate. 


472  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

With  rapid  concentration  Lee  might  be  struck  a  heavy 
blow  before  he  could  cross  the  Potomac.  But  again  ob- 
stacles arose  in  the  way  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The 
same  storm  which  aided  the  Federals  by  submerging  the 
Potomac  fords  now  became  a  hindrance  in  that  it  so  broke 
up  the  roads  that  a  rapid  concentration  of  the  army  was 
impossible. 

"Nevertheless,  the  general  was  unceasing  in  his  en- 
deavors to  get  his  army  forward.  He  keeps  urging  the 
corps  commanders  to  hurry.  To  Howard  he  writes  that 
he  must  leave  those  who  have  no  shoes  behind  in  Frederick 
and  push  on  with  the  rest.  Then  he  takes  a  turn  at  New- 
ton, then  at  Slocum,  and  then  again  at  Howard.  Finally 
he  dispatches  a  circular  to  all  the  corps  commanders  en- 
closing a  letter  from  Halleck  urging  forced  marches,  and 
calls  on  them  to  use  their  best  efforts  to  meet  the  wishes 
of  the  President  and  the  Commander  in  chief. 

"  Such  was  the  second  period  of  the  pursuit.  There  were 
no  eventful  incidents,  but  'it  was  a  time  of  great  anxiety 
and  incessant  toil  for  the  Federal  commander.  His  dis- 
patches show  that  he  was  at  work  at  all  hours  of  the 
day  and  night.  The  elements,  the  destitution  of  his  worn- 
out  army,  and  the  easy-going  character  of  some  of  his 
corps  commanders  combined  to  prevent  a  more  rapid  pur- 
suit. "Well  might  he  regret  the  loss  of  Reynolds  and 
Hancock. 

"  On  the  evening  of  the  9th,  the  army  passed  the  South 
Mountain,  and  was  halted  for  the  night  with  its  right  at 
Boonsbofough  and  its  left  at  Rohrersville.  The  Confederate 
army  was  then  in  a  good  position,  the  right  resting  on  the 
river  near  Downsville,  and  the  left  in  the  vicinity  of 


RECONNOISSANCE    OF    CONFEDERATE    POSITION.  473 

Hagerstown,  covering  the  road  from  that  place  to  Williams- 
port.  This  position  covered  both  the  ford  at  Williamsport 
and  the  remains  of  the  pontoon -bridge  at  Falling  Waters. 
It  ran  along  a  range  of  high  ground,  and  was  very  diffi- 
cult to  attack  in  front,  owing  to  the  broken  character  of 
the  country.  The  right  wing  was  protected  by  the  river. 
On  the  left  the  country  was  level,  but  the  proximity  of 
Conococheague  creek,  which  empties  into  the  Potomac 
river  at  Williamsport,  and  the  numerous  stone  walls  made 
it  a  difficult  position  to  turn.  General  Lee  had  added  to 
its  natural  strength  by  entrenching  it  completely;  and 
behind  these  earth -works  his  army  lay,  while  his  engineers 
were  making  herculean  exertions  'to  establish  communica- 
tion with  the  south  shore.  On  the  7th,  8th,  9th,  and  10th 
of  July  the  cavalry  of  the  two  armies  was  constantly 
engaged,  the  Confederates  endeavoring  to  block  the 
advance  of  the  Union,  forces,  and  the  Federals  to  clear 
the  way. 

"  By  the  night  of  the  10th  of  July  the  Twelfth,  Second, 
Fifth,  and  Third  corps  were  across  Antietam  creek  and 
in  front  of  Williamsport,  on  which  rested  the  right  flank 
of  the  enemy.  The  Sixth,  Eleventh,  and  First  Corps 
were  near  Funkstown  and  Hagerstown  in  front  of  the 
Confederate  left.  On  the  llth  and  12th  of  July  the  army 
advanced  in  line  to  feel  the  enemy,  and  ascertain  how  he 
,  was  posted.  Before  this  the  commanding  general  had 
tried  by  personal  reconnoissances  to  find  out  something 
of  the  Confederate  position,  so  that  an  attack  could  be 
directed  against  the  weak  points.  He  was  assisted  by  the 
two  ablest  men  in  the  army,  —  General  Warren,  his  chief 
engineer,  and  General  Humphreys,  his  chief  of  staff.  The 


474  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

former  was  the  man  whose  foresight  had  saved  the  Round 
Tops  and  the  position  of  Gettysburg  to  the  Federal  army 
on  the  memorable  2d  of  July.  The  latter  was  distin- 
guished as  one  of  the  two  generals  who  had  gained  laurel* 
at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg.  Both  were  clear-headed 
men,  and  no  one  could  accuse  either  of  any  want  of 
stomach  for  a  fight.  Yet  they  could  find  no  point  for  an 
attack.  '  Wherever  seen,  the  Confederate  position  was 
naturally  strong,'  says  General  Humphreys  in  his  book, 
"Gettysburg  to  the  Rapidan."  '  It  presented  no  vulnerable 
points,  but  much  of  it  was  concealed  from  view.  Its 
flanks  were  secure  and  could  not  be  turned.  In  this  con- 
dition of  aifairs,'  continues  General  Humphreys,  '  General 
Meade  determined  on  the  evening  of  the  12th  of  July  to 
move  forward  the  next  morning  and  make  a  reconnoissance 
in  force,  supported  by  the  whole  army,  feel  the  enemy  and 
attack  him  where  weakest,  if  it  should  give  any  promise- 
of  success.' 

"  What  followed  is  best  told  by  General  Meade  himself 
in  his  testimony  before  the  committee  on  the  conduct  of 
the  war.  I  give  his  own  words : 

'  Having  been  in  command  of  the  army  not  more  than 
twelve  or  fourteen  days,  and  in  view  of  the  tremendous 
and  important  issues  involved  in  the  result,  knowing  that 
if  I  were  defeated  the  whole  question  would  be  reversed, 
the  road  to  Washington  and  to  the  North  open,  and  all 
the  fruits  of  my  victory  at  Gettysburg  dissipated,  I  did 
not  feel  that  I  should  be  right  in  assuming  the  responsi- 
bility of  blindly  attacking  the  enemy  without  any  knowl- 
edge of  his  position.  I,  therefore,  called  a  council  of  my 
corps  commanders,  who  were  the  officers  to  execute  thia 
duty,  and  laid  before  them  the  precise  condition  of  affairs/ 


GENERAL    M'LAWS'    ACCOUNT.  475 

"  The  council  or'  war,  with  but  two  dissenting  voices,, 
disapproved  of  the  general's  aggressive  policy,  and  opposed 
an  attack.  In  this  decision  the  Federal  commander 
acquiesced,  and- agreed  to  defer  the  attack  for  one  day,  in 
order  that  an  endeavor  might  be  made  by  means  of 
further  reconnoissance  to  find  some  weak  spot  in  the 
enemy's  lines.  The  13th  of  July  was  devoted  to  this 
work,  and  orders  were  issued  on  that  evening  for  the 
whole  army  to  move  forward  in  accordance  with  the  plans 
of  the  day  before.  But  it  was  too  late.  The  bird  had 
flown.  By  superhuman  efforts  General  Lee  had  re-estab- 
lished the  pontoon  -  bridge.  Across  this  bridge  on  the 
night  of  the  thirteenth,  he  moved  his  baggage  and  artil- 
lery, the  infantry  taking  the  fords.  Before  morning  the 
whole  Confederate  army  was  once  more  on  the  soil  of 
Virginia." 

General  McLaws,  in  his  article  in  the  Philadelphia 
Weekly  Press,  referred  to  in  the  previous  chapter,  says: 

"  General  Lee's  forces  fell  back  leisurely  without  any  en- 
gagement between  the  infantry  forces  worthy  of  notice,  and 
on  the  12th,  when  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  arrived,, 
took  position  previously  selected,  covering  the  Potomac 
from  Williamsport  to  Falling  Waters,  where  it  remained 
for  two  days  with  the  enemy  immediately  in  front,  mani- 
festing no  disposition  to  attack,  but  throwing  up  entrench- 
ments along  his  whole  line. 

"The  Confederate  army  was  now  concentrated  and  on 
the  defensive.  General  Lee  himself  had  recovered  in  a 
great  measure  from  his  fatigue  consequent  on  his  exhaust- 
ing labors,  and  as  he  rode  along  the  line  he  had  adopted 
I  joined  him  and  rode  with  him  tor  some  distance.  He 


476  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

was  in  good  spirits  and  seemed  confident  of  success  if  his 
lines  were  attacked,  and  he  was  evidently  wishing  for  it. 
If  General  Meade  had  attacked,  his  chances  of  success  would 
have  been  much  less  than  they  were  at  Gettysburg,  as  the 
troops  were  eager  to  engage,  and  if  they  could  have  been 
allowed  to  try  to  provoke  an  attack  would  have  done  so. 

"  On  the  13th,  the  river  having  become  fordable  and  the 
bridge  at  Falling  Waters  having  been  reconstructed,  Gen- 
eral Lee,  finding  it  difficult  to  obtain  flour  for  his  troops, 
concluded  not  to  wait  on  General  Meade  any  longer  and 
retired  across  the  river,  with  no  great  loss  of  men  or  ma- 
terial— in  fact,  with  much  less  than  usually  attends  such 
a  movement  made  under  such  circumstances. 

"And  thus  the  invasion  of  Pennsylvania  by  the  Con- 
federate forces,  under  General  Lee,  was  brought  to  a  close, 
and  to  General  Meade  is  due  the  honor  of  the  result." 

Upon  ascertaining  in  the  morning  that  the  enemy  had 
succeeded  in  effecting  his  escape,  General  Meade  put 
his  army  in  motion,  and  marching  by  Pleasant  Valley, 
crossed  the  Potomac  at  Berlin.  Halting  a  day  on  the 
Leesburg  and  Winchester  pike  to  ascertain  the  movements 
of  the  enemy,  and  to  be  assured  that  an  attempt  to  cap- 
ture1 the  National  Capital  by  a  rapid  march  by  his  rear, 
would  not  be  made  in  case  he  advanced  and  left  the  way 
open,  he  again  put  his  columns  in  motion  and  at  length, 
near  the  close  of  July,  reached  his  old  position  on  the  Rap- 
pahannock.  Lee  moved  rapidly  down  the  valley,  and  pass- 
ing through  the  mountain  below  Strasburg,  concentrated 
his  army  at  Culpeper,  and  the  memorable  Pennsylvania 
campaign  of  less  than  two  months  in  duration  was  ended. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE    GREAT   WAGON   TRAIN   OF   WOUNDED. 

)S  stated  in  a  previous  chapter,  as  sooii  as  the  dark- 
ness  of  night  closed  over  the  terrible  scene  of  the 
third  and  concluding  day  of  the  series  of  battles  at 
Gettysburg,  General  Lee  began  his  preparations  for 
returning  with  his  defeated  and  shattered  forces  to 
Virginia.  His  first  and  greatest  care,  next  to  the  safety 
of  his  arrny,  was  for  his  large  number  of  wounded,  and 
he  determined  to  take  as  many  of  these  with  him  as 
possible.  Consequently  all  his  available  transportation 
was  used  for  this  purpose,  and  an  immense  train,  not  less 
than  twenty -five  or  thirty  miles  long,  was  loaded  with 
wounded  and  suffering  men.  All  that  could  walk  were 
required  to  accompany  this  train  on  foot,  and  the  remain- 
der of  the  wounded  were  left  to  the  care  of  the  Federals. 
This  train  was  placed  in  charge  of  General  J.  D.  Irnboden, 
and  the  head  of  it  left  the  scene  of  conflict  amidst  a  terrific 
rain  storm  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  Saturday, 
July  4th.  It  recrossed  the  South  Mountain  by  Cashtown  — 
the  same  way  the  army  had  come, — and  at  Greenwood  left 
the  turnpike  and  took  a  country  road  which  cuts  directly 
across  toward  the  Potomac,  leaving  Chambefsburg  to  the 
right.  This  side  road  is  known  as  the  Pine  Stump  Road 

477 


478  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

and  the  Walnut  Bottom  Road.  It  passes  through  the 
small  places  known  as  New  Guilford  and  New  Franklin, 
and  intersects  the  road  leading  south  from  Chambersburg 
at  Marion,  six  miles  south  of  the  former  place.  From 
Marion  the  train  proceeded  to  Greencastle  and  thence 
diverged  to  the  right  and  reached  Williamsport  on  the 
Potomac  by  the  Williamsport  Pike.  Such  was  the  route 
taken  by  this  train,  but,  as  will  appear  in  statements  by 
•eye  -  witnesses,  it  did  not  confine  itself  to  the  road.  Fences 
were  torn  away,  and  men  and  wagons  took  to  the  fields, 
either  to  shorten  the  distances  to  be  traversed  or  to  acceler- 
ate their  progress. 

This  train  was  thirty -four  hours  in  passing  a  given  point. 
•General  Imboden,  who  had  charge  of  it,  and  whose  state- 
ment will  be  given,  says  it  was  seventeen  miles  long.  Allow- 
ing a  mile  of  its  length  to  each  hour  of  passing  any  point, 
and  it  will  be  seen  that  it  was  not  less  than  thirty  miles  in 
extent.  Competent  eye  -  witnesses  have  estimated  the  num- 
ber of  wounded  in  these  wagons  and  walking  along  by 
them,  as  not  less  than  ten  or  twelve  thousand.  Add  to 
these  the  seven  thousand  five  hundred  and  forty  who  were 
left  upon  the  field  because  too  badly  wounded  to  be  borne 
away,  or  for  whom  transportation  could  not  be  given,  and 
some  idea  may  be  formed  of  the  extent  of  the  losses  of 
those  three  eventful  days. 

All  along  the  route  by  which  this  train  made  its  way, 
broken  wagons  and  dead  and  dying  soldiers  were  strewed. 
The  bottom  of  the  wagons  was  smeared  with  blood. 
Barns  and  houses  were  improvised  into  hospitals.  Groans 
and  shrieks  of  agony  fille,d  the  air  as  the  wagons  jolted 
•on  the  rough  and  stony  wray,  while  cries  and  prayers  and 


GENERAL   IMBODEN'S   DESCRIPTION.  479 

ourses  were  heard  all  along  that  moving  line  of  human 
woe.  During  all  this  time  the  rain  was  pouring  down  in 
torrents,  and  the  roads,  as  a  consequence,  were  soon  ren- 
dered almost  impassable.  Wagons  were  ditched  and  teams 
stalled,  and  as  the  roads  became  blocked  the  train  took  to 
the  fields  where  the  wheels  sank  to  the  axles  in  the  soft 
earth.  Drivers  lashed  their  horses;  curses  and  profanity 
abounded;  uxles  were  broken;  wagons  and  caissons,  and 
an  occasional  cannon,  were  abandoned;  and  dead  soldiers 
were  taken  from  the  wagons  to  give  more  room  for  the 
remaining  inmates,  and  thrown  by  the  way -side.  To  add 
to  the  terror  of  the  scene  the  Federal  cavalry  were  upon 
them,  and  dashes  were  made  here  and  there  along  the  line 
and  hundreds  of  wagons  with  their  miserable  and  suffering 
inmates  were  captured. 

The  vastness  of  this  train,  and  the  aggregate  of  human 
agony  it  contained,  has  never  been  understood  by  the 
country.  And  now  to  bring  these  before  the  reader  in 
some  adequate  form,  I  append  here  several  statements, 
written  especially  for  this  history,  by  competent  and  relia- 
ble persons  who  resided  along  the  line.  I  will,  however, 
first  introduce  the  following  graphic  description  given  by 
General  Imboden,  who  had  charge  of  this  train.  This 
statement  was  written  for  the  Galaxy  of  April,  1871,  from 
which  I  copy  it.  After  detailing  his  operations  along  the 
line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  in  Western  Vir- 
ginia, from  Cumberland  to  Hancock,  Maryland,  and  his 
entering  Pennsylvania  and  march  to  the  rear  of  the  Con- 
federate line  near  Gettysburg,  where  he  arrived  about 
noon  of  Friday,  July  3d,  just  previous  to  General  Pickett's 
.great  charge,  General  Imboden  says: 


480  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

"  I  belonged  to  no  division  or  corps  in  the  Confederate 
army,  and  therefore  on  arriving  near  Gettysburg  about 
noon,  when  the  conflict  was  raging  in  all  its  fury,  I  re- 
ported directly  to  General  Lee  for  orders,  and  was  assigned 
a  position  to  aid  in  repelling  any  cavalry  demonstration 
that  might  occur  on  his  flanks  or  rear.  None  being  made, 
my  little  force  took  no  part  in  the  battle.  I  then  had 
only  about  two  thousand  one  hundred  effective  mounted 
men,  and  a  six-  gun  battery. 

"  When  night  closed  upon  the  grand  scene  the  Confed- 
erate army  was  repulsed.  Silence  and  gloom  pervaded 
our  camps.  We  knew  that  the  day  had  gone  against  us, 
but  the  extent  of  the  disaster  was  not  known  except  in 
high  quarters.  The  carnage  of  the  day  was  reported  to 
have  been  frightful,  but  the  Confederate  army  was  not 
in  retreat,  and  we  all  surmised  that  with  the  dawn  of  the 
next  day  would  come  a  renewal  of  the  struggle.  We  also 
knew  that  if  such  was  the  case,  those  who  had  not  been 
in  the  fight  would  have  their  full  share  in  the  honors  and 
dangers  of  the  next  day.  All  felt  and  appreciated  the 
momentous  consequences  of  final  defeat  or  victory  on  that 
great  field.  These  considerations  made  that,  to  us,  one  of 
those  solemn  and  awful  nights  that  every  one  who  fought 
through  our  long  war  sometimes  experienced  before  a 
great  battle. 

"Few  camp-fires  enlivened  the  scene.  It  was  a  warm 
summer's  night,  and  the  weary  soldiers  were  lying  in 
groups  on  the  luxuriant  grass  of  the  meadows  we  occu- 
pied, discussing  the  events  of  the  day  or  watching  that 
their  horses  did  not  straggle  oft'  in  browsing  around. 
About  eleven  o'clock  a  horseman  approached  and  deliv- 


GENERAL  IMBODEN  AND  GENERAL  LEE.        481 

ered  a  message  from  General  Lee  that  he  wished  to  see 
me  immediately.  I  mounted  at  once,  and,  accompanied 
by  Lieutenant  McPhail  of  my  staff,  and  guided  by  the 
courier,  rode  about  two  miles  toward  Gettysburg,  where 
half  a  dozen  small  tents  on  the  road -side  were  pointed 
out  as  General  Lee's  head -quarters  for  the  night.  He 
was  not  there,  but  I  was  informed  that  I  would  find  him 
with  General  A.  P.  Hill  half  a  mile  further  on.  On 
reaching  the  place  indicated,  a  flickering,  solitary  candle, 
visible  through  the  open  front  of  a  common  tent,  showed 
where  Generals  Lee  and  Hill  were  seated  on  camp-stools, 
with  a  county  map  spread  upon  their  knees,  and  engaged 
in  a  low  and  earnest  conversation.  They  ceased  speaking 
as  I  approached,  and  after  the  ordinary  salutations  General 
Lee  directed  me  to  go  to  his  head  -  quarters  and  wait  for 
him.  He  did  not  return  until  about  one  o'clock,  when  he 
came  riding  along  at  a  slow  walk  and  evidently  wrapped 
in  profound  thought. 

"  There  was  not  even  a  sentinel  on  duty,  and  no  one  of 
his  staff'  was  about.  The  moon  was  high  in  the  heavens, 
shedding  a  flood  of  soft  silvery  light,  almost  as  bright  as 
day,  upon  the  scene.  When  he  approached  and  saw  us, 
he  spoke,  reined  up  his  horse,  and  essayed  to  dismount. 
The  effort  to  do  so  betrayed  so  much  physical  exhaustion 
that  I  stepped  forward  to  assist  him,  but  before  I  reached 
him  he  had  alighted.  He  threw  his  arm  across  his  saddle 
to  rest  himself,  and  fixing  his  eyes  upon  the  ground  leaned 
in  silence  upon  his  equally  weary  horse,  —  the  two  form- 
ing a  striking  group,  as  motionless  as  a  statue.  The 
moon  shone  full  upon  his  massive  features,  and  revealed 
an  expression  of  sadness  I  had  never  seen  upon  that  fine 


31 


482  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

countenance  before,  in  any  of  the  vicissitudes  of  the  war 
through  which  he  had  passed.  I  waited  for  him  to  speak 
until  the  silence  became  painful  and  embarrassing,  when 
to  break  it,  and  change  the  current  of  his  thoughts,  I 
remarked  in  a  sympathetic  tone,  and  in  allusion  to  his 
great  fatigue: 

" '  General,  this  has  been  a  hard  day  on  you.' 
"  This  attracted  his  attention.     He  looked  up  and   re- 
plied mournfully: 

"'Yes,  it  has  been  a  sad,  sad  day  to  us,'  and  immedi- 
ately relapsed  into  his  thoughtful  mood  and  attitude. 
Being  unwilling  again  to  intrude  upon  his  reflections,  I 
said  no  more.  After  a  minute  or  two  he  suddenly 
straightened  up  to  his  full  height,  and  turning  to  me 
with  more  animation,  energy,  and  excitement  of  manner 
than  I  had  ever  seen  in  him  before,  he  addressed  me  in 
a  voice  tremulous  with  emotion,  and  said: 

"  *  General,  I  never  saw  troops  behave  more  magnifi- 
'cently  than  Pickett's  division  of  Virginians  did  to-day 
in  their  grand  charge  upon  the  enemy.  And  if  they  had 
been  supported,  as  they  were  to  have  been, — but,  for 
some  reason  not  yet  fully  explained  to  me,  they  were  not, 
—  we  would  have  held  the  position  they  so  gloriously  won 
at  such  a  fearful  loss  of  noble  lives,  and  the  day  would 
have  been  ours.' 

"  After  a  moment  he  added  in  a  tone  almost  of  agony : 
"'Too  bad!     Too  bad!!    OH!   TOO  BAD!!' 
"  I  never  shall  forget,  as  long  as  I  live,  his  language, 
and  his  manner,  and  his  appearance   and  expression  of 
mental  suffering.     Altogether  it  was  a  scene  that  a  his- 
torical   painter  might  well    immortalize    had    one  been 
fortunately  present  to  witness  it. 


GENERAL  IMBODEN  AND  GENERAL  LEE.        483 

"  In  a  little  while  he  called  up  a  servant  from  his  sleep 
to  take  his  horse;  spoke  mournfully,  by  name,  of  several 
of  his  friends  who  had  fallen  during  the  day;  and  when 
a  candle  had  been  lighted  he  invited  me  alone  into  his 
tent,  where,  as  soon  as  we  were  seated,  he  remarked: 

" l  We  must  return  to  Virginia.  As  many  of  our  poor 
wounded  as  possible  must  be  taken  home..  I  have  sent 
for  you  because  your  men  are  fresh,  to  guard  the  wagon- 
trains  back  to  Virginia.  The  duty  will  be  arduous,  re- 
sponsible, and  dangerous,  for  I  am  afraid  you  will  be 
harassed  by  the  enemy's  cavalry.  I  can  spare  you  as 
much  artillery  as  you  require,  but  no  other  troops,  as  I 
I  shall  need  all  I  have  to  return  to  the  Potomac  by  a 
different  route  from  yours.  All  the  transportation  and 
all  the  care  of  the  wounded  will  be  intrusted  to  you. 
You  will  recross  the  mountain  by  the  Chambersburg 
road,  and  then  proceed  to  Williamsport,  Maryland,  by 
.any  route  you  deem  best,  without  halting.  There  rest 
and  feed  your  animals,  then  ford  the  river,  and  make  no 
halt  till  you  reach  Winchester,  where  I  will  again  com- 
municate with  you.' 

"After  a  good  deal  of  conversation  he  sent  for  his 
chiefs  of  staff  and  ordered  them  to  have  everything  in 
readiness  for  me  to  take  command  the  next  morning,  re- 
marking to  me  that  the  general  instructions  he  had  given 
Avould  be  sent  to  me  next  day  in  writing.  As  I  was  about 
leaving  to  return  to  my  camp,  he  came  out  of  his  tent 
and  said  to  me  in  a  low  tone :  '  I  will  place  in  your  hands 
to-morrow  a  sealed  package  for  President  Davis,  which 
you  will  retain  in  your  own  possession  till  you  are  across 
the  Potomac  river,  when  you  will  detail  a  trusty  commis- 


484  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

sioned  officer  to  take  it  to  Richmond  with  all  possible 
dispatch,  and  deliver  it  immediately  to  the  President.  I 
impress  it  upon  you  that  whatever  happens  this  package 
must  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  If  you  siiCL'ld 
unfortunately  be  captured,  destroy  it.' 

"On  the  morning  of  the  4th  of  July  my  written  in- 
structions and  the  package  for  Mr.  Davis  were  delivered 
to  me.  It  was  soon  apparent  that  the  wagons  and  ambu- 
lances and  the  wounded  could  not  be  ready  to  move  till 
late  in  the  afternoon.  The  General  sent  me  four  four-gun 
field  batteries,  which  with  my  own  gave  me  twenty -two 
guns  to  defend  the  trains. 

"  Shortly  after  noon  the  very  windows  of  heaven  seemed 
to  have  been  opened.  Rain  fell  in  dashing  torrents,  and 
in  a  little  while  the  whole  face  of  the  earth  was  covered 
with  water.  The  meadows  became  small  lakes;  raging 
streams  ran  across  the  road  in  every  depression  of  the 
ground;  wagons,  ambulances,  and  artillery  -  carriages 
filled  the  roads  and  fields  in  all  directions.  The  storm 
increased  in  fury  every  moment.  Canvas  was  no  pro- 
tection against  it,  and  the  poor  wounded,  lying  upon  the 
hard,  naked  boards  of  the  wagon  bodies,  were  drenched 
by  the  cold  rain.  Horses  and  mules  were  blinded  and 
maddened  by  the  storm,  and  became  almost  unmanage- 
able. The  roar  of  the  winds  and  waters  made  it  almost 
impossible  to  communicate  orders.  Night  was  rapidly 
approaching,  and  there  was  danger  that  in  the  darkness 
the  *  confusion '  would  become  *  worse  confounded.'  About 
four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  head  of  the  column  was 
put  in  motion  and  began  the  ascent  of  the  mountain. 
After  dark  I  set  out  to  gain  the  advance.  The  train  was 


THE   HORRORS   OF   THE   WAGON   TRAIN.  485 

seventeen  miles  long  when  drawn  out  on  the  road.  It 
was  moving  rapidly,  and  from  every  wagon  issued  wails 
of  agony.  For  four  hours  I  galloped  along,  passing  to 
the  front,  and  heard  more  —  it  was  too  dark  to  see  —  of 
the  horrors  of  war  than  I  had  witnessed  from  the  battle 
of  Bull  Run  up  to  that  day.  In  the  wagons  were  men 
wounded  and  mutilated  in  every  conceivable  way.  Some 
had  their  legs  shattered  by  a  shell  or  minnie  ball;  some 
were  shot  through  their  bodies;  others  had  arms  torn  to 
shreds;  some  had  received  a  ball  in  the  face,  or  a  jagged 
piece  of  shell  had  lacerated  their  heads.  Scarcely  one  in 
a  hundred  had  received  adequate  surgical  aid.  Many 
of  them  had  been  without  food  for  thirty -six  hours. 
Their  ragged,  bloody,  and  dirty  clothes,  all  clotted  and 
hardened  with  blood,  were  rasping  the  tender,  inflamed 
lips  of  their  gaping  wounds.  Very  few  of  the  wagons 
had  even  straw  in  them,  and  all  were  without  springs. 
The  road  was  rough  and  rocky.  The  jolting  was  enough 
to  have  killed  sound,  strong  men.  From  nearly  every 
wagon,  as  the  horses  trotted  on,  such  cries  and  shrieks  as 
these  greeted  the  ear: 

"'Oh  God!    why  can't  I  die?' 

"'My  God!  will  no  one  have  mercy  and  kill  me  and 
«nd  my  misery?' 

"'Oh!  stop  one  minute  and  take  me  out,  and  leave  me 
to  die  on  the  road -side.' 

"'I  am  dying!  I  am  dying!  My  poor  wife,  my  dear 
children!  what  will  become  of  you?' 

"  Some  were  praying;  others  were  uttering  the  most 
fearful  oaths  and  execrations  that  despair  could  wring 
from  their  agony.  Occasionally  a  wagon  would  be  passed 


486  THE    GKEAT   INVASION. 

from  which  only  low,  deep  moans  and  sobs  could  be 
heard.  No  help  could  be  rendered  to  any  of  the  sufferers. 
On,  on;  we  must  move  on.  The  storm  continued  and  the 
darkness  was  fearful.  There  was  no  time  even  to  fill  a 
canteen  with  water  for  a  dying  man;  for,  except  the 
drivers  and  the  guards  disposed  in  compact  bodies  every 
half  mile,  all  were  wounded  and  helpless  in  that  vast 
train  of  misery.  The  night  was  awful,  and  yet  it  was  our 
safety,  for  no  enemy  would  dare  attack  us  when  he  could 
not  distinguish  friend  from  foe.  We  knew  that  when 
day  broke  upon  us.  we  would  be  harrassed  by  bauds  of 
cavalry  hanging  on  our  flanks.  Therefore  our  aim  was  to 
go  as  far  as  possible  under  cover  of  the  night,  and  so  we 
kept  on.  It  was  my  sad  lot  to  pass  the  whole  distance 
from  the  rear  to  the  head  of  the  column,  and  no  language 
can  convey  an  idea  of  the  horrors  of  that  most  horrible 
of  all  nights  of  our  long  and  bloody  war. 

"  Daybreak  on  the  morning  of  July  5th  found  the  head 
of  our  column  at  Greencastle,  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  from 
the  Potomac  river  at  Williamsport,  our  point  of  crossing. 
Here  our  apprehended  troubles  from  the  Federal  cavalry 
began.  From  the  fields  and  cross-roads  they  attacked  us- 
in  small  bodies,  striking  the  column  where  there  were  few 
or  no  guards,  and  creating  great  confusion. 

"To  add  still  further  to  our  perplexities,  a  report  was- 
brought  that  the  Federals  in  large  force  held  Williams- 
port.  This  fortunately  proved  untrue.  After  a  great 
deal  of  harassing  and  desultory  fighting  along  the  road, 
nearly  the  whole  immense  train  reached  Williamsport  a 
little  after  the  middle  of  the  day.  The  town  was  taken 
possession  of;  all  the  churches,  school  houses,  etc.,  were 


GENERAL  IMBODEN  AT  WILLIAMSPORT.        487 

converted  into  hospitals,  and  proving  insufficient,  many 
of  the  private  houses  were  occupied.  Straw  was  obtained 
on  the  neighboring  farms;  the  wounded  were  removed 
from  the  wagons  and  housed;  the  citizens  were  all  put  to 
cooking,  and  the  army  surgeons  to  dressing  wounds.  The 
dead  were  selected  from  the  train, —  for  many  had  perished 
on  the  way, — and  were  decently  buried.  All  this  had  to 
be  done  because  the  tremendous  rains  had  raised  the 
river  more  than  ten  feet  above  the  fording  stage,  and  we 
could  not  possibly  cross. 

"  Our  situation  was  frightful.  We  had  over  ten  thou- 
sand animals  and  all  the  wagons  of  General  Lee's  army 
under  our  charge,  and  all  the  wounded  that  could  be 
brought  from  Gettysburg.  Our  supply  of  provisions  con- 
sisted of  a  few  wagon -loads  of  flour,  and  a  small  lot  of 
cattle.  My  effective  force  was  only  about  two  thousand, 
one  hundred  men  and  twenty  -  odd  field  pieces.  We  did 
not  know  where  the  Confederate  army  was;  the  river 
could  not  be  crossed;  and  small  parties  of  cavalry  were 
still  hovering  around.  The  means  of  ferriage  consisted 
of  two  small  boats  and  a  small  wire  rope  stretched  across 
the  river,  which  owing  to  the  force  of  the  swollen  current 
broke  several  times  during  the  day.  To  reduce  the  space 
to  be  defended  as  much  as  possible,  all  the  wagons  and 
animals  were  parked  close  together  on  the  river  bank. 

"  Believing  that  an  attack  would  soon  be  made  upon 
us,  I  ordered  the  wagoners  to  be  mustered,  and,  taking 
three  out  of  every  four,  organized  them  into  companies, 
and  armed  them  with  the  weapons  of  the  wounded  men 
found  in  the  train.  By  this  means  I  added  to  my  effective 
force  about  five  hundred  men.  Slightly  wounded  officers 


488  THE    GREAT   INVASION, 

promptly  volunteered  their  services  to  command  these 
improvised  soldiers;  and  many  of  our  quartermasters  and 
commissaries  did  the  same  thing.  "We  were  not  seri- 
ously molested  on  the  fifth,  but  the  next  morning  about 
nine  o'clock  information  reached  me  that  a  large  body  of 
cavalry  from  Frederick,  Maryland,  was  rapidly  advancing 
to  attack  us.  As  we  could  not  retreat  further,  it  was  at 
once  frankly  made  known  to  the  troops  that  unless  we 
could  repel  the  threatened  attack  we  should  all  become 
prisoners,  and  that  the  loss  of  his  whole  transportation 
would  probably  ruin  General  Lee;  for  it  could  not  be 
replaced  for  many  months,  if  at  all,  in  the  then  exhausted 
condition  of  the  Confederate  states.  So  far  from  repress- 
ing the  ardor  of  the  troops,  this  frank  announcement  of 
our  peril  inspired  all  with  the  utmost  enthusiasm.  Men 
and  officers  alike,  forgetting  the  sufferings  of  the  past  few 
days,  proclaimed  their  determination  to  drive  back  the 
attacking  force  or  perish  in  the  attempt.  All  told,  we 
were  less  than  three  thousand  men.  The  advancing  force 
we  knew  to  be  more  than  double  ours,  consisting,  as  we 
had  ascertained,  of  five  regular  and  eight  volunteer  regi- 
ments of  cavalry,  with  eighteen  guns,  all  under  the  com- 
mand of  Generals  Buford  and  Kilpatrick.  We  had  no 
works  of  any  kind;  the  country  was  open  and  almost 
level,  and  there  was  no  advantage  of  position  we  could 
occupy.  It  must  necessarily  be  a  square  stand  .up  fight, 
face  to  face.  We  had  twenty -two  field  guns  of  various 
calibre,  and  one  Whitworth.  These  were  disposed  in 
batteries,  in  semi -circle,  about  one  mile  out  of  the  village, 
on  the  summit  of  a  very  slight  rising  ground  that  lies 
back  of  the  town.  Except  the  artillery,  our  troops  were 


GENERAL    IMBODEN'S    DEFENSE.  489 

held  out  of  view  of  the  assailants,  and  ready  to  be  moved 
promptly  to  any  menaced  point  along  the  whole  line  of 
nearly  two  miles  in  extent.  Knowing  that  nothing  could 
save  us  but  a  bold  'bluff'  game,  orders  had  been  given  to 
the  artillery  as  soon  as  the  advancing  forces  came  within 
range  to  open  fire  along  the  whole  line,  and  keep  it  up 
with  the  utmost  rapidity.  A  little  after  one  o'clock  they 
appeared  on  two  roads  in  our  front,  and  our  batteries 
opened.  They  soon  had  their  guns  in  position,  and  a  very 
lively  artillery  fight  began.  We  fired  with  great  rapidity, 
and  in  less  than  an  hour  two  of  our  batteries  reported 
that  their  ammunition  was  exhausted.  This  would  have 
been  fatal  to  us  but  for  the  opportune  arrival  at  the  critical 
moment  of  an  ammunition  train  from  Winchester.  The 
wagons  were  ferried  across  to  our  side  as  soon  as  possible, 
and  driven  on  the  field  in  a  gallop  to  supply  the  silent 
guns.  Not  having  men  to  occupy  half  our  line,  they 
were  moved  up  in  order  of  battle,  first  to  one  battery, 
then  withdrawn  and  double-quicked  to  another,  but 
out  of  view  of  our  assailanta  till  they  could  be  shown  at 
some  other  point  on  our  line.  By  this  maneuvering  we 
made  the  impression  that  we  had  a  strong  supporting 
force  in  rear  of  all  our  guns  along  the  entire  front.  To 
test  this,  Generals  Buford  and  Kilpatrick  dismounted  five 
regiments  and  advanced  them  on  foot  on  our  right.  We 
concentrated  there  all  the  men  we  had,  wagoners  and 
all,  and  thus,  with  the  aid  of  the  united  fire  of  all  our 
guns  directed  at  the  advancing  line,  we  drove  it  back,  and 
rushed  forward  two  of  our  batteries  four  or  five  hundred 
yards  further  to  the  front.  This  boldness  prevented 
another  charge,  and  the  fight  was  continued  till  near  sun- 


490  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

set  with  the  artillery.  About  that  time  General  Fitzhugh 
Lee  sent  a  message  from  toward  Greencastle,  that  if  we 
could  hold  out  an  hour  longer  he  would  reinforce  us  with 
three  thousand  men.  This  intelligence  elicited  a  loud  and 
long -continued  cheer  along  our  whole  line,  which  was 
heard  and  understood  by  our  adversaries,  as  we  learned 
from  prisoners  taken.  A  few  minutes  later  General  J. 
E.  B.  Stuart,  advancing  from  Hagerstown,  fell  unexpect- 
edly upon  the  rear  of  their  right  wing,  and  in  ten  minutes 
they  were  in  rapid  retreat  by  their  left  flank  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Boonsborough.  Night  coming  on  enabled  them 
to  escape. 

"  By  extraordinary  good  fortune  we  had  thus  saved  all 
of  General  Lee's  trains.  A  bold  charge  at  any  time  be- 
fore sunset  would  have  broken  our  feeble  lines,  and  we 
should  all  have  fallen  an  easy  prey  to  the  Federals.  This 
came  to  be  known  as  'the  wagoners'  fight'  in  our  army, 
from  the  fact  that  so  many  of  them  were  armed  and  did 
such  gallant  service  in  repelling  the  attack  made  on  our 
right  by  the  dismounted  regiments. 

"Our  defeat  that  day  would  have  been  an  irreparable 
blow  to  General  Lee,  in  the  loss  of  all  his  transportation. 
Every  man  engaged  knew  this,  and  probably  in  no  fight 
in  the  war  was  there  a  more  determined  spirit  shown  than 
by  this  handful  of  cooped -up  troops.  The  next  day  our 
army  from  Gettysburg  arrived,  and  the  country  is  familiar 
with  the  manner  in  which  it  escaped  across  the  Potomac 
on  the  night  of  the  13th. 

"It  may  be  interesting  to  repeat  one  or  two  facts  to 
show  the  peril  in  which  we  were  until  the  river  could  be 
bridged.  About  four  thousand  prisoners  taken  at  Gettys- 


GENERAL   LEE'S    DIFFICULTIES.  491 

burg  were  ferried  across  the  river  by  the  morning  of  the 
9th,  and  I  was  ordered  to  guard  them  to  Staunton.  Be- 
fore we  had  proceeded  two  miles  I  received  a  note  from 
General  Lee  to  report  to  him  in  person  immediately.  I 
rode  to  the  river,  was  ferried  over,  and  galloped  out  to- 
ward Hagerstowu.  As  I  proceeded  I  became  satisfied 
that  a  serious  demonstration  was  making  along  our  frontr 
from  the  heavy  artillery  firing  extending  for  a  long  dis- 
tance along  the  line.  I  overtook  General  Lee  riding  to- 
the  front  near  Hagerstown.  lie  immediately  reined  upr 
and  remarked  that  he  believed  I  was  familiar  with  all  the 
fords  of  the  Potomac  above  Williamsport,  and  the  roads 
approaching  them.  1  replied  that  I  knew  them  perfectly. 
He  then  called  up  some  one  of  his  staff  to  write  down  my 
answers  to  his  questions,  and  required  me  to  name  all  fords 
as  high  up  as  Cumberland,  and  describe  minutely  their 
character,  and  the  roads  and  surrounding  country  on  both 
sides  of  the  river,  and  directed  me  to  send  my  brother^ 
Colonel  Imboden,  to  him  to  act  as  a  guide  with  his  regi- 
ment, if  he  should  be  compelled  to  retreat  higher  up  the 
river  to  cross  it.  His  situation  was  then  very  precarious. 
When  about  parting  from  him  to  recross  the  river  and 
move  on  with  the  prisoners,  he  told  me  they  would  prob- 
ably be  rescued  before  I  reached  Winchester,  my  guard 
was  so  small,  and  he  expected  a  force  of  cavalry  would 
cross  at  Harper's  Ferry  to  cut  us  off;  and  he  could  not 
spare  to  me  any  additional  troops,  as  he  might  be  hard 
pressed  before  he  got  over  the  river,  which  was  still  very 
much  swollen  by  the  rains.  Referring  to  the  high  water,, 
he  laughingly  inquired,  '  Does  it  ever  quit  raining  about 
here?  If  so,  I  should  like  to  see  a  clear  day.' 


492  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

"  These  incidents  go  to  show  how  near  Gettysburg  came 
to  ending  the  war  in  1863.  If  we  had  been  successful  in 
that  battle,  the  probabilities  are  that  Baltimore  and  "Wash- 
ington would  at  once  have  fallen  into  our  hands;  and  at 
that  tfcne  there  was  so  large  a  'peace  party'  in  the  North, 
that  the  Federal  Government  would  have  found  it  diffi- 
cult, if  not  impossible,  to  carry  on  the  war.  General  Lee's 
opinion  was  that  we  lost  the  battle  because  Pickett  was 
not  supported  '  as  he  was  to  have  been.'  On  the  other 
hand,  if  Generals  Buford  and  Kilpatrick  had  captured  the 
ten  thousand  animals  and  all  the  transportation  of  Lee's 
army  at  Williamsport,  it  would  have  been  an  irreparable 
loss,  and  would  probably  have  led  to  the  fall  of  Richmond 
iu  the  autumn  of  1863.  On  such  small  circumstances  do 
the  affairs  of  nations  sometimes  turn." 

Leaving  out  of  the  foregoing  account  that  which  is 
evidently  but  a  pardonable  vanity  in  detailing  his  own 
achievements,  and  the  extraordinary  valor  and  prowess 
of  his  troops,  General  Imboden's  statement  presents  the 
condition  of  the  Confederates,  after  their  defeat  at  Gettys- 
burg, in  a  faithful  light.  The  acknowledgment  of  General 
Lee  of  his  overwhelming  defeat,  and  his  deep  and  undis- 
guised distress  thereat,  stand  in  strange  contrast  with 
the  claims  that  have  been  made  by  some  Confederate 
writers  that  the  Federals  did  not  gain  much  of  a  vic- 
tory after  all.  The  statement  also  shows  that  in  this  im- 
mense train  there  was  as  much  distress  as  was  probably 
ever  brought  together  on  this  continent.  There  were,  it 
is  true,  places  and  occasions  where  a  greater  number  of 
wounded  were  congregated,  as  in  the  Wilderness,  and  at 
Gettysburg  itself  before  the  removal  of  these  men,  but  as 


MR.    SNYDER'S    ACCOUNT.  493 

a  moving  mass  of  human  agony,  augmented  and  intensi- 
fied by  the  roughness  of  the  road,  the  rolling  and  jolting 
of  the  wagons,  the  darkness  of  the  night,  the  rain  and  the 
mud,  and  the  pursuing  Federals,  this  event  stands  without 
a  parallel  upon  this  continent,  if  not  in  all  history. 

I  introduce  next  a  statement  prepared  by  Mr.  Jacob  C. 
Suyder,  who  resided  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  this 
train  upon  his  farm  near  New  Franklin.  Mr.  Snyder  says: 

"About  ten  or  eleven  o'clock  on  the  night  of  Satur- 
day, July  4th,  1863,  we  heard  a  great  noise  of  horses' 
feet  clattering  and  tramping  along  the  road.  It  was  at 
first  supposed  that  another  detachment  was  passing  to 
Gettysburg.  After  a  little  the  rumbling  of  wagons  was 
heard.  I  at  once  arose,  struck  a  light,  opened  the  door 
and  went  out,  and  in  less  than  fifteen  minutes  the  large 
hall  of  my  house  and  the  yard  in  front  were  filled  with 
wounded  Confederate  soldiers.  They  at  once  set  up  the 
clamor  to  my  wife  and  other  members  of  my  family,  *  Water! 
Water!!  Give  us  water!!'  They  also  begged  to  have  their 
wounds  dressed.  0,  what  a  sight!  I  at  once  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  something  unusual  had  taken  place,  and 
as  the  rain  was  falling  in  torrents,  I  put  on  my  overcoat 
and  walked  out  to  the  barn  -  yard  at  the  roadside  with  a 
staff  in  my  hand.  I  there  found  that  some  cavalry  -  men 
were  driving  part  of  my  young  cattle  out  of  my  barn- 
yard. I  walked,  up  to  the  gate  and  closed  it  to  prevent 
any  more  from  being  driven  out.  The  officer  in  charge, 
sitting  on  his  horse  and  seeing  the  staff  I  carried,  supposed 
it  to  be  a  gun  and  at  once  rode  away.  At  about  one 
o'clock  A.  M.  a  man  with  a  short  leg  rode  up  to  the  yard 
gate  in  company  with  five  or  six  others.  He  very  politely 


494  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

asked  Mrs.  Suyder  for  a  drink  of  water.  He  seemed  to 
be  strapped  to  his  horse.  When  riding  away  one  of  the 
men  said  he  was  General  Ewell.  I  afterward  learned  that 
his  amputated  limb  had  gotten  sore.*  The  long -wished 
for  daylight  at  length  dawned,  and  revealed  to  the  farmers 
along  the  road  that  their  fences  were  torn  down  and  that 
ambulances  and  wagons,  together  with  hundreds  of  cavalry, 
were  making  a  way  through  their  fields,  and  that  their 
wheat,  corn,  and  grass  were  being  ruined.  The  narrow 
road  in  many  places  was  so  badly  cut  up  that  ihe  wagons 
could  scarcely  get  on,  and  many  had  to  take  the  fields. 
Broken  down  wagons  and  caissons,  yet  containing  -large 
amounts  of  ammunition,  were  strewn  all  along  the  route. 
O,  what  a  sight!  The  groans  of  the  wounded  and  shrieks 
of  the  dying  beggar  description.  I  said  to  several  of  the 
men  —  Major  Throckmorton  and  others  who  had  been 
at  my  house  on  their  way  to  Gettysburg,  —  'What  does 
this  mean?  I  think  you  have  received  a  terrible  whip- 
ping.' They  replied  that  they  were  only  going  back  to 
get  more  ammunition  and  would  return  and  clean  out  the 

*It  will  be  remembered  that  General  Ewell  had  lost  a  leg  in  a  previous 
battle,  and  afterward  wore  a  wooden  substitute.  When  he  passed  through 
Chambersburg  on  his  way  to  Gettysburg,  he  rode  in  a  carriage,  but  when 
going  into  battle,  it  is  said,  he  was  strapped  to  his  horse.  The  stump  of 
his  .amputated  limb,  it  is  also  said,  sometimes  became  inflamed,  so  that 
he  would  have  to  lay  aside  for  awhile  his  artificial  limb.  A  citizen  of  Get- 
tysburg, who  witnessed  the  incident,  informed  the  writer  that  during  an 
interval  of  the  battle,  General  Ewell,  accompanied  by  his  staff,  rode  out 
Baltimore  Street  toward  the  Federal  line  and  was  fired  upon,  at  which  the 
whole  party  beat  a  hasty  retreat,  keeping  upon  tue  pavements  rather  than 
the  street  where  they  would  have  been  more  exposed.  Reaching  a  sheltered 
place  near  the  court  house,  some  of  his  attendants  either  pulled  off  the  gen- 
eral's boot  or  examined  a  probable  wound,  which  he  had  just  received.  The 
general  may  have  received  a  slight  wound  in  his  leg,  or  his  amputated  limb 
may  have  become  sore,  and  he  was  compelled  to  seek  safety  in  the  way  in- 
dicated by  Mr.  Snyder.  And  yet  it  seems  strange  that  if  such  was  the  case 
it  was  kept  secret. 


BURIAL   OF   MAJOR   M'DINE.  495 

Yankees.  I  then  said,  '  It  looks  to  me  as  if  the  Yankees 
had  completely  cleaned  you  out,  and  I  think,  and  I  pre- 
sume you  think  so  yourselves,  that  you  had  better  have 
stayed  at  home  and  remained  under  the  old  flag.'  At  two 
o'clock  P.  M.  a  company  with  a  battery  of  six  brass  pieces 
drew  up  in  front  of  my  barn  and  fed  their  horses.  This 
Toattery  was  supported  and  accompanied  by  about  one 
hundred  cavalry  and  some  infantry.  The  cavalry  dis- 
mounted in  a  ten  acre  field  of  prime  wheat,  all  out  in 
head.  At  the  same  time  during  the  halt  the  men  were 
slaughtering  cattle  at  Mr.  Jeremiah  "W.  George's.  At  this 
place  some  of  the  men  died  and  were  buried,  and  others 
unable  to  go  any  further  were  left  with  Mr.  George.  The 
graves  of  some  that  died  there  can  yet  be  seen  along  the 
road;  others  are  farmed  over.  Among*  those  that  were 
Juried  was  Major  McDine,  of  South  Carolina.  He  was 
buried  close  by  the  well  in  a  beautiful  grove,  and  the 
grave  was  marked  by  a  head -board  bearing  his  initials. 
On  the  20th  day  of  April,  1866,  three  persons  came  to 
Mr.  George's  in  search  of  this  grave.  One  of  them  was 
the  major's  brother-in-law,  who  was  accompanied  by  a 
friend  of  the  deceased,  and  the  two  were  under  the  guid- 
.ance  of  a  colored  man  who  had  been  the  major's  servant, 
and  was  with  him  when  he  died  and  was  buried.  In  a 
conversation  with  these  persons  I  learned  that  Mrs.  Mc- 
Dine, the  major's  wife,  had  partially  lost  her  mind  upon 
hearing  of  the  death  of  her  husband,  and  at  her  urgent 
solicitation  and  with  the  hope  of  relieving  her,  they  had 
come  in  search  of  his  body.  They  came  from  South 
Carolina  to  Hagerstown,  thence  to  Gettysburg,  and  then 
under  the  guidance  of  the  colored  man,  followed  up  the 


49G  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

way  of  the  disastrous  retreat  until  they  came  to  Mr. 
George's,  where  the  guide  at  once  recognized  the  place 
and  took  them  to  the  grave.  The  remains  were  taken 
up,  carried  to  a  place  near  my  spring,  and  there  prepared 
and  enclosed  in  a  box  and  taken  along. 

"  Among  the  wounded  left  at  Mr.  George's  was  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Benjamin  F.  Carter,  of  General  Hood's 
division,  Longstreet's  Corps.  I  visited  Colonel  Carter 
frequently  during  his  stay  there.  He  was  a  man  of  more 
than  ordinary  ability.  He  had  enjoyed  the  advantages 
of  a  fine  education,  and  had  great  conversational  powers. 
He  was  a  Texan  and  had  served  two  years  in  the  legis- 
lature of  that  state.  In  the  discussion  of  '  the  principles 
of  the  secession  heresy'  as  he  termed  it,  which  he  often 
did  with  his  conrpanions,  in  my  presence,  I  learned  that 
he  was  of  the  Alexander  H.  Stephens  stamp.  He  was 
taken  to  Chambersburg  in  an  ambulance,  where  he  sub- 
sequently died. 

"From  Colonel  Carter  I  obtained  much  information  in. 
relation  to  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  He  had  received 
his  wound  in  the  first  charge  made  by  Law  upon  Little 
Round  Top,  from  the  '  Devil's  Den.'  They  had  met  a 
heavy  repulse  from  that  place,  and  when  General  Long- 
street  ordered  General  Law  to  charge  the  second  time, 
the  latter  replied  in  these  words:  'General  Longstreet,  I 
regard  a  second  charge  a  needless  sacrifice  of  human  life, — 
to  lead  men  against  one  of  nature's  impregnable  barriers 
so  well  manned  and  so  bravely  defended,  —  I  disobey  the 
order/  'These,'  said  Colonel  Carter,  'were  the  precise 
words  used  by  General  Law.'  * 

"This  alleged  act   of  disobedience  seems  incredible,   but  General   I<avr,. 


SOME  SOUTHERNERS'  EXPERIENCE.  497 

"  On  Monday  morning,  July  6th,  about  three  o'clock, 
four  men  drove  into  my  yard  with  a  two -horse  carriage. 
They  asked  to  have  their  jaded  horses  fed  and  "breakfast 
for  four  persons,  for  all  of  which  they  proposed  to  pay. 
I  said  that  if  they  paid  in  greenbacks  and  not  in  Confed- 
erate scrip,  they  could  be  accommodated.  They  were 
evidently  civilians  and  not  soldiers,  and  belonged  to  the 
higher  grade  of  Southern  aristocracy.  They  were  cursing 
and  swearing  about  the  Yankees  getting  one  of  their 
blooded  horses,  for  which  they  said  they  were  offered 
fifteen  hundred  dollars.  Their  great  trouble  seemed  to  be, 
'  If  the  Yankees  only  knew  what  kind  of  a  horse  they 
had.'  They  paid  my  son  a  five  dollar  Government  note. 
I  told  them  that  they  had  better  get  away  or  the  Yankees 
would  get  them  and  their  old  jades  of  horses.  It  was  about 
daylight  when  they  left.  It  was  evident  that  they  ex- 
pected the  'blue -coats'  to  be  after  them.  Just  as  they 
were  about  to  leave  some  colored  persons,  who  came  along, 
began  to  sing, 

'I'se  gwine  back  to  Dixie, 

No  more  I'se  gwine  to  wander, 
My  heart 's  turned  back  to  Dixie, 

I  can't  stay  here  no  longer; 
I  miss  de  old  plantation,  • 

My  home  and  my  relation, 
My  heart 's  turned  back  to  Dixie, 

And  I  must  go. 
CHORUS: — 'I'se  gwine  back  to  Dixie, 

For  I  hear  the  children  calling, 
I  see  the  sad  tears  falling, 
My  heart 's  turned  back  to  Dixie, 
And  I  must  go.' 

in  his  article  in    The  Century  of  December,  1886,  relates  it  himself,  but 
somewhat  different. 
32 


498  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

"  Never  shall  I  forget  that  scene,  and  never  did  I  see  a 
more  forlorn  and  disgusted  party  than  those  five  men, 
when,  in  their  old  rickety  two  -  horse  carriage,  drawn  by 
two  old  jaded  horses,  they  drove  away  amidst  the  singing 
of  those  negroes. 

"  In  a  few  hours  the  *  Boys  in  Blue/  under  General 
Gregg,  were  on  hand  and  took  hundreds  of  prisoners." 

Rev.  J.  Milton  Snyder,  a  son  of  the  writer  of  the  fore- 
going, relates  as  follows: 

"I  can  well  remember  when  the  Confederate  train  of 
"wounded  came  from  Gettysburg,  by  way  of  my  father's 
residence  and  New  Franklin.  I  was  quite  young  at  the 
time,  and  hence  noticed  many  things  that  failed  to  attract 
the  attention  of  older  persons.  On  Saturday  evening, 
July  4th,  1863,  whilst  we  were  quietly  seated  in  the  house, 
my  father  heard  a  peculiar  noise,  —  like  the  approach  of  a 
heavy  storm.  This  was,  if  I  remember  correctly,  about 
ten  o'clock  on  Saturday  night.  Father  went  out  into  the 
darkness  to  listen.  A  short  time  after  a  body  of  Confed- 
erate cavalry  came  down  the  road  from  Greenwood.  They 
halted  in  front  of  father's  house  and  called  him  out.  The 
night  was  very  dark,  and  they  asked  to  be  directed  to 
Greeiicastle.  They  seemed  to  be  lost  or  bewildered.  "My 
father  not  knowing  in  the  darkness  whether  they  were 
Federals  or  Confederates,  directed  then}  properly.  About 
midnight  the  first  of  the  train  of  wounded  reached  our 
place.  The  wagons  kept  the  main  road  as  much  as  possi- 
ble, and  on  either  side  of  the  train  a  continual  stream  of 
wounded  soldiers  kept  moving.  Thus  they  continued 
coming  and  going  the  remainder  of  Saturday  night,  all 
day  Sunday,  and  the  last  wagon  passed  by  New  Franklin 


THE    WOUNDED   AT   GREENCASTLE.  499 

Monday  morning  at  nine  o'clock.  The  train  of  wounded 
left  the  pike  at  Greenwood,  came  on  the  old  *  Walnut 
Bottom  Road'  (called  also  the  Pine  Stump  road),  through 
New  Guilford  by  way  of  my  father's  house,  through  New 
Franklin,  thence  to  Marion  and  Greencastle.  On  Monday 
morning  Gregg's  cavalry  came  after  the  train,  following 
the  same  route.  General  Gregg  halted  at  father's  place, 
and  camped  in  one  of  our  fields  east  of  New  Franklin  and 
in  our  orchard.  Some  of  our  Franklin  County  boys  were 
with  Gregg.  The  Confederates  claimed  that  they  were 
going  South  for  ammunition.  Wounded  Confederate^ 
soldiers  were  left  all  along  the  route  of  retreat.  Many  ^ 
died  and  were  buried  by  the  road -side.  I  shall  never 
forget  those  ghastly  wounds,  those  thousands  of  faces 
dusky  with  powder,  and  that  battery  of  black  and  horrid  , 
field -pieces,  which  had  sent,  as  could  be  seen,  many 
charges  of  grape  and  canister  into  the  bosoms  of  our 
brave  men." 

Rev.  J.  C.  Smith,  at  that  time  a  resident  of  Greencastle, 
gives  the  following  account:  " 

"  Saturday,  July  4th,  1863,  closed  in  perfect  quiet  at 
{rreencastle.  Captain  Dahlgreen  and  his  troops  disap- 
peared as  mysteriously  as  they  had  come.  The  stragglers, 
who  had  been  bringing  up  the  rear  of  Lee's  army,  had 
either  all  passed  through  or  had  received  a  hint  that 
it  would  be  a  saving  of  muscle  to  advance  no  further 
North  just  then.  The  citizens  of  Greencastle  went  to  their 
beds  in  entire  ignorance  of  the  results  of  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  hopeful  to  be  sure,  but  not  assured  that  all 
was  well.  Four  o'clock  Sunday  morning  we  awoke  to 
hear  the  rumbling  of  wagons,  the  tramping  of  horses,  the 


500  THE   GREAT    INVASION. 

noise  and  racket  attending  an  army  in  motion.  The  first 
question  naturally  would  be,  '  "What  does  all  this  commo- 
tion mean?'  And  the  answer  came  readily  and  easily, 
1  There  goes  another  Confederate  army  to  help  decide  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg.'  Hastily  dressing  and  going  out  into 
the  street,  we  were  supremely  happy  at  seeing  the  army 
heading  the  other  direction.  It  was  the  army  of  wounded 
from  the  battle-field  hastening  on  toward  the  Potomac 
to  cross  over  to  Virginia.  No  one,  with  any  feelings  of 
pity,  will  ever  want  to  see  such  a  sight  even  once  in  a 
life -time.  Here  came  the  men  who  but  eight  or  ten 
days  before  had  passed  through  our  town  in  the  prime  of 
health,  boasting  of  the  exploits  they  would  do  when  they 
would  have  the  happy  chance  of  seeing  the  Union  army. 
A  more  crest-fallen,  woe -begone  mob  may  never  have 
been  seen.  Hurry  was  the  order  of  the  day.  They  seemed 
almost  to  be  pushing  each  other  forward.  Yet  when  asked 
about  the  results  of  the  battle,  the  officers  invariably  de- 
clared that  they  gave  the  boys  in  blue  a  sound  thrashing. 
In  conversation  with  an  intelligent  officer,  I  asked,  'If 
you  have  thrashed  our  army  so  soundly,  why  are  you  leav- 
ing us  so  hurriedly?  Why  not  stay  and  occupy  your  con- 
quered territory?'  In  reply  he  said:  <O,  we  are  just 
taking  these  home  to  have  them  cured  up,  and  with  these 
wagons  bring  on  more  ammunition  and  soldiers  and  finish 
up  the  job.'  Then  said  he,  'Did  you  hear  from  Vicks- 
burg?'  'No,'  said  I.  '"Well,  Pemberton  has  captured 
Grant  and  his  army.'  I  did  not  feel  as  though  I  could  go 
into  ecstacies  over  this,  but  still  I  hoped  that  for  veracit}r 
he  might  be  classed  among  those  creatures  whom  Paul 
accurately  describes  in  I.  Tim.  1 :  12.  The  common  soldiers 


CONDITION    OF   THE   WOUNDED  501 

seemed  to  be  either  too  stupid  to  speak,  or  else  forbidden  to 
give  a  true  account  of  the  battle,  but  all  the  way  through 
the  colored  portion  declared  that  they  were  badly  whipped. 
Such  a   scene   of  suffering,  who   may  undertake  to   de- 
scribe?    No  one  counted  the  wounded.    They  could  not  be 
counted   because   hundreds  of  wagons  loaded  with  them 
were  a  part  of  this  train.     All  who  were  wounded  in  the 
lower  extremities  were  placed  into  these  huge  and  rough- 
rolling  army  wagons.     When  passing  over  any  part  of) 
the  street  where  the  wagon  would  jolt,  they  would  yell 
and  groan  with  pain.     Many  had  received  their  hurt  on 
Wednesday  or   Thursday  before,  with  no  attention    paid 
to  them  by  surgeons,  the  doctors  having  been  kept  busyi 
with   the  graver   cases.     All  who  were  wounded  in  thej 
head,  the  arms,  the  shoulders,  the  non- vital  parts  of  the 
body,  were  compelled  to   walk  through  the  mud  ankle- 
deep,  with  no  food  save  a  little  flour  mixed  with  water 
and  baked  on  a  few  coals.     Those  wounded  in  the  arms 
or  shoulders  would  tear  away  the  garment  and  expose  the 
wounded   part.     Such   arms  —  swollen  to  twice  or  thrice 
their  natural  size  —  red  and  angry.     When  they  came  to 
a  pump,  one  would  place  his  wounded  member  under  the 
spout  while  another  would  pump  cold  water  on  the  sore. 
Then  he  would  do  a  like  service  to  his  comrade.     Thus 
the  pumps  were  going  all  that  day.     I  will  particularize 
one  case;  this   will   be  a  sample  for  probably  five  or  six 
thousand  similar  ones.     He  was  from  Xorth  Carolina;  was 
shot  through  the  arm,  between  the  shoulder  and  the  elbow. 
The  arm  was  swollen  to  the  size  of  a  man's  thigh,  very 
red  and  very  much  inflamed.     Nothing  had  been  done  for 
him  by  the  doctor  save  to  press  a  wad  of  cotton  into  the 


502  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

wound  in  each  side  of  the  arm.  He  had  received  the- 
injury  on  Wednesday.  'Now,'  said  he,  *I  am  going  home, 
and  I  will  never  enter  the  army  again.'  Said  I,  '  My  dear 
friend,  I  fear  you  can't  reach  home  soon.  I  learn  that  our 
government  has  thrown  an  army  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
Potomac.'  Said  he,  *  I  never  wanted  to  go  into  the  war. 
They  came  to  my  home  and  drove  me  into  the  army  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The  next  time  they  come  they 
may  shoot  me  down  at  my  door;  I  will  rather  die  than 
fight  again.'  We  estimated  the  number  of  wounded  that 
passed  through  our  town  at  twelve  to  fifteen  thousand. 
It  was  an  easy  matter  to  trace  their  route  of  flight.  Dead 
horses,  broken  down  and  abandoned  wagons,  cannons,  car- 
riages and  caissons,  new  made  graves  were  everywhere  to 
be  seen.  It  was  simply  a  road  covered  with  wrecks. 

"On  Monday  evening,  July  6th,  about  sundown  some 
cavalry,  being  the  rear  guard,  passed  through,  and  there 
ended  our  connection  with  the  Southern  Confederacy." 

Mr.  David  Z.  Shook,  a  resident  of  Greencastle,  and  an 
eye-witness,  relates  the  following: 

"  We  were  awakened  by  a  rumbling  sound  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Chambersburg.  It  was  the  wagon -train  from 
Gettysburg.  The  teamsters  and  guards  were  somewhat 
excited,  and  were  hurrying  through.  Many  of  the  wagons- 
were  loaded  with  wounded,  whose  cries  and  groans  were 
pitiful  indeed.  We  asked  the  Confederates  what  was  up. 
They  told  us  that  a  battle  had  been  fought  at  Gettys- 
burg, but  it  was  not  at  all  decisive.  They  said,  too,  that 
they  were  only  taking  their  wounded  oft',  and  that  they 
expected  reinforcements  from  Virginia.  They  tried  to 
hide  their  defeat,  but  we  saw  that  there  were  more  thai* 


INCIDENTS    AT  GREENCASTLE.  503 

wounded  hurrying  toward  Virginia.  One  poor  fellow 
begged  to  be  lifted  out  of  a  wagon  and  laid  on  the  ground, 
as  his  pain  in  the  jolting  wagon  was  unbearable,  but  the 
teamsters  hurried  on  and  took  no  account  of  his  entreat- 
ies. The  night  following  being  very  dark,  many  persona 
in  town  engaged  in  capturing  horses  and  cattle  from  the 
train.  As  cattle  passed  by  I  saw  many  turned  into  alleys. 
Horses  tied  behind  wagons  had  their  halters  cut,  and  were 
led  away  unobserved.  Many  horses,  too,  gave  out  here 
and  were  left.  They  suffered  greatly  from  not  being  shod, 
their  hoofs  being  worn  off  to  the  quick.  Many  such  were 
offered  for  sale,  —  fine  ones  being  offered  for  as  little  as 
five  dollars  in  Yankee  money.  I  captured  a  fine  bay 
horse,  hid  him  in  the  barn,  fed  him  well  and  felt  proud 
of  my  possession.  A  few  days  after  a  citizen  of  Green- 
castle  came  to  the  barn,  recognized  his  horse,  proved  him, 
and  took  him  away.  The  Confederates  had  taken  this 
horse  on  their  way  to  Gettysburg,  and  I  had  the  luck  to 
get  him  as  my  first  capture,  though  I  was  in  utter  ignor- 
ance of  his  belonging  to  a  fellow  townsman  until  he  in- 
formed me.  Many  persons  threw  taunts  at  the  retreating 
foe,  such  as,  'How  are  you  Gettysburg?'  'Have  you 
been  to  Philadelphia  already?'  and  'Did  you  meet  the 
Pennsylvania  militia  down  there?'  An  officer  rode  up  to 
a  pump  and  asked  for  water.  A  citizen  standing  by  said, 
'Did  you  get  enough  of  Meade  over  there?'  The  officer 
grew  furious  and  called  him  an  impudent  puppy." 

On  Saturday  evening  some  of  the  citizens  of  Chambers- 
burg,  who  resided  on  the  eastern  outskirts  of  the  town, 
heard  the  low  rumbling  sound  of  this  wagon  -  train,  as  it 
proceeded  across  the  country  some  six  miles  to  the  south- 


504  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

east;  and  the  same  night  information  was  brought  that 
the  train  was  of  immense  extent,  and  was  hurriedly 
making  its  way  south.  This  information  led  us  to  suppose 
that  in  the  buttle,  fought  east  of  the  mountain,  of  which  we 
had  some  intimations,  the  Confederates  had  been  worsted. 
Of  this  we  had  no  certain  information  until  the  morning 
of  Monday,  July  6th. 

At  day -break  on  Sunday  morning,  July  5th,  I  was 
called  from  my  bed  and  requested  to  proceed  immediately 
to  the  King  Street  hospital  to  assist  in  removing  from 
wagons  a  number  of  wounded  Confederates.  The  team- 
sters in  charge  of  these  wagons  had  lost  their  way  during 
the  night,  and  had  come  into  Chambersburg.  Arriving 
at  the  hospital  I  found  in  the  street  four  or  five  wagons, 
drawn  by  four  mules  each,  and  all  loaded  with  wounded 
men.  Standing  upon  the  pavement  in  front  of  the  hospital 
was  a  soldier  with  his  arm  oft'  close  to  the  shoulder.  To 
an  inquiry  made  by  one  of  our  citizens  as  to  what  this 
meant,  the  wounded  Confederate  replied,  "It  means  that 
Uncle  Robert  has  got  a  -  -  of  a  whipping."  This,  how- 
ever, was  denied  by  others.  O  what  a  terrible  sight 
these  men  presented!  Filthy,  bloody,  with  wounds  un- 
dressed and  swarming  with  vermin,  and  almost  famished 
for  food  and  water,  they  presented  such  a  sight  as  I  hope 
I  may  never  again  be  called  upon  to  witness.  After  they 
were  all  taken  into  the  hospital,  arrangements  were  at 
once  made  to  have  their  wounds  dressed  and  food  supplied. 
These  arrangements  a  few  of  the  citizens  kept  up  until 
the '  ensuing  Friday,  when  General  D.  if.  Couch,  who 
commanded  this  department,  reached  here,  and  relieved 
us  of  our  charge.  Appreciating  the  importance  of  send- 


EXPLOITS   OP   CAPTAIN  JONES5   CAVALRY.  505 

ing  information  to  the  authorities  at  Harrisburg  of  this 
train,  so  that,  if  possible,  it  might  be  intercepted,  I  en- 
gaged a  man,  who  had  just  come  in  from  the  country 
in  search  of  ^information,  to  carry  a  dispatch.  Telling 
him  the  situation,  and  showing  him  the  importance  of 
forwarding  the  information  as  soon  as  possible,  he  agreed 
to  bear  my  dispatch,  addressed  to  Governor  Curtin,  to  the 
nearest  telegraph  station.  Mounting  his  horse  he  rode 
rapidly  out  the  western  pike,  as  we  had  heard  that  a  repair 
party  was  coming  from  that  direction,  and  was  not  far 
off,  and  that  it  repaired  the  telegraph  line  as  it  came. 
Whether  or  not  my  dispatch  was  received  by  the  authori- 
ties at  Harrisburg,  I  can  not  say.  If  it  was  received,  and 
the  cavalry  who  were  at  that  time  in  McConnellsburg, 
had  been  ordered  to  proceed  across  the  mountain  against 
that  train,  it  all  might  have  been  captured.  The  few 
cavalry -men  who  did  make  a  dash  upon  it  made  large 
captures.  How  they  did  it,  and  how  they  came  to  be 
there,  I  will  next  proceed  to  narrate. 

On  the  evening  of  Saturday,  while  this  wagon  train  was 
making  its  way  across  the  South  Mountain,  a  citizen  of  . 
Mercersburg  —  Hon.  James  O.  Carson  —  sent  a  messenger 
across  the  North  Mountain  with  a  few  lines  to  Mr.  W.  S. 
Fletcher,  of  McConnellsburg,  informing  him  that  there 
were  prowling  about  the  former  place  a  number  of  ma- 
rauding stragglers  from  the  Confederate  army,  and  ask- 
ing, if  there  were  any  Federal  soldiers  at  the  latter  place, 
that  Mr.  Fletcher  would  have  some  sent  across  for  their 
protection.  There  were  in  and  about  McConnellsburg  at 
that  time  nearly  all  of  the  men  of  General  Milroy's  com- 
mand, who  had  escaped,  from  Winchester  into  southern 


506  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

Pennsylvania,  and  had  congregated  at  Everett,  or  Bloody 
Run.  There  were  the  Fourteenth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,. 
several  companies  of  the  First  New  York  Cavalry,  and 
some  infantry  from  several  different  regiments,  the  whole 
under  command  of  Colonel  Pierce.  Mr.  Fletcher  received 
this  letter  late  in  the  evening,  and  he  at  once  proceeded 
to  Colonel  Pierce's  head- quarters  and  showed  it  to  him, 
asking  him  to  send  on  the  following  morning  Captain 
Jones  with  about  two  hundred  men  to  Mercersburg.  Mi\ 
Fletcher  asked  that  Captain  Jones  might  be  in  command 
of  this  force  because  of  his  daring  exploit  in  defeating  a 
force  of  Confederates  double  the  number  of  his  own  com- 
mand in.  McConnellsburg  a  few  weeks  previous,  as  re- 
lated in  a  previous  chapter.  To  this  request  Colonel 
Pierce  agreed,  and  about  two  hundred  men  were  detailed 
for  this  duty,  Captain  Jones'  own  heroic  Irishmen  being 
of  the  number.  These  men  left  McConnellsburg  early 
on  Sunday  morning,  and  when  at  Mercersburg,  —  ten 
miles  distant, —  or  probably  before  reaching  that  place, 
they  learned  of  the  great  wagon  -  train,  and  at  once  pro- 
ceeded to  intercept  it.  Captain  Jones  ran  into  this  train 
at  Cearfoss'  Cross -Roads,  nearly  midway  between  Green- 
castle  and  Williamsport.  After  a  sharp  skirmish  with  the 
guards,  who  were  scattered  somewhat  thinly  along  the 
line,  the  wagons  were  turned  into  the  road  leading  to 
Mercersburg.  The  train  was  cut  out  from  Mr.  Hayde's- 
down  to  the  farm  formerly  owned  by  Mr.  David  Zellers. 
The  wagons  cut  oft*  south  of  the  cross-roads  were  turned 
about  in  the  barn -yard  of  Mr.  Zellers,  and  hastily  driven 
back  to  follow  the  other  part  of  the  captured  train  to  Mer- 
cersburg. Great  gallantry  was  displayed  by  Captain  Jones 
and  his  brave  troopers  in  this  affair,  and  had  all  the  cavalry 


FEDERAL    CAPTURES.  507 

at   McConnellsburg   been   with   this    brave   and   dashing- 
officer,  the  whole  of  that  train  might  have  been  captured. 

In  this  gallant  affair  about  one  hundred  wagons  —  as 
many  as  this  small  body  of  cavalry  could  handle  —  with 
about  one  thousand  wounded  Confederates,  who  were  in 
the  wagons,  were  captured.  The  head  of  this  captured 
train  reached  Mercersburg  near  evening,  and  the  whole  of 
it  passed  on  through  the  town  and  out  toward  the  Gap,  from 
fear  of  being  recaptured.  At  or  near  the  Gap  the  head 
of  the  train  met  a  large  detachment  from  the  Fourteenth 
Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  under  Colonel  Pierce.  Believing 
then  that  they  were  strong  enough  to. protect  themselves 
from  recapture,  the  whole  turned  again  and  went  back  to 
Mercersburg,  where  the  wounded  were  taken  from  the 
wagons  and  placed  in  the  Theological  Seminary  buildings 
and  other  improvised  hospitals.  No  sooner  was  this  train 
and  its  inmates  disposed  of,  than  the  brave  Jones  wanted 
to  make  another  dash  upon  the  enemy,  but  he  was  over- 
ruled by  Colonel  Pierce.  This  was  not  the  only  instance 
in  the  history  of  war,  in  which  brave  and  earnest  subordi- 
nates were  held  in  check,  and  great  and  important  results- 
prevented  by  timid,  hesitating  commanders. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  General  J.  I.  Gregg  with  his- 
brigade  of  cavalry  had  been  sent  in  pursuit  of  this  train. 
These  cavalry -men  had  skirmishes  with 'its  guard  at  Cale- 
donia Iron  Works,  in  the  South  Mountain,  and  at  or  near 
Greencastle,  capturing  a  large  number  of  prisoners.  The 
writer  passed  along  the  pike  from  Chambersburg  to  Gettys- 
burg in  the  afternoon  of  Monday,  6th,  and  from  Fayetteville 
to,  the  top  of  the  mountain  passed  hundreds  of  Confederate 
prisoners  under  charge  of  detachments  of  General  Gregg's 
command. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

PHENOMENA   OF   BATTLE   SOUND. 

)LTHOUGrH  but  twenty -five  miles  from  Gettysburg, 
the  inhabitants  of  Chambersburg  were  scarcely 
aware  that  a  great  battle  was  being  fought  at  the 
first  named  place.  A  few  of  our  citizens,  who  re- 
sided upon  the  outskirts  of  the  town,  heard  the 
sound  of  the  guns.  These  sounds,  however,  were  very  in- 
distinct. The  large  majority  of  our  people  did  not  hear 
them  at  all.  And  yet,  notwithstanding  the  reports  of  the 
cannon  were  scarcely  heard  here,  the  following  indubitable 
testimony  establishes  the  almost  incredible  fact  that  the 
reports  of  the  guns  were  heard  as  far  as  one  hundred  and 
twenty  and  one  hundred  and  forty  miles  away.  This  testi- 
mony is  from  men  of  undoubted  intelligence  and  veracity, 
whose  standing  and  character  are  widely  known.  The  first 
is  from  Rev.  C.  Cort,  a  minister  of  the  Reformed  Church. 
Mr.  Cort's  statement  is  as  follows : 

MR.  J.  HOKE: 

Dear  Sir  —  As  everything  relating  to  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  will  be  of 
increasing  interest  as  the  years  pass  by,  I  hereby  submit  to  you  for  insertion 
in  your  book  the  following  singular  phenomenon  relating  to  the  sound  of  the 
guns  at  that  great  conflict:  On  Friday  afternoon,  July  3d,  1863,  I  was  return- 
ing to  Somerset,  Pennsylvania,  from  a  trip  to  Mount  Pleasant,  in  Westmore- 

508 


THE  SOUND  OF  THE  CANNONADING.          509 

land  County,  same  state.  Rev.  George  H.  Johnston,  then  pastor  of  the 
Reformed  Church  in  Somerset,  but  now  pastor  of  a  congregation  in  West 
Philadelphia,  was  my  traveling  companion.  We  stopped  for  a  late  dinner  at 
the  hotel  of  a  Mr.  Hay,  at  the  eastern  base  of  Chestnut  Ridge  in  I,igonier 
Valley,  Westmoreland  County,  and  while  we  were  at  dinner  the  landlord 
entered  the  room  and  remarked  that  a  terrible  battle  must  be  going  on  some- 
where. We  replied  that  the  latest  telegraphic  dispatches  received  at  Mount 
Pleasant  before  our  departure  indicated  that  the  invading  army  under  Gen- 
eral Lee  had  met  the  Federal  forces  at  Gettysburg,  and  a  great  battle  would, 
no  doubt,  be  fought  there.  Mr.  Hay  replied,  "  It  must  be  going  on  now;  we 
hear  the  cannonading. "  Expressing  our  astonishment  at  his  statement,  he 
led  us  out  to  the  end  of  his  porch,  where  we  distinctly  heard  what  we  re- 
garded as  heavy  and  continuous  discharges  of  artillery  in  an  easterly  direc- 
tion. This  was  about  two  o'clock,  and  the  precise  time  when  the  great 
artillery  duel  took  place  preparatory  to  Pickett's  great  charge  upon  the 
Federal  line.  Upon  going  out  to  the  turnpike  the  sound  was  still  more  dis- 
tinct. We  listened  to  the  portentous  sounds  for  some  time  with  great  interest 
and  anxiety,  for  we  knew  that  to  a  great  extent  the  destiny  of  our  Govern- 
ment depended  upon  the  battle  then  in  progress.  The  following  entry  in  my 
diary  indicates  the  thought  which  was  uppermost  in  our  minds  at  the  time  : 
"May  the  Lord  of  hosts  give  victoiy  to  the  army  of  the  Union,  and  may  the 
hordes  of  rebeldom  be  discomfitted  in  the  valleys  of  our  noble  old  Keystone 
Commonwealth." 

Mr.  Hay  told  us  that  the  cannonading  had  been  going  on  more  or  less  for 
several  days.  We  afterwards  learned  that  hundreds  of  people  had  heard 
the  same  sound  all  along  the  south  -  eastern  border  of  Westmoreland  County, 
and  that  during  the  battle  of  Manassas  the  sound  of  the  cannonading  was 
also  distinctly  heard  throughout  the  same  localities.  The  distance  from  the 
place  where  we  heard  this  cannonading  to  Gettysburg,  in  a  straight  line,  was 
not  less  than  one  hundred  and  forty  miles.  The  configuration  of  the  in- 
tervening country,  —  the  numerous  transverse  ridges  of  the  Allegheny 
mountains,  —  would  seem  to  be  unfavorable  for  the  transmission  of  sound 
so  great  a  distance.  And  yet,  while  the  fact  is  established  beyond  dispute 
that  the  sound  of  the  great  conflict  at  Gettysburg  was  distinctly  heard  in  one 
of  the  western  counties  of  the  state,  it  was  not  heard  in  many  intervening 
localities  not  one  third  that  distance  from  the  scene  of  the  conflict.  Even  in 
Chambersburg  and  Greencastle,  but  about  twenty- five  miles  distant,  bu; 
few  heard  the  cannonading,  and  the  few  who  did  hear  it  say  it  was  very  in- 
distinct. Here  is  a  question  for  scientists  to  solve.  Some  military  men  to 
whom  I  stated  the  fact  a  few  days  later  at  Gettysburg,  hooted  at  the  idea  of 


510  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

what  I  said,  and  supposed,  I  have  no  doubt,  that  I  was  telling  an  untruth,  or 
was  mistaken.     And  yet  the  fa£l   is  true  beyond  question,   and  upon  the 
strength  of  what  I  heard,  I  at  once  prepared  to  start  for  the  scene  of  strife. 
Yours  respectfully,  C.  CORT. 

Greencastle,  Pennsylvania. 

The  following  letter  is  from  Rev.  C.  R.  Lane,  D.  D., 
an  eminent  and  well-known  divine  of  the  Presbyterian 
Church.  Mr.  Lane,  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Gettys- 
burg, resided  in  Wyoming  Count}',  Pennsylvania.  His 

statement  is  as  follows : 

CHAMBERSBURG,  August  igth,  1884. 
JACOB  HOKE,  ESQ.  : 

Dear  Sir — The  facts  referred  to  in  our  late  conversation,  as  I  understood 
the  matter  at  the  time,  are  the  following:  The  sound  of  the  artillery  at  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  was  heard  on  a  mountain  in  the  south  -  western  part 
of  Wyoming  County,  a  distance  measured  in  a  straight  line  of  at  least  one 
hundred  and  twenty  (120)  miles..  Supposing  the  alleged  fact  to  be  true,  this 
was  a  very  remarkable  propagation  of  sound  and  requires, 

ist.     A  very  favorable  state  of  atmosphere  for  the  propagation  of  sound. 

2d.     A  favorable  current  of  air;  and 

3d.  Perhaps  there  was  a  cloud  so  situated  as  to  reflect  the  sound  to  the 
particular  locality  where  it  was  heard. 

Thanking  you  for  your  efforts  to  collect  and  preserve  information  in  regard 
to  the  war,  I  remain,  Yours  truly,  C.  R.  L,ANE.* 

*That  the  phenomena  stated  by  Rev.  C.  Cort  and  Rev.  Dr.  I<ane  were  not 
confined  to  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  alone,  but  occurred  at  other  great  battles, 
will  appear  in  the  following  statements  by  Rev.  Bishop  J.  J.  Glossbrennef,  D. 
D.(  of  the  Church  of  the  United  Brethren  in  Christ,  a  resident  of  Churchville, 
Augusta  County,  Virginia,  and  by  Hon.  F.  M.  Kimmell,  at  the  time  referred 
to  a  resident  of  Somerset,  Somerset  County,  Pennsylvania,  and  at  present  re- 
siding in  Chambersburg.  Judge  Kimmell  was  formerly  presiding  judge  of 
this  district,  and  is  a  man  well  known  all  over  the  State.  Bishop"  Glossbren- 
ner,  by  reason  of  his  age,  extensive  travels,  and  undoubted  integrity,  is  kno^n 
from  Pennsylvania  to  the  Pacific  Coast.  The  statements  of  these  gentlemen 
therefore,  are  beyond  dispute. 

The  statement  of  Bishop  Glossbrenner  is  as  follows: 

CHURCHVILLE,  VIRGINIA,  June  igth,  1884. 
MR.  J.  HOKE: 

Dear  Sir — In  your  note  you  desire  me  to  state  in- writing  what  I  com- 
municated to  you  verbally  some  time  ago.  That  fact  is  as  follows:  During 


THE  SOUND  OF  THE  CANNONADING.          511 

Deeming  the  fact  of  the  phenomenon  authenticated  be- 
yond a  doubt,  and  desiring  to  know  the  reasons  why  this 
sound  was  heard  at  such  great  distances,  and  so  indistinctly 
at  Chambersburg  and  at  other  intervening  places,  I  com- 
'municated  the  facts  to  the  officers  of  the  Smithsonian  In- 
stitute, at  Washington,  D.  C.,  and  asked  for  an  explanation, 
to  be  used  in  my  history.  The  following  are  the  replies. 

the  great  battles  about  Richmond,  which  is  upwards  of  one  hundred  miles 
from  here,  we  distinctly  heard  the  report  of  the  cannonading. 

Respectfully  yours,  J.  J.  GLOSSBRENNER. 

The  following  is  Judge  Kimmell's  statement: 

CHAMBERSBURG,  September  i2th,  1884. 
MR.  J.  HOKE: 

Dear  Sir — On  the  2ist  of  July,  1861,  I  lived  at  Somerset,  Somerset 
County,  Pennsylvania,  distant  from  Cumberland,  Maryland,  thirty -seven 
miles  by  turnpike  road.  This  latter  place  is  one  hundred  and  ninety  miles 
by  rail  trom  Baltimore,  and  as  I  now  understand  the  geography  of  the 
country  one  hundred  and  ninety  miles  would  carry  you  from  Cumberland 
to  either  Washington  or  Bull  Run  in  Virginia.  This  would  make  a  distance 
of  some  two  hundred  and  thirty  miles  by  the  roads  from  Somerset  to  the 
battle-field,  or  as  the  bird  flies,  or  as  sound  carries,  two  hundred  miles. 
Standing  on  a  hill  which  overlooks  the  town,  in  company  with  others,  we 
distinctly  heard  the  "thuds"  of  tha  caution  of  the  battle,  not  once  only  nor 
for  a  short  time,  but  often  and  at  intervals  extending  over  hours.  We,  having 
previously  learned  of  the  army  having  moved  South,  conjectured  that  a 
battle  was  being  fought  between  the  Federal  and  Confederate  forces,  and  we 
were  on  the  tip-toe  of  expectation.  When  the  news  came  we  found  our  con- 
jectures fully  verified,  as  to  time  and  direction.  Somerset  lies  on  the  west  of 
the  main  ridge  of  the  Allegheny  Mountain,  fourteen  miles  from  the  summit. 
The  waters  of  the  eastern  slope  of  the  mountain  at  that  point  are  carried  by 
Wills  Creek  to  the  Potomac  at  Cumberland,  and  thence  flow  to  Washington 
City,  D.  C.  The  clouds  during  the  day  were  impending  so  far  a^>  we  could 
see.  We  learned  that  this  was  the  case  along  the  river,  and  my  theory  was, 
whether  right  or  wrong,  that  the  clouds  confined  the  sound  to  tlie  valley  of 
the  Potomac,  and  sent  them  to  the  mountains  upwards,  as  through  a  funnel. 
Along  the  Alleghenies  above  Cumberland,  the  sounds  were  heard  by  multi- 
tudes. Our  congregation  near  the  summit  adjourned  the  sermon  to  listen. 

On  the  days  of  the  Gettysburg  fights  I  lived  at  Chambersburg,  twenty -five 
miles  from  the  contest,  in  which  there  was  immense  cannonading,  and  never 
heard  it  at  all.  I  don't  remember  the  condition  of  the  clouds,  and  only  re- 
member the  facts  of  the  first  fight,  because  the  matter  was  the  subject  of 
discussion. 

I  have  heard  or  read  somewhere  that  the  sounds  of  Waterloo  were  heard 
two  hundred  miles  away.  F.  M.  KIMMELL. 


512  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

The  first  is  from  that  eminent  scientist,  Prof.  Spencer  F. 

Baird : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  September  6,  1884. 
MR.  J.  HOKE: 

Dear  Sir — The  irregularities  of  sound  transmission  referred  to  in  your 
letter  of  August  3oth,  have  been  repeatedly  observed,  and  may  be  thus  ex- 
plained: With  a  gentle  wind,  the  current  of  air  is  of  course  considerably 
retarded  near  the  surface  of  the  earth  by  friction  with  its  irregular  outlines; 
and  as  we  rise  higher  the  speed  is  ordinarily  found  to  gradually  increase  for 
some  hundreds  of  feet.  The  effect  of  this  partial  retardation  of  the  aerial 
current  on  the  spherical  wave  -  fronts  of  sound,  is  to  press  forward  their 
higher  portions  more  than  the  lower  portions, —  in  Ike  direction  in  which  the 
wind  is  moving, — and  reversely  to  press  back  the  upper  portions  of  the 
wave  -  fronts  more  than  their  lower  portions, —  in  the  opposite  direction.  It 
thus  results  that  sound -rays  moving  with  the  wind,  tend  to  curve  downward 
toward  the  earth;  and  sound -rays  moving  against  the  wind,  tend  to  rise  up- 
ward, and  at  the  distance  of  a  mile  or  so,  to  leave  the  observer  in  an  acoustic 
"shadow  "—the  sounds  passing  at  some  distance  above  his  head.  This  has 
been  verified  by  climbing  to  eminences,  where  a  lost  sound  is  completely  re- 
covered. Sound  probably  travels  as  far  against  the  wind  as  with  it,  but  it  is 
refracted  upward  beyond  the  ^ars  of  the  listener.  (See  the  Smithsonian 
Report  for  1875,  page  210.) 

This  subject  was.  well  discussed  by  the  late  Professor  Henry, —  a  copy  of 
whose  "Researches  in  Sound  "  is  herewith  mailed  to  your  address.  You  will 
find  special  reference  to  the^abnormal  effects  observed  during  cannonading  in 
battles,  at  pages  492,  493.  See  also  pages  512,  513.  • 

Under  certain  circumstances,  an  intervening  obstacle  —  as  a  hill  —  tends  to 
deflect  sound  -  rays  upward  to  some  distance  over  the  adjacent  valley;  so  as 
to  render  them  quite  audible  at  a  considerable  distance,  while  wholly  inaudi- 
ble through  the  middle  distance.  Yours  very  respectfully, 

SPENCER  F.  BAIRD,  Secretary.* 

*  The  following  certificate  from  Rev.  I,.  W.  Stahl,  received  subsequent  to  the 
submission  of  this  matter  to  the  learned  gentlemen  of  the  Smithsonian  Insti- 
tute, presents  this  matter  of  the  phenomena  of  sound  in  a  new  light.  It  will 
be  seen  from  this  statement  that  the  ground  was  the  conductor  and  not  the 
atmosphere : 

ANNVILLE,  PENNSYLVANIA,  August  2d,  1886. 
J.  HOKE,  ESQ.: 

Dear  Sir — At  the  time  of  the  war  I  resided  in  Madison,  Westmoreland 
County,  Pennsylvania,  on  the  Cumberland  pike,  twenty  -  eight  miles  from 
Pittsburg.  During  the  2d  of  July,  1863, —  the  second  day  of  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  —  I  was  in  a  field  near  the  village  helping  to  harvest,  and  while 


EXPLANATIONS    OF   THE    PHENOMENA.  513 

The  references  made  in  the  foregoing  to  Professor 
Henry's  "Researches  in  Sound"  are  as  follows: 

"  The  science  of  acoustics  in  regard  to  the  phenomena 
of  sound  as  exhibited  in  limited  spaces,  has  been  developed 
with  signal  success.  The  laws  of  its  production,  propaga- 
tion, reflection  and  refraction  have  been  determined  with 
much  precision,  so  that  we  are  enabled  in  most  cases  to 
explain,  predict,  and  control  the  phenomena  exhibited 
under  given  conditions.  But  in  cases  of  loud  sounds,  and 
those  wrhich  are  propagated  to  a  great  distance,  such  as  are 
to  be  employed  as  fog  -  signals,  considerable  obscurity  still 
exists.  As  an  illustration  of  this  I  may  mention  the  fre- 
quent occurrence  of  apparently  abnormal  phenomena. 
General  Warren  informs  me  that  at  the  battle  of  Seven 
Pines,  in  June,  1862,  near  Richmond,  General  Johnson, 
of  the  Confederate  army,  was  within  three  miles  of  the 
scene  of  action  with  a  force  intended  to  attack  the  flank 
of  the  Federal  forces,  and  although  listening  attentively 
for  the  sound  of  the  commencement  of  the  engagement, 
the  battle,  which  was  a  severe  one,  lasting  about  three 
hours,  ended  without  his  having  heard  a  single  gun.  (See 
Johnson's  report.)  Another  case  of  a  similar  kind  oc- 
curred to  General  McClellan,  at  the  battle  of  Games' 
Mills,  June  27,  1862,  also  near  Richmond.  Although  a 
sharp  engagement  was  progressing  within  three  or  four 

thus  engaged  one  of  our  number,  after  raking  together  enough  of  wheat  to 
make  a  sheaf,  laid  the  handle  of  his  rake  against  his  head  while  he  bound 
the  grain  thus  raked  together,  when  to  his  astonishment  he  heard  distinctly 
the  roar  of  the  cannon.  I  then  too  tried  it  and  the  sounds  were  very  distinct. 
We  heard  at  intervals  throughout  the  three  days  of  battle,  a  strange  roaring, 
but  it  was  only  by  the  use  of  the  rake  handle  that  we  could  distinguish  what 
it  was.  This  was  in  an  air  line  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
from  Gettysburg.  Yours  truly, 

L.  W.  STAHL. 


514  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

miles  for  four  or  five  hours,  the  General  and  his  staff  were 
unaware  of  its  occurrence,  and  when  their  attention  was 
called  to  some  feeble  sound  they  had  no  idea  that  it  was 
anything  more  than  a  skirmish  of  little  importance.  (See 
Report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.)  A 
third  and  perhaps  still  more  remarkable  instance  is  given 
in"  a  skirmish  between  a  part  of  the  Second  Corps  under 
General  Warren  and  a  force  of  the  enemy.  In  this  case 
the  sound  of  the  firing  was  heard  more  distinctly  at  Gen- 
eral Meade's  head -quarters  than  it  was  at  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Second  Corps  itself,  although  the  latter 
was  about  midway  between  the  former  and  the  point  of 
conflict.  Indeed,  the  sound  appeared  so  near  General 
Meade's  camp  that  the  impression  was  made  that  the 
enemy  had  gotten  between  it  and  General  Warren's  com- 
mand. In  fact  so  many  instances  occurred  of  wrong  im- 
pressions as  to  direction  and  distance  derived  from  the 
sound  of  guns  that  little  reliance  came  to  be  placed  on 
these  indications." 

By  direction  of  Professor  Baird  the  subject  was  also 
referred  to  Professor  A.  B.  Johnson,  chief  clerk  of  the 
Light  House  Board,  who  kindly  favored  me  with  the  fol- 
lowing: 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  September  10,  1884. 
MR.  J.  HOKE: 

Dear  Sir — I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of 
September  6th,  1884,  which  came  to  hand  by  due  course  of  mail. 

You  state  that  during  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  Rev.  C.  Cort  and  others  dis- 
tinctly heard  the  sound  of  the  cannonading  in  Westmoreland  County,  western 
Pennsylvania,  in  an  air  line  one  hundred  and  forty  miles  almost  west  from 
the  field  of  conflict,  while  during  that  battle,  at  Chambersburg,  but  twenty- 
five  miles  west  from  Gettysburg,  the  sound  of  the  guns  was  not  heard,  ex- 
cept indistinctly  on  the  outskirts  of  the  town. 

You  also  state  that  Rev.  Dr.  Lane  says  that  the  sound  of  the  cannonading 
at  Gettysburg  was  heard  in  the  southern  part  of  Wyoming  County,  Pennsyl- 


PROFESSOR  JOHNSON'S  EXPLANATIONS.  515 

-vania,  a  distance  of  over  one  hundred  and  twenty  miles  north  -east,  in  an  air 
line. 

And  you  also  say  that  at  the  instance  of  Professor  Baird,  of  the  Smith- 
sonian Institution,  you  ask  my  opinion  as  to  the  cause  of  this  phenomenon. 

In  reply,  I  beg  leave  to  say  that  this  phenomenon  has  received  the  atten- 
tion of  scientists  for  many  years. 

•  Dr.  Derham,  of  England,  writing  in  I<atin  to  the  British  Philosophical 
Society  in  1708,  seemed  to  consider  it  as  caused  by  variations  in  temperature, 
moisture,  and  the  direction  of  the  wind.  Baron  von  Humboldt,  and  after 
him  Dr.  Dove,  Sir  John  Herschel  and  Dr.  Robinson,  held  that  aerial  floccu- 
lence  caused  this  phenomenon,  a  theory  which  was  adopted  and  amplified  by 
Professor  Tyndall.  Professor  Joseph  Henry,  long  the  Director  of  the  Smith- 
sonian Institute,  has,  however,  presented  a  more  satisfactory  theory  and  has 
•worked  it  out  with  great  care  by  many  experiments.  He  accepted  as  a  good 
working  hypothesis,  the  suggestions  made  by  Professor  Stokes,  of  Cambridge, 
England,  founded  upon  those  remarkable  observations  of  the  French  Acade- 
mician, De  la  Roche,  which,  roughly  stated,  is  this:  The  several  strata  into 
which  a  current  of  air  may  be  divided,  do  not  move  with  the  same  velocity. 
The  lowest  stratum  is  retarded  by  friction  against  the  earth;  the  one  imme- 
diately above,  by  friction  against  the  lower;  hence  the  velocity  increases  from 
the  ground  upward,  and  when  the  direction  of  the  sound  is  perpendicular  to 
the  sound-wave,  as  when  projected  against  the  wind,  it  will  be  thrown  up- 
ward ahead  of  the  observer,  and  when  it  is  projected  with  the  wind  it  will 
be  thrown  downward  toward  the  earth. 

Professor  Henry  tested  this  theory  by  careful  and  often  repeated  experi- 
ments, and  announced  the  results  of  five  different  phenomena,  with  his  idea 
of  their  cause.  One  of  these  formula  describes  the  case  you  cite  in  these 
-words: 

"  The  audibility  of  sound  at  a  distance  and  its  inaudibility  nearer  the 
source  of  sound."    The  cause  of  this  aberration  in  audibility,  he  formulates 
thus:  "Sound  moving  with  the  zvind  is  refraEled  down  toward  the  earth, 
while  moving  against  the  wind  it  is  refra£led  -upward  and  passes  over  the 
head  of  the  observer. ' ' 

You  will  see  from  my  several  pamphlets  on  this  general  subject,  which  I 
send  you,  that  I  have  given  this  matter  some  attention,  that  I  agree  with 
Henry  rather  than  Tyndall,  and  that  I  have  cited  a  number  of  instances  which 
liave  occurred  under  my  own  observation  similar  to  those  which  you  relate, 
though  on  a  smaller  scale, — but  that  in  each  of  these  cases,  the  wind  is  blow- 
ing against,  rather  than  with  the  sound. 

You  ask  me  for  a  short  statement  of  the  reason  of  the  phenomena  you  have 


516  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

related.  In  reply  I  beg  to  say  that  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  aberration  in 
the  audibility  of  the  sound  of  the  guns  at  Gettysburg  was  caused  by  the 
wind;  that  is,  the  wind  blowing  against  the  sound-waves  tilted  them  up  so 
that  they  first  touched  the  earth  near  Chambersburg  and  then  passed  over  it 
describing  one  or  more  curves  from  there  to  the  hearers  in  Westmoreland 
County. 

It  is  not  improbable  that  the  length  of  the  cord  of  the  arc  described  by  the 
sound-wave  was  about  the  distance  from  Gettysburg  to  Chambersburg,  and 
that  the  sound  was  heard  at  intervals  of  twenty -five  or  thirty  miles  from 
thence  to  the  hearers  in  Westmoreland  County  and  maybe  beyond.  It  would 
be  interesting  to  know  if  this  was  the  case. 

An  instance  of  this  kind,  though  on  a  much  smaller  scale,  is  given  on  page 
731  of  my  pamphlet,  "Anomalies  in  the  Sound  of  Fog  Signals,"  and  the 
curve  of  the  sound-wave  showing  the  area  of  inaudibility  in  the  observations 
made  near  the  White  Head -Light  Station,  Maine,  is  indicated  in  a  rude 
wood  cut  on  the  next  page. 

The  battle  of  Gettysburg  lasted  about  three  days,  if  I  remember  it  cor- 
rectly; it  is  possible  that  the  wind  during  that  time  changed,  so  that  the 
same  reasons  which  would  have  caused  the  sound  of  the  guns  to  be  heard  in 
Westmoreland  County  in  one  day,  might  cause  them  to  be  heard  in  Wyoming 
County  on  another. 

Guns  were  frequently  heard  at  a  great  distance  from  battle-fields  during 
the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  while  they  were  not  heard  by  persons  compara- 
tively near,  but  in  the  same  direction.  In  one  instance  those  near  by  did  not 
hear  the  noise  of  the  guns  when  they  could  see  their  flash.  This  is  the  first 
time  I  have  had  to  consider  this  phenomenon  when  extending  over  twenty- 
five  miles.  Within  that  distance,  it  seems  to  me,  to  be  accounted  for.  When, 
as  in  this  instance,  the  distance  is  five  or  six  times  greater,  I  speak  with  less 
confidence.  But  I  do  not  see  that  the  question  of  the  distance  changes  the 
principle.  Yours  very  truly, 

ARNOLD  B.  JOHNSON,  Chief  Clerk. 

In  the  publications  accompanying  the  foregoing  letter, 
Mr.  Johnson  has  specially  called  attention  to  several  places 
which  he  has  marked  as  bearing  directly  upon  the  phe- 
nomena under  consideration.  These  I  annex.  The  first 
quotation  states  Professor  Henry's  five  phenomena  of 
sound,  as  referred  to  by  Mr.  Johnson : 

"  Professor  Henry,  in  considering  the  results  of  General 


SOME    PHENOMENA    OF   SOUND.  517 

Duane's  experiments,  and  his  own,  some  of  which  were 
made  in  company  with  Sir  Frederick  Arron  and  Captain 
"Webb,  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Xavy,  both  of  the  British 
Light  House  Establishment,  who  were  sent  here  to  study 
and  report  on  our  fog  signal  system,  formulated  these  ab- 
normal phenomena.  He  said  they  consisted  of — 

"1.  The  audibility  of  a  sound  at  a  distance  and  its  in- 
audibility nearer  the  source  of  sound. 

"2.  The  inaudibility  of  a  sound  at  a  given  distance  in 
one  direction,  while  a  lesser  sound  is  heard  at  the  same 
distance  in  another  direction. 

"3.  The  audibility  at  one  time  at  a  distance  of  several 
miles,  while  at  another  the  sound  can  not  be  heard  at  more 
than  a  fifth  of  the  same  distance. 

"4.  While  the  sound  is  generally  heard  further  with 
the  wind  than  against  it,  in  some  instances  the  reverse  is 
the  case. 

"5.  The  sudden  loss  of  a  sound  in  passing  from  one 
locality  to  another  in  the  same  vicinity,  the  distance  from 
the  source  of  the  sound  being  the  same." 

In  illustration  of  the  foregoing  the  following  is  cited: 

"  There  are  six  steam  fog  whistles  on  the  coast  of  Maine; 
these  have  been  frequently  heard  at  a  distance  of  twenty 
miles,  and  as  frequently  can  not  be  heard  at  the  distance 
of  two  miles,  and  this  with  no  perceptible  difference  in  the 
state  of  the  atmosphere. 

"The  signal  is  often  heard  at  a  great  distance  in  one 
direction,  while  in  another  it  will  be  scarcely  audible  at 
the  distance  of  a  mile.  This  is  not  the  effect  of  wind,  as 
the  signal  is  frequently  heard  much  farther  against  the 
wind  than  with  it;  for  example,  the  whistle  on  Cape  Eliza- 


518  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

beth  can  always  be  distinctly  heard  in  Portland,  a  distance- 
of  nine  miles,  during  a  heavy  north  -  east  snow  storm,  the 
wind  blowing  a  gale  directly  from  Portland  toward  the- 
whistle."  * 

In  illustration  of  his  sound-wave  theory,  Professor 
Henry  states  the  following,  as  given  in  the  same  paper : 

"  It  frequently  happens  on  a  vessel  leaving  a  station  that 
the  sound  (of.  the  fog  whistle)  is  suddenly  lost  at  a  point  in 
its  course,  and,  after  remaining  inaudible  some  time,  is 
heard  again  at  a  greater  distance,  and  then  is  gradually 
lost  as  the  distance  is  further  increased.  This  is  attributed 
to  the  upward  refraction  of  the  sound-wave,  which  passes 
over  the  head  of  the  observer,  and  continues  an  upward 
course  until  it  nearly  reaches  the  upper  surface  of  the  cur- 
rent of  wind,  when  the  refraction  will  be  reversed,  and  the 
sound  sent  downward  to  the  earth.  Or  the  effect  may  be 
considered  as  due  to  a  sound  -  shadow  produced  by  refrac- 
tion, which  is  gradually  closed  in  at  a  distance  by  the 
lateral  spread  of  the  sound  -  wave  near  the  earth  on  either 
side,  in  a  direction  which  is  not  affected  by  the  upper  re- 
fraction. Another  explanation  may  be  found  in  the  prob- 
able circumstance  of  the  lower  sheet  of  sound  -beama 
being  actually  refracted  into  a  serpentine  or  undulating 
course." 

Upon  this  sound-wave  theory,  Mr.  Johnson,  also  said: 

"  This  ricochetting  of  sound,  these  intervals  of  audi- 
bility, ought  to  be  recognized  by  the  mariner,  who  should 
now  understand  that  in  sailing  toward  or  from  a  fog-signal 

*"  Aberrations  of  Audibility  of  Fog  Signals."  A  paper  read  before  the 
Philosophical  Society  of  Washington,  October  22,  1881,  by  Arnold  B.  Johnson, 
Chief  Clerk  of  the  Light  House  Board. 


OTHER    EXAMPLES   AND   PRINCIPLES.  519 

in  full  blast,  he  might  lose  and  pick  up  its  sound  several 
times  though  no  apparent  object  might  intervene.  And 
the  mariner  now  needed  that  science  should  deduce  the 
law  of  this  variation  in  audibility  and  bring  out  some  in- 
strument which  should  be  to  the  ears  what  the  mariner's 
compass  is  to  the  eyes,  and  also  that  variations  of  this 
instrument  yet  to  be  invented,  be  provided  for  and  cor- 
rected as  now  are  the  variations  of  the  mariner's  compass. 
The  speaker  referred  to  the  benefit  the  mariner  had  de- 
rived from  the  promulgation  of  Professor  Henry's  theory 
of  the  tilting  of  the  sound-wave  up  or  down  by  adverse 
or  favorable  winds,  and  said  that  by  this  the  sailor  had 
been  led  to  go  aloft  in  the  one  case  and  to  get  as  near  as 
possible  to  the  surface  of  the  water  in  the  other,  when 
trying  to  pick  up  the  sound  of  a  fog  -  signal." 

Such  are  the  explanations  given  of  these  phenomena  by 
these  eminent  scientists.  The  facts  are  exceedingly  inter- 
esting and  are  worthy  of  investigation. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

GETTYSBURG,    THE   NATIONS    SHRINE. 

"On  Fame's  eternal  camping  ground 

Their  silent  tents  are  spread, 
And  Glory  guards,  with  solemn  round, 
The  bivouac  of  the  dead. ' ' 

)S  soon  as  the  result  of  the  series  of  engagements 
between  the  Federal  and  Confederate  armies  at 
Gettysburg  was  known  throughout  the  country, 
people  from  all  sections  nocked  to  that  place.  In 
traversing  the  field  of  conflict  the  evidences  of  the 
tremendous  struggle  were  visible  in  all  directions.  Dis- 
abled cannon,  abandoned  and  captured  arms,  broken  down 
fences,  trampled  and  ruined  lields  of  grass  and  grain,  pools 
of  blood,  dead  and  wounded  men,  and  the  bloated  and 
offensive  carcasses  of  horses,  were  some  of  the  visible  re- 
sults. The  hearts  of  patriots  were  saddened  and  their 
feelings  shocked  to  see  the  remains  of  the  brave  men  who 
had  yielded  up  their  lives  that  the  Nation  might  live,  be- 
cause of  the  necessary  haste  with  which  they  were  interred, 
in  many  instances  but  partially  covered  with  earth.  These 
partly  covered  bodies  were  scattered  for  miles  over  ground 
that  would  soon  be  cultivated.  The  graves  which  were 
marked  were  only  temporarily  so,  and  the  marks  would 
soon  decay  or  be  obliterated,  and  all  traces  of  the  sacred 

520 


ORIGIN   OP   GETTYSBURG   CEMETERY.  521 

dust  be  entirely  lost.  Humanity  shuddered  at  the  sight, 
and  patriotism  revolted  at  such  desecration.  The  idea 
then  was  suggested  of  purchasing  a  suitable  piece  of 
ground  upon  some  elevated  place,  and  gathering  these 
men  from  all  parts  of  the  field  and  decently  interring  them 
side  by  side.  Mr.  David  Wills,  a  citizen  of  Gettysburg, 
submitted  a  proposition  to  effect  the  purpose  to  his  Ex- 
cellency, Governor  Andrew  G.  Curtin,  in  a  letter  dated 
July  24th,  1863;  and  the  governor,  with  the  promptness 
and  zeal  for  the  cause  of  the  Union,  and  the  welfare  arid 
comfort  of  the  soldiers,  which  he  had  always  shown,  ap- 
proved of  the  design,  and  appointed  Mr.  Wills  as  agent  to 
carry  out  the  project.  Mr.  Wills  at  once  opened  corre- 
spondence with  the  governors  of  other  states,  which  had 
soldiers  dead  upon  the  field,  and  they  all  with  great 
promptness  responded  and  seconded  the  plan.  About 
seventeen  acres  of  ground  on  Cemetery  Hill,  at  the  apex 
of  the  triangular  line  of  battle  of  the  Union  army,  was 
purchased  and  the  title  made  to  the  State  of  Pennsylvania. 
No  more  beautiful  or  appropriate  place  for  the  gallant 
heroes  who  died  upon  that  field,  could  be  found  than  the 
one  selected.  It  is  high  and  prominent.  It  was  the  center 
of  the  Federal  position.  Upon  it  were  planted  the  bat- 
teries which  thundered  forth  death  and  destruction  to  the 
foe;  and  it  was  there  that  the  awful  fire  of  Lee's  one 
hundred  and  twenty  guns  was  concentrated  during  that 
fearful  two  hours'  artillery  duel,  which  preceded  Pickett's 
great,  but  wild  and  disastrous  charge.  Lots  in  this  ceme- 
tery were  gratuitously  given  to  each  State  having  dead  on 
the  field.  It  was  arranged  that  the  expenses  for  the  re- 
moval and  re-interment  of  the  dead,  the  laying  out,  orna- 


.PLAN   OF    THE   CEMETERY.  523 

meriting,  and  enclosing  of  the  grounds,  erecting  a  lodge 
for  the  keeper,  and  constructing  a  suitable  monument, 
should  be  borne  by  the  several  States,  and  assessed  in 
proportion  to  their  population,  as  indicated  by  their  repre- 
sentation in  Congress. 

The  Soldiers'  National  Cemetery  is  enclosed  by  a  well 
built  stone  wall,  surmounted  with  heavy  dressed  capping 
stones.  This  wall  extends  along  the  south,  west,  and 
north  sides  of  the  grounds.  The  division  fence  between 
it  and  the  local  cemetery  of  the  town  is  of  iron.  The 
lodge  for  the  residence  of  the  keeper  is  a  beautiful 
structure,  and  the  front  fence  and  gate -way  are  of  orna- 
mental iron  work.  The  grounds  have  been  graded,  and 
are  adorned  with  many  beautiful  trees,  shrubbery,  and 
flowers.  The  burial-place  proper  is  semi -circular  in 
form.  In  the  center  of  this  semi -circle  stands  the  Na- 
tional Monument.  The  grounds  from  this  center  slope 
off  gradually  in  every  direction.  They  are  laid  out  in 
lots,  each  State  proportioned  in  size  to  the  .number  of  its 
dead.  Each  of  these  lots,  is  divided  into  sections,  with  a 
space  of  four  feet  for  a  walk  between  the  sections.  There 
are  also  spaces  set  apart  for  the  Regulars,  as  also  for 
those  whose  identity  could  not  be  distinguished.  .Many 
of  those  who  fell  in  the  first  day's  engagement  are  among 
the  latter;  they  lay  either  unburied  and  exposed  to  the  sun 
and  rain,  until  the  Monday  following  the  battle,  or  were 
but  slightly  covered.  The  outer  division  of  the  section 
is  lettered  "  A,"  and  so  on  in  alphabetical  order.  As  the 
observer  stands  in  the  center  of  the  semi -circle,  facing 
the  circumference,  the  burials  are  commenced  at  the  right 
hand  of  the  section  in  each  lot,  and  the  graves  are  num- 


524 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


bered  regularly.  A  register  is  kept  of  the  number,  name, 
regiment,  and  company  of  the  occupant  of  each  grave. 
Two  feet  of  space  is  allowed  to  each,  and  they  are  laid 
with  their  heads  toward  the  center  of  the  semi  -  circle.  At 
the  head  of  the  graves  there  is  a  stone  wall,  built  up  from 
the  bottom  as  a  foundation  for  the  bead  -  stones,  which  are 
placed  along  the  whole  length  of  each  section,  and  on 


GENERAL   REYNOLDS'  MONUMENT  IN  THE  SOLDIERS'  NATIONAL   CEME- 
TERY AT  GETTYSBURG.    (From  a  photograph  by  Tipton.) 

which,  opposite  each  grave,  is  engraved  the  name,  regi- 
ment, and  the  company  of  the  deceased.  These  head- 
stones are  all  alike  in  size,  the  design  being  wholly  adapted 
to  a  symmetrical  order,  and  one  which  combines  simplicity 
and  durability.  The  remains  of  the  soldiers  were  taken 
up  and  re-interred  with  great  care.  Every  precaution  was 


GENERAL    REYNOLDS'    MONUMENT.  525 

taken  to  identify  the  unmarked  graves,  and  also  to  pre- 
vent the  marked  graves  from  losing  their  identity  by  the 
defacement  of  the  original  temporary  boards,  on  which 
the  names  were  written  or  cut  by  their  comrades  in  arms. 
The  graves  being  all  numbered,  the  numbers  are  regis- 
tered in  a  record -book,  with  the  name,  company,  and 
regiment.  This  register  will  ever  designate  the  graves 
and  preserve  the  identity  of  the  occupants.  The  coffins 
and  head -stones  were  furnished  by  the  Government,  and 
the  cemetery  is  kept  in  order  by  persons  appointed  and 
paid  by  the  same.  A  careful  account  was  also  taken 
and  kept  of  each  article  found  in  the  pockets,  or  about 
the  person  of  the  deceased. 

Not  all,  however,  who  fell  at  this  place  in  the  sacred 
cause  of  Freedom  were  interred  here.  Many  were  taken 
away  by  their  friends  and  buried  among  their  own  kindred; 
and  many  others  who  were  wounded  and  taken  to  their 
homes,  or  to  distant  hospitals,  and  died  there,  were  laid 
away  to  rest  where  they  died.  Among  the  killed  who 
were  removed  was  the  brave,  the  lamented  Reynolds.  His 
body  was  borne  to  his  native  city,  Lancaster,  Pennsyl- 
vania, where,  amidst  his  own  kindred,  he  sleeps.  A  beau- 
tiful monument,  however,  has  been  erected  by  his  com- 
rades, in  the  National  Cemetery,  near  the  entrance,  a  view 
of  which  is  shown  in  our  illustration. 

But  of  all  the  gallant  heroes  who  fell  at  Gettysburg, 
wherever  they  rest,  it  may  truthfully  be  said: 

"They  fell  devoted,  but  undying; 
Their  very  names  the  gale  seems  sighing; 
The  rivers  murmur  of  their  name; 
The  woods  are  peopled  with  their  fame; 
The  silent  tombstone,  cold  and  gray, 


526  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

Claims  kindred  with  their  hallowed  clay; 
Their  spirits  wrap  the  dusky  mountains; 
Their  memory  sparkles  over  the  fountains; 
The  meanest  rill,  the  mightiest  river, 
Rolls  mingling  with  their  fame  forever." 

The  Soldiers'  National  Monument,  standing  in  this  semi- 
circle, is  one  of  the  most  beautiful  works  of  art  upon  the 
continent.  The  whole  rendering  of  the  design  is  intended 
to  be  purely  historical,  telling  its  own  story,  with  such 
simplicity  that  any  discerning  mind  will  readily  compre- 
hend its  meaning  and  purpose. 

The  superstructure  is  sixty  feet  high,  and  consists  of  a 
massive  granite  pedestal,  twenty -five  feet  square  at  the 
base,  crowned  by  a  colossal  statue,  representing  the  GENIUS 
OF  LIBERTY.  Standing  upon  a  three  quarter  globe,  she 
raises  with  her  right  hand  the  victor's  wreath  of  laurel, 
while  with  her  left  she  gathers  up  the  folds  of  our  na- 
tional flag  under  which  the  victory  has  been  won. 

Projecting  from  the  angles  of  the  pedestal  are  four 
buttresses,  supporting  an  equal  number  of  allegorical 
statues  representing,  respectively,  WAR,  HISTORY,  PEACE, 
and  PLENTY. 

WAR  is  personified  by  a  statue  of  the  American  soldier, 
who,  resting  from  the  conflict,  relates  to  HISTORY  the  story 
of  the  battle  which  this  monument  is  intended  to  com- 
memorate. 

HISTORY,  in  listening  attitude,  records  with  stylus  and 
tablet  the  achievements  of  the  field,  and  the  names  of  the 
honored  dead. 

PEACE  is  symbolized  by  a  statue  of  the  American  me- 
chanic, characterized  by  appropriate  accessories. 

PLENTY  is  represented  by  a  female  figure,  with  a  sheaf 


SOLDIERS'   NATIONAL  MONUMENT. 


[527] 


528  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

of  wheat  and  fruits  of  the  earth,  typifying  peace  and 
abundance  as  the  soldier's  crowning  triumph. 

Upon  the  panels  of  the  main  die  between  the  statues  are 
appropriate  inscriptions,  one  of  which  is  the  concluding 
part  of  President  LINCOLN'S  .address  upon  the  occasion  of 
the  dedication  of  this  cemetery,  as  follows: 

"  It  is  rather  for  us  to  be  here  dedicated  to  the  great  task 
remaining  before  us  —  that  from  these  honored  dead  we 
take  increased  devotion  to  the  cause  for  which  they  here 
gave  the  last  full  measure  of  devotion — that  we  here 
highly  resolve  that  the  dead  shall  not  have  died  in  vain; 
that  the  nation  shall,  under  God,  have  a  new  birth  of  free- 
dom, and  that  the  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people* 
and  for  the  people,  shall  not  perish  from  the  earth." 

The  main  die  of  the  pedestal  is  octagonal  in  form, 
panelled  upon  each  face.  The  cornice  and  plinth  above 
are  also  octagonal,  and ,  are  heavily  molded.  Upon  this 
plinth  rests  an  octagonal  molded  base,  bearing  upon  its 
face,  in  high  relief,  the  National  arms. 

The  upper  die  and  cap  are  circular  in  form,  the  die 
being  encircled  by  stars  equ#l  in  number  with  the  States 
whose  sons  contributed  their  lives  as  the  price  of  the 
victory  won  at  Gettysburg. 

The  ground  thus  purchased  and  set  apart  for  the  burial 
of  those  who  fell  at  Gettysburg  in  defense  of  the  Govern- 
ment, was,  on  November  19th,  1863,  solemnly  dedicated  to 
this  sacred  purpose.  There  were  present,  beside  a  vast 
concaurse  of  people  from  all  parts  of  the  country,  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  several  members  of  his 
cabinet,  the  ministers  of  .France  and  Italy,  the  governors 
of  several  Slates,  representatives  of  the  army  and  navy, 


DEDICATION   OF   THE   CEMETERY.  529 

members  of  Congress,  and  many  other  distinguished  per- 
sons. A  stand  or  platform  was  erected  for  the  speakers 
and  invited  guests.  This  stand  stood  just  where  the  Na- 
tional Monument  now  stands.  The  exercises  were  opened 
by  music  by  Birgfield's  band,  after  which  followed  an  elo- 
quent and  impressive  prayer  by  Rev.  Thomas  H.  Stock- 
ton, D.  D.,  from  which  I  make  the  following  extracts: 

"By  this  Altar  of  Sacrifice;  on  this  Field  of  Deliver- 
ance; on  this  Mount  of  Salvation;  within  the  fiery  and 
bloody  line  of  the  '  Munitions  of  Rocks,'  looking  back  to 
the  dark  days  of  fear  and  trembling,  and  to  the  rapture  of 
relief  that  came  after,  we  multiply  our  thanksgivings,  and 
confess  our  obligations  to  renew  and  perfect  our  personal 
and  social  consecration  to  Thy  service  and  glory. 

"  Oh,  had  it  not  been  for  God!  For  lo!  our  enemies, 
they  came  tin  resisted,  multitudinous,  mighty,  flushed  with 
victory,  and  sure  of  success.  They  exulted  on  our  mount- 
ains; they  revelled  in  our  valleys;  they  feasted,  they  rested; 
they  slept,  they  awakened;  they  grew  stronger,  prouder, 
bolder,  every  day;  they  spread  abroad,  they  concentrated 
here;  they  looked  beyond  this  horizon  to  the  stores  of 
wealth,  to  the  haunts  of  pleasure,  and  to  the  seats  of  power 
in  our  capital  and  chief  cities.  They  proposed  to  cast  a 
chain  of  slavery  around  the  form  of  Freedom,  binding 
life  and  death  together  forever.  Their  premature  triumph 
was  the  mockery  of  God  and  man.  One  more  victory, 
and  all  was  theirs!  But  behind  these  hills  was  heard  the 
feeble  march  of  a  smaller,  but  pursuing  host.  Onward 
they  hurried,  day  and  night,  for  God  and  their  country. 
Foot -sore,  way-worn,  hungry,  thirsty,  faint, — but  not  in 
heart, —  they  came  to  dare  all,  to  bear  all,  and  to  do  all 


530  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

that  is  possible  to  heroes.  And  Thou  didst  sustain  them! 
At  first  they  met  the  blast  on  the  plain,  and  bent  before  it 
like  the  trees  in  a  storm.  But  then,  led  by  Thy  hand  to 
these  hills,  they  took  their  stand  upon  the  rocks  and  re- 
mained as  firm  and  immovable  as  they.  In  vain  were 
they  assaulted.  All  art,  all  violence,  all  desperation,  failed 
to  dislodge  them.  Baffled,  bruised,  broken,  their  enemies 
recoiled,  retired,  and  disappeared.  Glory  to  God  for  this 
rescue!  But  oh,  the  slain!  In  the  freshness  and  fulness 
of  their  young  and  manly  life,  with  such  sweet  memories 
of  father  and  mother,  brother  and  sister,  wife  and  children, 
maiden  and  friends,  ihey  died  for  us.  From  the  coasts 
beneath  the  eastern  sky,  from  the  shores  of  northern  lakes 
and  rivers,  from  the  flowers  of  the  western  prairies,  and 
from  the  homes  of  the  midway  and  border,  they  came  here 
to  die  for  us  and  for  mankind.  Alas,  how  little  we  can 
do  for  them!  We  come  with  the  humility  of  prayer,  with 
the  pathetic  eloquence  of  venerable  wisdom,  with  the 
tender  beauty  of  poetry,  with  the  plaintive  harmony  of 
music,  with  the  honest  tribute  of  our  Chief  Magistrate, 
and  with  all  this  honorable  attendance;  but  our  best  hope 
is  in  thy  blessing,  0  Lord,  our  God!  0  Father,  bless  us! 
Bless  the  bereaved,  whether  present  or  absent;  bless  our 
sick  and  wounded  soldiers  and  sailors;  bless  all  our  rulers 
and  people;  bless  our  army  and  navy;  bless  the  efforts  for 
the  suppression  of  the  rebellion;  and  bless  all  the  associa- 
tions of  this  day  and  place  and  scene  forever.  As  the  trees 
are  not  dead,  though  their  foliage  is  gone,  so  our  heroes 
are  not  dead,  though  their  forms  are  fallen.  In  their 
proper  personality  they  are  all  with  Thee.  And  the  spirit 
of  their  example  is  here.  It  fills  the  air;  it  fills  our  hearts. 


PRESIDENT  LINCOLN'S    DEDICATORY   ADDRESS.  531 

And,  long  as  time  shall  last,  it  will  hover  in  the  skies  and 
rest  on  the  landscape;  and  the  pilgrims  of  our  own  land, 
and  from  all  lands,  will  thrill  with  its  inspiration,  and  in- 
crease and  confirm  their  devotion  to  liberty,  religion,  and 
God." 

At  the  conclusion  of  this  prayer,  the  Marine  Band  of 
Washington  rendered  excellent  and  appropriate  music, 
after  which  Hon.  Edward  Everett  delivered  an  able  and 
elaborate  address.  Following  this  address  a  choir  sang 
the  hymn  composed  specially  for  the  occasion  by  B.  B. 
French,  Esq.,  some  verses  of  which  are  given  at  the  close 
of  tliis  chapter.  The  President  of  the  United  States,  the 
honored  and  revered  LINCOLN,  then,  amidst  the  tremen- 
dous applause  of  the  assembled  multitude,  arose  and 
slowly  advanced  to  the  front  of  the  platform  and  de- 
livered his  celebrated  dedicatory  address,  which  was  as 
follows : 

"Fourscore  and  seven  years  ago  our  fathers  brought 
forth  upon  this  continent  a  new  nation,  conceived  in 
Liberty,  and  dedicated  to  the  proposition  that  all  men  are 
created  equal. 

"Now  we  are  engaged  in  a  great  civil  war,  testing 
whether  that  nation,  or  any  nation  so  conceived  and  so 
dedicated,  can  long  endure.  We  are  met  on  a  great  battle 
field  of  that  war.  We  are  met  to  dedicate  a  portion  of  it 
as  a  final  resting  place  of  those  who  here  gave  their  lives 
that  that  nation  might  live.  It  is  altogether  fitting  and 
proper  that  we  should  do  this. 

"But  in  a  larger  sense  we  can  not  dedicate,  we  can  not 
consecrate,  we  can  not  hallow  this  ground.  The  brave 
men,  living  and  dead,  who  struggled  here  have  consecrated 


532  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

it  far  above  our  power  to  add  or  detract.  The  world  will 
little  note  nor  long  remember  what  we  say  here,  but  it  can 
never  forget  what  they  did  here.  It  is  for  us,  the  living, 
rather  to  be  dedicated  here  to  the  unfinished  work  that 
they  have  thus  so  nobly  carried  on.  It  is  rather  for  us  to 
be  here  dedicated  to  the  great  task  remaining  before  us  — 
that  from  these  honored  dead  we  take  increased  devotion 
to  the  cause  for  which  they  gave  tli  ;  last  full  measure  of 
devotion — that  we  highly  resolve  that  the  dead  shall  not 
have  died  in  vain;  that  the  nation  shall,  under  God,  have 
a  new  birth  of  freedom,  and  that  the  government  of  the 
people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the  people,  shall  not  perish 
from  the  earth." 

The  words  of  the  president  were  uttered  in  slow  and 
measured  tones,  and  although  not  heard  by  the  large  ma- 
jority of  the  people  present,  the  most  profound  silence  was 
observed  during  their  delivery.  When  he  uttered  the 
closing  sentences,  which  have  become  immortal,  empha- 
sizing each  with  a  significant  nod  and  jerk  of  his  head, — 
"that  the  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the 
people,  shall  not  perish  from  the  earth" — it  occurred  to  the 
writer,  who  stood  within  a  few  feet  of  him,  that  those 
words  were  destined  to  an  imperishable  immortality. 

After  the  president's  dedicatory  address,  a  solemn  dirge 
was  sung,  after  which  the  benediction  was  pronounced  by 
Rev.  H.  L.  Baugher,  D.D. 

The  admiration  of  the  people  for  President  LINCOLN  ex- 
ceeded that  ever  bestowed  upon  any  other  person  within 
my  knowledge.  It  was  evidently  not  so  much  for  him 
personally,  as  representatively.  He  was  recognized  as  the 
personification  of  the  cause  which  was  enshrined  in  every 


THE   SPIRIT  OF  THE  NATION.  533 

patriot's  heart,  and  for  which  the  armies  of  the  Union 
were  contending.  To  love  the  Union  was  to  love  ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN.  To  hate  and  defame  him  was  the  acknowledged 
evidence  of  disloyalty.  The  honored  head  of  the  Nation, 
the  humble  and  unpretending  man  from  Illinois,  standing 
upon  the  ground  where  one  of  the  greatest  battles  of 
modern  times  occurred,  and  in  which  the  existence  and 
destiny  of  the  Government  were  in  part  decided,  modestly 
received  the  willing  homage  of  the  assembled  thousands. 
The  Man — the  President  —  the  Government  —  the  yet  un- 
decided peril  to  which  it  was  exposed — the  ground  we 
were  on-1— the  sleeping  thousands  all  about  us,  whose  blood 
had  been  poured  out  upon  that  soil  that  the  Nation  might 
live,  all  conspired  to  make  the  occasion  one  never  to  be 
forgotten. 

During  the  twenty  -  three  years  that  have  elapsed  since 
this  ground  was  dedicated  to  the  sacred  purpose  of  the  in- 
terment of  these  honored  dead,  many  improvements  have 
been  made.  Additional  grounds  have  been  purchased; 
avenues  along  the  lines  held  by  the  Federals  have  been 
laid  out;  tablets  have  been  erected  to  mark  the  places 
where  corps,  divisions,  brigades,  and  regiments  stood,  and 
monuments  where  distinguished  men  fell.  States  whose 
troops  fought  in  this  battle  are  appropriating  money  for 
additional  improvements,  and  in  the  years  to  come  the 
field  of  Gettysburg  will  increase  in  beauty  and  interest, 
and  will  be  visited  by  untold  thousands. 

Such  was  the  origin  of  this  final  resting  place  for  the 
remains  of  the  heroic  men  who  fell  upon  the  field  of  Get- 
tysburg. Who  can  estimate  the  importance  to  the  race 
of  their  valor  and  heroism?  They  have  fallen,  but  victory 


534  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

is  ours  —  theirs  enrollment  upon  the  scroll  of  undying 
fame.  They  did  not  fight  in  vain.  Not  for  themselves, 
but  for  their  children,  for  the  race,  for  humanity,  for 
righteousness,  for  God,  they  gave  themselves  a  willing 
sacrifice.  Their  remains  deserve  the  highest  honor  that 
a  grateful  people  can  bestow.  Their  deeds  will  live  in 
history  long  after  their  bodies  have  mouldered  into  dust ; 
and  the  place  where  they  lie  will  be  honored,  protected, 
and  preserved  as  a  sad,  but  sacred,  memento  of  their  heroic 
conduct.  And,  as  was  intimated  in  Dr.  Stockton's  im- 
pressive prayer,  the  place  where  this  great  battle  was 
fought,  the  ground  where  the  dust  of  the  slain^  reposes, 
has  become  the  Nation's  shrine,  and  pilgrims  from  our 
own  land,  and  from  all  lands,  will  ever  continue  to  visit 
it  to  catch  a  new  inspiration  of  freedom,  and  increase  and 
confirm  their  tlevotion  to  Liberty,  to  Religion,  and  to  God. 

In  the  Soldiers'  National  Cemetery  at  Gettysburg  there 
are  interred  the  bodies  of  three  thousand  five  hundred  and 
fifty -five  Union  soldiers.  They  were  from  the  following 
states:  Maine,  one  hundred  and  four;  New  Hampshire, 
forty -eight;  Vermont,  sixty -one;  Massachusetts,  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty -nine;  Rhode  Island,  twelve;  Connecticut, 
twenty -two;  New  York,  eight  hundred  and  sixty -six; 
New  Jersey,  seventy -eight;  Pennsylvania,  five  hundred 
and  twenty -six;  Delaware,  fifteen;  Maryland,  twenty -two; 
West  Virginia,  eleven;  Ohio,  one  hundred  and  thirty -one; 
Indiana,  eighty;  Illinois,  six;  Michigan,  one  hundred  and 
seventy -one;  Wisconsin,  seventy -three;  Minnesota,  fifty- 
two;  United  States  Regulars,  one  hundred  and  thirty  -  eight; 
Unknown,  nine  hundred  and  seventy  -  nine.  These  fallen 
patriots  having  come  together  from  the  East,  North,  and 


THE    DEDICATION    HYMN.  535 

West,  and  stood  side  by  side  under  one  flag,  inspired  by 
one  spirit,  and  fought  for  one  cause,  it  is  but  right  and 
proper  that  they  should  not  be  divided  in  death,  but  rest 
in  the  ground  hallowed  by  their  valor  and  made  sacred  by 
their  blood.  For  them  there  is  no  more  separation  from 
home  and  loved  ones  at  their  country's  call,  no  more  weary 
marches,  no  more  digging  of  trenches,  no  more  charging 
into  yawning  chasms  of  death,  no  more  painful  wounds 
and  sleepless  nights,  and  long  and  weary  days  in  hospitals. 
All  these  are  forever  ended.  On  this  Altar  of  Sacrifice, 
this  Mount  of  Salvation,  this  Field  of  Deliverance,  and 
surrounded  by  these  Munitions  of  Rocks,  let  them  rest 
until  the  Archangel's  clarion  shall  sound  with  a  louder 
blast  than  that  which  summoned  them  to  this  field  of 
heroic  deeds. 

"  'Tis  holy  ground  — 
This  spot,  where,  in  their  graves, 
Are  placed  our  country's  braves, 
Who  fell  in  freedom's  holy  cause, 
Fighting  for  liberties  and  laws: 

I,et  tears  abound. 

"Here  where  they  fell, 
Oft  shall  the  widow's  tears  be  shed; 
Oft  shall  fond  parents  mourn  their  dead; 
The  orphan  here  shall  kneel  and  weep, 
And  maidens  where  their  lovers  sleep, 

Their  woes  to  tell. 

"Here  let  them  rest: 
And  summer's  heat  and  winter's  cold 
Shall  glow  and  freeze  above  their  mould— 
A  thousand  years  shall  pass  away  — 
A  nation  still  shall  mourn  their  clay 

Which  now  is  blest." 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

A   GUIDE   TO   THE   FIELD   OF   BATTLE. 

»JQ 

^ISITORS  to  Gettysburg  should  bear  in  mind  that 
the  field  of  battle  extends  over  about  twenty -five 
*  square  miles;  and  while  events  of  thrilling  interest 
A  occurred  at  every  portion,  a  few  points  only,  which 
T  possess  special  interest,  and  from  which  a  general 
view  of  the  whole  may  be  had,  can  be  visited  by  those 
whose  time  is  limited.  Those,  however,  whose  time  will 
justify  it  should  employ  one  of  the  many  excellent  guides 
at  all  times  to  be  found,  whose  services,  with  the  neces- 
sary means  of  conveyance,  can  be  had  for  a  reasonable 
compensation.  To  such  as  have  but  a  day,  or  part  of  a 
day,  to  spend  in  inspecting  the  field,  the  following  direc- 
tions will  be  of  value. 

In  approaching  Gettysburg  from  the  north,  you  pass 
along  and  through  part  of  the  battle  field  of  the  first  day. 
The  wooded  elevation  to  your  right,  just  before  entering 
the  town,  is  Oak  Hill,  and  is  almost  the  center  of  the  Union 
line.  The  line  of  battle  extended  from  this  ridge  in  a 
north-easterly  direction  for  about  a  mile.  The  ridge, 
which  you  see  to  your  right,  and  which  extends  for  several 
miles  in  a  southerly  direction,  is  Seminary  Ridge.  Along 

536 


GENERAL   VIEW   OF   GETTYSBURG.  537 

this  ridge,  from  the  Chambers!) urg  pike  to  a  short  distance 
below  Big  Round  Top, — about  three  miles,  —  the  Con- 
federate line  extended  during  the  battles  of  the  second  and 
third  days.  That  large  brick  building  upon  this  hill,  sur- 
mounted by  a  cupola,  is  the  Lutheran  Theological  Seminary, 
from  which  the  hill  was  named.  The  left  of  the  Federal 
line,  on  the  first  day's  engagement,  extended  down  some 
distance  below  this  building;  and  near  it  General  Rey- 
nolds was  killed.  That  large  white  building  to  your  left 
is  Pennsylvania.  College.  It  was  used  as  a  hospital  during 
the  battle,  and  from  its  cupola  General  Lee  took  observa- 
tions. The  first  road,  or  street,  which  leaves  the  town, 
and  leads  up  and  over  the  hill  in  a  westerly  direction,  is 
the  Chambersbiirg  Pike.  By  this  road  the  principal  part  of 
the  Confederate  army  came,  and  by  it  their  great  wagon 
train  of  wounded  retreated  after  the  close  of  the  three 
days  of  conflict.  Along  this  road,  a  short  distance  out, 
stands  a  stone  house  in  which  General  Lee  had  his  head- 
quarters. The  next  road  immediately  after  this,  which  runs 
in  a  south-westerly  direction,  crossing  Seminary  Ridge 
below  the  seminary,  is  the  Fairfield  Road.  It  crosses  the 
South  Mountain  by  Monterey  Pass.  Upon  this  road  the 
Confederate;  army  retreated  after  the  battle. 

Turning  to  your  left,  you  see  in  the  distance  the  Adams 
County  Alms-house,  around  which  desperate  fighting  took 
place.  The  hills  to  your  left  are  CULP'S  and  WOLFF  HILL 
—  names  which  have  become  historic.  CEMETERY  HILL, 
crowned  with  the  stars  and  stripes,  rises  to  your  view  just 
beyond  the  town. 

Arrived  at  Gettysburg,  you  will  proceed  first  to  EAST 
CEMETERY  HILL.  This  stands  at  the  southern  edge 


538 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


of  the  town,  and  you  reach  it  by  going  out  Baltimore 
Street,  or  the  Baltimore  Pike.  Upon  this  hill,  to  your 
left,  and  directly  opposite  the  entrance  to  the  Soldiers' 
National  Cemetery,  is  the  center  of  the  Federal  position. 
A  view  of  the  breast -works  and  cannon,  which  yet  re- 
main, is  given  on  page  278  of  this  book.  Ilere  the  broken, 


OBSERVATORY  ON  EAST  CEMETERY  HILL. 
(From  a  photograph  by  Tipton,) 

but  heroic  survivors  of  the  First  and  Eleventh  corps  ral- 
lied behind  those  guns  which  you  see  around  you.  And 
here,  in  the  evening  of  the  second  day's  engagement,  the 
most  desperate  hand  to  hand  fighting  took  place.  The 
Louisiana  Tigers  charged  up  and  upon  this  hill  and  cap- 
tured the  gmis,  but  after  a  desperate  and  terrific  hand  to 
hand  fight,  in  which  the  butts  of  guns,  cannon  rammers,, 


VIEW   FROM    EAST    CEMETERY    HILL.  539 

and  stones  were  used,  they  were  driven  away,  and  in  their 
retreat  a  ba'tery  stationed  to  your  right  across  that  de- 
pression, swept  through  and  through  them  with  grape 
and  canister.  But  let  us  mount  the  Observatory  upon 
this  hill  and  take  a  survey.  Here  you  have  an  excellent 
view  of  the  scene  of  the  first  day's  engagement.  From 
Seminary  Ridge^about  a  mile  to  the  west,  and  a  half  mile 
south  of  the  Theological  Seminary,  to  about  two  miles  to 
the  north  and  north  -  east,  at  Barlow's  Knoll,  where  a 
monument  may  be  seen,  the  line  of  battle  extended.  Over 
the  fields  intervening  the  conflict  raged;  and  when  the 
Federals  were  compelled  to  fall  back,  they  retreated  over 
these  and  through  the  town  to  the  hill  upon  which  you 
stand.  Turning  your  eyes  to  the  west  and  south-west  you 
have  a  fine  view  of  Seminary  Ridge  upon  which  the  Con- 
federate line  rested  during  the  battles  of  the  second  and 
third  days.  The  illustrations  upon  pages  260  and  298 
show  this  ridge  from  where  the  Chambersburg  pike  crosses 
it,  to  that  point  where  Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's 
Corps  joined  the  right  of  Hill's;  and  the  illustration  in 
this  chapter — View  from  Little  Round  Top  looking  west  — 
shows  the  extension  of  that  hill  to  the  extreme  right  of 
the  Confederate  line. 

Turning  Sfcoward  the  east  —  but  about  a  half  mile  —  is 
Gulp's  Hill,  a  view  of  which  is  given  on  page  280,  and  be- 
yond it  is  Wolff  Hill,  where  the  Federal  right  terminated. 
Upon  Gulp's  Hill  you  will  see  the  Federal  breast  -  works, 
which  yet  remain  as  is  shown  on  page  302.  A  short 
distance  further  east  is  Spangler's  Spring,  where,  on  the 
evening  of  the  second  day  of  the  battle,  Johnson's  division, 
in  the  absence  of  nearly  the  whole  of  the  Twelfth  Corps, 


540  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

which  defended  that  part  of  the  line,  and  had  been  sent 
to  assist  in  repelling  Longstreet's  assault  upon  the  left, 
succeeded  in  obtaining  an  entrance,  which,  had  it  been 
followed  up,  might  have  proved  fatal  to  the  Federals. 
This  position  the  Confederates  held  during  the  night,  but 
were  driven  out  in  the  morning  after  a  fearful  and  des- 
perate engagement  of  six  hours  duration.  The  slain  here 
were  many,  the  Confederates  losing  most  heavily. 

Returning  from  Gulp's  Hill,  we  enter  the  SOLDIERS'  NA- 
TIONAL CEMETERY,  and  view  the  beautiful  resting-place  of 
the  heroic  slain.  A  beautiful  view  of  this  sacred  place  will 
be  found  in  the  preceding  chapter.  That  bronzed  statue 
near  the  entrance  is  to  the  brave,  noble,  and  gallant  REY- 
NOLDS. Although  the  place  of  his  death  is  a  mile  to  the 
west,  and  his  body  was  interred  at  Lancaster,  Pennsylvania, 
his  statue  was  placed  here.  It  is  but  right  that  in  the  ab- 
sence of  himself,  that  which  represents  him  should  be  placed 
among  his  gallant  fallen  comrades.  From  the  Cemetery,  as 
well  as  from  the  Observatory,  you  have  an  excellent  view 
of  the  Confederate  position  of  the  second  and  third  days. 
Upon  that  ridge  their  line  was  formed,  and  all  along  it 
down  to  Round  Top,  and  through  the  town,  and  around 
to  the  north-east  of  it — a  distance  from  one  extreme  to 
the  other  of  about  four  and  a  half  miles  —  a  line  of  bristling 
bayonets  stood.  And  all  along  that  ridge,  as  well  as  upon 
elevated  positions  to  the  north  and  north-east,  across  the 
fields  and  beyond  the  town,  their  batteries  were  planted. 
These  all  in  terrible  concert  opened  upon  the  place  where 
you  now  stand  during  the  fearful  two  hours'  prelude  to 
Pickett's  great  assault  -upon  the  afternoon  of  the  3d  of 
July.  The  ground  all  about  you  was  torn  and  ploughed 


ON   THE    WAY   TO   LITTLE   ROUND   TOP.  •      541 

with  shot  and  shell,  and  almost  every  foot  of  it  was  hal- 
lowed with  patriot  blood.  That  modest  looking  building 
you  see  to  your  left,  standing  by  the  side  of  the  Taney- 
town  road,  was  GENERAL  MEADE'S  HEAD  -  QUARTERS.  Just 
before  Pickett's  great  assault,  General  Meade  removed 
to  Powers'  Hill,  which  stands  about  half  a  mile  to  the 
south  -  east  by  the  Baltimore  pike,  where  General  Slocum 
had  previously  established  his  head  -  quarters. 

Having  satisfied  your  curiosity,  or  spent  as  much  time 
as  you  have  at  your  disposal  in  looking  about  this  part  of 
the  field,  you  will  next  proceed  to  LITTLE  ROUND  TOP. 

Round  Top  is  about  three  miles  south  of  Gettysburg, 
and  the  train,  if  you  go  by  rail,  will  land  you  at  Round  Top 
Parky  on  the  eastern  slope  of  that  historic  hill.  Passing 
down  by  rail  from  the  town,  you  go  between  the  lines  of 
the  two  armies  —  Seminary  Ridge  on  your  right,  and  Ceme- 
tery Hill  and  Ridge  on  your  left.  That  dilapidated  yellow 
farm  house,  with  a  barn  opening  toward  you,  about  two 
hundred  yards  to  your  right,  and  just  on  this  crossing  of 
that  lane,  marks  the  extreme  left  of  Pickett's  great  assault- 
ing column.  On  your  left  you  will  see,  on  the  slope  of  the 
hill,  a  dump  of  trees,  one  of  which  is  umbrella  shaped.  This 
was  the  center  and  focus  of  the  great  charge,  and  General 
Pickett,  it  is  said,  directed  his  men  to  aim  at  that  place. 
At  that  point  the  Federal  line  was  pierced;  there  General 
Armistead  received  his  mortal  wound;  near  it  Hancock 
was  wounded;  and  there  the  rebellion  received  its  death- 
blow. Excellent  yiews  of^Jhis  historic  place,  with  the 
ground  over  which  the  charge  was  made,  are  given  on 
pages  370,  374.  To  your  right,  as  the  train  crosses  the 
Emmittsburg  road,  you  will  see  a  brick  house  and  red  barn. 


-542  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

These  are  Codori's,  so  frequently  spoken  of  in  the  history 
of  the  battle.  These  buildings  mark  about  the  center,  of 
Pickett's  assaulting  column.  In  and  behind  the  grove,  about 
a  half  mile  west,  upon  Seminary  Ridge,  this  column  was 
formed. 

Over  the  ground  all  about  you  the  Confederate  hosts 
passed  under  a  terrific  artillery  and  musketry  fire.  The 
guns  from  Round  Top  and  East  Cemetery  Hill  ploughed 
through  and  through  them  diagonally  from  right  to  left, 
and  from  left  to  right,  covering  the  ground  with  their 
slain. 

Arriving  at  Round  Top  Park,  you  ascend  by  a  gradual 
slope  to  its  summit.  The  ground  over  which  you  pass  is 
historic.  Over  it  the  Union  forces  moved  to  charge  the 
enemy.  Round  Top  was  the  key  to  the  field,  and  to  seize 
and  hold  it  the  Confederates  made  the  most  determined 
and  desperate  efforts,  but  were  met  and  driven  back  by 
the  brave  defenders  of  the  Union.  This  hill  was  baptized 
with  blood.  That  monument  which  stands  out  so  con- 
spicuously marks  the  spot  where  the  brave  General  Strong 
Vincent  fell.  But  a  few  feet  to  its  rear  General  Weed  fell, 
and  Lieutenant  Ilazlett,  in  the  act  of  catching  him  in  his 
arms,  also  fell  pierced  by  the  bullet  of  a  sharp-shooter 
from  the  Devil's  Den.  Near  by,  too,  fell  the  lamented 
Colonel  O'Rourke  while  bravely  leading  his  regiment  against 
the  foe.  Then  to  your  left,  where  the  ground  begins  to 
slope  toward  the  depression  between  Little  and  Big  Round 
Top,  the  heroic  Chamberlain  threw  his  hardy  sons  of  Maine 
into  the  form  of  the  letter  U  to  meet  the  foe,  who  pressed 
upon  him  from  every  side.  And  down  through  the  de- 
pression between  these  two  hills  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves 


544  .  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

made  their  desperate  charge,  driving  the  enemy  before 
them,  and  this  Hill  of  Salvation  was  saved  to  the  Union 
cause.  And  when  the  Federals  by  main  force  succeeded 
in  planting  their  cannon  upon  its  rock- crowned  brow,  it 
became  a  second  Gibraltar,  and  victory  was  assured  to  the 
cause  of  Freedom.  Does  it  not  seem  that  God  planted 
that  rock -covered  and  rock -crowned  hill  just  at  that 
place,  with  its  bold,  precipitous,  and  almost  inaccessible 
side  to  the  enemy,  and  its  comparatively  gentle  elevation 
to  the  Federals,  for  the  express  purpose  of  saving  the 
American  Union? 

But  let  us  sit  down  now,  and  by  the  aid  of  this  beautiful 
illustration,  take  a  more  extended  view  of  the  field.  This 
view,  as  its  title  indicates,  gives  us  a  north-eastern  out- 
look. But  in  order  that  you  may  have  a  correct  under- 
standing of  the  situation  you  will  bear  in  mind  that  the 
Federal  line  was  in  the  shape  of  a  fish-hook.  The  heel 
of  that  hook  rested  upon  the  place  where  you  now  are,  its 
curve  upon  Cemetery  Hill,  —  the  high  ground  which  is  seen 
three  miles  off  to  the  right,  —  and  its  point  upon  Gulp's 
and  Wolff  Hills,  which  lie  further  to  the  right,  or  about  a 
half  to  three  quarters  of  a  mile  south  -  east  of  Cemetery  Hill. 
These  hills  are  not  seen  in  this  picture.  Gettysburg  lies 
behind  Cemetery  Hill.  The  Federal  line,  then,  on  the 
second  and  third  days  of  the  battle,  extended  from  Round 
Top,  and  in  front  of  it,  up  across  the  ground  between  you 
and  that  elevation  in  the  extreme  right,  and  then  curving 
in  an  easterly  and  then  in  a  south-easterly  direction,  ended 
upon  Wolff  Hill,  —  the  whole  about  three  and  a  half  miles 
in  length.  Seminary  Ridge,  upon  which  the  Confederate 
line  lay,  up  as  far  as  where  the  Chambersburg  road  crosses 


35 


546  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

it,  is  faintly  seen  in  the  distance.  This  view  embraces  the 
whole  field,  from  the  Federal  left  to  the  center,  and  all  the 
ground  within  view  was  fought  over. 

But  we  introduce  another  view  from'  this  same  hill, 
looking  west  and  north  -  west. 

This  view  presents  the  theatre  of  the  greatest  events  in 
human  history.  Within  an  area  scarcely  more  than  a 
mile  square,  and  directly  in  front  of  you  (the  corps  badge 
on  the  monument  marks  its  eastern  side,  or  the  side  next 
to  you),  amidst  those  fields  and  woods  and  rocks  and  stones, 
fifty  thousand  armed  men,  like  two  mighty  wrestlers, 
struggled  and  fought  for  four  hours  for  the  mastery, 
strewing  the  ground  with  their  slain.  But  let'  me  particu- 
larize. The  ridge,  or  high  ground  you  see  in  the  distance, 
and  which  extends  from  one  end  of  the  picture  to  the 
other,  is  Seminary  Ridge,  along  which  the  Confederate  line 
lay  during  the  battles  of  the  second  and  third  days.  On 
pages  260  and  298  you  have  a  view  of  this  ridge  from 
where  the  Chambersburg  pike  crosses  it  down  beyond  the 
Theological  Seminary.  On  that  part  of  the  ridge  the 
Federal  left  rested  during  the  battle  of  the  first  day  (facing 
west),  and  Hill's  Corps  was  stationed  there  during  the 
second  and  third  days.  This  view  shows  that  ridge  from 
where  it  ends  in  those  pictures  down  to  the  Confederate 
right  a  little  below  Big  Round  Top.  The  house  and  barn 
which  are  seen  just  beyond  the  right  of  that  grove  are 
Codorfs.  The  Emmittsburg  road  which  leaves  the  town 
close  by  the  western  base  of  East  Cemetery  Hill,  —  or  near 
the  curve  of  the  fish  hook, —  passes  by  that  house.  The 
group  of  buildings  this  side  of  the  grove  are  Trostle's;  and 
the  lane,  or  narrow  road,  which  is  seen  running  westward 


VIEW  FROM   LITTLE   ROUND   TOP.  547 

•close  by  those  buildings,  intersects  the  Emmittsburg  road 
a  short  distance  beyond  that  grove  a  little  to  the  left.  In 
the  left  hand  angle  where  these  roads  meet  is  the  Peach 
Orchard.  General  Sickles'  line,  in  the  battle  of  the  after- 
noon of  the  second  day,  extended  along  the  Emmittsburg 
road,  some  distance  to  the  left  of  Codori's  to  the  Peach 
•Orchard,  where  it  formed  an  angle  and  passed  down  in  a 
south-easterly  direction  through  and  across  the  woods  and 
iields  in  your  front  to  the  Devil's  Den,  which  is  about  six 
hundred  yards  in  a  south-westerly  direction  from  where 
you  sit.  Against  this  line  General  Longstreet  threw  his 
disciplined  and  brave  fighters,  and  upon  the  angle  at  the 
Peach  Orchard  the  fire  of  sixty  cannon  was  concentrated, 
until  after  some  of  the  most  desperate  fighting  that  ever 
occurred  upon  this  continent,  the  brave  boys  in  blue  were 
compelled  to  fall  back  step  by  step,  covering  the  ground 
wit;h  the  slain  of  the  two  armies.  At  the  same  time 
Hood's  Texans  outflanked  Sickles'  left  by  the  Devil's  Den, 
and  made  desperate  efforts  to  capture  this  hill.  Division 
after  division  from  the  Second  and  Fifth  Corps  were  sent 
to  assist  in  driving  back  the  enemy,  and  at  length  the 
hill  was  held.  In  that  enclosed  field  a  little  to  your  right, 
immediately  south  of  Trestle's  and  across  the  lane  from 
that  house  is  the  Wheat  Field.  There  occurred  what  is 
called  the  Whirlpool  of  the  Battle.  Regiments  from  three 
corps,  and  from  eight  or  ten  brigades,  here  fought  pro- 
miscuously. The  Confederate  lines  also  seemed  to  be  in 
confusion.  The  scene  as  the  men  advanced  and  then  fell 
back,  and  fought  in  a  circle  and  through  and  about  each 
other,  resembled  a  huge  whirlpool  and  suggested  the  title 
given  the  battle  at  this  place.  Hundreds  on  each  side 


548  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

here  fell,  and  the  ground  was  drenched  with  human  gore. 
Upon  no  other  two  places  of  equal  extent  upon  the  Ameri- 
can continent, —the  Wheat  Field  and  the  Peach  Orchard, — 
excepting  probably  the  Bloody  Angle  at  Spottsylvania, 
were  so  many  human  lives  lost,  and  so  much  human 
blood  shed.  On  page  327  a  view  of  the  Wheat  Field  is 
given.  That  view  is  from  the  west,  and  from  the  lane 
beyond  Trostle's.  Ayer's  division  of  Regulars  charged 
down  into  the  abyss  before  you  and  across  the  rocky  space 
into  those  woods,  but  were  driven  back  with  the  loss  of 
nearly  half  their  number.  An  officer  who  participated 
in  the  charge  says  that  it  seemed  like  "going  down  into 
hell."  The  illustration  on  page  325  shows  this  fearful  vale. 
It  is  called  "The  Valley  of  Death."  In  the  terrific  struggle 
for  the  possession  of  this  hill,  the  Confederates  at  length 
came  up  by  the  ravine  between  Big  and  Little  Round 
Top,  a  short  distance  to  the  left,  and  attacked  the  Federals 
in  flank  and  rear.  At  this  juncture,  when  the  result  of 
the  struggle  seemed  to  be  so  nearly  decided  in  favor  of 
the  Confederates,  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  under  the 
gallant  Crawford,  charged,  and  with  tremendous  cheers 
dashed  upon  the  foe  and  drove  them  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet  down  the  slope,  over  the  Valley  of  Death,  and 
across  the  stone  fence  by  the  Wheat  Field.  This  point 
the  gallant  Pennsylvanians  held  to  the  close  of  the  battle 
of  the  following  day,  when,  after  the  repulse  of  Pickett's 
assault,  they  made  another  charge  and  regained  the  ground 
lost  by  Sickles  the  day  before.  Big  Round  Top,  just  south 
of  you,  had  been  occupied  by  Confederate  sharp-shooters, 
and  in  the  evening  after  Longstreet's  final  repulse,  a  de- 
tachment of  Pennsylvania  Reserves  drove  them  away  and 


VIEW   FROM   LITTLE   ROUND   TOP.  549 

took  possession  of  the  hill,  and  held  it  until  the  final  re- 
treat of  the  enemy.  Its  abrupt,  precipitous,  and  rocky 
sides  prevented  artillery  from  being  taken  to  its  summit, 
hence  it  was  of  comparatively  little  value,  and  little  effort 
was  made  for  its  possession.  All  along  that  lane,  which 
runs  westward  by  Trestle's  and  the  Wheat  Field,  and 
among  those  rocks  and  boulders,  south  of  it,  are  monu- 
ments and  tablets  which  mark  the  places  where  noble  and 
heroic  men  fell.  Among  them  is  that  monument  in  the 
"Wheat  Field  to  General  Zook;  the  magnificent  monument 
to  Colonel  Ellis  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Twenty  -  fourth 
New  York,  surmounted  by  his  statue  in  marble,  a  little  to 
the  left  and  just  beyond  the  Devil's  Den;  and  that  hum- 
ble stone  tablet,  which  is  seen  across  the  Valley  of  Death, 
marks  the  spot  where  Colonel  Frederick  Taylor,  of  the  Buck- 
tails,  met  his  fate.  All  about  Trestle's  to  the  right  of  the 
Wheat  Field,  the  battle  raged  with  terrible  fury,  and  the 
ground  was  strewed  with  the  slain.  The  Devil's  Den,  that 
wonderful  freak  of  nature,  the  home  of  Confederate  sharp- 
shooters, by  whose  deadly  aim  so  many  prominent  officer^ 
fell,  is  seen  about  six  hundred. yards  in  front  and  a  little 
to  the  left.  (Fine  views  of  this  are  given  on  pages  320 
and  322.)  Visitors  should,  if  possible,  visit  the  places 
named,  all  of  which  except  the  Peach  Orchard,  which  is 
about  one  mile  distant,  are  within  easy  and  convenient 
reach. 

Before  dismissing  this  picture,  there  is  one  more  view 
which  is  [of  special  importance.  Turn  your  eyes  now  to 
the  grove  which  stands  upon  Seminary  Ridge,  directly 
west  of  Codori's,  (toward  the  top  of  the  picture,)  and  you 
have  the  place  where  PicketCs  great  assaulting  columns 


550  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

formed,  and  from  which  they  came.  The  ground  about 
Codori's,  and  up  to  the  Federal  line,  was  the  scene  of 
their  great  charge,  and  the  artillery  planted  upon  this, 
hill  decimated  their  ranks  as  it  ploughed  through  and 
through  them. 

BIG  ROUND  TOP,  as  already  stated,  was  not  of  so  much 
importance,  and  comparatively  little  fighting  was  done  for 
its  possession.  If  able  to  do  a  little  climbing,  by  all  means 
go  to  the  top  of  this  hill.  Stone  steps  wind  up  to  its 
summit,  upon  which  stands  an  Observatory,  from  the  top 
of  which  you  will  have  a  view  of  sublimity  and  grandeurr 
as  well  as  of  historic  interest,  which  has  few  equals  any- 
where. Upon  a  clear  day,  and  without  the  aid  of  a  glass,, 
Hanover  and  Littlestown  to  the  east,  Taneytown  to  the- 
south,  and  Emmittsburg  to  the  south  -  west,  can  be  seen. 
Even  the  hills  below  Frederick,  bordering  on  the  Poto- 
mac, are  visible.  With  the  aid  of  a  glass  the  view  is  of 
course  more  extensive  and  satisfactory.  In  the  fields  to- 
the  east,  sheltered  by  these  hills,  part  of  the  immense 
wagon  train  of  the  army  was  parked.  The  greater  part 
was  left  in  the  neighborhood  of  Westminster.  Upon  that 
elevated  ground  west  of  you  the  Confederate  right  restedr 
and  in  the  ravine  which  intervenes  Kilpatrick  made  his 
famous  dash  upon  the  Confederates  while  Pickett's  charge 
was  in  progress.  In  this  charge  the  gallant  Farnsworthr 
promoted  to  the  command  of  a  brigade  but  the  Sunday 
before,  fell. 

Visitors  should,  if  possible,  return  to  Gettysburg  by  the- 
Avenue,  which  runs  along  the  Federal  line.  Tablets  and 
monuments  of  exquisite  design,  and  some  of  them  exe- 
cuted at  great  expense,  are  found  all  along  this  avenue. 


MONUMENTS   ON   THE   FIELD.  551 

These  mark  the  places  where  distinguished  men  fell,  as 
also  where  the  various  corps,  divisions,  brigades,  and  regi- 
ments fought.  The  different  states  whose  sons  fought 
upon  this  field  are  vying  with  one  another  in  erecting  these 
mementos.  They  are  to  be  seen  standing  everywhere- — 
all  over  the  field  of  strife.  These,  with  the  hundreds 
which  will  yet  be  erected,  in  connection  with  the  sacred 
associations  of  the  place,  will  make  the  Battle  Field  of 
Gettysburg  a  place  of  the  greatest  interest  upon  the  Ameri- 
can continent  during  all  the  ages  to  come. 


APPENDIX. 


A. 

EXTRACT  FROM  HON.  A.  H.  STEPHENS'  ADDRESS  AT  SAVANNAH,  GEORGIA. 

Reference  is  made  on  page  108  to  the  address  of  Hon.  A.  H.  Stephens  in 
Savannah,  Georgia,  March  2ist,  1861,  upon  the  occasion  of  his  election  to  the 
office  of  Vice  -  President  of  the  Confederacy,  in  which  he  unequivocably  de- 
clared that  Slavery  was  the  basis  and  corner-stone  of  the  new  government 
sought  to  be  established.  That  part  of  this  address  which  relates  to  this  sub- 
j  uct  is  as  follows : 

•'But,  not  to  be  tedious  in  enumerating  the  numerous  changes  for  the 
better,  allow  me  to  allude  to  one  other — though  last,  not  least:  the  new  con- 
stitution has  put  at  rest  forever  all  the  agitating  questions  relating  to  our 
peculiar  institution — African  slavery  as  it  exists  among  us  —  the  proper 
status  of  the  negro  in  our  form  of  civilization.  This  was  the  immediate 
cause  of  the  late  rupture  and  the  present  revolution.  Jefferson,  in  his  fore- 
cast, had  anticipated  this,  as  the  'rock  upon  which  the  old  Union  would  split.' 
He  was  right.  What  was  conjecture  with  him  is  now  a  realized  fact.  But 
whether  he  comprehended  the  great  truth  upon  which  that  rock  stood  and 
stands,  may  be  doubted.  The  prevailing  ideas  entertained  by  him  and  most 
of  the  leading  statesmen  at  the  time  of  the  formation  of  the  old  constitution 
•were,  that  the  enslavement  of  the  African  was  in  violation  of  the  laws  of 
nature;  that  it  was  wrong  in  principle,  socially,  morally,  and  politically. 
It  was  an  evil  they  knew  not  well  how  to  deal  with ;  but  the  general  opinion 
of  the  men  of.  that  day  was,  that  some  how  or  other,  in  the  order  of  Provi- 
dence, the  institution  would  be  evanescent  and  pass  away.  This  idea, 
though  not  incorporated  in  the  constitution,  was  the  prevailing  idea  at  the 
time.  The  constitution,  it  is  true,  secured  every  essential  guarantee  to  the 

553 


554  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

institution  while  it  should  last,  and  hence  no  argument  can  be  justly  used 
against  the  constitutional  guarantees  thus  secured,  because  of  the  common 
sentiment  of  the  day.  These  ideas,  however,  were  fundamentally  wrong. 
They  rested  upon  the  assumption  of  the  equality  of  the  races.  This  was  an 
error.  It  was  a  sandy  foundation;  and  the  idea  of  a  government  built  upon 
it — when  the  storm  came  and  the  wind  blew,  it  fell. 

"Our  new  government  is  founded  upon  exaElly  the  opposite  ideas;  its 
foundations  are  laid,  its  corner  stone  rests  upon  the  great  truth  that  the 
negro  is  not  equal  to  the  white  man;  that  slavery,  subordination  to  the  su- 
perior race,  is  his  natural  and  normal  condition.  [Applause.]  This,  our 
new  government,  is  the  first  in  the  history  of  the  world,  based  upon  this 
preat  physical,  philosophical,  and  moral"  truth.  This  truth  has  been  slow 
in  the  process  of  its  development,  like  all  other  truths  in  the  various  depart- 
ments of  science.  It  is  so,  even  amongst  us.  Many  who  hear  me,  perhaps, 
can  recollect  well  that  this  truth  was  not  generally  admitted^  even  within 
their  day.  The  errors  of  the  past  generation  still  cling  to  many.  Those  at 
the  North  who  still  cling  to  these  errors  with  a  zeal  above  knowledge  we 
justly  denominate  fanatics.  All  fanaticism  springs  from  an  aberration  of  the 
mind;  from  a  defect  in  reasoning.  It  is  a  species  of  insanity.  One  of  the 
most  striking  characteristics  of  insanity,  in  many  instances,  is,  forming  cor- 
rect conclusions  from  fancied  or  erroneous  premises;  so  with  the  anti- slavery 
fanatics;  their  conclusions  are  right  if  their  premises  are.  They  assume  that 
the  negro  is  equal,  and  hence  conclude  that  he  is  entitled  to  equal  privileges 
and  rights  with  the  white  man.  If  their  premises  were  correct,  their  con- 
clusions would  be  logical  and  just;  but  their  premises  being  wrong,  their 
whole  argument  falls.  I  recollect  once  of  having  heard  a  gentleman  from 
one  of  the  Northern  states,  of  great  power  and  ability,  announce  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  with  imposing  effect,  that  we  of  the  South  would 
be  compelled,  ultimately,  to  yield  up  this  subject  of  slavery;  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  war  successfully  against  a  principle  in  politics,  as  it  was  in  physics 
or  mechanics: — that  the  "principle  would  ultimately  prevail — that  we,  in 
maintaining  slavery,  as  it  now  exists  with  us,  were  warring  against  a  principle 
—  a  principle  founded  in  nature  —  the  principle  of  the  equality  of  man.  The 
reply  I  made  to  him  was,  that,  upon  his  own  grounds,  we  should  succeed; 
that  he  and  his  associates  in  their  crusade  against  our  institutions  would 
ultimately  fail.  The  truth  announced,  that  it  was  impossible  to  war  success- 
fully against  a  principle  in  politics  as  in  physics  and  mechanics,  I  admitted; 
but  told  him  it  was.  he,  and  those  acting  with  him,  who  were  warring  against 
a  principle.  They  were  attempting  to  make  things  equal  which  the  Creator 
had  made  unequal. 


A.   H.    STEPHENS7   ADDRESS.  555 

"In  the  conflict  thus  far,  success  has  been  on  our  side  complete,  throughout 
the  length  and  breadth  of  the  Confederate  states.  It  is  upon  this,  as  I  have 
stated,  our  social  fabric  is  firmly  planted ;  and  I  can  not  permit  myself  to 
doubt  the  ultimate  success  of  a  full  recognition  of  this  principle  throughout 
the  civilized  and  enlightened  world. 

"As  I  have  stated,  the  truth  of  this  principle  may  be  slow  in  development, 
as  all  truths  are,  and  ever  have  been,  in  the  various  branches  of  science.  It 
was  so  with  the  principles  announced  by  Galileo  —  it  was  so  with  Adam 
Smith,  and  his  principles  of  political  economy.  It  was  so  with  Harvey,  and 
.  his  theory  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood.  It  is  stated  that  not  a  single  one 
of  the  medical  profession,  living  at  the  time  of  the  announcement  of  the 
truths  made  by  him,  admitted  them.  Now  they  are  universally  acknowl- 
edged. May  we  not,  therefore,  look  with  confidence  to  the  ultimate  universal 
acknowledgment  of  the  truths  upon  which  our  system  rests  ?  It  is  the  first 
government  ever  instituted  upon  principles  in  strict  conformity  with  nature, 
and  the  ordination  of  Providence,  in  furnishing  the  materials  of  human 
society.  Many  governments  have  been  founded  upon  the  principle  of  en- 
slaving certain  classes ;  but  the  classes  thus  enslaved  were  of  the  same  race, 
and  their  enslavement  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  nature.  Our  system  com- 
mits no  such  violation  of  nature's  laws.  The  negro,  by  nature,  or  by  the 
curse  against  Canaan,  is  fitted  for  that  condition  which  he  occupies  in  our 
system.  The  architect,  in  the  construction  of  buildings,  lays  the  foundation 
•with  proper  material — the  granite — then  comes  the  brick  or  the  marble. 
The  substratum  of  our  society  is  made  of  the  material  fitted  by  nature  for  it; 
and  by  experience  we  know  that  it  is  the  best,  not  only  for  the  superior,,  but 
for  the  inferior  race,  that  it  should  be  so.  It  is,  indeed,  in  conformity  with 
the  Creator.  It  is  not  for  us  to  inquire  into  the  wisdom  of  his  ordinances,  or 
to  question  them.  For  his  own  purposes  he  has  made  one  race  to  differ  from 
another,  as  he  has  made  'one  star  to  differ  from  another  in  glory.' 

"  The  great  objects  of  humanity  are  best  obtained  when  conformed  to  his 
laws  and  decrees  in  the  formation  of  governments  as  well  as  in  all  things 
else.  Our  Confederacy  is  founded  upon  principles  in  strifl  conformity  with 
these  laws.  THIS  STONE,  WHICH  WAS  REJECTED  BY  THE  FIRST  BUILDERS, 

*IS  BECOME  THE  CHIEF  STONE  OF  THE  CORNER*  IN  OUR  NEW  EDIFICE."     [Ap- 

plause.] 


556  THE  GREAT  INVASION. 


B. 

The  following  beautiful  poem,  from  which  I  have  quoted  a  single  verse 
on  page  109,  is  given  here  in  full.  It  was  written  by  a  Southern  man  to  the 
people  of  the  South.  In  the  rapid  recuperation  of  the  people  of  that  section 
of  our  restored  Union  from  the  effects  of  the  war,  and  the  increase  of  their 
manufacturing  and  educational  interests,  the  beautifully  expressed  desire  of 
the  author  has  been  already  largely  realized.  That  this  prosperity  may  ever 
continue  is  the  wish  and  desire  of  every  lover  of  his  country,  North  as  well 
as  South. 

TO  THE  SOUTH. 

O,  subtle,  musky,  slumbrous  clime  ! 

O,  swart,  hot  land  of  pine  and  palm, 
Of  fig,  peach,  guava,  orange,  lime, 

And  terebinth  and  tropic  balm  ! 
Land  where  our  Washington  was  born, 
When  truth  in  hearts  of  gold  was  worn  1 
Mother  of  Marion,  Moultrie,  I,ee, 
Widow  of  fallen  chivalry  ! 
No  longer  sadly  look  behind, 
But  turn  and  face  the  morning  wind, 

And  feel  sweet  comfort  in  the  thought : 
"  With  each  fierce  battle's  sacrifice 
I  sold  the  wrong  at  awful  price, 

And  bought  the  good;  but  knew  it  not." 

Cheer  up  I    Reach  out  I    Breathe  in  new  life  f 
Brood  not  on  unsuccessful  strife 
Against  the  current  of  the  age  ; 
The  Highest  is  thy  heritage  ! 
Iveave  off  this  death's-head  scowl  at  Fate, 
Throttle  this  hate  insatiate, 
And  into  thy  true  heart  sink  this : 
"  God  loves  to  walk  where  Freedom  is  I " 

There  is  no  sweet  in  dregs  and  lees ; 
There  is  no  fruit  on  girdled  trees. 
Plant  new  vineyards,  sow  new  fields, 
For  bread  and  wine  the  Future  yields ; 
Out  of  free  soil  fresh  spathes  shall  start.' 
Now  is  the  budding -time  of  Art ! 


MAURICE  THOMPSON'S  "TO  THE  SOUTH."  557 

• 

But  hark !    Oh  !  hear !    My  senses  reel  I 
Some  grand  presentiment  I  feel ! 
A  voice  of  love,  bouquet  of  Truth, 
The  quick  sound  of  the  feet  of  Youth  ! 

Lo !  from  the  war  -  cloud,  dull  and  dense, 

Loyal  and  chaste,  and  brave  and  strong, 
Comes  forth  the  South  with  frankincense, 

And  vital  freshness  in  her  song. 
The  weight  is  fallen  from  her  wings ; 
To  find  a  purer  air  she  springs 
Out  of  the  Night  into  the  Morn, 
Fair  as  cotton,  sound  as  corn. 

Hold !    Shall  a  Northman,  fierce  and  grim, 
With  hoary  beard  and  boreal  vim, 
Thus  fling,  from  some  bleak  waste  of  ice, 
Frost  -crystals  of  unsought  advice 

To  those  who  dwell  by  Coosa's  stream, 
Or  on  dark  hummocks  plant  the  cane 
Beside  the  lovely  Pontchartrain, 

Or  in  gay  sail -boats  drift  and  dream 
Where  Caribbean  breezes  stray 
On  Pensacola's  drowsy  bay? 

Not  so  !    I  am  a  Southerner ; 

I  love  the  South ;  I  dared  for  her 

To  fight  from  Lookout  to  the  sea, 

With  her  proud  banner  over  me ; 

But  from  my  lips  thanksgiving  broke, 

As  God  in  battle -thunder  spoke, 

And  that  Black  Idol,  breeding  drouth 

And  dearth  of  human  sympathy 

Throughout  the  sweet  and  sensuous  South, 

Was,  with  its  chains  and  human  yoke, 
Blown  hellward  from  the  cannon's  mouth, 

While  Freedom  cheered  behind  the  smoke ! 

MAURICE  THOMPSON. 
Crawfordsville,  Indiana. 


558  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 


c. 

CONSIDERATION  OF  GENERAL  SICKLES'  ALLEGED  DISOBEDIENCE  OF  ORDERS, 
'JULY   1ST,    1863. 

Since  the  preparation  of  the  chapters  relating  to  the  battles  of  the  ist  and 
ad  of  July,  1863,  a  controversy  has  arisen  between  certain  gentlemen,  formerly 
connected  with  the  First  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  General 
Sickles,  in  which  the  latter  is  charged  with  having  disregarded  an  order  sent 
him  by  General  Reynolds,  in  the  early  morning  of  July  ist,  and  also  one  from 
General  Meade,  on  the  following  day.  Unfortunately  the  only  persons  who 
could  decide  the  truthfulness  of  these  allegations  have  passed  away,  and  we 
are  left  to  decide  upon  the  fadls  and  circumstances  as  related  by  others.  These 
facts,  or  statements,  we  condense  and  place  upon  record  here. 

That  part  of  the  controversy  which  relates  to  the  conduct  of  General  Sickles 
on  July  ist,  is  as  follows:  Colonel  A.  Wilson  Norris,  in  an  address  delivered 
at  Gettysburg,  July  ist,  1886,  upon  the  occasion  of  the  dedication  of  a  monu- 
ment to  General  Reynolds  upon  the  spot  where  he  fell  twenty -three  years 
ago,  made  two  important  statements:  He  attempted  to  vindicate  the  battle  of 
the  first  day  from  a  charge  previously  made  by  General  Sickles,  in  a  speech 
delivered  in  Boston,  Massachusetts,  that  it  was  but  an  accidental  collision  of 
the  advanced  wings  of  the  two  armies,  and  without  much  influence  upon  the 
final  result;  he  also  charged  that  he — Sickles— failed  to  perform  the  part 
assigned  to  him  by  Reynolds.  Colonel  Norris  asserted  that  Reynolds  was  per- 
fectly aware  of  the  presence  near  Gettysburg  of  the  enemy  in  force  upon  the 
evening  of  Tuesday,  June  3oth,  and  that  he  had  determined  to  proceed  there 
the  following  morning  and  engage  him;  that  he  sent  an  order  to  Sickles  to 
advance  at  daylight  to  that  place,  which  brder  reached  him  at  one  o'clock 
A.  M.  of  Wednesday,  July  ist,  and  that  disregarding  this  order  he  delayed  to 
march  till  sometime  in  the  afternoon,  and  only  reached  the  front  late  in  the 
evening,  and  that  because  of  such  delay  the  Union  army  was  defeated. 

To  this  allegation  General  Sickles  enters  a  positive  denial.  In  an  address 
delivered  at  Gettysburg,  July  2d,  1886,  upon  the  twenty -third  anniversary  of 
this  battle,  Sickles  said  that  General  Meade,  as  well  as  Reynolds,  was  ignorant 
of  the  fact  that  the  enemy  were  in  force  at  Gettysburg,  that  a  place  for  battle 
had  been  decided  upon  on  the  line  of  Pipe  Creek,  between  Middletown  and 
Manchester,  some  twenty -three  miles  to  the  rear,  and  that  the  left  wing  of  the 
army,  consisting  of  the  First,  Third,  and  Eleventh  corps,  was  pushed  forward 
toward  Emmittsburg  and  Gettysburg  as  a  mask  to  enable  the  army  to  con- 


THE   GENERAL   SICKLES   CONTROVERSY.  559 

centrate  on  the  line  chosen.  The  Third  Corps,  he  said,  was  ordered  to 
Emmittsburg  to  hold  the  road  running  through  that  place,  and  while  there, 
as  directed,  in  the  afternoon  of  Wednesday,  July  ist,  he  received  information 
that  a  battle  was  in  progress  at  Gettysburg;  that  Reynolds  had  fallen';  that 
the  Federals  were  being  sorely  pressed,  and  that  he  was  needed  there.  He 
further  says  that  although  under  imperative  orders  from  the  commander  in 
chief  to  remain  at  Emmittsburg  and  hold  that  place,  he  at  once  upon  the 
receipt  of  information  of  the  perilous  condition  at  the  front,  left  two  brigades 
and  a  battery  of  artillery  at  that  place,  and  with  the  remainder  of  his  com- 
mand moved  as  quickly  as  possible  to  Gettysburg.  This,  too,  "without  or- 
ders; even  against  orders." 

The  case  will  be  better  understood  by  the  following:  Gettysburg,  Taney- 
town,  and  Emmittsburg  form  a  triangle,  with  the  first  named  as  its  apex,  and 
a  line  running  nearly  due  west  from  the  second  named,  its  south  -  eastern 
angle,  to  the  last  named,  its  south-western  angle,  as  its  base.  The  distance 
from  Gettysburg  to  Taneytown  is  thirteen  miles,  to  Emmittsburg,  ten  miles, 
and  from  Taneytown  to  Emmittsburg,  ten  miles.  Midway  between  these  two 
last  named  places,  at  the  crossing  of  the  Monocacy,  is  Bridgeport.  This 
place  is  distant  from  Gettysburg,  direEl,  twelve  miles,  and  by  way  of 
Emmittsburg,  fifteen  miles.  Marsh  Creek  is  four  miles  south  of  Gettysburg 
on  the  road  leading  to  Emmittsburg.  There  is  another  place  called  Marsh 
Creek,  four  miles  out  from  Gettysburg,  on  the  road  leading  to  Chambersburg. 
Both  these  places  are  at  crossings  of  the  same  stream  of  water.  During 
the  night  of  Tuesday,  June  30th,  — the  night  preceding  the  first  day's  engage- 
ment,—  General  Meade  was  at  Taneytown;  Sickles,  with  the  Third  Corps,  at 
Bridgeport;  Howard,  with  the  Eleventh  Corps,  at  Emmittsburg;  and 
Reynolds,  with  the  First  Corps,  at  Marsh  Creek.  In  the  forenoon  of  the 
preceding  day,  a  brigade  of  Confederates,  under  General  Pettigrew,  came 
in  by  the  Chambersburg  pike  to  a  point  within  a  mile  of  Gettysburg,  and 
then  fell  back  to  Marsh  Creek  on  the  same  road.  At  this  place,  during  the 
night  following,  the  divisions  of  Heth  and  Fender,  of  Hill's  Corps,  were 
encamped,  and  Anderson's  division  of  the  same  corps,  was  four  miles 
further  west  at  Cashtown.  Rodes'  and  Early's  divisions  of  Swell's  Corps, 
were  at  Heidlersburg,  ten  miles  north  of  Gettysburg.  General  Buford  in 
command  of  a  division  of  Federal  cavalry  passed  through  Gettysburg  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  day  (Tuesday),  and  apprised  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy, 
encamped  over  night  midway  between  Gettysburg  and  the  enemy  at  Marsh 
Creek. 

Such  was  the  situation  on  the  night  preceding  the  opening  of  the  battle. 
I^t  us  now  consider  whether  General  Meade  was  fully  apprised  of  the  con- 


560  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

dition,  and  what  were  his  plans;  and  whether  General  Reynolds,  as  has  been 
alleged,  had  another  plan  different  from  the  plan  of  the  commander  in  chief, 
and  whether  General  Sickles  disregarded  an  order  from  him.  Upon  these 
points  the  following  testimonies  are  adduced.  General  Doubleday  says: 

"  By  evening  Meade  was  fully  apprised  by  telegrams  and  Buford's  scouts, 
that  the  enemy  were  concentrating  on  Gettysburg.  He  knew  that  Reynolds 
at  Marsh  Creek  was  only  about  six  miles  from  Hill  at  Cashtown,  but  he  sent 
no  orders  that  night,  and  gave  no  indication  of  having  any  plan.  He  simply 
stated  that  the  enemy  were  marching  on  Gettysburg,  and  he  would  issue 
orders  when  they  developed  their  intentions.  Thus  the  opposing  forces  were 
moving  in  directions  that  would  necessarily  bring  them  in  contact,  and  a 
fight  or  a  retreat  was  inevitable,  for  one  or  both.  Reynolds  had  the  true  spirit 
of  a  soldier.  He  was  a  Pennsylvania!!,  and,  inflamed  at  seeing  the  devasta- 
tion of  his  native  State,  was  most  desirous  of  getting  at  the  enemy  as  soon  as 
possible.  I  speak  from  my  own  knowledge,  for  I  was  his  second  in  com- 
mand, and  he  told  me  at  Poolesville  soon  after  crossing  the  river,  that  it  was 
necessary  to  attack  the  enemy  at  once,  to  prevent  his  plundering  the  whole 
State.  As  he  had  great  confidence  in  his  men,  it  was  not  difficult  to  divine 
what  his  decision  would  be.  He  determined  to  advance  and  hold  Gettys- 
burg. He  directed  the  Eleventh  Corps  to  come  up  as  a  support  to  the  First, 
and  he  recommended,  but  did  not  order  the  Third  Corps  to  do  the  same.1'  * 

Speaking  of  the  conduct  of  General  Reynolds  in  the  morning  of  Wednes- 
day, July  ist,  after  being  apprised  of  the  proximity  of  the  enemy,  General 
Doubleday  says: 

"General  Reynolds,  in  consequence  of  the  duties  devolving  upon  him  as 
commander  of  the  left  wing  of  the  army, —  that  is,  of  the  First,  Third,  and 
Eleventh  Corps, —  had  turned  over  the  command  of  the  First  Corps  to  me. 
He  now  made  immediate  dispositions  to  go  forward  to  assist  Buford.  *  * 
He  sent  for  me  about  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  read  to  me  the  various 
dispatches  he  had  received  from  Meade  and  Buford,  and  told  me  he  should 
go  forward  at  once  with  the  nearest  division — that  of  Wadsworth  —  to  aid 
the  cavalry.  He  then  instructed  me  to  draw  in  my  pickets,  assemble  the 
artillery  and  the  remainder  of  the  corps,  and  join  him  as  soon  as  possible. 
Having  given  these  orders  he  rode  off  at  the  head  of  the  column,  and  I  never 
saw  him  again,  "f 

General  Doubleday's  statement  would  seem  to  imply  that  Reynolds  had 
formed  a  purpose  to  fight  the  enemy  at  Gettysburg  upon  his  own  responsi- 
bility, but  in  other  statements  it  is  evident  that  when  he  left  Marsh  Creek  for 

*  "  Chaticellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  page  122. 

f "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  pages  124,  125. 


THE    GENERAL    SICKLES    CONTROVERSY.  561 

Gettysburg  he  did  not  go  to  carry  out  any  prearranged  plan  of  his  own,  but 
" to  assist  Buford"  and  "aid  the  cavalry,"  and  that  to  afford  this  assistance 
the  Eleventh  Corps  was  needed  and  was  ordered  up  from  Emmittsburg,  and 
that  in  his  j  udgment  the  Third  Corps  might  also  be  needed,  and  could  render 
as  much  service  at  the  front  as  back  at  Emmittsburg,  to  which  place  it  had 
been  ordered.  General  Doubleday,  it  will  be  seen,  clearly  exonerates  Sickles 
from  the  charge  of  having  been  peremptorily  ordered  to  proceed  to  Gettys- 
burg, as  has  been  charged. 

General  Sickles,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  James'Beale,  of  Philadelphia,  dated  July 
I7th,  1886,  explains  some  seeming  inconsistencies  in  his  testimony  before  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  and  in  his  later  statements  in  relation 
to  what  he  terms  ' '  his  preliminary  orders  in  going  to  Gettysburg ' '  which  throw 
additional  light  upon  this  subject.  Au  extract  from  that  letter  is  as  follows: 

*  #  *  *  *  "You  intimate  a  desire  to  learn  from  me  whether  or  not 
I  received  any  orders  to  march  to  Gettysburg,  as  you  seem  puzzled  to  explain 
a  passage  in  my  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War 
(February  26,  1864),  in  which,  by  a  misprint,  I  am  made  to  speak  of  my  '  pre- 
liminary orders  in  going  to  Gettysburg, '  etc. 

"I  have  no  hesitation  in  addressing  you  on  the  subject,  as  I  recognize  the 
love  of  truth  and  j  ustice  which  governs  your  conduct  in  this  matter. 

"So  acute  a  critic  and  so  well-informed  a  military  student  as  yourself  can 
not  fail  to  see  from  the  context  that  the  word  '  Gettysburg  '  in  that  sentence 
of  my  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  in  which 
I  refer  to  '  my  preliminary  orders,'  etc.,  was  a  misprint  for  Emmittsburg.  I 
say  my  orders  were  '  to  go  there  and  hold  that  position  with  my  corps,  as  it 
was  regarded  as  a  very  important  flanking  position,  to  cover  our  rear  and 
line  of  communication.'  Surely  this  description  could  not  possibly  mean 
Gettysburg,  our  most  advanced  position,  to  which  Reynolds  had  been 
ordered,  and  which  he,  not  Sickles,  was  ordered  to  hold,  temporarily  at  least. 
The  obvious  misprint  is  preceded  by  another  of  the  same  tenor,  in  the  same 
paragraph,  equally  obvious,  in  which  I  am  made  to  say:  That  I  received  a 
dispatch  from  General  Howard,  'at  Gettysburg,''  between  two  and  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  July  ist.  Of  course  that  dispatch  was  received 
by  me  at  Emmittsburg. 

"The  whole  paragraph  in  my  testimony,  to  which  reference  is  made,  is  a 
statement  of  the  considerations  and  reasons  which  led  me  to  move  without 
orders  from  Emmittsburg  to  the  relief  of  General  Howard.  After  summing 
up  the  conflicting  orders  on  the  one  hand  and  the  earnest  appeal  of  Howard 
on  the  other,  my  conclusion  is  stated  as  follows:  ' I  therefore  moved  to  Gettys- 
burg on  my  own  responsibility.' 
36 


562  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

"Again,  I  proceeded  to  state  in  my  testimony,  February  26,  1864,  that  as 
soon  as  I  determined  to  march  to  Gettysburg,  '  I  addressed  a  communication 
to  General  Meade  from  Emmittsburg  informing  him  of  what  I  had  done,  and 
explaining  my  anxiety  to  have  his  sanction  of  it.  I  received  a  communica- 
tion from  him,  informing  me  that  he  approved  my  course,  and  that  the  two 
brigades  and  battery  I  had  left  at  Emmittsburg  would  be  relieved  and  ordered 
to  join  me.' 

"Why  ask  General  Meade 's  approval  of  my  march  to  Gettysburg  if  I 
moved  there  pursuant  to  orders  from  competent  authority  ? 

"The  suggestion  that  I  received  orders  from  General  Reynolds  during  the 
night  before  his  battle,  directing  me  to  march  to  Gettysburg,  is  absurd;  that 
is  to  say,  it  is  a  statement  contradicted  by  all  the  fadts  and  by  all  probabili- 
ties. First.  General  Reynolds  received  his  orders  to  move  to  Gettysburg 
late  in  the  night  before  his  battle.  Second.  He  did  not  know  that  the  enemy 
were  approaching  Gettysburg  until  Buford  reported  the  enemy  in  his  front, 
on  the  Cashtown  Road,  on  the  morning  of  July  ist.  Third.  General  Rey- 
nolds, on  the  morning  of  July  ist,  was  ordered  by  General  Meade  to  'with- 
draw the  force  at  present  at  Gettysburg,  two  corps  (First  and  Eleventh)  by 
the  road  to  TaneytOwn  and  Westminster,  and,  after  crossing  Pipe  Creek,  de- 
ploy toward  Middleburg.  The  corps  at  Emmittsburg  (Sickles'  Corps)  will 
be  withdrawn  via  Mechanicsville  to  Middleburg. '  Fourth.  My  senior  aid- 
de-camp,  Major  H.  E.  Tremaine,  sent  by  me  on  the  morning  of  July  ist  to 
communicate  with  General  Reynolds,  reached  Reynolds  at  Gettysburg  shortly 
before  he  fell  and  received  no  intimation  from  Reynolds  of  any  order  sent  to 
me  to  march  to  Gettysburg.  General  Tremaine,  writing  to  me  under  date  of 
June  28th,  1880,  says:  'I  recall  my  interview  with  General  Reynolds  shortly 
"before  he  was  killed,  and  his  message  by  me  to  you  suggesting  more  than 
otherwise  that  you  had  better  come  up,  and  that  without  orders  you  moved 
your  troops  from  Emmittsburg  to  Gettysburg.'  Fifth.  General  Hancock  in 
his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  states:  'On 
the  morning  of  the  ist  of  July  I  received  an  order  to  march  to  Taneytown.  I 
arrived  there  about  eleven  o'clock  and  massed  my  troops.  I  then  went  to 
the  head -quarters  of  General  Meade  and  reported  to  him.  While  I  was 
there  General  Meade  told  me  all  his  plans.  He  said  he  had  made  up  his 
mind  to  fight  a  battle  on  what  was  known  as  Pipe  Creek. 

"  'Shortly  after  that  conversation  General  Meade  received  a  message  from 
General  Reynolds,  who,  at  Gettysburg,  was  really  a  mask,  in  order  to  allow 
this  movement  (occupying  the  line  of  Pipe  Creek)  to  go  on  in  his  rear.' 

"Of  course,  General  Reynolds,  in  command  of  the  left  wing  of  the  army, 
was  as  well  informed  as  General  Hancock  or  myself  of  the  plans  of  General 


MR.  BEALE'S  DIGEST  OF  ORDERS.  563 

Meade.  I  had  received  from.  General  Meade,  on  the  morning  of  July  ist,  a 
similar  communication.  Is  it  conceivable  —  is  it  consistent  with  the  soldierly 
qualities  of  Reynolds  —  that  he  should  order  the  Third  Corps  to  Gettysburg 
in  defiance  of  the  plans  of  his  commanding  officer  and  in  direct  disobedience 
of  the  orders  requiring  the  whole  of  the  left  wing  to  fall  back  to  Pipe  Creek? 

"The  assertion  by  anybody  that  Reynolds  gave  such  an  order  on  the  night 
before  his  battle  betrays  the  grossest  ignorance  of  the  character  of  General 
Reynolds  and  of  all  the  facts  of  history  touching  this  question." 

Mr.  Beale,  to  whom  the  foregoing  letter  was  addressed  by  General  Sickles, 
has  published  a  digest  of  the  orders,  circulars,  and  other  communications, 
drawn  from  official  sources,  which  passed  between  General  Meade  and  his 
subordinate  commanders  on  the  day  before  the  first  day's  engagement,  and  also 
upon  the  first  day  of  the  battle,  which,  besides  showing  the  true  situation  at 
that  eventful  time,  prove  conclusively  that  the  charge  of  disobedience  to  an 
order  from  General  Reynolds  to  Sicklcc  is  entirely  without  foundation.  The 
following  is  Mr.  Beale's  paper: 

MEMORANDA  REFERRING  TO  MOVEMENTS,  JUNE  30  AND  JULY  i,  1863. 
June  jo,  1863. 

1.  Reynolds  to  Butterfield : 

"The  enemy  will  undoubtedly  endeavor  to  turn  our  left  byway  of  Fairfield 
and  mountain  roads  leading  down  into  the  Frederick  and  Emmittsburg  pike, 
tiear  Mt.  St.  Mary's  College." 

He  asks  for  an  engineer  officer  to  reconnoiter  this  position. 

2.  Meade  answers  at  1 1 : 30  A.  M. 

"In  case  of  an  advance  in  force  either  against  you  or  Howard  at  Emmitts- 
burg, YOU  MUST  FALL  BACK  TO  THAT  PLACE,  and  I  will  reinforce  you  from 
the  corps  nearest  to  you,  which  is  Sickles',  at  Taneytown. " 

3.  At  12:45  p-  M-  Meade  orders  Third  Corps  to  Emmittsburg,  with  sixty 
rounds  of  ammunition,  three  days'  rations,  and  ambulances.     "Enemy  re- 
ported to  be  in  force  at  Gettysburg.       *        *      You  will  report  to  General 
Reynolds,  and  throw  out  strong  pickets  on  the  roads  from  Emmittsburg  to 
Greencastle  and  Chambersburg. " 

4.  Meade  to  Sickles: 

"It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  you  should  move  with  your  infantry 
and  artillery  to  Emmittsburg  with  all  possible  dispatch." 

5.  When  about  half  way  out  toward  Emmittsburg,   Sickles  receives  a 
verbal  message — "Halt!"     He  writes  Meade,   enclosing  Reynolds'   order 
relative  to  "Cat -tail  Branch,"  and  says,    "It  agrees  with  written  orders  re- 


564  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

ceived  at  i  P.  M.  [see  3  and  4  above],  but  is  in  conflict  with  verbal  order  given 
by  the  commanding  general  while  on  the  march.     Shall  I  move  forward  ?  " 

[See  also  Humphrey's  testimony,  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Conduct  of 
the  War,  page  389.  ] 

6.  Meade  issues  a  circular  saying  he  "has  received  information  that  the 
enemy  are  advancing,  probably  in  strong  force,  on  Gettysburg.     *    *    Three 
corps  (First,  Third,   Eleventh,)  are  in  vicinitv  of  Emmittsburg,  the  Third 
Corps  being  ordered  up  to  that  point." 

7.  At  7:45  P.  M.  Sickles  notifies  Reynolds:    "  By  direction  of  the  general 
commanding  I  have  gone  into  camp  here,  countermanding  a  previous  order 
to  go  to  Emmittsburg,  AND  I  AM  TO  WAIT  HERE  FOR  FURTHER  ORDERS  FROM 
HEAD  -  QUARTERS  A.  OF  P.    When  these  orders  were  received  I  sent  Captain 
Crocker,  of  my  staff,  to  communicate  them  to  General  Reynolds,  AND  TO  IN- 
FORM HIM  OF  MY  POSITION." 

INFERENCES. 

(a.)    The  left  wing  was  considered  in  some  danger  of  being  flanked. 

(ft. )     Reynolds,  if  attacked,  was  to  fall  back. 

(c.)  Both  Meade  and  Reynolds  knew  where  the  Third  Corps  was,  it  being 
under  Meade's  special  orders,  and  practically,  temporarily  detached  from 
Reynolds,  though  co  -  operating  with  him. 

July  i,  1863. 

8.  Meade  issues  the  "Pipe  Creek  order."     (Report  of  Committee  on  Con- 
duct of  the  War,  page  353.) 

9.  He  sends  a  circular  to  Reynolds  in  which  he  refers  to  "General  Hum- 
phreys,  who  is  AT  EMMITTSBURG  WITH  THE  THIRD  CORPS," 

10.  "Pretty  late  in  the  morning"   (vide  Meade's  testimony,   page  347,) 
Meade  receives  Buford's  dispatch  to  Reynolds,  dated  at  Gettysburg,  June  30, 
10:30  P.  M.     (Report  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  page  352.) 

11.  Meade  to  Sedgwick: 

"It  is  not  improbable  he  [the  enemy]  will  reach  that  place  [Gettysburg] 
before  the  command  under  Major -General  Reynolds  (First  and  Eleventh 
Corps),  now  on  the  way,  can  arrive  there.  Should  such  be  the  case,  and 
General  Reynolds  find  himself  in  the  presence  of  a  superior  force,  he  is  in- 
structed to  hold  the  enemy  in  check,  AND  FALL  SLOWLY  BACK.  If  he  is 
able  to  do  this,  the  line  indicated  in  the  circular  of  to  -  day  will  be  occupied 
to-night" 

12.  Meade  to  French: 

"In  the  event  of  our  being  compelled  to  withdraw  or  retire  before  the 


MR.  BEALE'S  DIGEST  OF  ORDERS.  565 

enemy,  you  will  be  in  readiness  to  throw  your  command  by  rail  or  march,  as 
may  be  most  speedy,  into  the  defenses  of  Washington." 

13.  Meade  corrects  the  Pipe  Creek  order  so  far  as  it  relates  to  route  of 
withdrawal  of  THE  CORPS  AT  EMMITTSBURG. 

14.  At  12:30  P.  M.  Meade  writes  Hancock: 

"In  view  of  the  possible  failure  of  Reynolds  to  receive  the  order  to  with- 
draw his  command  by  the  route  through  Taneytown,  *  *  proceed  with 
your  troops  out  on  the  direct  road  to  Gettysburg  from  Taneytown.  When 
you  find  that  Reynolds  is  covering  that  road  (instead  of  withdrawing  by  F,m- 
mittsburg,  WHICH  IT  is  FEARED  HE  MAY  DO,)  you  will  withdraw  to  FrizeU- 
burgh,  as  directed  in  the  circular  issued  this  morning."  (See  No.  13,  ante.) 

INFERENCES. 

(d.)    Meade  was  well  aware  of  the  locality  of  the  Third  Corps. 

(e.)  He  expected  Reynolds,  if  attacked,  to  fall  back,  but  was  in  doubt 
whether  Reynolds  had  received  the  Pipe  Creek  circular.  (See  No.  14,  ante.) 

(f.)  Meade  was  taking  all  proper  precaution  in  case  of  any  reverse  to  his 
army.  (See  No.  12,  ante.) 

Now,  at  10:30  P.  M.  of  June  30,  Buford,  at  Gettysburg,  was  able  to  correctly 
locate  the  Confederate  army.  I  have  found  the  scout  who  brought  the  news 
late  that  evening  on  which  this  10:30  dispatch  is  based. 

Until  ii  P.  M.  that  night  Howard  and  Reynolds  were  at  Marsh  Run,  study- 
ing maps,  etc.  (See  Atlantic  Monthly,  July,  1876,  page  52.) 

Soon  after  this,  Buford  appears  at  Marsh  Run,  and  holds  conference  with 
Reynolds. 

Buford  returns  to  Gettysburg  with  one  of  Reynolds'  staff. 

This  staff  officer  reports  to  Reynolds  "very  early  in  morning  of  July  ist," 
with  the  latest  news. 

Quite  early  on  July  ist,  before  any  of  the  First  Corps  marched,  Buford  again 
appears  at  Marsh  Run,  and  says  to  Reynolds,  "I've  run  on  a  couple  of  regi- 
ments in  woods  near  Gettysburg,  lend  me  some  troops  to  feel  them." 

Reynolds  forwards  this  news  to  Meade,  and  the  First  Corps  march  fot 
Gettysburg. 

How  the  rest  of  the  First  Corps  may  have  traveled  I  know  not,  but  I  do 
know  our  division  (Robinson's)  moved  quite  leisurely.  In  fact,  when  we  re- 
ceived the  news  of  "trouble  ahead,"  Robinson,  his  staff,  and  many  of  his 
division,  were  eating  cherries. 

Now  here  are  Buford  and  Reynolds  in  close  and  frequent  conference  — 
Buford  in  full  and  correct  knowledge  of  the  locality  of  the  enemy.  How  in 


566  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

the  face  of  his  10:30  dispatch  could  Buford  a  few  hours  later  speak  of  "a 
couple  of  regiments,"  etc. 

Meade  was  using  Reynolds  as  a  mask  to  cover  the  Pipe  Creek  movement 
(see  Hancock's  testimony,  page  404).  Until  Meade  heard  of  Reynolds'  death 
(noon  of  July  ist),  Meade  was  expecting  Reynolds  to  "fall  back,  if  attacked, 
(see  ii  and  14,  ante). 

Did  the  death  of  Reynolds  upset  these  plans  ?  Who  is  responsible  for  the 
stand  made  on  Seminary  Ridge  ?  Had  Buford  and  Reynolds  concluded  to 
force  the  fight  there  at  all  hazards  ? 

See  Wadsworth's  testimony,  page  413. 

"It  was  a  matter  of  momentary  consultation  between  General  Reynolds 
and  myself  whether  we  would  go  into  the  town  or  take  a  position  in  front. 
He  decided  we  had  better  take  a  position  in  front." 

Meade  had  doubts  whether  Reynolds  had  received  the  Pipe  Creek  circular 
(see  No.  14,  ante).  Did  Reynolds  ever  get  that  circular  ?  The  general  belief 
is  he  did  not  receive  it. 

At  11:20  A.  M.,  July  ist,  Meade  receives  Reynolds'  message  from  Gettys- 
burg (the  aide  quotes  from  his  diary);  at  12:30  Meade  orders  the  Second  Corps 
out  (see  No.  14,  ante),  and  at  i :  10,  Meade,  having  heard  of  Reynolds'  death, 
orders  Hancock  to  the  front,  and  (see  Meade's  testimony,  page  330,  331, )  about 
6  or  7  o'clock  p.  M.,  having  heard  from  Hancock,  the  Pipe  Creek  movement 
is  abandoned,  and  the  Army  of  Potomac  march  on  Gettysburg. 

15.  Sickles  to  Howard,  3: 15  P.  M. : 

"I  have  at  this  moment  received  a  communication  from  an  officer  of  your 
staff,  and  also  two  written  communications  dated  at  i  and  i :  30  p.  M.  I  SHALL 
MOVE  TO  GETTYSBURG  IMMEDIATELY." 

16.  Sickles  to  Meade,  3:15  P.  M.  : 

"A  staff  officer  from  Howard  and  a  communication  dated  Gettysburg  1:30 
has  just  reached  me.  Howard  requests  me  to  support  him,  and  I  SHALL 

MOVE  IMMEDIATELY." 

17.  Sickles  to  Meade,  3:25  p.  M.  : 

"  I  shall  leave  a  brigade  and  a  battery  on  the  heights  beyond  Emmittsburg 
toward  Fairfield,  and  another  to  the  left  and  rear  of  Emmittsburg.  These 
have  orders,  if  unable  to  hold  Emmittsburg,  to  fall  back  to  Taneytown." 

1 8.  Sickles  to  Birney,  3:50  p.  M.: 

"Move  your  division  to  Gettysburg  immediately  and  report  to  General 
Howard." 

19.  Meade  to  Sickles,  4:40  p.  M.  :  , 
"  Have  just  learned  that  Howard  has  ordered  you  from  Emmittsburg  up  to 

Gettysburg;    *     *    do  not  wish  the  approaches  through  Emmittsburg  un- 


MR.  BEALE'S  DIGEST  OF  ORDERS.  567 

guarded  as  they  cover  our  left  and  rear.     *    *     Hold  on  until  you  shall  hear 
from  General  Hancock,  leaving  a  division  at  Emmittsburg,  AS  IT  IS  A  POINT 

NOT  TO   BE   ABANDONED   EXCEPT   IN   AN   EXTREMITY." 

20.  Meade  to  Hancock  and  Doubleday,  6  P.  M. : 

"Say  to  him  (Slocum),  I  thought  it  prudent  to  leave  a  division  of  the  Third 
Corps  at  Emmittsburg.  It  can  be  ordered  up  to-night  if  necessary." 

21.  Meade  to  Sedgwick,  7  p.  M.  : 

"The  present  prospect  is,  that  our  general  engagement  must  be  there" 
(Gettysburg). 

22.  Meade  to  commanding  officer  at  Emmittsburg,  7:30  p.  M.: 

Directs  that  "the  division  of  General  Sickles'  Corps  ordered  to  remain  at 
Emmittsburg  move  up  and  join  their  corps  on  the  field  of  Gettysburg." 

23.  Sickles  to  Meade,  9:30  p.  M.-: 

"  Our  left  and  rear  is  not  sufficiently  guarded.  *  *  This  is  a  good  battle- 
field." 

This  9:30  message  of  Sickles'  is  of  same  tenor  as  one  sent  by  Hancock  at 
5:25:  "It  is  a  position,  however,  easily  turned. " 

[Report  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  page  357.] 

INFERENCES. 

(.§".)  Sickles  moved  from  Emmittsburg  on  his  own  responsibility  and 
without  delay. 

(h. )  Meade  was  loth  to  let  Sickles  go,  but  on  finding  some  troops  had  been 
left  at  Emmittsburg,  Meade  fully  endorsed  Sickles.  (Sickles  really  had  an- 
ticipated Meade's  order.)  See  17,  18,  and  compare  19  ante. 

(£.)  On  the  evening  of  July  ist,  Meade  was  twice  notified  that  the  left  of 
his  line  was  weak.  (See  No.  23,  ante,  and  Hancock's  testimony,  page  405; 
also  Hancock's  message,  page  357.) 

Thus  it  is  shown  beyond  a  peradventure  that  the  movements  of  July  ist, 
until  noon,  as  far  as  they  were  controlled  by  General  Meade,  did  not  contem- 
plate any  serious  engagement  of  First  and  Eleventh  corps;  that  the  Third 
Corps  was  operating  under  direct  and  positive  instructions  from  General 
Meade;  that  the  Third  Corps  commander  was  guilty  of  no  delay  or  postpone- 
ment on  July  ist  in  coming  to  the  front;  that  he  actually  went  in  advance  of 
his  orders;  and  that  even  before  General  Meade's  arrival  at  Gettysburg,  he 
had  been  twice  notified  that  the  left  of  his  line  would  need  special  attention. 

JAMES  BEALE, 
Late  12th  Mass.  'Infy>  2d  Brig.,  2d  Div.,  ist  Corps,  A.  of  P. 

In  summing  up  this  matter  the  following  conclusions  seem  to  be  fully 
sustained  from  the  facts  given: 


568  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

1.  If,  as  has  been  alleged,  General  Sickles  received  an  order  from  Rey- 
nolds at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  Wednesday,  July  ist,  to  move  to 
Gettysburg,    that    order  was  received  by    him  at  Bridgeport  and  not  at 
Emmittsburg;  and  being  already  under  orders  from  the  commander-in-chief 
to  proceed  in  another  direction  to  occupy  what  was  supposed  to  be  a  very 
important  point,  is  it  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  reception  of  an  order, 
which  indicated  a  departure  from  the  plan  determined  upon,  and  the  execu- 
tion of  which  would  derange  that  plan,  would  be  at  least  reported  to  head- 
quarters, but  five  miles  distant?     This  inference  is  equally  applicable  were 
the  dispatch  the  "  recommendaiion  "  spoken  of  by  General  Doubleday  and 
not  a  peremptory  order. 

2.  Generalj  Sickles,  as  Doubleday  says  on  page  125  of  the  book  already 
referred  to,   "was  under  orders  to  march  to   Emmittsburg,  to  relieve  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  which  was  directed  to  join  the  First  at  Gettysburg."     If 
Reynolds  issued  an   order  to  Sickles  to  march  to  Gettysburg,  that  order 
was  issued   subsequent  to   the   order  to  Howard,    for   the  former   was  en 
route  to  Emmittsburg  to  enable  the  latter  to  comply  with  the  order  to  him. 
Howard's  order  evidently  did  not  reach  him  until  after  six  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  * 

3.  General  Tremaine,   of  Sickles'  staff,    who  was  present  at  Gettysburg 
when  General  Sickles  delivered  his  address  there,  said  that  he  was  the  only 
officer  in  communication  between  Sickles  and  Reynolds,  and  that  he  was 
sent  by  the  former  to  the  latter's  head-quarters  on  the  night  of  June  3oth, 
and  that  the  first  intimation  he  had  of  a  desire  upon  the  part  of  Reynolds  for 
Sickles  to  advance  was  about  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  July  ist,  and 
that  his  wish  did  not  come  in  the  form  of  an  order,  but  a  suggestion,  and  that 
he  at  once  set  out  for  Sickles'  head-quarters  to  deliver  this  suggestion.     That 
suggestion  for  Sickles  to  advance  is  entirely  inconsistent  with  an  order  pre- 
viously given  to  do  so;  and  it  could  not  have  reached  him  before  ten  o'clock 

A.  M. 

4.  General  Carr  says  that  he  was  in  command  that  day  (July  ist,)  while 
Sickles,  as  directed  by  Meade,  was  reconnoitering  the  country  about  Em- 
mittsburg  for  a  battle-field  in  case  one  were  needed  there,  and  the  first  order 
to  move  to  Gettysburg  came  from  Hancock  about  two  o'clock  P.  M.,  and  that 
with  that  order  came  the  news  of  Reynolds'  death. 

5.  The  foregoing  should    settle  the   question,    and  show  that    General 
Sickles  received  no  order  from  Reynolds,  as  alleged.     The  following,  how- 
ever, from  General  Meade  establishes  this  fact  beyond  dispute : 

*  General  Doubleday's  "  Chancellorsville  and  Gettysburg,"  page  124. 


SUMMARY   OF   THE   FACTS.  569 

HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  July  i,  1:10  p.  it,  1863. 
Commanding  Officer  of  the  Second  Corps  (Hancock): 

The  Major -General  commanding  has  just  informed  me  that  General  Reynolds 
has  been  killed  or  badly  wounded.  He  directs  that  you  turn  over  the  command  of 
your  corps  to  General  Gibbon;  that  you  proceed  to  the  front,  and  by  virtue  of  this 
order,  in  case  of  the  truth  of  General  Reynolds'  death,  you  assume  command  of  the 
corps  there  assembled,  viz:  The  Eleventh,  First,  and  Third,  at  Emmittsburg,  If  you 
consider  the  ground  and  position  there  a  better  one  to  fight  a  battle  under  existing 
circumstances,  you  will  so  advise  the  General  and  he  will  order  all  the  troops  up. 
You  know  the  General's  views,  and  General  Warren,  who  is  fully  aware  of  them, 
has  gone  out  to  see  General  Reynolds. 

D.    BUTTERFIELD, 

Major-  General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

The  fact  that  General  Meade  located  Sickles'  Corps  at  Emmittsburg*as  late 
as  i :  10  P.  M.  on  the  first  day  of  the  battle,  and  ordered  its  advance,  through 
General  Hancock,  to  Gettysburg,  dissipates  entirely  the  theory  of  an  earlier 
order  from  General  Reynolds.  Assuming  then  that  the  first  order  •which 
Sickles  received  to  move  to  the  front  came  from  Hancock,  and  that  Hancock 
issued  that  order  immediately  upon  receiving  Meade's  order,  it  could  not 
have  reached  him  before  the  time  stated  by  General  Carr,  namely,  two  o'clock, 
and  probably  later,  for  the  distance  it  had  to  be  carried  from  Taneytown  to 
Emmittsburg  i.;  ten  miles. 

6.  If  General  Reynolds,  burning  with  the  fire  of  patriotism,  and  a  desiro 
to  attack  the  invaders  and  despoilers  of  his  State,  did,  in  the  exercise  of  a 
discretion  which  his  temporary  position  as  commander  of  the  left  wing  of 
the  army,  enabled  him  to  assume,  form  a  plan  and  purpose  of  his  own,  which 
conflicted  with  the  plan  of  his  commander  in  chief,  and  took  measures  to 
carry  his  plan   into  execution  without  informing  him  of   it  when  he  had 
abundant  time  to  do  so,  he  was  guilty  of  disrespect  and  discourtesy,  if  not  of 
downright  disobedience  and  insubordination.     Who  would  entertain  such  a 
reflection  upon  General  Reynolds  ? 

7.  General  Sickles,   as  already  stated,  was  under  orders  from  the  com 
mander  in  chief  to  proceed  to  Emmittsburg  and  hold  that  place,   and  in 
accordance  with  this  order  he  did,   in  the  morning  of  July  ist,  proceed  from 
Bridgeport  to  the  place  named,  and  while  there  engaged  in  reconnoitering 
the  country  for  a  battle-field  in   case  one  were   needed  there,  he  received 
about  two  or  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  a  dispatch  from  General  Howard, 
telling  of  the  critical  condition  at  Gettysburg,  and  directing  him  to  come  as 
quickly  as  possible  to  his  assistance.     Upon  the  receipt  of  this  order  or  re- 
quest (General  Sickles  claims  that  under  the  circumstances  he  was  not  sub- 
ject to  the  orders  of  Howard)  he  "without  orders  and  against  orders"  left 


570  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

two  brigades  and  a  battery  to  hold  the  place  and  marched  with  all  possible 
speed  with  the  remainder  of  his  command  to  the  point  of  danger.  How 
striking  the  contrast  between  his  conduct  and  that  of  General  Slocum,  whose 
corps  was  at  Two  Taverns,  but  five  miles  from  the  field,  and  who  was  repeat- 
edly importuned  by  Howard  to  come  to  his  assistance,  but,  held  by  Meade's- 
orders  for  an  expected  concentration  elsewhere,  refused  to  do  so. 


D. 


DID    GENERAL   SICKLES    DISREGARD    AN    ORDER    FROM    GENERAL    MEADE    ON 

JTJLY   2D,    1863? 

It  has  generally  been  supposed  that  General  Sickles  acted  imprudently,  if 
not  in  direct  disobedience  of  orders,  in  advancing  his  line  so  far  from  the 
position  he  was  expected  to  take  on  July  2d.  General  Meade,  in  his  official 
report  to  the  government,  charges  that,  either  through  misapprehension  or 
disobedience,  General  Sickles  advanced  his  line  a  half  to  three  quarters  of  a 
mile  from  the  position  he  was  directed  to  take,  and  that  by  so  doing  he 
brought  on  the  engagement  before  he  (Meade)  was  prepared  for  it,  and  that 
he  thereby  endangered  the  whole  army.  When  this  report  was  made  General 
Sickles  went  in  person  to  President  Lincoln  and  asked  for  a  court  of  inquiry 
for  the  purpose  of  correcting  the  charge,  which,  he  claimed,  was  erroneous 
and  did  him  injustice.  Mr.  Lincoln  said:  "Sickles,  they  say  you  pushed 
out  your  men  too  near  the  enemy,  and  began  the  fight  just  as  that  council 
was  about  to  meet,  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  battle.  I  am 
afraid  what  they  say  of  you  is  true,  and  God  bless  you  for  it.  Don't  ask  us 
to  order  an  inquest  to  relieve  you  from  bringing  on  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 
History  will  set  you  all  right  and  give  everybody  his  j  ust  place,  and  there  is- 
glory  enough  to  go  all  around."  To  the  remonstrance  of  the  president  Gen- 
eral Sickles  yielded,  and  no  inquiry  was  had  into  the  charge  made  by  the 
commander  in  chief.  Public  opinion,  however,  from  that  day  to  the  present 
has  been  divided  as  to  the  propriety  of  Sickles'  course,  many  believing  that 
he  acted  imprudently,  and  perhaps  an  equal  number  that  the  position  he 
took  was  the  best  one.  Colonel  Batchelder,  the  Government  Gettysburg  His- 
torian, said  once  in  the  hearing  of  the  writer,  that  he  had  consulted  fifty -six 
general  officers  who  participated  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  as  to  Sickles* 
position,  and  they  were  about  equally  divided  in  their  opinion  regarding  it. 


THE    GENERAL    SICKLES    CONTROVERSY.  571 

Recently  General  Sickles  has  been  making  some  extravagant  assertions 
touching  the  part  his  corps  took  in  the  battle  of  the  2d  of  July,  claiming  sub- 
stantially that  it  fought  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  and  that  the  battle  of  the 
first  day  was  but  an  accidental  and  unimportant  affair.  This  indiscretion 
upon  his  part,  as  might  be  expected,  has  led  to  a  renewal  of  the  charges 
made  against  him,  and  much  bad  feeling  has-  been  evoked.  The  case  has. 
assumed  such  shape  that  it  demands  our  attention,  and  we  shall  consider  it 
as  follows: 

Colonel  James  C.  Biddle,  of  General  Meade's  staff,  in  the  Philadelphia 
Press  of  July  i8th,  1886,  thus  presents  the  case  against  Sickles: 

"  General  Meade,  after  a  careful  inspection  of  the  ground,  in  the  early 
morning  of  July  2d,  issued  orders  to  his  corps  commanders  directing  the 
positions  they  were  to  take.  Under  these  orders  General  Sickles  was  di- 
rected to  form  his  corps  in  line  of  battle  on  the  left  of  the  Second  Corps, 
commanded  by  General  Hancock,  his  right  resting  on  Hancock's  left  and 
his  left  on  Round  Top,  if  it  was  practicable  to  occupy  it.  Between  eight  and 
nine  o'clock  A.  M.  these  orders  were  repeated  to  General  Sickles,  and  further- 
more he  was  told  that  he  was  to  relieve  Geary's  division,  and  to  occupy  the 
position  it  was  understood  General  Hancock  had  put  Geary  in  the  night 
before.  It  should  be  stated  here  that  General  Geary  had  had  two  regiments 
on  I,ittle  Round  Top  during  the  hight  of  July  I.  Even  as  late  as  between 
eleven  A.  M.  and  twelve  M.  General  Sickles  came  to  General  Meade's  head- 
quarters, when  the  latter  distinctly  told  him  that  his  right  was  to  be 
Hancock's  left,  his  left  on  Round  Top,  which  General  Meade  pointed  out 
to  him. 

"  Between  three  and  four  p.  M.  I  rode  with  General  Meade  to  the  left  of  our 
line  occupied  by  General  Sickles  with  the  Third  Corps.  General  Meade, 
after  surveying  the  position,  sent  for  General  Sickles  and  on  meeting  him 
said  in  my  presence : 

"  'General  Sickles,  why  have  you  not 'obeyed  my  orders  to  connect  with 

General  Hancock's  left,  with  your  left  on  Little  Round  Top?' 

• 
"General  Sickles  answered  that  he  had  moved  out  to   occupy  the   high 

ground  on  which  he  had  formed  his  line.     General  Meade  replied: 

"  'This  is  neutral  ground.  The  guns  of  the  enemy  command  it,  our  guns 
command  it,  and  you  can  not  occupy  it  for  the  very  same  reason  that  they 
can  not. ' 

"General  Sickles  expressed  regret  that  he  should  have  occupied  a  posi- 
tion that  did  not  meet  with  General  Meade's  approval,  and  asked  if  he  should 
move  to  the  line  designated.  General  Meade  replied: 

"'Yes,  you  may  as  well,  at  once.     The  enemy  will  not  let  you  withdraw 


572  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

without  taking  advantage  of  your  position,  but  you  have  to  come  back  and 
may  as  well  do  it  at  once  as  at  any  other  time.' 

"  General  Sickles  left  to  carry  out  this  movement,  and  had  not  gone  more 
than  a  few  hundred  feet  when  the  enemy  opened  upon  him,  enfilading  his 
entire  corps.  General  Meade  called  Sickles  back  and  told  him  that  it  was 
now  too  late  for  him  to  retire,  and  that  he  must  hold  his  line  as  best  he  could 
and  that  he  would  support  him. 

"General  Warren  had  accompanied  General  Meade  when  he  rode  out  to 
General  Sickles'  advanced  position.  As  soon  as  General  Meade  saw  the 
condition  of  affairs  he  ordered  General  Warren  to  ride  at  once  to  Little 
Round  Top,  see  what  troops,  if  any,  were  there  and  to  take  every  measure 
for  its  proper  defense.  Fortunately,  by  the  timely  arrival  of  the  Fifth  Corps, 
which  General  Meade  had  ordered  over  to  his  left  before  going  to  General 
Sickles,  General  Warren  was  enabled  to  secure  Vincent's  brigade,  which 
was  hurried  on  to  Round  Top,  and,  after  a  most  desperate  and  bloody  en- 
counter, secured  this  most  important  position,  which  Sickles  had  neglected 
to  occupy.  General  Meade  remained  on  or  about  that  part  of  the  field  where 
the  enemy's  attack  was  made  throughout  the  whole  of  the  contest,  bringing 
forward  reinforcements  from  all  parts  of  the  field,  himself  leading  Lock- 
wood's  brigade  into  action.  His  horse  was  shot  under  him  during  the  en- 
gagement. Finally,  owing  to  the  valor  and  admirable  fighting  of  the  troops, 
to  the  hearty  co-operation  of  the  superior  officers  and  to  the  skillful  handling 
of  the  army,  was  the  enemy's  attack  repulsed,  and  a  new  line,  where  General 
Meade  had  intended  originally  that  General  Sickles  should  form,  was  occu- 
pied by  the  sxipports  that  had  been  brought  up  and  held  until  the  end  of  the 
battle." 

General  Sickles,  in  an  address  delivered  at  Gettysburg,  on  the  twenty- 
third  anniversary  of  the  great  engagement,  thus  gives  his  side  of  the  case: 

' '  It  has  been  said  that  General  Meade  had  formed  a  plan  of  battle  on  the 
left,  and  assigned  a  position  to  my  corps  on  that  flank,  from  which  I  advanced 
on  the  enemy  too  soon,  and  that  advance  so  disarranged  General  Meade's 
plans  as  to  hazard  their  successful  execution.  My  statement  is  that  no  plan 
of  battle  whatever  had  been  promulgated  to  any  corps  commander,  or  to  any 
officer  of  the  general  staff  on  July  ad.  The  enemy  had  a  plan  of  battle,  but 
we  had  none." 

The  General  further  said  that  Meade's  attention  was  altogether  turned  to 
his  right,  where,  he  thought  the  real  attack  would  be  made ;  and  that  to  the 
repeated  notices  he  sent  him  that  the  enemy  was  massing  large  bodies  of 
troops  opposite  his  left,  and  that  Little  Round  Top  should  be  at  once  strongly 
occupied,  he  paid  no  attention  whatever.  He  further  said  that  he  sent 


THE   GENERAL    SICKLES   CONTROVERSY.  573 

repeatedly  for  Meade  to  come  and  see  for  himself,  or  to  send  General  Warren, 
his  chief  engineer,  but  neither  of  them  paid  any  attention  to  his  requests. 
At  length,  when  he  found  that  he  could  not  get  either  the  commander  in 
chief,  or  his  chief  engineer,  to  come  and  see  the  point  of  danger  and  give  his 
support  and  orders,  he  asked  for  General  Hunt,  the  chief  of  artillery,  who 
was  sent,  and  who  approved  of  the  position  he  had  taken.  In  support  of 
these  allegations,  as  well  as  those  to  follow,  Sickles  quotes  numerous  authori- 
ties, Federal  and  Confederate.  Upon  the  point  of  having  received  no  orders 
from  Meade,  Sickles  said,  pointing  to  General  Tremaine,  who  sat  near  him 
and  assented  to  what  he  said,  "There 's  the  officer  whom  I  kept  in  the  saddle 
from  sunrise  till  the  battle  opened,  imploring  him  (Meade)  to  send  troops  to 
t,ittle  Round  Top." 

The  following  are  further  extracts  from  this  speech : 

"The  battle  of  July  2d  was  fought  on  the  lines  I  occupied,  on  my  own  re- 
sponsibility. The  battle  was  fought,  so  far  as  the  Third  Army  Corps  is  con- 
cerned, without  orders  of  any  nature  or  kind  whatever  from  the  commanding 
general  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac.  From  sunrise  on  the  morning  of  July 
2d  until  after  six  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  I  was  wounded,  I  received 
no  order  from  General  Meade  relating  to  the  dispositions  of  my  troops  or  to 
the  conduct  of  the  battle,  except  that  I  was  to  occupy  the  position  General 
Geary  had  left,  which  I  at  once  reported  to  General  Meade  was  no  position 
at  all,  and  the  further  exception  that  at  half -past  three,  when  the  battle  was 
in  progress,  General  Meade  directed  me  to  call  on  General  Hancock  for  sup- 
port for  my  right  and  upon  General  Sykes  for  the  support  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
on  my  left  and  upon  the  artillery  of  the  reserve  for  such  batteries  as  I  might 
need. 

"  From  half-  past  three  in  the  afternoon  until  after  six  o'clock,  when  I  was 
wounded,  I  received  no  communication  from  him  on  the  field.  *  *  *  * 

"lam,  therefore,  alone  responsible  for  the  lines  on  which  the  battle  of 
July  ad  was  fought.  Good  or  bad,  it  was  my  line.  I  am  not  responsible  for 
the  delay  in  occupying  Round  Top,  the  key  of  our  position  on  the  left.  I 
had  repeatedly  urged  General  Meade  to  send  infantry  and  artillery  to  L.ittle 
Round  Top,  but  he  did  not  do  so,  nor  did  he  approve  my  suggestion  that  I 
should  occupy  it  in  force.  General  Meade  did  not  concur  in  my  belief  that 
the  enemy  would  make  a  serious  attack  on  our  left,  hence  he  made  no  dispo- 
sitions himself  and  authorized  none  on  my  part  to  meet  such  an  attack.  At 
length,  when  the  assault  of  the  enemy  was  so  imminent  that  I  could  wait  no 
longer  for  orders,  I  made  my  own  dispositions  to  meet  it.  I  advanced  my 
corps  so  as  to  occupy  higher  and  better  fighting  ground,  cleared  away  the 
fences  which  obstructed  my  movements.  I  took  positions  which  threatened 


574  THE    GREAT   INVASION! 

the  flank  of  the  enemy  in  moving  to  our  left  and  forced  him  to"attack  me  on 
my  front. 

"I  knew  that  the  enemy  had  massed  in  my  front  and  on  my  left  a  much 
larger  force  than  I  had  under  my  command.  I  had  so  reported  to  General 
Meade  more  than  once  or  twice  or  thrice,  but  he  did  not  accept  my  estimate 
of  the  strength  of  the  assaulting  columns  of  the  enemy,  nor  my  judgment  as 
to  the  design  of  the  enemy  to  turn  our  left.  He  believed  the  enemy  was 
making  a  demonstration  on  my  front  to  cover  a  serious  attack  on  our  right. 
The  Fifth  Corps  had  been  kept  all  the  morning  on  the  right  as  a  reserve. 
There  was  no  reserve  within  supporting  distance  on  the  left.  Buford's  di- 
vision of  cavalry,  the  only  support  on  my  left,  had  been  ordered  away  to  the 
rear,  toward  Westminster." 

Upon  due  consideration  of  the  two  conflicting  statements  thus  given,  I  ar- 
rive at  the  following  conclusions: 

1.  It  is  scarcely  conceivable  that  in  such  an  emergency  as  confronted  Gen- 
eral Meade  in  the  morning  of  July  2d,  he  would  give  no  directions  whatever 
concerning  the  posting  of  troops  on  every  part  of  the  iield,  especially  upon 
his  left,  which  was  the  most  exposed,  and  to  which  his  attention  had  been 
specially  directed.     We  assume  then  that  he  undoubtedly  did  give  General 
Sickles  some  order. 

2.  Colonel  Biddle  asserts  most  positively  that  General  Meade  did  order 
General  Sickles  to  place  his  line  with  his  right  joining  Hancock's  left,  and 
his  left  upon  Little  Round  Top ;  and  General  Sickles  declares  as  positively 
that  General  Meade  gave  no  order  whatever.    And  yet  both  these  men  concur 
in  the  statement  that  an  order  such  as  Colonel  Biddle  asserts  Meade  gave, 
was  actually  given,  with  the  qualification  that  Sickles  was  to  place  his  troops 
in  the  position  General  Geary  had  occupied  during  the  night,  which  was  upon 
Little  Round  Top,   "provided  it  was  practicable  to  occupy  it."     How  can 
this  qualification,  which  is  equally  admitted  by  both  Colonel  Biddle  and  Gen- 
eral Sickles,  be  reconciled  with  the  declaration  of  the  former  of  a  positive 
and  unqualified  order,  and  the  assertion  of  the  latter  of  no  order  whatever? 

3.  In  this  qualification,  which  is  admitted  by  both  parties,  the  solution 
of  the  difficulty  seems  to  lie.     General  Sickles  was  given  a  discretion  so  far  as 
occupying  Little  Round  Top  was  concerned,  and  he  used  that  discretion  con- 
cerning his  whole  line,  and,  for  reasons  which  seemed  satisfactory  to  himself 
and  his  engineers,  he  chose  the  advanced  position  for  which  he  is  blamed. 

4.  General  Sickles  is  again  inconsistent  in  the  fact  that  in  the  discretion 
given  him  concerning  Round  Top,  he  reported  that  "that  there  was  no  posi- 
tion there  at  all, ' '  and  yet  says  that  he  sent  aid  after  aid  to  the  commander 
in  chief,  urging  him  to  send  troops  to  occupy  that  place. 


THE   GENERAL   SICKLES   CONTROVESY.  575 

5.  It  seems  clear  that  General  Meade,  in  his  earnest  efforts  to  prepare  for 
an  expected  assault  upon  his  right,  did  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  his  left. 
Upon  no  other  ground  can  the  strange  oversight  until  too  late'  to  rectify  it  of 
the  advanced  position  taken  by  Sickles,  and  the  neglect  to  occupy  Little 
Round  Top,  be  accounted  for. 

6.  The  question  at  issue  is  not  whether  the  advanced  position  Sickles  took 
was  better  than  the  one  Meade  expected  him  to  take,  but  whether  or  not  he 
disobeyed  the  order  of  his  commanding  general.     He  certainly  did  receive  a 
qualified  order,  and  interpreted  the  discretion  it  gave  him  liberally. 

7.  Among  the  advantages  claimed  by  General  Sickles  for  the  line  he  chose 
over  the  one  Meade  expected  and  qualifiedly  ordered  him  to  take,  are  these: 
That  both  Little  and  Big  Round  Top  were  thereby  secured  to  the  Federal 
army.     If,  he  says,  his  line  had  been  placed  where  Meade  expected  it  to  be 
placed,  the  enemy  would  certainly  have  succeeded  in  siezing  these  two  com- 
manding eminences,  and  thereby  the  whole  Federal  line  would  have  been 
rendered  untenable.    Judging  from  the  fact  that  the  line  he  did  take  could 
not  be  held  with  the  force  at  his  disposal,  as  he  was  driven  back,  he  assumes 
that  the  same  result  would  have  happened  had  he  occupied  Round  Top,  and 
that  important  position  would  have  fallen  into  the  possession  of  the  enemy 
and  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  would  have  been  lost.     It  may  be  true  that  in 
the  position  he  took  these  eminences  were  secured  to  the  Federal  army,  and  a 
final  victory  there  assured;  but  what  would  have  been  the  probable  result 
had  he  occupied  and  fortified  that  place  ?     Upon  this  question  the  following 
remarks  by  General  McLaws,  taken  from  an  article  written  by  him  for  the 
Philadelphia   Weekly  Press  of  August  4th,   1886,  are   important.      General 
McLaws  says:          *  *  *  *  ®  * 

"But  in  the  general  results  General  Sickles  might  say  that  his  corps,  con- 
sidered apart  from  the  remainder  of  the  army,  was  so  posted  that  it  not  only 
occupied  a  strong  position  of  itself,  but  one  which,  while  inviting  an  attack, 
could  be  reinforced  without  the  movement  being  known,  as  there  was  a  dense 
wood  in  his  rear;  that  in  carrying  that  position  against  General  Sickles  and 
the  strong  reinforcements  which  were  brought  forward,  that  strong  outwork 
as  it  were,  Longstreet's  forces  exhausted  themselves,  and  by  the  time  the 
Confederate  advance  reached  the  main  Federal  line  it  was  too  scattered  and 
had  lost  so  many  commanders  and  rank  and  file  as  to  be  unfit  and  unable  to 
make  any  further  combined  effort  and  was,  in  consequence,  recalled  from  the 
most  advanced  position,  as  there  was  no  support  on  hand  from  any  other 
corps. 

"In  the  sense  I  have  last  considered  it,  I  suppose,  General  Sickles  has 
argued  that  his  position  was  the  cause  of  victory,  as  events  turned  out. 


576  THE  GREAT   INVASION. 

' '  But  before  the  crown  of  '  victory  '  can  be  accorded  to  him  we  must  dis- 
cuss the  chances  and  the  strong  probabilities  of  disaster  which  might  have 
happened,  not  only  to  his  corps,  but  to  the  Federal  army,  because  of  this 
advanced  salient  position,  taken  on  his  own  responsibility,  and  then  see  if  it 
would  not  have  been  more  advantageous  to  his  corps  and  the  army  if  he  had 
taken  his  position  on  the  left  extension  of  the  main  line,  occupying  and 
fortifying  the  Round  Tops. 

"  If  General  Sickles  had  taken  position  on  the  extension  of  General 
Meade's  main  line  occupying  and  fortifying  Round  Top  and  vicinity,  cer- 
tainly it  would  have  been  more  difficult  to  carry  Round  Top  by  assault  than 
it  was  when  occupied  for  the  first  time  in  great  haste  by  General  Warren's 
orders,  after  the  battle  had  commenced.  And  as  it  was  not  then  seized  by 
the  Confederates,  there  could  have  been  no  apprehension  felt  by  General 
Meade  as  to  its  capture  had  it  been  occupied  as  I  have  supposed  —  and  as 
the  Round  Tops  were  natural  fortresses  and  could  have  been  made  practi- 
cally impregnable  —  the  Confederates  arriving  there,  and  seeing  the  formida- 
ble preparations  to  receive  them,  would  not,  it  is  very  probable,  have  made 
the  attempt  to  take  them.  There  would  have  been  no  need  of  a  reserve  force 
to  aid  in  holding  them. 

"Whereas  General  Sickles,  instead  of  taking  his  place  on  the  extension  of 
the  main  line,  which  it  would  be  natural  for  General  Meade  to  suppose  he 
had  done,  did,  without  special  orders,  take  an  advanced  position  forming  a 
salient  to  the  main  line,  and  being  there  without  orders  and,  as  General 
Meade  says,  contrary  to  orders,  of  course  no  support  was  provided  to  main- 
tain him  in  that  salient  position,  unless  General  Meade  had  determined  to 
make  that  his  battle-ground.  But  he  had  no  such  intention,  and  as  he  was 
the  commander- in -chief  it  reads  strange  to  a  Confederate  that  a  subordinate 
should  attempt  to  thwart  the  wishes  of  his  chief. 

"Thus  being  in  that  salient  position  and  'inviting'  an  attack,  General 
Sickles  was  assaulted  by  two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  Corps  and  forced  back 
to  the  main  line,  and  if  General  Longstreet's  advance  had  been  supported, 
followed  by  even  another  division,  I  do  not  think  there  can  be  any  doubt  but 
that  Round  Top  would  have  been  occupied  and  held  by  the  Confederates. 
Therefore,  it  would  seem  that  by  occupying  the  salient  position  in  the  manner 
it  was  done  without  orders,  a  very  great  risk  was  run  of  losing  the  key  to  the 
battle-field. 

"That  it  was  not  lost  was  owing  to  the  rapid  concentration  by  General 
Meade  of  forces  from  other  portions  of  the  field,  and  one  can  imagine  how 
astonished  General  Meade  was  when  he  found  out  how  near  he  had  been  to 
losing  Round  Top,  which  he  supposed,  until  then,  had  been  occupied  and 


THE   GENERAL   SICKLES   CONTROVERSY.  577 

fortified,  but  which*  had  not  been  when  his  line  was  formed.  The  question 
may  well  be  propounded  here :  By  whose  fault  was  this  great  catastrophe  so 
near  of  accomplishment,  and  by  whose  exertions  was  it  avoided  ? 

"  If  General  Stuart,  with  his  cavalry,  had  been  with  General  Lee  at  Cham- 
bersburg — and  he  could  have  been  if  be  had  not  gone  within  four  miles  of 
Washington  in  his  travels — the  whole  of  Longstreet's  Corps,  including 
Pickett's  division,  would  have  been  up  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  July, 
and  the  'supporting'  division  would  have  been  present  in  the  charge;  but 
not  only  this,  the  advance  would  have  been  made  early  on  the  morning  of 
the  ad  of  July,  before  Round  Top  was  occupied! 

If,  when  Longstreet's  divisions  of  McLaws'and  Hood  made  their  charge, 
General  Ewell,  who  had  been  directed  to  co  -  operate,  had  so  timed  his  ad- 
vance on  the  right  of  the  Federal  army  as  to  have  struck  General  Meade's 
right  when  all  but  one  brigade  of  the  force  stationed  there  had  been  with- 
drawn to  resist  Longstreet's  assault,  General  Ewell  could  have  carried  the 
heights,  and,  advancing  his  whole  corps,  the  Federal  reserve  being  away, 
what  then  ?  If  the  Round  Tops  had  been  occupied  and  fortified  there  would 
have  been  no  necessity  of  sending  the  reserve  which  had  been  posted  there 
to  aid  in  averting  the  danger  to  Round  Top. 

"Thus  the  non  -  occupation  and  fortification  of  Round  Top  not  only  came 
near  being  the  loss  of  this  position,  but  it  was  a  mere  chance  that  it  was  not 
the  cause  of  a  very  serious  disaster  on  the  right. 

"  It  would,  therefore,  appear  that  the  arrangements  of  the  troops  made  by 
General  Meade,  which  contemplated  the  occupation  of  Round  Top,  were  the 
best  possible  to  meet  all  emergencies. 

«««««« 

' '  Had  General  Sickles  taken  possession  of  Round  Top  and  vicinity  with 
his  corps  and  fortified  his  position,  as  General  Meade  says  he  supposed  had 
been  done,  it  must  have  been  a  surprise  when  General  Meade  learned  that 
the  Confederates  had  attacked,  in  force,  on  his  left.  For,  believing  it  im- 
pregnable, he  ccfuld  have  had  no  reasonable  fear  of  bad  results,  and,  while 
wondering  at  the  rashness  of  the  move,  he  must  have  been  more  than  ever 
convinced  that  it  was  made  to  cover  some  other  and  more  real  attack.  But 
he  must  have  been  very  much  surprised  when  he  learned  the  true  state  of  the 
case — that  his  orders  had  not  been  carried  out,  and  that  in  consequence  the 
key  to  the  battle  -  field  was  in  imminent  danger  of  being  captured,  and  he 
showed  that  he  was  fully  posted  as  to  the  positions  occupied  by  the  com- 
mands in  his  army  by  the  skill  and  promptness  with  which  he  moved  troops 
from  other  and  the  most  distant  parts  of  the  field  to  meet,  as  he  did,  this 

emergency  and  pluck  therefrom  the  flower  of  safety, 
37 


578  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

"General  Meade  was  in  command  of  the  army,  and  upon  him  rested  the 
responsibility  as  to  the  manner  and  mode  of  driving  back  the  invaders  — 
whether  to  do  this  he  chose  to  stand  on  the  defensive  in  his  stronghold  or 
assume  the  offensive  was  for  him  alone  to  say.  It  was  not  personal  fame  he 
was  looking  after,  but  safety  to  his  people  and  the  success  of  his  cause.  He 
was  in  the  occupation  of  a  line  which  on  his  left  could  have  been  made  im- 
pregnable, and  his  right,  was,  so  General  Sickles  says,  also  impregnable. 
That  the  commander  on  his  left  should  leave  the  position  which  could  be 
made  impregnable  and  offer  battle  in  front  of  that  position,  thereby  imper- 
iling that  position,  and  this  without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  com- 
mander in  chief,  thus  taking  upon  himself  to  force  the  defensive  plan  into 
an  offensive  movement,  will  have  to  be  characterized  by  those  whose  inter- 
ests he  was  serving.  The  assault,  as  it  was,  was  unsuccessful.  But  if  it  had 
been  made  on  the  same  troops  occupying  an  impregnable  position,  the 
attacking  party  would  have  been  defeated  with  far  greater  loss  to  themselves 
and  much  less  to  the  defenders  than  the  records  show." 

Since  the  renewal  of  this  controversy,  a  letter  written  by  General  Meade  to 
Colonel  G.  G.  Benedict,  of  Burlington,  Vermont,  bearing  date  March  i6th, 
1870,  has  been  published.  That  part  of  it  which  relates  to  the  conduct  of 
General  Sickles  on  the  second  day  at  Gettysburg  unmistakably  fixes  it  (so 
far  as  the  personal  testimony  can  go)  that  Sickles  did  disregard  the  order  of 
his  commander  -  in  -  chief.  The  following  is  an  extract  from  that  letter: 

"As  to  General  Sickles  having  by  his  advance  brought  on  an  attack,  and 
thus  compelled  the  battle  which  decided  the  war,  you  have  completely 
answered — and  it  is  a  very  favorite  theory  with  the  partisans  of  this  officer. 
But  these  gentlemen  ignore  the  •faxft  that  of  the  eighteen  thousand  men  killed 
and  wounded  on  the  field  during  the  whole  battle,  more  than  two  thirds  were 
lost  on  the  second  day,  and  but  for  the  timely  advance  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
and  the  prompt  sending  a  portion  on  Round  Top,  where  they  met  the  enemy 
almost  on  the  crest,  and  had  a  desperate  fight  to  secure  the  position  —  I  say 
but  for  these  circumstances,  over  which  Sickles  had  neither  knowledge  nor 
control,  the  enemy  would  have  secured  Round  Top,  planted  his  artillery 
there  commanding  the  whole  battle  -  field,  and  what  this  result  would  have 
been,  I  leave  you  to  judge. 

"  Now,  when  I  wrote  my  report  of  the  battle  I  honestly  believed  General 
Sickles  did  not  know  where  I  wished  him  to  go,  and  that  his  error  arose 
from  a  misapprehension  of  my  orders,  but  I  have  recently  learned  from  Gen- 
eral Geary,  who  had  the  day  before  been  sent  by  Hancock  to  hold  the  left, 
and  who,  in  doing  so,  had  seen  the  great  importance  of  Round  Top  and  posted 
a  brigade  on  it,  that  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  when  he  received  my  order 


THE    GENERAL    SICKLES   CONTROVERSY.  579 

that  lie  would  be  relieved  by  the  Third  Corps,  and  on  being  relieved  would 
rejoin  his  own  corps  (Twelfth)  on  the  right,  after  waiting  for  some  time  to  be 
relieved  he  sent  to  General  Sickles  a  staff  officer,  with  instructions  to  explain 
the  position  and  its  importance,  and  to  ask  if  troops  could  not  be  sent  to  re- 
lieve him;  that  General  Sickles  would  send  one  of  his  staff  to  see  the  ground, 
and  to  place  troops  there  on  their  arrival.  He  received  for  reply  that  General 
Sickles  would  attend  to  it  in  due  time.  No  officer  or  troops  came,  and,  after 
waiting  till  his  patience  was  exhausted,  General  Geary  withdrew  and  rejoined 
his  corps. 

"Now,  my  first  orders  to  General  Sickles  were  to  relieve  the  Twelfth  Corps 
Division  (Geary's)  and  occupy  their  position.  Here  is  evidence  that  he  knew 
the  position  occupied  by  Geary's  division,  or  could  have  known,  and  yet 
failed  to  occv  py  it.  Furthermore,  when  he  came  to  my  head  -  quarters  at 
about  noon  and  said  he  did  not  know  where  to  go,  I  answered:  'Why,  you 
were  to  relieve  the  Twelfth  Corps.'  He  said  they  had  no  position;  they  were 
massed  awaiting  events.  Then  it  was  I  told  him  his  right  was  to  be  Han- 
cock's left,  his  left  on  Round  Top,  which  I  pointed  out.  Now,  his  right  was 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  front  of  Hancock's  left,  and  his  left  one-quarter 
of  a  mile  in  front  of  the  base  of  Round  Top,  leaving  that  key  -point  unoccu- 
.pied,  which  ought  to  have  been  occupied  by  L/ongstreet  before  we  could  get 
there  with  the  Fifth  Corps.  Sickles'  movement  practically  destroyed  his 
own  corps,  the  Third,  caused  a  loss  of  fifty  per  cent  in  the  Fifth  Corps,  and 
very  heavily  damaged  the  Second  Corps,  as  I  said  before,  producing  sixty- 
six  per  cent  of  the  loss  of  the  whole  battle,  and  with  what  result  ?  —  driving 
us  back  to  the  position  he  was  ordered  to  hold  originally.  These  losses  of 
the  first  and  second  day  affected  greatly  the  efficiency  and  morale  of  the 
army,  and  prevented  my  having  the  audacity  in  the  offense  that  I  might 
otherwise  have  had. 

"If  this  is  an  advantage,  to  be  so  crippled  in  battle  without  attaining  any 
object,  I  must  confess  I  can  not  see  it.  Pardon  my  writing  with  so  much 
prolixity,  but  your  generous  defense  and  the  clear  view  you  have  taken  of 
the  battle  have  led  me  to  wander  thus  far. 

"Very  truly  yours, 

"GEORGE  G.  MEADE." 


580  THE   GREAT  INVASION. 

EX 

THE  BURNING  OF  CHAMBERSBURG,    PENNSYLVANIA. 

In  the  campaign  of  the  spring  of  1864,  General  Hunter  succeeded  General 
Sigel  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  by  the  orders  of  General  Grant,  ad- 
vanced upon  I,ynchburg,  Virginia,  with  the  view  of  destroying  the  enemy's 
resources  at  that  place.  On  the  5th  of  June  he  met  the  enemy  at  Piedmont 
and  defeated  him.  Forming  a  junction  on  the  8th,  with  Crook  and  Averell 
at  Staunton,  he  moved  directly  on  Lynchburg  by  way  of  Lexington,  reaching 
the  latter  place  on  June  loth.  Up  to  this  time  Hunter  had  been  very  suc- 
cessful, and  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  supplies  and  manufactories  had 
been  very  great.  To  meet  this  movement  General  L,ee  sent  General  Early  with 
his  corps,  a  part  of  which  reached  L,ynchburg  in  advance  of  Hunter.  After 
some  skirmishing  on  the  ijth  and  i8th,  General  Hunter,  owing  to  a  want  of 
ammunition,  declined  to  give  battle,  and  found  himself  under  the  necessity  of 
retiring  from  the  place,  and  abandoning  the  chief  object  of  his  expedition. 
This  want  of  ammunition,  and  consequent  inability  to  meet  the  force  sent 
against  him,  compelled  him  to  choose  as  the  route  of  his  return  the  way  of 
the  Gauley  and  Kanawha  rivers,  thence  up  the  Ohio  River,  and  returning  to 
Harper's  Ferry  by  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  This  movement  un- 
covered the  valley,  and  Early,  after  some  show  of  pursuit  upon  the  route 
Hunter  had  taken,  fell  back  to  the  valley  and  rapidly  advanced  toward  the 
Potomac.  Crossing  this  river  on  Thursday,  July  yth,  he  turned  hastily  to- 
ward the  National  Capital,  defeating  the  Federal  force  under  General  I,ewis 
Wallace  at  the  Monocacy  River,- on  Saturday,  July  9th.  On  Tuesday,  the  i2th, 
the  advance  of  his  army  came  up  in  front  of  the  defenses  of  Washington, 
but  finding  them  too  strong  to  be  carried,  and  fearing  that  the  gathering 
forces  might  cut  his  communications,  Early,  in  the  morning  of  the  I3th,  fell 
back,  recrossing  the  river  at  Edwards'  Ferry,  and  passing  through  Snicker's 
Gap  with  an  immense  train  of  plunder,  which  he  had  gathered  by  the  way, 
encamped  about  Martinsburg.  The  Federal  force  under  General  Hunter, 
having  arrived  from  the  west,  crossed  the  river  and  engaged  Early,  and 
were  finally  compelled  to  recross  and  take  position  from  Hancock,  Maryland, 
to  Harper's  Ferry,  the  main  body  being  at  the  latter  place.  Each  army  had 
cavalry  stationed  upon  its  flanks.  The  brigade  of  General  John  A.  McCaus- 
land  was  placed  upon  Early 's  left;  the  command  of  General  Averell  was 
upon  the  Federal  right'  and  confronting  McCausland.  This  was  substantially 


THE   BURNING    OF   CHAMBERSBURG.  581 

the  situation  up  to  Thursday,  July  28th.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  prox- 
imity of  the  Confederates,  and  their  bold  and  aggressive"  movements,  caused 
intense  excitement  and  alarm  all  along  the  Southern  border  of  the  tier  of 
counties  immediately  threatened. 

On  Thursday,  July  28th,  General  Early  directed  General  McCausland  to 
take  his  own  brigade  of  mounted  infantry  and  the  cavalry  brigade  of  General 
Bradley  T.  Johnson,  the  two  numbering  about  two  thousand  nine  hundred 
men,  and  proceed  to  Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania,  and  after  capturing  it, 
levy  a  tribute  upon  it  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  gold,  or  five  hun- 
dred thousand  dollars  in  United  States  currency,  and  in  default  of  the  pay- 
ment of  either  to  burn  the  town.  On  this  same  day  these  two  brigades  were 
assembled  at  or  near  Hammond's  Mill,  in  Berkeley  County,  West  Virginia. 
During  the  ensuing  night  the  Federal  pickets  on  the  north  side  of  the  Poto- 
mac were  captured,  and  in  the  early  morning  of  Friday,  29th,  the  command 
crossed  at  Cherry  Run  and  McCoy's  fords,  and  with  but  little  opposition  ad- 
vanced by  way  of  Clearspring  and  Mercersburg  upon  Chambersburg.  The 
first  knowledge  the  citizens  of  the  latter  place  had  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy  was  at  about  half  past  twelve  o'clock  of  this  day,  when  a  scene  of  in- 
discribable  confusion  at  once  took  place.  The  contents  of  the  bank,  stores, 
shops,  and  many  private  houses  were  hurriedly  removed  and  secreted, — an 
experience  which  the  people  of  that  place,  and  other  towns  along  the  southern 
border,  had  often  undergone. 

About  ten  o'clock  at  night  the  Confederate  force  came  up  to' the  high  hills 
two  miles  west  of  town.  At  this  place  the^  remained  during  the  night,  kept 
back  probably  by  the  firing  of  a  single  gun,  which,  with  a  few  men — all  the 
soldiers  then  at  this  place  —  had  been  sent  to  retard  the  approach  of  the 
enemy. 

Chambersburg  at  this  time  was  the  head  -  quarters  of  the  military  district 
of  the  Susquehanna,  and  although  General  Couch,  its  commander,  liad  organ- 
ized regiment  after  regiment  specially  to  guard  the  southern  border,  they 
were,  as  soon  as  organized,  ordered  to  Washington  to  meet  the  danger 
threatening  that  place.  His  inability,  then,  to  meet  this  emergency  may 
be  seen  in  the  fact  that  during  the  time  Early  was  raiding  Maryland  and 
threatening  the  Capital,  his  whole  available  force  in  the  department  did  not 
exceed  three  hundred  men,  and  at  this  time  he  had  but  one  hundred  and 
thirty -five  under  his  command,  of  whom  but  about  forty,  including  himself 
and  staff,  were  in  the  town.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  while  the  people  of 
the  southern  border  had  a  military  department,  well  and  ably  officered,  they 
were  without  troops,  and  that  too  at  one  of  the  most  threatening  periods  of 
the  war. 


582  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

At  an  early  hour  in  the  morning — Saturday,  July  3Oth  —  General  McCaus- 
land  placed  about  two  thousand  of  his  command  in  line  upon  a  hill  near  the 
western  suburb  of  the  town,  and  about  one  mile  from  its  center.  Six  pieces 
of  artillery  were  also  placed  in  position,  and  three  shells  were  fired  into  the 
place  without  any  notice  to  the  citizens.  The  remaining  nine  hundred  of  his 
force  were  sent  into  the  town,  and  the  Court  House  bell  was  rung  as  a  signal 
for  the  citizens  to  assemble  to  hear  his  requisition.  No  response  being  made, 
a  guard  under  Major  Harry  Gilmore,  of  Baltimore,  was  sent  around,  who 
captured  some  six  or  eight  of  our  leading  men  and  conducted-them  to  the 
front  of  the  Court  House.  Captain  Fitzhugh,  McCausland's  chief  of  staff, 
then  read  to  them  General  Barly's  requisition,  demanding  the  immediate 
payment  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  gold,  or  five  hundred  thousand 
dollars  in  United  States  currency,  and  in  default  of  payment  ordering  the  de- 
struction of  the  town.  This  order  stated  that  this  requisition  and  threatened 
burning  were  in  retaliation  for  acts  of  destruction  committed  by  General 
Hunter  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  and  specially  naming  some  half  dozen 
dwellings  which  he  had  burned.  The  money  demanded  was  not,  and  could 
not  be  paid,  for  the  reason  that  there  was  nothing  like  the  amount  demanded 
remaining  in  the  town.  Besides  the  citizens  did  not  feel  like  contributing  to 
aid  in  the  overthrow  of  their  government.  While  these  negotiations  were 
going  on  the  work  of  plunder  had  already  been  commenced.  Stores,  shops, 
and  other  places  of  business  were  broken  into  and  robbed  of  whatever  of 
their  contents  yet  remained  unremoved  or  unsecreted.  In  some  cases  saloons 
were  opened  and  liquor  obtained  and  some  of  the  soldiers  became  intoxi- 
cated. Citizens,  too,  along  the  streets  were  relieved  of  hats,  caps,  boots, 
shoes,  watches,  etc. 

As  soon  as  General  McCausland  saw  that  the  money  demanded  would  not 
be  furnished  he  gave  the  order  to  commence  the  work  of  destruction.  De- 
tachments were  sent  to  different  parts  of  the  town.  Houses  were  opened, 
furniture  was  broken  and  piled  upon  heaps  in  rooms  and  fired.  In  some 
cases  fire  was  kindled  in  closets,  bureaus,  and  other  depositories  of  clothing. 
Many  of  the  Confederate  soldiers  entered  into  this  work  with  evident  de- 
light, and  to  the  entreaties  and  tears  of  the  aged,  the  infirm,  of  women  and 
children,  they  turned  a  deaf  ear.  Others,  to  their  credit  be  it  said,  entirely 
disapproved  of  the  work,  and  only  entered  upon  it  because  compelled  to  do 
so.  In  some  instances,  in  response  to  the  cries  and  entreaties  of  the  afflicted 
inmates  of  houses  entered,  the  unwilling  soldiers  would  say:  "  I  must  obey 
my  orders  and  fire  your  house;  you  can  do  what  you  please  when  I  leave." 
In  some  cases,  after  fire  had  been  kindled,  others  would  come  in  and  assist 
in  extinguishing  it.  Some  sections  of  the  town  were  entirely  saved  because 


SCENES    IN    CHAMBERSBURG.  583 

the  officers  sent  there  refused  to  execute  their  barbarous  orders,  and  in  a  few 
cases  officers  and  soldiers  worked  with  citizens  at  the  fire  engine  to  extinguish 
the  flames.  Cases  were  numerous  in  which  valuable  articles  were  taken 
from  those  who  were  dragging  them  from  their  burning  homes,  or  through 
streets  and  alleys,  up  upon  the  horses  by  their  riders  and  safely  deposited 
upon  the  outskirts  of  the  to\v::.  Others  a^ain  were  robbed  of  valuable  arti- 
cles which  they  were  trying  to  carry  away.  The  writer,  while  running  with 
his  family  through  flame  and  smoke,  was  pursued  and  stopped  by  a  Confed- 
erate cavalryman  and  ordered  to  hand  over  a  satchel.  When  assured  that  it 
contained  neither  money  nor  valuables,  but  a  few  pieces  of  clothing,  the  man 
desisted  and  rode  away.  No  sooner  did  this  one  leave  us  than  another  rode 
up  and  entreated  one  of  the  ladies  of  our  company  to  mount  his  horse  and 
ride  away,  declaring  that  he  would  never  use  him  again  in  the  Confederate 
service. 

The  scenes  enacted  in  the  streets  during  the  earlier  part  of  the  burning 
were  distressing  indeed.  People  were  running  wildly  about  in  search  of 
children  and  friends.  The  occupants  of  houses  "were  dragging  from  their 
threatened  or  burning  homes  valuable  articles,  such  as  sewing  machines, 
articles  of  furniture,  etc.  Others  with  their  arms  full  of  clothing,  bedding, 
carpets,  books,  pictures,  etc.,  were  running  hither  and  thither  seeking  places 
of  safety.  In  some  cases  these  persons  were  compelled  to  sit  down  and  pull 
off  their  boots  and  hand  them  over  to  some  cavalryman. 

In  a  town  the  size  of  Chambersburg  there  were  necessarily  many  aged,  in- 
firm, and  sick  persons,  as  well  as  some  dead  bodies  of  friends  awaiting  burial. 
The  infirm  had  to  be  assisted  to  places  of  safety;  the  sick  removed;  and 
corpses  temporarily  buried  in  gardens.  In  several  instances  Confederate 
soldiers  assisted  in  these  humane  acts.  In  a  few  cases  houses  isolated  from 
others  were  spared  and  guards  placed  about  them,  because  one  or  more  of  the 
inmates  were  too  ill  to  be  removed ;  and  others  still  were  spared  by  paying  a 
ransom.  Had  the  destruction  occurred  in  winter,  or  at  night,  or  during  a 
storm,  the  destruction  of  life,  with  other  imaginable  horrors,  would  have 
been  fearful.  But  it  was  in  the  morning  and  during  a  perfect  calm.  And  yet 
at  one  time  a  fearful  cyclone,  or  funnel  -shaped  column,  which  originated  in 
the  public  square,  where  the  converging  flames  seemed  to  have  suddenly  given 
birth  and  shape  to  this  terrible  apparition,  moved  with  a  hissing  and  roaring 
noise  eastward  along  the  line  of  Market  Street,  carrying  far  up  into  the  heavens 
innumerable  flakes  of  fire,  ignited  shingles  and  bits  of  boards.  In  its  course 
it  passed  over  the  ground  surrounding  a  residence  which  was  not  burned,  and 
in  which  clothing,  bedding,  furniture,  etc.,  had  been  deposited.  As  this 
•whirling,  hissing,  and  sucking  cone  touched  these  articles,  it  instantly  drew 


584  THE    GREAT   INVASION. 

some  of  the  lighter  ones  up  into  the  air.  Pillows,  feather-beds,  bed  quilts, 
and  other  articles  were  carried  up  and  fell  at  considerable  distances.  A  little 
girl  of  probably  four  years  of  age  was  caught  by  the  monster  and  lifted  six 
or  eight  feet  from  the  ground. 

The  conflagration  at  its  height  was  a  scene  of  surpassing  grandeur  and 
terror.  As  building  after  building  was  fired,  or  caught  from  others,  column 
after  column  of  smoke  rose  black,  straight,  and  single;  first  one,  then  another, 
and  another.  Each  of  these  then,  like  huge  serpents,  writhed  and  twisted 
into  a  thousand  fantastic  shapes,  until  all  finally  blended  and  commingled, 
and  formed  one  vast  and  livid  column  of  smoke  and  flame  which  rose  per- 
pendicularly to  the  sky,  and  then  spread  out  into  a  huge  crown  of  sackcloth. 
It  was  heaven's  shield  mercifully  drawn  over  the  scene  to  shelter  from  the 
blazing  sun  the  homeless  and  unsheltered  ones  that  had  fled  to  the  fields  and 
cemeteries  around  the  town,  where  they  in  silence  and  sadness  sat  and  looked 
upon  the  destruction  of  their  homes  and  the  accumulations  of  a  life -time. 
Add  to  all  this  the  roaring  and  crackling  of  the  flames,  the  sound  of  falling 
walls,  the  distressing  cries  of  burning  animals,  as  horses,  cattle,  and  swine, 
and  a  picture  of  the  terrible  is  seen  which  no  one  who  witnessed  it  would 
ever  desire  to  have  repeated. 

.  General  McCa.usland  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Cherry  Run  and  McCoy's  fords, 
thus  turning  the  right  flank  of  General  Averell,  who  had  been  placed  nearly 
opposite  him  to  watch  him.  As  a  demonstration  in  his  favor,  and  to  prevent 
Averell  from  intercepting  him,  the  divisions  of  Rodes  and  Ramsuer  and  the 
cavalry  brigade  of  Vaughan  also  crossed  the  river  at  Williamsport  — Vaughan 
pressing  on  as  far  as  Hagerstown,  Maryland.  Averell,  thus  threatened  upon 
both  flanks,  was  under  the  necessity  of  looking  after  his  own  safety,  and  accord- 
ingly fell  back  into  Pennsylvania,  reaching  Greencastle,  eleven  miles  south  of 
Chambersburg,  about  sundown,  where  he  went  into  bivouac.  Learning  of  his 
presence  there,  General  Couch,  who  yet  remained  at  Chambersburg,  sent  him 
three  successive  dispatches  peremptorily  ordering  him  on  to  the  latter  plcae. 
These  dispatches  were  taken  by  couriers  to  the  camp,  but  Averell  could  not  be 
found.  For  some  reason  which  has  never  been  satisfactorily  explained,  he 
had  changed  the  place  of  his  own  rest  without  the  knowledge  of  his  staff,  and 
when  Couch's  orders  were  taken  to  the  camp  no  one  knew  where  the  General 
was.  *  At  length  about  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  he  was  found  and  <he 


*In  so  important  a  matter  as  this,  in  which  a  general  officer  of  such  well  known 
vigilance  and  efficiency  as  General  Averell,  is  charged  with  indiscretion,  or  negligence, 
resulting  so  disastrously  as  in  this  case,  I  have  sought  for  the  most  positive  information, 
and  append  here  extracts  from  letters  from  two  reliable  persons  •whose  means  of  in- 
formation will  not  be  questioned.  The  first  is  from  Thomas  R.  Bard,  Esq.,  an  at- 


GENERAL  AVERELI/S  DELAY.  585 

dispatches  placed  in  his  hands,  but  it  was  then  too  late.  General  Couch,  un- 
able to  communicate  with  him,  and  having  no  other  force  to  rely  upon,  had 
left  the  town.  Averell  at  once  put  his  command  in  motion,  but  still  fearing 
an  attack  by  Vaughan's  command,  which  had  pressed  him  the  day  before, 

torney  at  the  bar  of  Hueneme,  Ventura  County,  California.  Mr.  Bard  was  formerly  a 
citizen  of  Chanibersburg,  but  at  the  time  of  the  war  was  in  the  forwarding  and  com- 
mission business,  at  Hagerstown,  Maryland,  and  also  the  agent  at  that  place  of  the 
Cumberland  Valley  Railroad  Company,  charged  with  the  duty  of  superintending  the 
transportation  of  troops  and  supplies.  Mr.  Bard,  after  detailing  his  departure  from 
Hagerstown  upon  the  approach  of  the  Confederates  in  the  evening  of  Friday,  July  agth, 
and  his  attendance  upon  the  telegraph  office  at  Greencastle,  and  the  passage  through 
that  place  of  Averell's  forces,  says: 

"General  Averell  left  three  'orderlies'  at  the  telegraph  office  to  convey  to  him  all 
messages  that  might  be  received  for  him,  and  encamped  his  troops  in  a  grove  distant 
about  one  and  a  half  miles  north-east  of  Greencastle,  and  only  nine  and  .a  half  mile ; 
from  Chambersburg.  Late  in  the  evening  General  Couch,  commanding  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Susquehanna,  with  head-quarters  at  Chambersburg,  sent  a  message  to 
General  Averell,  which  was  promptly  handed  to  one  of  the  orderlies,  who  quickly 
mounted  his  horse  and  rode  off  in  the  direction  of  General  Averell's  camp.  Mr.  B. 
Gilmore,  the  telegraph  operator  at  Chambersburg,  kept  us  informed  constantly  of  all* 
that  was  transpiring  at  that  place,  and  of  the  movements  of  the  Confederate  force.  It 
is  quite  probable  that  I  was  informed  by  one  of  the  operators  as  to  the  contents  of  the 
message  from  General  Couch.  At  any  rate,  at  the  time,  I  understood  that  General 
Couch  informed  General  Averell  that  the  Confederate  forces  were  at  or  had  passed 
through  Mercersburg,  Pennsylvania,  and  were  moving  toward  Chambersburg;  and, 
that  being  without  adequate  forces  to  check  the  movement,  he  inquired  whether 
Averell  could  be  depended  011  for  assistance.  Later  in  the  night  two  other  messages 
were  received  from  General  Couch  for  General  Averell,  and  were  promptly  delivered 
to  the  orderlies.  The  last  of  these  messages  was  received  probably  about  three  o'clock 
in  the  morning  of  July  3oth.  These  messages  reported  the  rapid  approach  of  the 
Confederates,  and  expressed  great  anxiety  to  learn  if  General  Averell  intended  to  render 
assistance  for  the  defense  of  Chanibersburg. 

"There  had  been  no  reply  from  General  Averell,  and  learning  that  General  Couch 
had  made  preparations  for  leaving  Chambersburg,  and  that  in  all  probability  the 
communications  with  that  place  would  soon  be  interrupted,  I  mounted  a  horse  and 
hurriedly  rpde  out  to  find  General  Averell.  On  the  road,  about  half  way  to  the  camp, 
I  met  the  orderlies  riding  leisurely  toward  Greencastle.  In  reply  to  my  inquiry  if  they 
had  delivered  their  messages,  they  said  that  General  Averell  could  not  be  found,  and 
that  they  did  not  know  what  to  do  with  the  messages.  Hastily  informing  them  of  the 
importance  of  the  dispatches,  I  took  them  in  my  own  hands,  and  telling  them  to  follow 
me,  I  spurred  my  horse  and  was  soon  at  the  grove.  There  was  no  sentry  or  guard  to 
halt  me.  All  was  quiet.  There  was  not  a  sound  save  the  champing  of  the  feeding 
horses;  there  were  no  lights  or  fires  except  the  embers  where  the  men  had  prepared 
their  evening  meal.  I  dashed  into  the  middle  of  the  encampment,  and  there  found  a 
solitary  man  to  answer  my  inquiry,  '  Where  is  General  Averell  ? '  He  could  not  tell  me. 
An  officer  of  a  West  Virginia  regiment  then  appeared  and  said  it  would  be  difficult  to 
find  General  Averell,  but  offered  to  aid  me  in  the  search.  While  he  prepared  to  mount 
his  horse,  the  booming  of  a  cannon  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  Chambersburg.  The 


586  THK    GREAT    INVASION.  • 

and  to  avoid  being  caught  between  it  and  the  force  under  McCausland,  he 
proceeded  in  an  easterly  direction  until  he  reached  Greenwood,  eight  miles 
from  Chambersburg,  when  he  turned  westward  and  proceeded  to  the  latter 
place.  The  Confederates,  apprised  by  their  scouts  of  his  approach,  left  the 

officer  expressed  surprise  and  asked,  •  What  can  that  be  ? '  I  told  him  it  supplemented 
the  messages  which  I  brought,  and  indicated  that  McCausland  had  arrived  at  Cham- 
bersburg. We  rode  hastily  through  the  grove  and  soon  found  General  Averell  asleep 
by  the  side  of  a  fence.  On  being  awakened,  he  raised  upon  his  elbow  and  heard  the 
information  I  had  brought.  I  had  handed  him  the  telegrams,  but  as  there  was  no 
light  I  told  him  what  they  contained,  and  informed  him  that  they  had  been  delivered 
to  his  orderlies  hours  before.  He  made  no  reply,  and,  as  I  thought,  was  about  to  turn 
over  and  go  to  sleep.  Minutes  seemed  hours  to  me,  and  growing  impatient  I  said  to 
him,  '  General  Averell,  if  you  wish  me  to  convey  any  answer  to  General  Couch,  I  beg 
you  to  let  me  have  it  quickly,  for  it  is  barely  possible  that  I  can  get  back  before  tele- 
graphic communications  will  be  cut  off.'  Without  rising  to  put  his  troops  in  motion, 
or  without  the  slightest  manifestation  of  interest  in  the  condition  of  General  Couch,  or 
of  the  peril  to  which  the  loyal  people  of  Chambersburg  were  exposed,  he  merely  said, 
'  Tell  Couch  I  will  be  there  in  the  morning1.'  It  was  then,  I  think,  about  four  o'clock, 
A.  M.  Returning  to  Greencastle,  I  found  that  already  the  Chambersburg  office  was 
closed,  having  first  reported  that  General  Couch  had  all  his  military  forces  and  sup- 
plies on  the  cars,  and  that  the  Confederate  advance  was  about  to  enter  the  town." 

The  other  account  is  from  H.  R.  Fetterhoff,  M.  D,,  of  Baltimore,  Maryland,  but  at  the 
time  of  the  war  telegraph  operator  at  Greencastle,  Pennsylvania.  Dr.  Fetterhoft 
says: 

"  At  the  time  these  events  transpired  I  was  telegraph  operator  at  Greencastle,  and 
had  the  means  of  knowing  what  was  going  0:1  generally.  In  the  evening  of  Friday, 
July  29th,  rS64,  about  eight  o'clock,  General  Averell's  command  passed  through  Green- 
castle on  their  way  from  Hagerstown  toward  Chambersburg,  and  bivouacked  for  the 
night  a  short  distance  north  of  the  town  along  the  road  leading  to  Chambersburg.  If 
my  memory  serves  me  right  Genral  Averell  reported  his  arrival  to  General  Couch  at 
Chambersburg.  At  least  I  so  reported  it  to  Mr.  Gilmore,  telegraph  operator  at  Cham- 
bersburg. The  General  sent  three  or  four  orderlies  to  my  office  and  informed  me  of 
his  whereabouts.  Mr.  D.  C.  Atighinbaugh,  operator  at  Hagerstown,  Mr.  T.  R.  Bard, 
and  I  think  several  other  persons  from  that  place,  were  at  the  office  in  the  evening  and 
at  intervals  during  the  night.  The  scouts  reported  that  the  Confederates  had  built 
camp-fires  in  the  neighborhood  of  State  Line,  four  miles  south  of  Greencastle,  and  it 
was  supposed  that  they  had  encamped  there  for-the  night.  About  midnight,  or  per- 
haps a  little  later,  Mr.  Gilmore  informed  me  that  the  telegraph  lines  west  of  Cham- 
bersburg on  the  Pittsburg  turnpike  had  been  cut,  showing  that  the  enemy  after 
building  the  camp-fires  at  the  State  Line  as  a  blind  had  moved  in  the  direction  of 
Upton  and  Bridgeport  on  General  Averell's  left  flank.  I  immediately  informed 
General  Averell  of  this  facl;,  when  he  sent  me  a  message  thanking  me  for  the  informa- 
tion, and  requesting  me  to  keep  him  posted  in  regard  to  any  information  I  might 
obtain.  About  one  o'clock  A.  M.  July  3oth,  General  Couch  sent  an  order  to  General 
Averell  directing  him  to  '  Move  on  to  Chambersburg  at  once.'  I  immediately  sent  this 
message  with  an  orderly,  but  never  heard  from  him  again.  In  about  a  half  hour 
General  Couch  repeated  the  message  in  the  same  words,  and  I  sent  another  orderly 
with  the  message,  but  still  no  answer.  The  same  order  was  repeated  about  every  half 


THE  EXTENT  OF  THE  DESTRUCTION.          587 

burning  town  about  eleven  o'clock  and  passed  rapidly  westward  and  crossed 
the  North  Mountain  into  Fulton  County  and  thence  down  the  valley  and  re- 
crossed  the  Potomac  at  Hancock,  pursued  by  Averell.  Had  General  Averell 
informed  his  staff  of  his  removal,  Couch's  dispatches  would  have  reached  him 
in  time,  and  the  terrible  disaster  of  Chambersburg  would  have  been  averted. 
It  certainly  seems  strange  that  a  commander  of  Averell's  sagacity  should, 
under  the  threatening  circumstances,  have  committed  so  grave  an  oversight. 

The  work  of  destruction  was  commenced  about  eight  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing, and  by  eleven  o'clock  the  enemy  had  all  gone,  but  so  thorough  had  been 
their  work  that  the  major  part  of  Chambersburg —  its  chief  wealth  and  busi- 
ness, its  capital  and  elegance  —  were  laid  in  ruins.  Ten  squares  of  buildings 
were  burned  and  two  thousand  human  beings  were  made  homeless,  and  many 
of  them  penniless.  From  this  disaster  the  majority  never  recovered,  but 
lived  the  remainder  of  their  days  in  poverty.  Reduced  from  affluence  to  pov- 
erty, many  were  dependent  upon  the  charity  of  the  few  whose  homes  escaped 
the  invaders'  torch,  as  well  as  upon  the  provision  made  by  the  military  au- 
thorities to  meet  their  immediate  wants. 

When  the  fire  had  subsided  and  the  enemy  had  gone,  the  people  who  had 
taken  refuge  in  the  cemeteries  and  fields  around  the  town,  returned  to  view 
the  remains  of  their  ruined  homes.  Sad  indeed  were  their  feelings  when 
they  stood  by  the  scene  of  desolation,  recognizing  here  and  there  among  the 
ruins  some  articles  which  reminded  them  of  the  past,  as  broken  and  warped 
stoves,  cooking  utensils,  etc.  Dutwhcn  nijht  came  on,  and  a  place  of  shelter 
had  to  be  sought,  then  only  did  tlicy  realize  their  sad  condition.  Such  build- 
ings as  had  escaped  the  common  destruction  were  opened  and  were  crowded 
to  their  utmost  capacity.  Some  made  their  way  on  foot  to  the  country,  or  to 
neighboring  towns,  and  some  removed  to  distant  places,  never  again  to  reside 
in  Chambersbunj.  Chambersbur-j  was  founded  A.  D.  1764,  and  was  burned 
A.  D.  1864. 

The  following  is  the  aggregate  of  the  buildings  burned:  Residences  and 
places  of  business,  266;  barns  and  stables,  98;  out-buildings  of  various  kinds, 


hour  until  my  orderlies  were  all  gone  and  I  had  no  one  to  carry  the  last  message, 
when  Mr.  Bard  came  to  my  office  and  volunteered  to  deliver  it.  After  searching  for 
General  Averell  and  finding  him  he  delivered  the  message.  I  then  learned  that  when 
I  had  sent  General  Averell  the  information  that  the  Confederates  were  in  his  rear,  or 
on  his  flank,  he  moved  his  head-quarters  from  t'.ie  rear  of  his  line,  where  it  had  been, 
up  into  the  line  •without  informing  the  orderlies  or  any  one  else,  consequently  no  one 
knew  where  to  find  him,  and  the  messages  had  not  been  delivered  and  only  reached 
him  near  four  o'clock  A.  M.  when  Mr.  Bard  delivered  them.  The  Confederates  entered 
Chambersburg  about  this  time,  and  Mr.  Gilmore  bade  me  'good-bye'  and  left  the 
office." 


588 


THE    GREAT    INVASION. 


173;  total  buildings  burued,  537.  Two  commissions,  composed  of  compe- 
tent and  disinterested  persons,  appointed  by  the  governor  of  the  State,  and 
authorized  by  a<5ls  of  the  legislature,  came  to  the  town  and  adjudicated  the 
losses  of  the  citizens  by  the  fire.  The  claims  adjudicated  by  these  commis- 
sions were  carefully  scrutinized.  Each  claimant  was  examined  separately 
and  under  oath,  evidence  besides  his  own  being  required.  The  claims  thus 
adjudicated  were  as  follows:  Real  estate,  $713,294.34;  personal  property, 
$915,137.24:  total,  $1,628,431.58.  Immediately  after  the  fire  the  legislature  of 


AFTER  THE  FIRE. 

[This  view,  copied  from  a  photograph  taken  shortly  after  the  fire,  shows  the  ruins  of 
the  north-east  corner  of  the  public  square.  The  column  on  the  left  marks  the  ruins  of 
the  writer's  dwelling  and  store,  and  the  ruins  to  the  right  are  those  of  the  Court  House. 
Between  these  two  buildings  stood  Franklin  Hall.  These  three  buildings  were  not  in 
line  in  front,  but  the  hall  was  about  thirty  feet  behind  the  •writer's  building,  and  the 
Court  House  about  seventy-five  feet  behind  the  hall.  The  walls  of  the  hall  had  entirely 
fallen  except  the  column  on  the  extreme  right,  which  marks  its  south-west  corner. 
Had  these  walls  not  fallen  the  ruins  of  the  Court  House  could  not  have  been  seen  in 
this  picture.] 

the  State  was  convened  in  special  session,  and  after  visiting  the  town  and 
ascertaining  the  destitution  of  the  people,  the  sum  of  one  hundred  thousand 
dollars  was  appropriated  to  meet  the  immediate  wants  of  the  needy.  This 


REASONS  FOR  THE  BURNING.  589 

sum  was  divided,  not  pro-rata  to  the  amount  of  losses  sustained,  but  according 
to  the  necessities  of  each.  Subsequently  an  appropriation  of  five  hundred 
thousand  dollars,  followed  a  year  or  two  later  by  another  of  three  hundred 
thousand,  was  made.  These  appropriations  were  divided  pro-rata,  and,  as 
will  be  seen  from  the  figures  given,  paid  about  one  half  the  losses  by  the 
fire.  Certificates  were  given  for  the  remainder,  certifying  to  the  amount, 
but  not  binding  the  State  to  pay  it  until  the  United  States  indemnifies  the 
State. 

Three  causes  have  been  assigned  for  the  destruction  of  Chambersburg. 
One  of  these  is  that  it  was  in  revenge  for  the  innocent  hospitality  the  town 
gave  to  John  Brown  and  his  misguided  followers  when  planning  their  mad 
raid  upon  Harper's  Ferry.  A  second  is,  that  it  was  in  retaliation  for  alleged 
acts  of  burning  and  destruction  committed  by  Federal  troops  in  the  South, 
and  specially  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  by  orders  of  General  Hunter  dur- 
ing the  raid  referred  to  in  the  opening  of  this  article.  A  third  opinion 
regards  it  as  a  barbarous,  wanton,  and  unjustifiable  act.  The  true  cause 
will  appear  in  the  following  statements.  The  first  is  a  letter  written  by 
General  Early,  who  gave  the  order,  in  response  to  one  addressed  to  him  by 
the  -writer: 

YELLOW  SULPHUR  SPRINGS,  September  4th,  1884. 
J.  HOKE,  ESQ.- 

Sit — Having  been  from  home  since  the  5th  of  August,  your  letter,  of  the  6th  of 
that  month  did  not  reach  me  until  a  very  few  days  ago,  when  it  was  forwarded  to 
me  from  Lynchburg  with  a  number  of  others. 

As  you  desire  my  statement  in  regard  to  the  burning  of  Chambersburg,  Pennsyl- 
vania, under  my  order  in  July,  1864,  I  send  you  a  copy  of  my  "  Memoirs  of  the  Last 
Year  of  the  War,"  in  which  you  will  find,  on  pages  60  to  70,  my  account  of  that 
affair.  All  I  have  to  add,  is  that  on  my  march  from  Lynchburg  in  pursuit  of  Gen- 
eral Hunter,  and  down  the  valley  on  the  expedition  against  Washington,  I  had  seen 
the  evidences  of  the  destruction  wantonly  committed  by  his  troops  under  his  orders, 
including  the  burning  of  a  number  of  private  houses  without  provocation,  among 
them  being  the  family  residence,  at  Lexington,  of  ex-Governor  Letcher;  also  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute  at  the  same  place,  and  a  part  of  the  town  of  Newtown, 
in  Frederick  County;  and  in  addition  there  had  been  a  wholesale  destruction  of  pri- 
vate property,  including  even  -wearing  apparel  of  ladies,  and^  bed  clothing;  the  beds 
in  many  cases  being  cut  to  pieces  and  the  feathers  scattered  to  the  winds.  In  addi- 
tion, there  had  been  the  destruction  of  several  towns  in  the  South  by  Federal 
troops,  among  them  being  the  town  of  Darien,  Georgia,  in  the  year  1863.  When, 
therefore,  on  my  return  from  the  expedition  threatening  Washington,  I  found  that 
Hunter,  who  had  reached  the  lower  valley  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad, 
after  his  flight  to  the  Kanawha  Valley,  had  been  engaged  in  his  accustomed  work) 
and  had  burned  the  valuable  residences  of  several  citizens  of  Jefferson  County,  I 


590  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

determined  to  demand  compensation  therefor  from  some  town  in  Pennsylvania, 
and  in  the  event  of  failure  to  comply  with  my  demand  to  retaliate  by  burning  said 
town.  The  town  of  Chambersburg  was  selected  because  it  was  the  only  one  of  any 
consequence  accessible  to  my  troops,  and  for  no  other  reason.  The  houses  men- 
tioned with  their  contents,  all  of  which  were  destroyed,  were  fully  worth  at  least 
$100,000  in  gold,  and  I  required  $500,000  in  United  States  currency  in  the  alternative, 
for  the  reason  that  said  currency  was  rapidly  depreciating,  being  then  nearly  three 
to  one  in  gold,  and  I  determined  to  secure  the  full  equivalent  of  $100,000  in  gold.  I 
will  add  that  according  to  the  laws  of  retaliation  in  war,  I  would  have  been  justi- 
fied in  burning  Chambersburg  without  giving  the  town  a  chance  of  redemption. 

Compare  the  expedition  of  Hunter  into  Virginia  in  June,  1864,  the  campaign  of 
Sherman  in  Georgia  and  South  Carolina,  of  Banks  in  the  trans-Mississippi,  and 
Sheridan  in  the  valley  of  Virginia,  with  General  L,ee  in  Pennsylvania,  leaving  out 
of  consideration  Beast  Butler's  performances  in  New  Orleans,  and  then  say  whether 
the  denunciations  of  those  who  applaud  the  destroyer  of  Atlanta,  Georgia,  and 
Columbia,  South  Carolina,  and  him  who  boasted  that,  besides  burning  the  town  of 
Dayton,  he  had  so  desolated  the  valley  as  that  a  crow  flying  over  it  would  have  to 
carry  its  rations,  should  have  any  terror  for  me. 

Respectfully,  J.  A.  EARLY. 

Accompanying  the  foregoing  letter  was  a  pamphlet  of  one  hundred  and 
thirty -six  pages,  entitled  "A  Memoir  of  the  Last  Year  of  the  War  for  In- 
dependence in  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  containing  an  account  of 
the  operations  of  his  commands  in  the  years  1864  and  1865,  by  Lieutenant- 
General  Jubal  A.  Early,  of  the  Provisional  Army  of  the  Confederate  States." 
In  a  foot  -  note  on  page  70,  General  Early,  speaking  of  the  destruction  of 
Chambersburg,  says:  "For  this  act  I,  alone,  am  responsible,  as  the  officers 
engaged  in  it  were  simply  executing  my  orders,  and  had  no  discretion  left 
them."  As  General  Early,  then,  assumes  the  entire  responsibility  in  this 
matter,  and  claims  as  his  justification  the  wanton  destruction  of  property  by 
General  Hunter  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  it  is  but  fair  to  give  him  a 
further  hearing,  as  well  as  to  introduce  other  testimony  to  the  allegations 
he  makes.  I  therefore  quote  from  his  pamphlet  as  follows: 

"The  scenes  on  Hunter's  route  from  I/ynchburg  had  been  truly  heart-ren- 
ding. Houses  had  been  burned,  and  helpless  women  and  children  left  with- 
out shelter.  The  country  had  been  stripped  of  provisions,  and  many  families 
left  without  a  morsel  to  eat.  Furniture  and  bedding  had  been  cut  to  pieces, 
and  old  men  and  women  and  children  robbed  of  all  the  clothing  they  had 
except  that  on  their  backs.  Ladies  trunks  had  been  rifled  and  their  dresses 
torn  to  pieces  in  mere  wantonness.  *  *  We  had  renewed  evidence  of  the 
outrages  committed  by  Hunter's  orders  in  burning  and  plundering  private 
houses.  We  saw  the  ruins  of  a  number  of  houses  to  which  the  tofch  had 


GENERAL  EARLY's  REASONS.  591 

been  applied  by  his  orders.  At  Lexington  he  had  burned  the  Military  Insti 
tute,  with  all  its  scientific  apparatus;  and  Washington  College  had  been  plun- 
dered and  the  statue  of  Washington  stolen.  The  residence  of  ex  -  Governor 
Letcher  at  that  place  had  been  burned  by  his  orders,  and  but  a  few  minutes 
given  Mrs.  Letcher  and  her  family  to  leave  the  house."  (Page  48.) 

Again  General  Karly,  on  page  50,  says: 

"On  this  day  (July  2d)  we  passed  through  Newtown  where  several  houses, 
including  that  of  a  Methodist  minister,  had  been  burned  by  Hunter's  orders, 
because  a  part  of  Mosby's  command  had  attacked  a  train  of  supplies  for 
Sigel's  force  at  this  place.  The  original  order  was  to  burn  the  whole  town, 
but  the  officer  sent  to  execute  it  had  revolted  at  the  cruel  mandate  of  his  su- 
perior, and  another  had  been  sent  who  had  but  partially  executed  it,  after 
having  forced  the  people  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States 
to  save  their  houses.  Mosby's  battalion,  though  called  'guerillas'  by  the 
enemy,  was  a  regular  organization  in  the  Confederate  army,  and  was  merely 
serving  on  detached  duty  under  General  Lee's  orders.  The  attack  on  the 
train  was  an  ac~l  of  legitimate  warfare,  and  the  order  to  burn  Newtown,  and 
the  burning  of  the  houses  mentioned,  were  most  wanton,  cruel,  unjustifiable, 
and  cowardly. ' ' 

One  more  quotation  from  this  pamphlet  is  as  follows: 

"On  the  26th  (July)  we  moved  to  Martinsburg,  the  cavalry  going  to  the 
Potomac.  The  2jth  and  28th  were  employed  in  destroying  the  railroad,  it 
having  been  repaired  since  we  passed  over  it  at  the  beginning  of  the  month. 
While  at  Martinsburg  it  was  ascertained,  beyond  all  doubt,  that  Hnnter  had 
been  again  indulging  in  his  favorite  mode  of  warfare,  and  that,  after  his  re- 
turn to  the  valley,  while  we  were  near  Washington,  among  other  outrages, 
the  residences  of  Mr.  Andrew  Hunter,  a  member  of  the  Virginia  Senate,  Mr. 
Alexander  R.  Boteler,  an  ex -member  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  and  Ed- 
mund I.  Lee,  with  their  contents,  had  been  burned  by  his  orders,  only  time 
enough  being  given  for  the  ladies  to  get  out  of  the  houses.  *  *  I  now  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  we  had  stood  this  mode  of  warfare  long  enough,  and 
that  it  was  time  to  open  the  eyes  of  the  people  of  the  North  to  its  enormity 
by  an  example  in  the  way  of  retaliation.  I  did  not  select  the  cases  men- 
tioned as  having  more  merit  or  greater  claims  for  retaliation  than  others,  but 
because  they  had  occurred  within  the  limits  of  the  country  covered  by  my 
•command,  and  were  brought  more  immediately  to  my  attention. 

"The  town  of  Chambersburg,  in  Pennsylvania,  was  selected  as  the  one  on 
which  retaliation  should  be  made,  and  McCausland  was  ordered  to  proceed 
with  his  brigade  and  that  of  Johnson's  and  a  battery  of  artillery  to  that 
place,  and  demand  of  the  municipal  authorities  the  sum  of  $100,000  in  gold 


592  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

or  $500,000  in  United  States  currency,  as  a  compensation  for  the  destruction 
of  the  houses  named  and  their  contents;  and,  in  default  of  payment,  to  lay 
the  town  in  ashes,  in  retaliation  for  the  burning  of  these  houses  and  others 
in  Virginia,  as  well  as  for  the  towns  which  had  been  burned  in  other  South- 
ern States.  A  written  demand  to  that  effect  was  sent  to  the  municipal 
authorities,  and  they  were  informed  what  would  be  the  result  of  a  failure  to 
comply  with  it.  I  desired  to  give  the  people  of  Chambersburg  an  oppor- 
tunity of  saving  their  town  by  making  compensation  for  part  of  the  injury 
done,  and  hoped  that  the  payment '  of  such  a  sum  would  have  the  desired 
effect,  and  open  the  eyes  of  the  people  of  the  North  to  the  necessity  of  urging 
upon  their  government  the  adoption  of  a  different  policy." 

As  General  IJarly  bases  his  retaliatory  policy  upon  certain  specific  acts  of 
alleged  vandalism  upon  the  part  of  General  Hunter,  it  is  important  that  the 
fullest  information  upon  those  facts  that  can  be  obtained  should  be  con- 
sidered here.  I  will  therefore  introduce  some  extracts  from  an  article  written 
by  General  J.  D.  Imboden,  for  the  Philadelphia  Weekly  Times,  and  repub- 
lished  in  Annals  of  the  War  (pages  169-183),  entitled  "Fire,  Sword,  and  the 
Halter."  This  article  by  General  Imboden  is  lengthy  and  enters  into  details, 
covering  the  precise  cases  referred  to  by  Early,  as  well  as  many  others,  to 
which  the  latter  but  incidentally  refers.  General  Imboden  says: 

"Up  to  his  occupation  of  Staunton,  where  his  army  was  so  much  strength- 
ened by  Crook  and  Averell,  as  to  relieve  his  mind  of  all  apprehension  of 
disaster,  the  conduct  of  General  Hunter  had  been  soldierly,  striking  his 
blows  only  at  armed  men.  But  at  Staunton  he  commenced  burning  private 
property,  and,  as  will  be  seen  further  on,  the  passion  for  house  burning 
grew  upon  him,  and  a  new  system  of  warfare  was  inaugurated  that  a  few 
weeks  afterward  culminated  in  the  retaliatory  burning  of  Chambersburg.  *  * 
"From  Brownsburg  General  Hunter  proceeded  to  Lexington,  encountering; 
only  such  delay  as  McCausland  could  effect  with  a  single  brigade  of  cavalry. 
At  Lexington  he  enlarged  upon  the  operations  begun  at  Staunton.  On  his 
way,  and  in  the  surrounding  country,  he  burnt  mills,  furnaces,  store  -  houses, 
granaries,  and  all  farming  utensils  he  could  find,  beside  a  great  amount  of 
fencing,  and  a  large  quantity  of  grain.  In  the  town  he  burnt  the  Virginia 
Military  Institute,  and  all  the  professor's  houses  except  the  superintendent's 
(General  Smith),  where  he  had  his  head  -  quarters,  and  found  a  portion  of 
the  family  too  sick  to  be  removed.  He  had  the  combustibles  collected  to- 
bum  Washington  College,  the  recipient  of  the  benefactions  of  the  Father  of 
his  Country  by  his  will;  but  yielding  to  the  appeals  of  the  trustees  and  citi- 
zens, spared  the  building,  but  destroyed  the  philosophical  and  chemical 
apparatus,  libraries,  and  furniture.  He  burned  the  mills  and  some  private 


TESTIMONY   REGARDING   HUNTER'S   CONDUCT.  593 

stores  in  the  lower  part  of  the  town.  Captain  Towns,  an  officer  in  General 
Hunter's  army,  took  supper  with  the  family  of  Governor  John  Letcher. 
Mrs.  Letcher  having  heard  threats  that  her  house  would  be  burned,  spoke 
of  it  to  Captain  Towns,  who  said  it  could  not  be  possible,  and  remarked  that 
he  would  go  at  once  to  head  -  quarters  and  let  her  know.  He  went,  returned 
in  a  half  hour,  and  told  her  that  he  was  directed  by  General  Hunter  to 
assure  her  that  the  house  would  not  be  destroyed,  and  she  might,  therefore, 
rest  easy.  After  this,  she  dismissed  her  fears,  not  believing  it  possible  that 
a  man  occupying  Hunter's  position  would  be  guilty  of  wilful  and  deliberate 
falsehood  to  a  lady.  It,  however,  turned  out  otherwise,  for  the  next  morn- 
ing, at  half  past  eight  o'clock,  his  assistant  provost -marshal,  accompanied 
by  a  portion  of  his  guard,  rode  up  to  the  door,  and  Captain  Berry  dismount- 
ed, rang  the  door  bell,  called  for  Mrs.  Letcher,  and  informed  her  that  Gen- 
eral Hunter  had  ordered  him  to  burn  her  house.  She  replied :  '  There  must 
be  some  mistake, '  and  requested  to  see  the  order.  He  said  it  was  verbal. 
She  asked  if  its  execution  could  not  be  delayed  till  she  could  see  General 
Hunter  ?  He  replied :  '  The  order  is  peremptory,  and  you  have  five  minutes 
to  leave  the  house.'  Mrs.  Letcher  then  asked  if  she  could  be  allowed  to  re- 
move her  mother's,  her  sister's,  her  own,  and  her  children's  clothing.  This 
request  being  refused,  she  left  the  house.  In  a  very  short  time  they  poured 
camphene  on  the  parlor  floor  and  ignited  it  with  a  match.  In  the  meantime 
Miss  Lizzie  Letcher  was  trying  to  remove  some  articles  of  clothing  from  the 
other  end  of  the  house,  and  Berry,  finding  these  in  her  arms,  set  fire  to  them. 
The  wardrobe  and  bureaus  were  then  fired,  and  soon  the  house  was  en- 
veloped in  flames.  Governor  Letcher's  mother,  then  seventy  -  eight  years 
old,  lived  on  the  adjoining  lot.  They  fired  her  stable,  within  forty  feet  of 
the  dwelling,  evidently  to  burn  it,  too;  bnt  owing  to  the  active  exertions  of 
Captain  Towns,  who  made  his  men  carry  water,  the  house  was  saved.  While 
Hunter  was  in  Lexington,  Captain  Matthew  White,  residing  near  town,  was 
arrested,  taken  about  two  miles,  and,  without  trial,  was  shot,  on  the  allega- 
tion that  he  was  a  bush  -  whacker.  During  the  first  year  of  the  war  he  com- 
manded the  Rockbridge  Cavalry,  and  was  a  young  gentleman  of  generous 
impulses  and  good  character.  The  total  destruction  of  private  property  in 
Rockbridge  County,  by  Hunter,  was  estimated  and  published  in  the  local 
papers  at  the  time  as  over  $2,000,000.  The  burning  of  the  Institute  was  a 
public  calamity,  as  it  was  an  educational  establishment  of  great  value. 

"From  Lexington  he  proceeded  to  Buchanan,  in    Botetourt  County,  and 
camped  on  the  magnificent  estate  of  Colonel  John  T.  Anderson,  an  elder 
brother  of  General  Joseph  R.  Anderson,  of  the  Tredegar  Iron  Works,  at  Rich- 
mond.    Colonel  Anderson's  estate,  on  the  banks  of  the  Upper  James,  and  his 
36 


594  THE    GREAT    INVASION. 

mansion,  were  baronial  in  character.  The  house  crowned  a  high,  wooded 
hill,  was  very  large,  and  furnished  in  a  style  to  dispense  that  lavish  hospitality 
which  was  the  pride  of  so  many  of  the  old-time  Virginians.  It  was  a  seat  of 
luxury  and  refinement,  and  in  all  respects  a  place  to  make  the  owner  con- 
tented with  his  lot  in  this  world.  Colonel  Anderson  was  old  —  his  head  as 
white  as  snow  —  and  his  wife  but  a  few  years  his  junior.  He  was  in  no  office, 
and  too  old  to  fight — hence  he  was  living  on  his  fine  estate  strictly  the  life  of 
a  private  gentleman.  He  had  often,  in  years  gone  by,  filled  prominent  repre- 
sentative positions  from  his  county.  There  was  no  military  or  public  object 
on  God's  earth  to  be  gained  by  ruining  such  a  man.  Yet  Hunter,  after  de- 
stroying all  that  he  could  on  the  plantation  when  he  left  it,  ordered  the  grand 
old  mansion,  with  all  its  contents,  to  be  laid  in  ashes. ' '  *  *  *  * 

General  Imboden,  then,  details  the  burning  of  several  fine  mansions  in  the 
Lower  Valley,  referred  to  also  by  General  Early.  He  says: 

"  I  shall  conclude  this  already  long  narrative  by  citing  a  few  more  instances 
of  Hunter's  incendiarism  in  the  Lower  Valley.  It  seems  that,  smarting  under 
the  miserable  failure  of  his  grand  raid  on  Lynchburg,  where,  during  a  march 
of  over  two  hundred  miles,  the  largest  force  he  encountered  was  under  Jones, 
at  Piedmont,  and  he  routed  that,  thus  leaving  the  way  open  to  Lynchburg 
within  three  days,  destroy  the  stores  there  and  go  out  through  West  Virginia 
unmolested,  he  had  failed  to  do  any  thing  but  inflict  injury  on  private  citi- 
zens, and  he  came  back  to  the  Potomac  more  implacable  than  when  he  left 
it  a  month  before.  His  first  victim  was  the  Hon.  Andrew  Hunter,  of  Charles- 
town,  Jefferson  County,  his  own  first  cousin,  and  named  after  the  General's 
father.  Mr.  Hunter  was  a  lawyer  of  great  eminence,  and  a  man  of  deservedly 
large  influence  in  his  county  and  the  state.  His  home,  eight  miles  from 
Harper's  Ferry,  in  the  suburbs  of  Charlestown,  was  the  most  costly  and  ele- 
gant in  the  place,  and  his  family  as  refined  and  cultivated  as  any  in  the  state. 
His  offense,  in  General  Hunter's  eyes,  was  that  he  had  gone  politically  with 
his  state,  and  was  in  full  sympathy  with  the  Confederate  cause.  The  general 
sent  a  squadron  of  cavalry  out  from  Harper's  Ferry,  took  Mr.  Hunter  prisoner, 
and  held  him  a  month  in  the  common  guard  house  of  his  soldiers,  without 
alleging  any  offense  against  him  not  common  to  nearly  all  the  people  of  Vir- 
ginia, and  finally  discharged  him  without  trial  or  explanation,  after  heaping 
these  indignities  upon  him.  Mr.  Hunter  was  an  old  man,  and  suffered 
severely  from  confinement  and  exposure.  While  he  was  thus  a  prisoner, 
General  Hunter  ordered  his  elegant  mansion  to  be  burned  to  the  ground, 
with  all  its  contents,  not  even  permitting  Mrs.  Hunter  and  her  daughter 
to  save  their  clothes  and  family  pictures  from  the  flames;  and,  to  add  to 
the  desolation,  camped  his  cavalry  within  the  inclosure  of  the  beautiful 


FURTHER   CONFEDERATE    TESTIMONY.  595 

grounds,  of  several  acres,  surrounding  the  residence,  till  the  horses  had  de- 
stroyed them. 

"  General  Hunter's  next  exploit  was  at  Shepherdstown,  in  the  same  county, 
where,  on  the  igth  of  July,  1864,  he  caused  to  be  burned  the  residence  of 
Hon.  A.  R.  Boteler,  '  Fountain  Rock. '  Mrs.  Boteler  was  a  cousin  of  General 
Hunter.  This  homestead  was  an  old  colonial  house  endeared  to  the  family 
by  a  thousand  tender  memories,  and  contained  a  splendid  library,  many  pic- 
tures, and  an  invaluable  collection  of  rare  and  precious  manuscripts,  illus- 
trating the  early  history  of  that  part  of  Virginia,  that  Colonel  Boteler  had 
collected  by  years  of  toil.  The  only  members  of  the  family  who  were  there 
at  the  time  were  Colonel  Boteler's  eldest  and  widowed  daughter,  Mrs.  Shep- 
herd, who  was  an  invalid,  her  three  children,  the  eldest  five  years  old  and  the 
youngest  eighteen  months,  and  Miss  Helen  Boteler.  Colonel  Boteler  and  his 
son  were  in  the  army,  and  Mrs.  Boteler  in  Baltimore.  The  ladies  and  children 
were  at  dinner  when  informed  by  the  servants  that  a  body  of  cavalry  had 
turned  in  at  the  gate,  from  the  turnpike,  and  were  coming  up  to  the  house." 

General  Imboden  then  proceeds  to  detail  the  manner  of  the  burning  of  this 
house  by  order  of  General  Hunter,  and  follows  this  description  with  another 
detailing  the  burning  of  the  residence  of  Mr.  Edmund  I.  Lee,  in  the  same 
locality.  He  then  concludes  as  follows: 

"If  the  people  of  Chambersburg  will  carefully  read  this  record  of  wanton 
destruction  of  private  property,  this  'o'er  true  tale'  of  cruel  wrong  inflicted 
on  the  helpless,  they  will  understand  why,  when  goaded  to  madness,  re- 
muneration was  demanded  at  their  hands  by  General  Early,  and  upon  its 
refusal  retaliation  was  inflicted  on  the  nearest  community  that  could  be 
reached,  and  it  was  their  misfortune  to  be  that  community.  Contrast  L,ee  in 
Pennsylvania,  in  1863,  and  Hunter  in  Virginia,  in  1864,  and  judge  them  both 
as  history  will. " 

I  follow  these  accounts  by  Generals  Early  and  Imboden  with  an  extract 
from  a  letter  from  if.  C.  Slingluff,  Esq. ,  a  leading  member  of  the  bar  of  the 
city  of  Baltimore,  and  a  gentleman  of  unimpeachable  veracity.  Mr.  Sling- 
luff  was  a  member  of  the  First  Maryland  (Confederate)  Cavalry,  General 
Bradley  T.  Johnson's  brigade.  He  participated  in  the  valley  campaign,  and 
was  an  eye-witness  of  what  he  relates.  He  was  also  present,  as  a  privatet 
in  the  destruction  of  Chambersburg.  Mr.  Slingluff  says : 

"  *  «  Now  you  would  like  to  know  if  the  men  whom  I  have  described 
(the  men  who  assisted  in  burning  Chambersburg,  many  of  whom  are  now 
among  the  leading  merchants,  lawyers,  doctors,  and  farmers  of  Baltimore 
and  other  parts  of  Maryland,)  justified  the  burning  of  your  town,  in  their 
individual  capacity,  irrespective  of  the  orders  from  head  -  quarters,  under 


596  THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

which  they  acted.  I  must  say  to  you  frankly  that  they  did,  and  I  never 
heard  one  dissenting  voice.  And  why  did  we  justify  so  hard  a  measure? 
Simply  because  we  had  long  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  time  for  us  to 
burn  something  in  the  enemy's  country.  For  the  campaign  of  the  preceding 
year,  when  our  whole  army  had  passed  through  your  richest  section  of  coun- 
try, where  the  peaceful  homes  and  fruitful  fields  only  made  the  contrast 
with  what  we  had  left  the  more  significant,  many  a  man,  whose  home  was  in 
ruins,  chafed  under  the  orders  from  General  I/ee,  which  forbade  him  to  touch 
them,  but  the  orders  were  obeyed  and  we  left  the  homes  and  fields  as  we 
found  them,  the  ordinary  wear  and  tear  of  an  army  of  occupation  alone  ex- 
cepted.  We  had  so  often  before  our  eyes  the  reverse  of  this  wherever  your 
army  swept  through  Virginia,  that  we  were  thoroughly  convinced  of  the 
justice  of  a  stern  retaliation. 

"  It  is  no  pleasure  to  me  to  have  to  recall  the  scenes  of  those  days,  nor  do 
I  do  so  in  any  spirit  of  vindictiveness,  but  I  simply  tell  the  truth  in  justifica- 
tion of  an  act  which  you  and  others  may  suppose  was  without  justification. 
We  had  followed  Kilpatrick  (I  think  it  was)  in  his  raid  through  Madison, 
Greene,  and  other  counties,  and  had  seen  the  cattle  shot,  or  ham  -  strung  in 
the  barn -yards,  the  agricultural  implements  burned,  the  feather-beds  and 
clothing  of  the  women  and  children  cut  in  shreds  in  mere  wantonness,  farm- 
house after  farm-house  stripped  of  every  particle  of  provisions,  private  car- 
riages cut  and  broken  up,  and  women  in  tears  lamenting  all  this.  I  do  not 
write  here  anything  that  I  did  not  se£  myself.  We  had  seen  a  thousand 
ruined  homes  in  Clark,  Jefferson,  and  Frederick  counties, —  barns  and  houses 
burned  and  private  property  destroyed, — but  we  had  no  knowledge  that  this 
was  done  by 'official  orders.'  At  last  when  the  official  order  came  openly 
from  General  Hunter,  and  the  burning  was  done  there  under  his  orders,  and 
when  our  orders  of  retaliation  came,  they  met  with  the  approbation,  as  I 
have  said,  of  every  man  who  crossed  the  Potomac  to  execute  them.  Of 
course  we  had  nothing  personal  against  your  pretty  little  town.  It  just  so 
happened  that  it  was  the  nearest  and  most  accessible  place  of  importance  for 
us  to  get  to.  It  was  the  unfortunate  victim  of  circumstances. "  Had  it  been 
further  off  and  some  other  town  nearer,  that  other  town  would  have  gone, 
and  Chambersburg  would  have  been  saved."  • 

These  three  persons  whose  statements  have  been  given,  while  speaking  of 
the  general  disregard  of  private  property  in  the  South,  concur  in  the  allega- 
tion of  General  Hunter's  wholesale  destructive  propensities,  and  two  of 
them  specifically  refer  to  the  destruction  of  the  properties  of  Andrew  Hunter, 
A.  R.  Boteler,  E.  I.  Lee,  ex -Governor  I^etcher,  J.  T.  Anderson,  and  the  Vir- 
ginia Military  Institute.  These  six  properties  were  specifically  named  by 


FEDERAL   STATEMENTS.  597 

General  Early  in  his  order  to  McCausland,  and  upon  these  he  based  his 
retributive  demand  upon  Chambersburg.  The  responsibility,  then,  for  the 
destruction  of  Chambersburg,  it  will  be  seen,  rests  upon  General  Hunter. 
Justice  to  him,  and  to  the  people  of  the  South,  as  well  as  the  truth  of  history, 
demands  a  fair,  candid,  and  impartial  consideration  of  the  case. 

The  fact  of  the  destruction  of  the  six  properties  named,  as  well  as  many 
others  by  General  Hunter,  in  his  valley  campaign,  has  not  been  denied. 
Federal  soldiers,  who  saw  these  ruins,  have  freely  admitted  them.  But  while 
these  facts  are  conceded,  General  Hunter  claims  that  he  had  sufficient 
ground  for  his  severity  in  the  following  considerations:  In  no  part  of  the 
South,  perhaps,  was  the  hostility  to  the  Union  so  bitter  and  malignant  as 
in  the  valley  of  Virginia.  With  but  few  exceptions  the  entire  male  popula- 
tion, capable  of  bearing  arms,  were  either  in  the  Confederate  army,  or  the 
secret  emissaries  of  such  as  were  thus  engaged.  The  entire  valley  was  in- 
fested with  guerillas  and  bush-whackers  who,  during  the  day,  assumed  to  be 
farmers  and  tradesmen,  and  at  night  carried  on  the  nefarious  work  of  way- 
laying straggling  Federal  soldiers  and  unprotected  trains.  Familiar  with 
every  foot  of  ground  in  the  valley,  as  well  as  with  the  mountain  fastnesses, 
they  stole  upon  their  victims,  and  then,  under  the  cover  of  the  night,  fled  to 
places  of  safety.  And  as  one  of  the  evidences  of  the  facts  stated,  the  follow- 
ing account  of  an  act  of  barbarity,  committed  by  this  class  of  men,  is  cited. 
It  was  published  in  one  of  the  papers  of  Martinsburg,  West  Virginia,  July 
23,  1864,  under  the  caption  of  "A  Fiendish  Act."  "Six  Union  soldiers  were 
found  strapped  to  a  fence  in  the  vicinity  of  Charlestown,  having  their  throats 
cut  from  ear  to  ear.  The  fiendish  act  is  supposed  to  have  been  the  work  of 
resident  Confederates,  who  are  farmers  and  tradesmen  during  the  day  and; 
guerillas  at  night.  Virginia  swarms  with  men  of  this  class,  who  have,  ever 
since  the  commencement  of  the  war,  pursued  a  course  of  this  kind,  and  who 
have  committed  deeds  so  fiendish  in  their  character  as  to  put  to  blush  the 
darkest  and  bloodiest  deeds  of  our  Indian  savages.  It  is  said  that  General 

Hunter  is  as  mad  as about  this  barbarous  deed,  and  has  arrested  some 

sixty  residents  of  the  neighborhood  in  which  these  unfortunate  men  were 
found,  and  are  now  held  in  order,  if  possible,  to  ferret  out  the  guilty  parties 
and  bring  them  to  justice." 

Compare  the  date  of  the  foregoing  barbarous  act  with  the  arrest  and  im- 
prisonment of  Mr.  Andrew  Hunter,  and  the  destruction  of  the  properties 
referred  to  in  that  neighborhood,  and  the  cause  which  led  General  Hunter  to 
adopt  so  severe  a  retributive  policy  will  be  seen.  In  justification  of  the 
destruction  of  the  property  of  ex  -  Governor  Letcher,  it  is  said,  whether  truly 
or  falsely  I  can  not  say,  that  the  form  of  a  hand  -  bill  was  found  in  a  printing: 


598  THE    GKEAT   INVASION. 

establishment  in  Lexington,  bearing  Letcher's  name,  and  urging  the  bush- 
whacking of  Federal  soldiers;  and,  further,  that  his  house  was  occupied  by 
concealed  sharpshooters,  who  fired  upon  some  of  General  Hunter's  men. 
What  the  particular  provocation  was,  which  led  to  the  destruction  of  the 
other  properties  named,  has  not  been  stated. 

The  three  gentlemen  from  whom  I  have  quoted  —  Early,  Imboden,  and 
Slingluff, — refer  to  the  humane  manner  in  which  General  Lee  conducted  his 
campaign  in  Pennsylvania  in  1863,  and  claim  that  no  wanton  destruction  of 
private  property  was  made.  This  is  freely  admitted.  With  the  exception 
of  the  railroad  buildings  in  Chambersburg,  and  one  or  two  buildings  on  the 
field  of  Gettysburg,  no  houses  or  barns  were  destroyed.  Private  property  was 
taken  for  the  use  of  the  army,  but,  except  in  a  few  cases  by  stragglers,  the 
regulations  of  siezure  laid  down  by  General  Lee  in  general  orders  No.  72, 
and  issued  specially  for  the  Pennsylvania  campaign,  were  strictly  observed. 
But  while  the  comparative  good  conduct  of  the  Confederates  in  Pennsylvania 
is  admitted,  it  must  also  be  remembered  that  there  was  no  bushwhacking  of 
them,  nor  depredations  committed  upon  their  trains.  Suppose  General  Lee 
had  found  a  number  of  his  men  massacred  by  citizens  as  were  the  six 
Federal  soldiers  near  Charlestown,  Virginia,  and  the  houses  of  the  people 
used  for  concealed  sharp-shooters,  and  his  trains  waylaid  and  robbed,  would 
he  not  have  adopted  a  different  policy,  and  would  not  the  laws  of  civilized 
warfare  and  the  sentiment  of  the  world  have  justified  him  in  so  doing?  That 
a  retributive  policy  would  have  been  adopted,  and  severe  retaliation  visited 
upon  the  people,  is  clear  from  a  paragraph  in  General  Order,  No.  49,  issued 
by  Lieutenant  -  General  Ewell  while  in  Chambersburg:  "Citizens  of  the 
country  through  which  the  army  may  pass,  who  are  not  in  the  military 
service,  are  admonished  to  abstain  from  all  acts  of  hostility,  upon  a  penalty 
of  being  dealt  with  in  a  summary  manner.'1''  The  contrast,  then,  is  not  be- 
tween the  conduct  of  General  Lee  in  Pennsylvania,  and  his  treatment  of  the 
people  there,  and  that  of  General  Hunter  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia  and  his 
treatment  of  the  people  in  that  locality,  but  between  the  conduct  of  the  peo- 
ple of  Pennsylvania,  and  their  treatment  of  the  Confederate  army,  and  that 
of  the  people  of  the  valley  and  their.treatment  of  the  Federals. 

The  policy  of  the  commanders  of  the  Federal  armies  operating  in  the  She- 
uandoah  Valley  had  been  humane  and  lenient,  notwithstanding  the  evils 
complained  of,  but  when  General  Hunter  succeeded  to  the  command  in  that 
place,  he  adopted  a  different  policy.  From  the  time  he  assumed  command 
in  that  department  he  gave  evidence  that  he  had  decided  convictions  as  to 
how  to  deal  with  such  inveterate  haters  of  the  Union.  He  was  convinced 
that  the  mild  and  lenient  course  pursued  by  his  predecessors  had  only  em- 


GENERAL    HUNTER'S   SHENANDOAH   CIRCULAR.  599 

boldened  them  in  their  unwarranted  methods,  and  he  determined  to  adopt  a 
retaliatory  policy.  Guerrillas  and  bushwhackers,  whose  depredations  had 
heretofore  gone  unpunished,  were  now  notified  that  their  claim  to  be  in  the 
regular  Confederate  service,  under  which  they  claimed  exemption  from  the 
summary  punishment  inflicted  upon  irregular  and  unorganized  soldiers, 
would  no  longer  avail  them.  He  accordingly  issued  and  circulated  the  fol- 
lowing circular: 

HEAD  -  QUARTERS  OF  WEST  VIRGINIA, —  IN  THE'  FIELD. 
Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  May  24th,  1864. 

Sir — Your  name  has  been  reported  to  me  with  evidence  that  you  are  one  of  the 
leading  secessionist  sympathizers  in  the  valley,  and  that  you  countenance  and  abet 
the  bush-whackers  and  guerillas  who  infest  the  woods  and  mountains  of  this  region, 
swooping  out  on  the  roads  to  plunder  and  outrage  loyal  residents,  falling  upon  them 
and  firing  into  defenseless  wagon-trains  and  assassinating  soldiers  of  this  command, 
who  may  chance  to  be  placed  in  exposed  positions.  These  practices  are  not  recog- 
nized by  the  laws  of  war  of  any  civilized  nation,  nor  are  the  persons  engaged 
therein  entitled  to  any  other  treatment  than  that  done  by  the  universal  code  of 
justice  to  pirates,  murderers,  and  other  outlaws. 

But  from  the  difficulties  of  th;  country,  the  secret  aid  and  information  given  to 
these  bush-whackers  by  persons  of  your  class,  and  the  more  important  occupation 
of  the  troops  under  my  command,  it  is  impossible  to  chase,  arrest,  and  punish 
these  marauders  as  they  deserve.  Without  the  countenance  and  help  given  to  them 
by  the  Confederate  residents  of  the  valley,  they  could  not  support  themselves  for  a 
week.  You  are  spies  upon  our  movements,  abusing  the  clemency  which  has  pro- 
tected your  persons  and  property,  while  loyal  citizens  of  the  United  States,  residing 
•within  the  Confederate  lines,  are  invariably  plundered  of  alj  they  may  possess,  im- 
prisoned, and  in  some  cases  put  to  death.  It  is  from  you  and  your  families  and 
neighbors,  that  these  bandits  receive  food,  clothing,  ammunition  and  information, 
and  it  is  from  their  secret  hiding-places,  in  your  houses,  barns  and  woods,  that  they 
issue  on  their  missions  of  pillage  and  murder. 

You  are  therefore  hereby  notified,  that  for  every  train  fired  upon,  or  soldier  of  the 
Union  wounded  or  assassinated  by  bush-whackers  in  any  neighborhood  within  the 
reach  of  my  command,  the  houses  and  other  property  of  every  secession  sympa- 
thizer residing  within  a  circuit  of  fivewniles  from  the  place  of  the  outrage,  shall  be 
destroyed  by  fire,  and  that  for  all  public  property  jayhawked  or  destroyed  by  these 
marauders,  an  assessment  of  five  times  the  value  of  such  property  will  be  made 
upon  the  secession  sympathizers  residing  within  the  circuit  of  ten  miles  around  the 
point  at  which  the  offense  was  committed.  The  payment  of  this  assessment  will 
be  enforced  by  the  troops  of  this  department,  who  will  sieze  and  hold  in  close 
military  custody  the  persons  assessed,  until  such  payment  shall  have  been  made. 
This  provision  will  also  be  applied  to  make  good  from  the  secessionists  in  the 
neighborhood  five  times  the  amount  of  any  loss  suffered  by  loyal  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  from  the  action  of  the  bush-whackers  whom  you  may  encourage. 

If  you  desire   to  avoid  the   consequences  herein   set   forth,  you   will   notify  your 


600  'THE   GREAT   INVASION. 

guerilla  and  bush-whacking  friends  to  withdraw  from  that  portion  of  the  valley 
within  my  lines,  and  to  join,  if  they  desire  to  fight  for  the  rebellion,  the  regular 
forces  of  the  secession  army  in  my  front  or  elsewheie.  You  will  have  none  but  your- 
selves to  blame  for  the  consequences  that  will  certainly  ensue  if  these  evils  are  per- 
mitted to  continue.  This  circular  is  not  sent  to  you  for  the  reason  that  you  have 
been  singled  out  as  peculiarly  obnoxious,  but  because  you  are  believed  to  furnish 
the  readiest  means  of  communication  with  the  prominent  secession  sympathizers  of 
your  neighborhood.  It  will  be  for  their  benefit  that  you  communicate  to  them  the 
tenor  of  this  circular.  D.  HUNTER, 

Major-  General  Commanding, 

In  his  invasion  of  Pennsylvania,  General  I,ee  fully  appropriated  to  the  use 
of  his  army  the  resources  of  our  people,  conveying  away  with  him  all  he  had 
transportation  for.  All  was,  however,  taken  under  special  instructions  and 
by  specified  officers,  and  either  paid  for  in  such  money  as  he  had,  or  vonchers 
given.  In  the  valley  campaigns,  Hunter  and  Sheridan  did  what  I,ee  did  in 
Pennsylvania,  except  paying  for  what  they  took,  and  in  addition  destroyed 
what  they  could  not  consume  or  carry  away.  This  was  done  as  a  war  measure 
to  deplete  the  resources  of  the  enemy.  The  Valley  of  Virginia  had  been  the 
great  store  house  from  which  supplies  had  been  drawn  for  the  army  about 
Richmond,  and  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  destroy  these  resources.  Conse- 
quently all  the  grain,  provender,  and  cattle  that  could  not  be  used  were  de- 
stroyed, and  barns,  granaries,  mills,  and  factories  burned.  It  was  an  extreme 
measure  allowable  under  the  circumstances.  The  policy,  however,  inaugur- 
ated by  Hunter,  as  indicated  in  the  foregoing  circular,  was  still  a  sterner  re- 
sort, and  could  never  be  justified  unless  the  provocations  were  actually  such 
as  he  states.  If  citizens  —  persons  not  regularly  in  the  Confederate  service, 
and  wearing  the  Confederate  uniform  —  committed  depredations  upon  his 
trains  and  brutally  waylaid  and  murdered  his  soldiers,  he  was  justified  in 
resorting  to  the  extreme  measure  of  retaliating  upon  the  citizens  and  their 
property,  and  he  was  as  clearly  within  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare  in  so 
doing  as  was  Lee  in  his  more  humane  policy  in  Pennsylvania.  The  fault  lies 
with  the  people  who  first  violated  the  rules  of  war  by  depredations  upon  the 
soldiers.  The  severe  punishment  which  followed  was  but  the  sequel  of  their 
own  actions.  Chambersburg,  then,  was  burned,  not  so  much  because  of  Gen- 
eral Hunter's  retaliatory  policy  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia,  but  because  of  the 
barbarous  violations  of  the  laws  of  war  by  the  citizens  of  the  last  named  place. 

War  is  a  game  at  which  the  two  contending  parties  can  play,  and  any  re- 
taliatory or  cruel  policy  inaugurated  by  the  one  is  invariably  followed  by  a 
similar  policy  by  the  other.  It  need  not  seem  strange,  then,  that  the  first 
opportunity  the  Confederates  had  of  retaliating  upon  their  enemies,  they 
improved.  They  could  scarcely  have  been  expected  to  do  otherwise. 


ANALYTICAL    INDEX. 


AGATE,  description  of  Pickett's  great 
charge,  378. 

Alexander,  General,  Chief  of  Confederate 
Artillery,  observes  the  effect  of  the  ar- 
tillery fire  and  notifies  Pickett  when 
to  advance,  421;  gives  his  opinion  as  to 
the  probable  result  had  Meade  order- 
ed a  counter  assault  after  Pickett's  re- 
pulse, 429. 

.Aldie,  cavalry  engagement  at,  117. 

Anderson,  General  R.  H.,  commands  a 
division  in  Hill's  Corps,  41;  passes 
through  Chambersburg,  174;  encamps 
about  Fayetteville,  191;  crosses  South 
Mountain  and  encamps  at  Cashtown, 
227;  reaches  Gettysburg  and  placed  in 
line  of  battle,  281,  300. 

Archer,  Confederate  General,  leads  the 
advance  and  opens  the  battle  of  Get- 
tysburg, 266;  captnred  with  part  of  his 
brigade,  267. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  strength  and  or- 
ganization, 34;  reduced  in  numbers 
after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  47; 
positions  occupied  before  the  move- 
ment northward  began,  66;  discovers 
lice's  purposes  and  moves  northward, 
76;  daily  marches,  76, 114;  defeats  Lee's 
purposes  and  shuts  him  in  the  valley, 
75;  covers  Washington  and  awaits 
further  developments,  115,  234;  learns 
of  Lee's  whereabouts  and  resumes  its, 
march  northward,  235;  daily  marches, 
236;  change  of  commanders,  243;  su- 
preme patriotism,  247;  positions  occu- 
pied during  the  night  before  the  first 
day's  engagement,  257;  casualties  at 
Gettysburg,  444;  relative  strength  after 
the  battle,  446;  pursuit  of  the  enemy, 
451;  daily  marches,  455;  comes  up  with 
its  enemy  but  fails  to  attack,  465; 


marches  upon  the  enemy's  works  but 
finds  them  deserted,  467;  re-occupies 
its  former  positions  on  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  476. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  strength,  37; 
organization,  40;  position  before  the 
movement  northward  began,  66;  re- 
moves to  Culpeper,  67;  flushed  with 
the  victory  of  Chancellorsville  and 
confident  of  success,  41 ;  confidence  in 
its  commander,  168;  moves  northward, 
68,  76,  123,  132,  146,  160,  169;  description 
of,  207;  commendable  behavior,  175; 
excellent  discipline,  154,  209;  immense- 
ness,  215;  objective,  218,  220;  change  of 
objective,  225;  movements  eastward, 
219;  concentration  near  Gettysburg, 
227;  positions  occupied  during  the 
night  before  the  first  day's  engage- 
ment, 233;  demoralization  after  Pick- 
ett's repulse,  statement  by  Colonel 
Freemantle,  442;  Captain  Owen,  425; 
Colonel  Semmes,  442;  casualties  at 
Gettysburg,  444;  relative  condition  and 
strength  after  the  battle,  446;  with- 
draws from  the  field  and  falls  back 
toward  the  Potomac,  449;  takes  a  strong 
position  below  Hagerstown,  460;  re- 
crosses  the  river  and  re-occupies  its 
former  position,  476. 

Artillery  prelude  to  Pickett's  assault,  ef- 
fect within  the  Federal  line  described 
by  Wilkinson,  364,  within  the  Confed- 
erate lines  by  Captain  Owen,  366. 

Averell,  General,  advance  from  West  Vir- 
ginia, 459;  strange  conduct  near  Green- 
castle,  584. 

Ayers,  General,  brilliant  charge,  326. 

BAIRD,  PROF.  SPENCER  F.,  philosophical 
explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  bat- 
tle sound,  512. 


601 


602 


THE   GREAT   INVASION. 


Baird,  Thos.  R.,  statement  concerning 
General  Averell,  584. 

Barnes,  General,  brilliant  charge,  326. 

Barracks,  United  States,  at  Carlisle,  Penn- 
sylvania, burned,  254. 

Barksdale,  General  (Confederate),  killed, 
336. 

Bartlett,  N.,  reasons  why  Cemetery  and 
Gulp's  Hills  were  not  assailed  and  oc- 
cupied in  the  evening  after  the  first 
day's  engagement,  286. 

Battle  near  Greencastle  (the  first  of  the 
war  upon  Pennsylvania  soil),  123;  of 
North  Mountain,  147;  of  Wrightsville, 
186;  at  Oyster's  Point,  199,  229;  at  Mc- 
Connellsburg,  200;  at  Westminster, 
251;  at  Hanover,  253. 

Beale,  James,  defense  of  General  Sickles, 
563. 

Benedict,  G.  G.,  General  Meade's  letter  to 
in  relation  to  General  Sickles'  conduct 
on  July  2d,  578. 

Beverly  Ford,  or  Brandy  Station,  cavalry 
engagement  at,  69. 

Berryville,  occupied  by  Colonel  McRey- 
nolds,  79;  driven  out  by  General  Rodes, 
81;  occupied  by  General  Lee,  where 
he  perfects  his  plans  for  the  invasion, 
117,  121. 

Biddle,  Colonel  James  C.,  opinion  as  to 
the  propriety  of  a  counter  assault  after 
Pickett's  repulse,  432;  charges  General 
Sickles  with  disobedience  of  Meade's 
order  on  July  2d,  571. 

Birney,  General,  assumes  command  of 
the  Third  Corps  when  Sickles  was 
wounded,  324;  discovers  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Confederates,  and  asks  permis- 
sion to  fire  upon  them,  but  is  forbid- 
den, 450. 

Bloody  Run,  or  Everett,  the  rendezvous 
of  part  of  General  Milroy's  refugees, 
84. 

Border,  Southern,  excitement  upon  the 
approach  of  the  enemy,  94,  96,  97. 

Brandy  Station,  or  Beverly  Ford,  cavalry 
engagement  at,  69, 

Brand,  J.,  perilous  predicament,  101. 

Brooks,  General,  commands  department 
of  the  Monongahela,  93. 

Buford,  General,  commands  a  division  of 
Federal  cavalry,  37;  reconnoissances 
upon  the  Federal  left,  250;  advances  to 
Gettysburg  and  encamps  on  the  Charu- 
bersburg  road,  254;  discovers  the  enemy 
and  dispatches  to  Reynolds,  261;  en- 


gages the  Confederates,  259;  heroic  re- 
sistance until  the  arrival  of  Reynolds, 
262;  dispatches  to  General  Meade,  271; 
covers  the  withdrawal  of  the  Federals, 
276. 

CAFFERTY,  SERGEANT,  wounded  in  the 
first  engagement  of  the  war  on  Penn- 
sylvania soil,  near  Greencastle,  126. 

Caledonia  Iron  Works  (Hon.  Thaddeus- 
Stevens')  visited  by  Jenkins,  107;  burn- 
ed by  Early,  170. 

Caldwell,  General,  brilliant  charge,  326. 

Carlisle,  Pennsylvania,  occupied  by  Fed- 
eral militia,  254;  entered  by  Jenkins' 
cavalry,  173;  occupied  by  General 
Rodes,  173;  evacuated,  227;  re-occupied 
by  Federal  militia  under  General 
Smith,  254;  its  surrender  demanded  by 
Fitzhugh  Lee,  254;  United  States  Bar- 
racks burned,  254. 

Carr,  General,  vindicates  Sickles,  568. 

Cashtown,  Adams  County,  Pennsylvania, 
its  location  and  Lee's  great  strategic 
place,  92.  * 

Casualties,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  444; 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  444. 

Cearfoos'  Cross  Roads,  Confederate  wagon 
train  intercepted  at,  506. 

Cemetery  Hill,  East,  description  of,  267,- 
278;  conflicting  claims  as  to  the  first  dis- 
covery of  its  importance,  268;  occupied 
by  Steiuwehr's  division,  273;  the  Fed- 
erals rally  there,  278;  failure  of  the 
Confederates  to  drive  the  Federals 
from  it,  reasons  stated  by  General 
Doubleday,  283;  Colonel  Taylor,  284; 
General  Ewell,  285;  N.  Bartlett,  286; 
Longstreet,  286;  Colonel  Swallow,  287; 
General  Lee,  289;  assaulted  by  Early 
who  is  terribly  repulsed,  338;  the  focus 
of  the  great  artillery  prelude  to  Pick- 
ett's assault,  363;  selected  as  the  sol- 
diers' last  resting  place,  521. 

Cemetery,  Soldiers'  National,  description, 
of,  523;  its  dedication — solemn  and  im- 
posing ceremonies,  528. 

Chambersburg,  Pennsylvania,  location, 
89;  excitement  at  the  approach  of  the 
Confederates,  97;  McReynolds'  wagon 
train  dashes  through,  98;  entered  and 
occupied  by  Jenkins,  100;  evacuated, 
HI;  re-occupied  by  same,  t32;  entered 
by  Confederate  infantry,  135;  requisi- 
tions made  for  supplies,  138;  com- 
municates daily  with  the  Federal  au» 


ANALYTICAL   INDEX. 


603 


thorities  at  Harrisburg,  157;  entered 
by  Lee  and  staff,  162;  important  con- 
sultation between  Lee  and  Hill,  162; 
plundered  by  Longstreet,  191;  rapid 
passage  through  of  Swell's  great 
wagon  train,  217;  Pickett's  division 
destroys  the  railroad  and  railroad 
buildings,  204;  entrance  of  Imboden's 
cavalry,  231 ;  insolent  demands  and  hur- 
ried departure,  231;  passage  through 
of  cavalry  brigade  of  Generals  W.  E. 
Jones  and  B.  Robertson,  232;  entered 
by  straggling  wagons  with  wounded 
from  Gettysburg,  304;  occupied  by 
General  Couch,  459;  burned  by  the 
Confederates,  580;  reason  assigned  by 
General  Early,  589;  General  Imboden, 
592;  F.  C.  Slingluff,  Esq.,  595- 

Chamberlain,  Colonel,  heroic  defense  of 
Little  Round  Top,  332. 

Charge,  Pickett's,  descriptions  by  General 
Doubleday,  375;  Agate,  378;  Coffin,  382; 
Owen,  384;  Swallow,  390;  should  it 
have  been  followed  by  a  counter  as- 
sault—  opinions  by  Longstreet,  427; 
Alexander,  428;  Trimble,  429;  McLaws, 
432;  Doubleday,  430;  Hancock,  430; 
Howard,  430;  Pleasanton,  431;  Biddle, 
432;  Semmes,  442;  Robins,  437;  Greeley, 
431;  Sypher,  441;  Swinton,  428. 

Coffin,  C.  C.,  description  of  Pickett's 
charge,  382. 

College  Cupola,  used  as  an  observatory  by 
Federals,  276,  269;  by  General  Lee,  292. 

Columbia  Bridge  burned,  185;  probable 
object  of  the  Confederates  in  attempt- 
ing to  seize  it,  190. 

Consultation  between  Generals  Lee  and 
Hill  in  Chambersburg,  162;  Ewell  and 
Early,  157. 

Cort,  Rev.  C.,  certifies  to  having  heard  the 
cannonade  one  hundred  and  forty 
miles  from  the  field,  508. 

Council  of  War  between  General  Meade 
and  his  commanders,  at  Gettysburg, 
352;  below  Hagerstown,  465. 

Couch,  General  D.  N.,  relieved  of  the  com- 
mand of  the  Second  Corps  and  placed 
over  the  Department  of  Susquehanna, 
93;  moves  his  head-quarters  to  Cham- 
bersburg, 459. 

Court-Martial,  Confederate,  proceedings 
of,  153- 

Cove  Gap,  occupied  by  General  Imboden, 
172. 

Cowen,  Hon.  EM  alarming  report  of  the 


situation  in  Washington  prior  to  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  249. 

Crawford,  General  S.  W.,  commands  the 
Pennsylvania  Reserves,  36;  leads  the 
Reserves  in  a  gallant  charge,  333. 

Cross,  Colonel,  killed,  326. 

Culpeper  Court  House,  concentration  at  of 
the  Confederate  army,  68.  t 

Gulp's  Hill,  why  not  occupied  by  the  Con- 
federates in  the  evening  after  the  first 
day's  engagement,  283-289;  its  import- 
ance discovered  by  Hancock,  and 
troops  sent  to  occupy  it,  281;  occupied 
by  the  Twelfth  Corps,  281;  assaulted 
and  temporarily  occupied  by  Johnson, 
341;  Confederates,  after  a  terrible  en- 
gagement, driven  out,  358. 

Curtin,  Gov.  A.  G.,  proclamation,  93;  certi- 
fies to  Rev.  S.  W.  Pomeroy,  225. 

Cushing,  Lieutenant,  heroic  conduct  and 
death,  375. 

Custer,  General,  cavalry  commander,  37; 
promoted  to  a  Brigadiership,  248. 

DAHLGREN,  CAPTATN  ULRIC,  gallant  dash 
upon  the  Confederates  at  Greencastle, 
180,  181,  182. 

Dana,  General,  commands  a  division  of 
militia,  94;  advances  to  Greencastle, 
459- 

Daniel's  brigade  reinforces  Johnson  on 
Gulp's  Hill,  357. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  confident  of  success  in 
the  invasion  and  sends  Alexander  H. 
Stephens  to  Washington  to  secure  the 
recognition  of  the  Southern  Confed- 
eracy, 51;  his  letter  of  instructions,  51. 

Devil's  Den,  320,  322. 

Doubleclay,  General  Abner,  commands  a 
division  in  First  Corps,  35;  gives  rea- 
sons why  Lee  invaded  the  North,  48; 
reaches  Gettysburg  and  assumes  com- 
mand upon  the  fall  of  Reynolds,  265; 
claims  for  Reynolds  the  discovery  of 
the  importance  of  Cemetery  Hill,  268; 
says  Howard  refused  to  obey  Hancock 
when  he  reached  the  field,  279;  de- 
scribes Pickett's  charge,  375;  says  Gen- 
eral Meade  should  have  ordered  a 
counter  charge,  430. 

EARLY,  GENERAL  J.  A.,  commands  a  di- 
vision of  Ewell's  Corps,  40;  engages 
General  Milroy  at  Winchester,  81; 
crosses  the  Potomac  and  passes  down 
the  Cumberland  Valley  by  way  of 


604 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


Hagerstown,  Waynesborough,  Quincy, 
and  Funkstown  to  Greenwood,  146; 
visits  General  Ewell  at  Chambersburg, 
157;  marches  across  the  South  Moun- 
tain, 169;  burns  Caledonia  Iron  Works, 
170;  enters  Gettysburg  and  makes  a 
demand  for  supplies,  171;  hurried  de- 
parture for  York,  183;  receives  the  sur- 
render of  that  place,  183;  demands  a 
ransom  for  the  town,  184;  issues  an 
address  to  the  citizens,  184;  sends  Gen- 
eral Gordon  to  seize  the  bridge  at 
Wrightsville,  185;  falls  back  to  Heid- 
lersburg,  227;  comes  unexpectedly  up- 
on the  Federal  right,  276;  assaults  Fast 
Cemetery  Hill  and  is  repulsed,  337; 
charged  with  foolishly  breaking  his 
lines  and  therefore  unprepared  for  this 
assault,  348;  crosses  the  Confederate 
rear  in  the  retreat,  450;  states  his  rea- 
sons for  ordering  the  destruction  of 
Chambersburg,  589. 

Edward's  Ferry,  the  place  where  the  Fed- 
eral army  crossed  the  Potomac,  236. 
Emmittsburg,  272. 

Errors  of  the  Confederates, first  day's  en- 
gagement, 283;  second  day's,  343-349. 
Errors  of  the  Federals,  349. 
Everett,  or  Bloody  Run,  place  for  Rendez- 
vous for  Milroy's  defeated  forces,  84. 
Everett,  Hon.  Edward,  estimate  of  strength 
of  Confederate  army,  37;  states  Lee's 
plans  in  the  invasion ,  54 ;  remarks  up- 
on Lee's  inactivity  in  the  morning  of 
the  second  day  of  battle,  307;  dedica- 
tory address  of  the  Soldiers'  National 
Qemetery,  531. 

Ewell,  Lieutenant-General  R.  S.,  com- 
mands Second  Corps  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  40;  marches  from  Fredericks- 
burg,  Virginia,  and  reaches  Culpeper, 
68;  departs  for  the  valley,  76;  reaches 
Winchester  and  defeats  Milroy,  81  • 
drives  Colonel  McReynolds  from  Ber- 
ryville,  81;  crosses  the  Potomac  and 
leads  the  advance  into  Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania,  87,  123;  enters  Cham- 
bersburg, 136;  requisitions  for  sup- 
plies, 139;  issues  two  general  orders, 
J31,  J38;  occupies  Shirk's  Hill;  146;  ad- 
vances to  Carlisle,  173;  departs  for  Get- 
tysburg via  Mt.  Holly,  and  encamps 
•with  Early  at  Heidlersburg,  227;  starts 
for  Cashtown,  but  hearing  the  guns  at 
Gettysburg  proceeds  to  that  place,  273; 
falls  upon  the  Federal  center,  274;  oc- 


cupies Gettysburg  and  the  left  of  the 
Confederate  line,  300;  reasons  for  not 
ordering  an  assault  upon  Gulp's  and 
East  Cemetery  hills,  285;  withdraws 
from  Gettysburg  and  takes  position 
behind  Seminary  Ridge,  449. 

FAIRFIELD,  route  of  Lee's  retreat,  449; 
pursued  to  this  place  by  General  Sedg- 
wick,  450;  not  permitted  to  attack  the 
enemy,  and  reasons  stated  by  General 
Howe,  451. 

Falling  Waters,  Confederate  pontoon  de- 
stroyed by  General  French,  452;  pon- 
toon repaired  and  the  wagon  trains 
and  artillery  re-cross  into  Virginia, 
467;  Confederate  rear  attacked  by  Gen- 
eral Kilpatrick,  468. 

Farnsworth,  General,  promoted  to  a  brig- 
adiership,  24$;  killed  in  attack  upon 
the  Confederate  right,  412. 

Fayetteville,  92. 

Fetterhoff,  Dr.  H.  R.,  statement  concern- 
ing General  Averell,  586. 

Fisher,  Rev.  S.  R.,  D.  D.,  excellent  finan- 
ciering, 145. 

Frederick  City,  93,  250. 

French,  General,  moves  from  Maryland 
Heights  to  Frederick,  248;  occupies 
Turner's  Pass,  452;  destroys  Confed- 
erate pontoon  at  Falling  Waters,  452. 

Freemautle,  Colonel  (British  officer  with 
the  Confederates),  tells  of  the  confi- 
dence of  the  Confederates  in  their  suc- 
cess, 41;  tells  of  the  plundering  of 
Chambersburg,  193;  describes  the  pil- 
laging propensities  of  the  Confeder- 
ates, 177;  describes  the  demoralization 
of  the  enemy  after  Pickett's  repulse, 
424;  describes  Lee's  conduct  after  the 
failure  of  the  assault,  425. 

Frick,  Colonel,  commands  the  militia  for 
the  protection  of  the  Columbia  Bridge, 
185;  unable  to  maintain  his  position, 
he  re-crosses  the  river  and  destroys 
the  bridge,  186;  his  official  report  of 
this  transaction,  186. 

Furnace,  Caledonia,  destroyed  by  General 
Early,  170;  Early's  reasons  for  order- 
ing its  destruction,  171. 

GBARY,  GENERAL,  occupies  Little  Round 
Top,  281,  318. 

Gettysburg,  location,  92;  occupied  by  Gen- 
eral Early,  170;  requisitions  for  sup- 
plies, 171;  approached  by  Confederates 


ANALYTICAL   INDEX. 


605 


•under  General  Pettigrew,  232;  Buford's 
cavalry  passes  through,  258;  arrival  of 
General  Reynolds,  262;  of  Howard, 
266;  retreat  through  the  town  of  the 
Federals,  276;  occupied  by  Ewell's 
Corps,  300;  evacuated,  449. 

Gibbon,  General,  heroic  conduct,  375; 
wounded,  376. 

Glossbrenner,  Bishop  J.  J.,  certifies  to 
having  heard  the  cannonading  one 
hundred  miles  from  the  field  of  action, 

510. 

Gordon,  General,  advances  from  York  to 
the  Susquehanna  at  Wrightsville,  185. 

Green,  General,  holds  part  of  the  line  on 
Gulp's  Hill,  341. 

Greencastle,  the  first  battle  of  the  war  up- 
on Pennsylvania  soil,  near  by,  124; 
requisitions  for  supplies,  134;  gallant 
dash  by  Captain  Dahlgren,  180,  182; 
passage  through  of  the  great  wagon 
train  of  Confederate  wounded,  499. 

Greenvillage,  227. 

Greenwood,  92. 

Gregg  General  D.  McM.,  commands  a  di- 
vision of  Federal  cavalry,  37. 

Gregg,  General  J.  I.,  commands  a  brigade 
of  Federal  cavalry,  37;  pursues  the 
wagon  train  of  wounded,  450." 

Greeley,  H.,  opinion  as  to  whether  or  not 
General  Meade  should  have  ordered  a 
counter  charge  after  Pickett's  repulse, 
428. 

HAGERSTOWN,  MARYLAND,  89. 

Halleck,  General  in  chief,  disapproves  of 
Hooker's  plans,  243;  correspondence 
on  the  subject,  243,  244;  accepts  Hook- 
er's resignation  and  places  General 
Meade  in  command,  244;  places  Hooker 
under  arrest,  245. 

Hampton,  General  Wade,  commands  a 
brigade  of  Confederate  cavalry,  41; 
wounded  in  an  engagement,  411. 

Hancock,  General  W.  S.,  succeeds  General 
Couch  to  the  command  of  the  Second 
Corps,  35;  commands  the  center  of  the 
army,  37;  occupies  Thoroughfare  Gap 
and  shuts  Stuart  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  117;  sent  to  Gettysburg  to  as- 
sume the  command  upon  the  fall  of 
Reynolds,  271;  reaches  the  field  and 
decides  upon  making  a  stand  there, 
279;  rallies  and  posts  the  troops,  281; 
magnificent  judgment  of  the  situation, 
281;  turns  the  command  over  to  Gen- 


eral Slocum  and  reports  to  General 
Meade  at  Taneytown,  280;  again 
reaches  the  front  with  the  commander 
in  chief,  280;  his  corps  reaches  the 
field,  303;  place  in  the  line  of  battle, 
303;  reinforces  Sickles,  326;  sends  as- 
sistance to  Howard,  338;  heroic  con- 
duct, 363;  wounded,  373;  advises  Gen- 
eral Meade  to  throw  his  army  upon 
the  heels  of  Pickett's  defeated  men, 

43°- 

Hanover,  cavalry  engagement  at,  252. 

Hanover  Junction,  183. 

Harper's  Ferry,  84,  87. 

Harrisburg,  Pennsylvania,  location,  89; 
head-quarters  of  the  Department  of 
the  Susquehanna,  93;  preparations 
made  for  the  enemy,  94;  Tree's  objective, 
55,  58;  probable  method  of  attack,  190, 
220;  the  order  to  attack  countermand- 
ed and  plan  changed,  56,  219;  the  au- 
thorities there  kept  constantly  inform- 
ed of  important  Confederate  move- 
ments, 157. 

Hawkins,  George,  captured  in  Chambers- 
burg,  100. 

Hays,  General,  commands  a  brigade  in 
Early's  division,  40  ;  perceives  the  im- 
portance of  East  Cemetery  and  Gulp's 
hills,  and  asks  permission  to  occupy 
them,  286;  storms  F^st  Cemetery  Hill 
in  the  evening  of  the  second  day's  en- 
gagement and  is  repulsed,  338. 

Hazlett,  Lieutenant,  killed  upon  Little 
Round  Top,  330. 

Head-quarters  of  General  Lee,  291;  scene 
in,  355- 

Head-quarters  of  General  Meade,  352 ;  coun- 
cil of  war  there,  352;  scene  at,  362. 

Heidlersburg,  union  of  Early's  and  Rodes' 
divisions,  227. 

Henry,  Professor,  extracts  from  his  writ- 
ings relating  to  the  phenomena  of 
battle  sound,  513,  514. 

Heth,  General,  commands  a  division  of 
Hill's  Corps,  41;  passes  through  Cham- 
bersburg,  160;  encamps  about  Fayette- 
ville,  160;  crosses  the  South  Mountain 
and  encamps  at  Cashtown,  203;  ad- 
vances to  Marsh  Creek,  227;  proceeds 
toward  Gettysburg  and  encounters 
Buford's  cavalry,  259;  object  of  this 
advance,  259;  wounded,  277;  severe 
losses  of  his  division,  277. 

Hill,  Lieutenant  General  A.  P.,  commands 
Third  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 


606 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


ginia,  41;  leaves  Fredericksburg  and 
marches  toCulpeper,  77;  marches  down 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  78;  crosses  the 
Potomac,  153;  advances  to  below  Green- 
castle,  157;  enters  Chambersburg,  161; 
in  consultation  with  General  Lee,  162; 
in  camp  at  Cashtown  when  the  col- 
lision at  Gettysburg  first  occurred,  259; 
position  of  his  corps  in  the  battle  line 
of  the  2d  and  3d,  300;  failure  to  sup- 
port Wright,  345. 

Hill,  Shirk's  (below  Chambersburg),  occu- 
pied by  Jenkins'  cavalry,  105;  by  Rodes' 
infantry,  146;  awe-inspiring  view  from, 
at  Longstreet's  Corps  in  motion,  204. 

Hood,  General,  commands  a  division  of 
Longstreet's  Corps,  40;  crosses  the  Po- 
tomac and  marches  down  the  valley, 
153,  173;  passes  through  Chambers- 
burg, 174;  marches  to  Fayetteville, 
204;  proceeds  to  Gettysburg  and  en- 
camps at  Marsh  Creek,  228;  placed  in 
position,  313;  desperate  attempt  to 
capture  Little  Round  Top,  323;  wound- 
ed and  quits  the  field,  334. 

Hooker,  General  Joseph,  commands  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  34;  suspects 
Lee's  purpose  to  invade  the  North, 
and  informs  President  Lincoln,  67;  or- 
ders a  reconnoissance,  68;  takes  meas- 
ures to  defeat  Lee's  plans,  74;  his  army 
in  motion,  76,  114;  hems  him  in  the 
valley,  118;  Washington  completely 
covered,  when  he  waits  for  the  further 
development  of  his  enemy's  purpose, 
234;  crosses  the  Potomac,  236;  proposes 
to  cut  Lee's  line  of  communication 
but  is  thwarted  by  General  Halleck, 
243;  enters  into  a  spirited  correspond- 
ence and  tenders  his  resignation, 
which  is  accepted,  243;  succeeded  by 
General  Meade,  247;  farewell  to  the 
army,  245;  visits  Washington  without 
orders,  and  is  placed  under  arrest  by 
Halleck,  245. 

Howard,  General  O.  O.,  commands  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  36;  with  the  left  wing 
of  the  army  under  Reynolds,  37;  re- 
ceives at  Emmittsburg  Reynolds'  or- 
der and  marches  to  Gettysburg,  262; 
reaches  the  field  and  assumes  com- 
mand, 267;  discovers  the  importance  of 
Cemetery  Hill  and  orders  Steinwehr's 
division  to  occupy  it  as  a  rallying 
place,  268;  the  discovery  of  this  posi- 
tion claimed  for  General  Reynolds, 


269;  superseded  in  command  by  Gen- 
eral Hancock,  279;  General  Double- 
day's  allegation  that  he  refused  for 
awhile  to  obey  Hancock,  279;  heroic 
efforts  in  rallying  the  defeated  troops, 
279;  repels  the  assault  of  the  enemy 
upon  his  front,  338;  gives  his  opinion 
respecting  Meade's  failure  to  follow  up 
Pickett's  repulse  by  a  counter  assault, 
430;  favors  an  attack  upon  the  enemy 
below  Hagerstown,  466. 

Howe,  General,  relates  his  experience  in 
pursuit  of  Lee,  451,  462. 

Huber,  Benjamin  S.,  carries  an  important 
dispatch  to  the  authorities  at  Harris- 
burg,  164;  his  account  of  his  perilous 
trip,  164-166. 

Humphreys,  General,  commands  a  divis- 
ion of  the  Third  Corps,  36;  his  posi- 
tion in  the  engagement  of  the  second 
day,  320;  driven  back  after  terrific 
fighting,  323. 

Hunt,  General,  Chief  of  Artillery  of  the . 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  35;  claimed  by 
Sickles  as  approving  of  the  position 
he  chose,  319;  judicious  preparations 
for  meeting  Pickett's  assault,  372. 

Hunter,  General  D.,  commander  of  an 
expedition  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia, 
580;  charges  of  cruelty  and  vandalism 
by  Early,  589;  Imboden,  592;  Slingluff, 
595;  his  case  stated,  597;  his  circular  to 
the  people,  599. 

INVASION  OF  THE  NORTH,  reasons  why, 
stated  by  General  Longstreet,  44; 
Doubleday,  48;  inferred  from  A.  H. 
Stephens'  mission  to  Washington,  51; 
indications  of  perceived,  and  prepara- 
tions made  for,  67. 

Information,  method  of  communicating 
important  events  to  the  authorities, 

157- 

Imboden,  General  J.  D.,  Confederate  com- 
mander, 41 ;  destroys  the  railroad  and 
canal  from  Cumberland,  Maryland,  to 
Hancock,  172;  crosses  the  Potomac 
and  enters  Pennsylvania,  172;  occu- 
pies Cove  Gap  and  Mercersburg,  172; 
plundering  propensities  of  a  detach- 
ment of  this  force,  173;  skirmish  with, 
200;  detachment  defeated  in  McCon- 
nellsburg,  200;  advance  to  Chambers- 
burg, 231;  hasty  departure  eastward, 
231;  reaches  the  Confederate  line,  480; 
interview  with  General  Lee,  481;  de- 


ANALYTICAL   LN"L»EX. 


607 


scribes  Lee's  despondency,  482;  in 
charge  of  the  wagon  train  of  wounded, 
483;  terrible  scenes  by  the  way,  485;  in- 
trusted with  an  important  paper  for 
Jefferson  Davis,  483;  Lee's  anxiety  for 
the  safety  of  his  army,  491;  reasons 
stated  for  the  burning  of  Chambers- 
burg,  592. 

JENKINS,  GENERAL,  Confederate  Cavalry 
Commander,  41 ;  pursues  McReynolds1 
wagon  train,  87;  crosses  the  Potomac 
at  Williamsport,  87;  advances  into 
Pennsylvania,  99;  enters  Chambers- 
burg,  99;  thrilling  events  in  the  town, 
100;  occupies  Shirk's  Hill,  105;  re- 
prisals upon  the  town  authorities,  105; 
requisition  upon  the  place,  106;  orders 
the  stores  and  shops  opened,  109;  scours 
the  country  for  horses,  107;  captures 
and  sends  South  negroes,  107;  falls 
back  below  Greencastle,  in;  maraud- 
ing parties  sent  out  in  all  dirediions, 
in,  112;  again  advances,  124;  engages 
Federal  cavalry  near  Greencastle,  125; 
re-enters  Chambersburg,  132;  requisi- 
tions upon  the  town,  132;  passes  on 
down  the  valley,  146;  through  Carlisle, 
173;  Mechanicsburg,  182;  skirmish  at 
Oyster's  Point,  229;  covers  Rodes' 
withdrawal,  229;  occupies  and  plun- 
ders Petersburg,  229;  interesting  state- 
ment by  Mr.  E.  Hiteshew,  230;  receives 
a  dispatch  and  hurries  on  to  Gettys- 
burg where  he  is  wounded,  231;  joins 
Stuart  in  the  great  cavalry  engage- 
ment behind  the  Federal  right,  405. 

Johnson,  General,  commands  a  division 
of  Ewell's  Corps,  40;  invests  Winches- 
ter, 83;  crosses  the  Potomac,  132;  passes 
through  Chambersburg,  157;  encamps 
about  Shippensburg,  160;  hurried 
withdrawal  toward  Gettysburg,  227; 
encamps  about  Greenwood,  228; 
reaches  Gettysburg,  281;  position  in 
line  of  battle,  300;  attacks  the  Federal 
right  and  is  temporarily  successful, 
341 ;  failure  to  improve  his  opportunity, 
348;  driven  out  after  a  desperate  fight, 
359;  withdrawn  behind  Seminary 
Ridge,  449. 

Johnson,  Professor  A.  B.,  Chief  Clerk 
United  States  Light  House  Board,  phi- 
losophical paper  explanatory  of  the 
phenomena  of  battle  sound,  514. 

Jones,  Captain,  First  New  York  Cavalry, 


defeats  a  detachment  of  Imboden's 
men  in  McConnellsburg,  Pennsylva- 
nia, 200;  dash  upon  the  Confederate 
wagon  train  at  Cearfoos'  Cross  Roads, 
506. 

Jones,  General  W.  E.,  Confederate  Cavalry 
Commander,  41;  covers  the  withdrawal 
of  Johnson's  division  from  the  Cum- 
berland Valley,  231;  passes  through 
Chambersburg  and  on  east  toward 
Gettysburg,  232. 

KILPATRICK,  GENERAL  JUDSON,  Federal 
Cavalry  Commander,  37;  succeeds  Gen- 
eral Stahl  in  command  of  his  division, 
248;  engages  Stuart  at  Hanover,  253; 
dash  upon  the  Confederate  right  at 
Gettysburg,  412;  terrific  night  attack 
upon  the  retreating  Confederates,  452; 
attack  upon  the  Confederate  rear  at 
Falling  Waters,  468. 

Kimmel,  Hon.  F.  M.,  important  services 
in  forwarding  information  to  the  au- 
thorities at  Harrisburg,  158;  testifies 
to  having  heard  the  sound  of  the  can- 
nonading two  hundred  miles  from  the 
field,  511. 

Knipe,  General,  Commander  of  Federal 
Militia,  120;  advances  from  Harrisburg 
to  a  short  distance  south  of  Chambers- 
burg, 121 ;  informed  of  the  enemy's 
proximity,  128;  flight  of  his  command, 
128;  falls  back  from  Carlisle  upon  the 
approach  of  the  Confederates,  173. 

LANE,  REV.  C.  R.,  D.  D.,  certifies  to  having 
heard  the  cannonading  one  hundred 
and  twenty  miles  from  the  field,  510. 

Lee,  General  R.  E-,  Commander  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  40;  rea- 
sons for  invading  the  North,  47;  with- 
draws his  army  from  Fredericksburg 
and  concentrates  at  Culpeper,  67;  re- 
views Stuart's  cavalry  preparatory  to 
its  advance,  69;  official  orders  to  Stuart 
revealing  his  plans  captured,  70;  his 
army  forced  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
route,  73;  reaches  Berryville  and  issues 
a  general  order,  121;  enters  Chambers- 
burg, 162;  holds  a  consultation  with 
General  Hill,  164;  departs  eastward, 
164;  importance  attached  to  this  move- 
ment and  it  is  reported  at  Harrisburg, 
165;  description  of  his  appearance, 
167;  establishes  his  head-quarters  near 
Chambersburg,  169;  issues  another  gen- 


608 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


eral  order.  174;  visited  in  his  camp  by 
Mrs.  Ellen  McClellan,  197;  by  Dr.  J.  L. 
Suesserott,  205;  plans  an  attack  upon 
Harrisburg,  169;  arrival  of  Longstreet's 
scout  and  change  of  plan,  219;  rides 
from  Chambersburg  with  Longstreet 
to  Greenwood,  226;  again  on  the  way, 
but  hearing  the  sound  of  guns  he  rides 
forward  to  ascertain  the  cause,  227; 
reaches  Seminary  Ridge  and  observes 
the  flight  of  the  Federals,  284;  anxiety 
concerning  General  Stuart  and  the 
where-abouts  of  the  Federal  army,  290; 
reconnoiters  the  Federal  position  and 
determines  to  attack,  311;  refuses 
Longstreet's  counsel,  309;  dissatisfied 
with  his  tardiness,  317;  scene  at  his 
head-quarters,  355;  again  rejects  Long- 
street's  counsel  and  orders  another  as- 
sault, 360;  distress  at  Pickett's  repulse 
and  assists  in  rallying  the  troops,  425; 
interview  with  General  Imboden,  481; 
deep  depression  and  lament  over  his 
defeat,  482;  sends  the  wounded  to  Vir- 
ginia, 483;  -withdraws  from  the  field 
and  retreats  southwardly,  451;  unable 
to  re-cross  the  river  he  takes  a  strong 
position  below  Hagerstown,  460;  sends 
for  General  Imboden  and  inquires 
concerning  the  upper  fords  of  the  Po- 
tomac, 491;  the  river  falling  he  re- 
crosses  into  Virginia,  467. 

I,ee,  General  Fitzhugh,  Confederate  Cav- 
alry Commander,  41;  demands  the  sur- 
render of  Carlisle,  254;  burns  the  United 
States  barracks,  254. 

Lincoln,  President,  apprised  by  General 
Hooker  of  Lee's  purpose  to  invade  the 
North,  67;  calls  for  volunteers,  94; 
anxiety  to  have  Meade  attack  Lee  in 
the  retreat,  466;  dedicatory  address  of 
.  the  Soldiers'  National  Cemetery  at 
Gettysburg,  531. 

Lockwood's  Maryland  Brigade,  reinforces 
the  Twelfth  Corps  and  assists  in  driv- 
ing Johnson's  division  from  Gulp's 
Hill,  358. 

Longstreet,  Lieutenant  -  General  James, 
commands  the  First  Corps,  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  40;  estimate  of  the 
strength  of  Lee's  army,  38;  objections 
to  the  Northern  invasion,  and  plan 
proposed  by  him,  44;  claims  an  agree- 
ment between  Lee  and  himself  that 
the  invasion  should  be  "offensive  in 
strategy,  but  defensive  in  tactics,"  45; 


contradictory  statements  as  to  the 
time'bf  the  scout's  arrival,  57;  crosses 
the  Potomac  and  advances  into  Penn- 
sylvania, 153;  encamps  near  Cham- 
bersburg, 174;  plunders  the  town,  191; 
two  of  his  divisions  advance  to  Fay- 
etteville,  203;  rides  with  Lee  from 
Chambersburg  to  Greenwood,  223; 
from  Greenwood  toward  Gettysburg, 
224;  opposes  an  attack  upon  the  Fed- 
erals, but  counsels  a  flank  movement, 
308,  360;  charges  Lee  with  departing 
from  the  plan  agreed  upon,  308;  tardi- 
ness in  attacking,  316;  blamed  by 
Southern  writers,  313;  defense,  341; 
his  statement  as  to  how  Little  Round 
Top  was  occupied,  351;  extravagant 
estimate  of  the  number  of  Federal 
troops  engaged  against  him,  335;  again 
counsels  Lee  to  flank  the  Federals, 
360;  Lee  dissents  and  orders  him  to 
attack  their  left  center,  360;  again  slow 
in  executing  this  order,  415;  loth  to 
order  the  advance  of  Pickett,  he  com- 
mits to  General  Alexander  this  duty, 
421;  reply  to  Colonel  Freemantle's  con- 
gratulations upon  the  supposed  suc- 
cess of  Pickett,  421;  his  opinion  of  the 
probable  result  of  a  counter  assault 
by  the  Federals,  429. 

Long,  General  A.  L.,  Chief  Military  Secre- 
tary to  General  Lee,  states  reasons  for 
the  invasion,  43;  claims  superior  gen- 
eralship for  Lee  in  stealing  away  from 
the  Federal  army,  75;  says  that  York, 
Pennsylvania,  is  where  Lee  expected 
to  concentrate  his  army  for  battle,  55; 
criticism  of  the  Count  of  Paris  as  to 
Lee's  alternatives,  62;  probable  result 
of  a  counter  charge  after  Pickett's  re- 
pulse, 427. 

MAHON,  T.  M.,  captures  Lieutenant  Smith, 

103. 
Marion,  Pennsylvania,  89;  approach  to  of 

Jenkins  cavalry,  125;  the  great  wagon 

train  passes  through,  478. 
Marsh  Creek  (on  the  Chambersburg  Pike), 

encampment  of  Heth's  and  Fender's 

divisions,   233;   advance    from  by  the 

same,  259;  reached  by  the  divisions  of 

McLaws  and  Hood,  228. 
Marsh  Creek  (on  the  Emmittsburg  road), 

encampment  at  of  First  Corps,  257; 

advances  to  Gettysburg,  261.   / 


ANALYTICAL   INDEX. 


609 


Marches,  daily  (Federal  army),  see  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

Marches,  daily  (Confederate  army),  see 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Maryland  Heights,  escape  to  of  part  of 
Milroy's  force,  87;  occupied  by  General 
French,  243. 

Martinsburg,  West  Virginia,  occupied  by 
General  Rodes,  87. 

McLaws,  General  L-,  commands  a  division 
of  Longstreet's  Corps,  40;  encamps 
below  Chambersburg,  174;  advances  to 
Fayetteville,  203;  reaches  Marsh  Creek, 
228;  position  in  line  of  battle,  313;  en- 
gages Sickles,  322;  gives  his  opinion 
of  Meade's  judgment  in  refusing  to 
order  a  counter  assault  after  Pickett's 
repulse,  432;  states  Meade's  wise  de- 
cision in  not  ordering  an  assault  of  Lee 
below  Hagerstown,  475;  criticises 
Sickles'  conduct  on  July  2d,  575. 

McLellan,  Mrs.  Ellen,  interview  with  Gen- 
eral Lee,  197. 

McClellan,  Major  H.  B.  (General  Stuart's 
staff),  relates  how  Stuart's  head-quar- 
ter's chest  was  captured,  70;  estimate 
of  the  numbers  engaged  in  the  cav- 
alry engagement  of  Beverly  Ford,  or 
Brandy  Station,  74;  vindicates  General 
Stuart  for  his  course  around  the  Fed- 
eral army,  241. 

McConnellsburg,  Pennsylvania,  visited  by 
Confederate  cavalry  under  Colonel 
Ferguson,  112;  occupied  by  General 
Stewart's  Confederate  Brigade,  152; 
brilliant  cavalry  engagement  and  dis- 
graceful flight  of  Pennsylvania  mili- 
tia, 200. 

McReynolds,  Colonel,  evacuates  Berry- 
ville  and  marches  to  Winchester,  80; 
his  wagon  train  heads  for  the  Poto- 
mac pursued  by  Jenkins,  87;  dashes 
through  Chambersburg,  98. 

Meade,  General  George  G.,  relieved  of  the 
command  of  the  Fifth  Corps  and 
placed  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  244;  address  to  the  army 
upon  assuming'command,  247;  in  coun- 
cil with  General  Reynolds,  248;  asks 
for  the  promotion  of  Kilpatrick,  Cus- 
ter,  Merritt,  and  Farnsworth,  248;  care- 
fully reconnoiters  the  country  and  se- 
lects the  line  of  Pipe  Creek  for  a  battle- 
field, 255;  apprised  at  Taneytown  of 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  at  Gettys- 
burg and  the  fall  of  Reynolds,  he  sends 
39 


Hancock  to  the  front  to  take  command 
and  report  upon  the  position  selected 
there,  270;  orders  the  army  to  Gettys- 
burg, 280;  reaches  the  field',  280;  spends 
the  night  in  preparation,  301;  contem- 
plates an  attack  upon  the  Confederate 
left,  but  abandons  it  upon  the  advice 
of  Slocum  and  Warren,  304;  discovers 
Sickles'  position  and  posts  the  Fifth 
Corps  upon  the  line  originally  intend- 
ed, 321;  did  Sickles  disobey  his  order 
in  posting  his  corps  (see  Appendix  D); 
calls  a  council  of  war  and  decides  to 
remain  and  fight  the  battle  there,  352; 
exposed  condition  during  the  terrible 
artillery  prelude  to  Pickett's  assault, 
364;  removes  to  Powers'  Hill,  372;  rides 
to  Round  Top  after  Pickett's  repulse 
and  orders  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves 
to  advance  upon  the  enemy,  439;  vari- 
ous opinions  as  to  the  propriety  of  or- 
dering a  counter  charge  upon  Pickett's 
repulse,  427-442;  forbids  an  attack  up- 
on the  retreating  enemy,  450;  daily 
marches  in  pursuit,  454;  comes  up  with 
Lee  in  his  new  position,  460;  calls  a 
council  of  war,  which  oppose  an  at- 
tack, 465;  responsible  position,  474; 
urged  by  President  Lincoln  he  orders 
an  advance  the  next  morning,  but 
finds  that  the  enemy  has  escaped 
across  the  river,  467;  dissatisfaction  of 
General  Halleck  with  the  escape  of 
the  enemy,  468;  did  General  Meade 
act  wisely  in  not. attacking  Lee  in  his 
strong  position— opinion  of  Thomas 
Robins,  469,  General  McLaws,  475, 
evidence  of  the  engineers,  467. 

Mechanicsburg,  Pennsylvania,  89;  entered 
by  Jenkins,  182. 

Merritt,  General,  promoted,  248. 

Mercersburg,  Pennsylvania,  occupied  "by 
Stewart's  infantry,  147;  by  Imboden's 
cavalry,  173;  by  the  wounded  Confed- 
erates captured  by  Captain  Jones,  507. 

Militia,  Pennsylvania,  called  into  se  rvice, 
93;  advance  from  Harrisburg  up  the 
valley,  254;  disgraceful  flight  from  the 
enemy  at  McConnellsburg,  202;  heroic 
but  rash  conduct  of  Captain  Wallace's 
company  upon  North  Mountain,  147. 

Militia,  New  York,  in  position  below 
Chambersburg,  121;  panic  and  dis- 
graceful flight,  128;  slanderous  stones 
circulated  by  these  men,  130. 

Milroy,  General,  in  command  at  Winches- 


610 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


ter,  78;  informed  of  the  approach  of 
the  Confederates  he  declares  his  abil- 
ity to  maintain  his  position,  79;  daily 
reconnoissances,  79;  attacked  by  the 
enemy  and  desperate  fighting,  83; 
evacuates  Winchester  but  is  intercep- 
ted and  routed,  84;  escape  of  part  ot 
his  command  to  Maryland  Heights, 
and  others  to  Everett,  or  Bloody  Run, 
Pennsylvania,  84. 

Monongahela,  Department  of,  establish- 
ed, 93- 

Moss,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  conduct  at 
North  Mountain,  147. 

Moses,  Major,  Chief  Commissary  of  Long- 
street's  Corps,  transactions  with,  194. 

Mountain,  North,  skirmish  at,  148. 

NEGROES,  hunted,  captured,  and  taken 
South  by  the  Confederates,  96,  107. 

New  Franklin,  passage  through  of  the 
great  wagon  train,  493. 

New  York  Militia  (see  Militia,  New  York). 

Newville,  Pennsylvania,  89. 

Norris,  Colonel  A.  Wilson,  charges  Gen- 
eral Sickles  with  disobeying  an  order 
from  General  Reynolds,  558. 

Northern  Virginia,  Army  of  (see  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia). 

OBSERVATIONS  from  a  tree  top,  127;  from 
a  church  steeple,  217. 

Orchard,  Peach,  terrible  fighting  and  great 
slaughter,  323,  328. 

Orders,  general,  issued  by  General  Hooker, 
244;  Meade,  247, 256;  Lee,  121, 174;  Ewell, 
131,  138;  Early,  184. 

Order,  Meade  to  Hancock,  271. 

O'Rourke,  Colonel,  killed  on  Little  Round 
Top,  330. 

Owen,  Captain  (Confederate)  description 
of  the  effects  of  the  artillery  fire  with- 
in the  Confederate  lines,  366;  Pickett's 
charge,  384;  demoralization  after  his 
repulse,  425. 

Oyster's  Point,  skirmishes  at,  199,  229. 

PARIS,  COUNT  OF,  estimate  of  the  strength 
of  Lee's  army,  38;  of  Stuart's  force  in 
the  great  cavalry  engagement,  412;  re- 
marks upon  Lee's  alternatives  when 
confronted  by  the  Federal  army  at 
Gettysburg,  62. 

Fender,  General,  commands  a  division  of 
Hill's  Corps,  41 ;  passes  through  Cham- 
bersburg,  174;  encamps  at  Greenwood, 


191;  crosses  the  South  Mountain  to 
Cashtown,  227;  encamps  at  Marsh 
Creek,  227;  engages  in  the  battle,  276. 

Pennsylvania,  Southern,  description  of, 
89,  90. 

Pennsylvania  Reserves,  brilliant  charge 
upon  the  enemy,  333;  holds  the  ad- 
vanced line,  again  charges  and  re- 
covers the  ground  lost  by  Sickles,  413. 

Petersburg,  Pennsylvania,  plundered  by 
Jenkins,  229. 

Pettigrew,  General,  commands  a  brigade 
in  Heth's  division,  Hill's  Corps,  41; 
leads  a  reconnoissance  to  near  Gettys- 
burg, 232;  falls  back  to  Marsh  Creek, 
233;  leads  a  division  in  Pickett's  charge, 
371;  killed  at  Falling  Waters,  468. 

Pickett,  General,  commands  a  division  of 
Longstreet's  Corps,  40;  encamps  near 
Chambersburg,  174;  remains  behind 
and  destroys  the  railroad,  204;  rapid 
march  to  the  front,  357;  leads  in  the 
great  charge  (see  Charge,  Pickett's). 

Pipe  Creek,  line  of,  chosen  for  the  battle 
field,  255. 

Pittsburg,  Head-quarters  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Monongahela,  93;  prepa- 
rations made  for  the  enemy,  94. 

Pleasanton,  General,  Commander  of  the 
Federal  Cavalry,  37;  reconnoissance 
across  the  Rappahannock  and  battle 
of  Beverly  Ford,  68;  states  the  proba- 
ble result  of  a  flank  movement  by 
Lee  as  recommended  by  Longstreet, 
63;  of  a  countercharge  by  Meade  after 
Pickett's  repulse,  431. 

Pollard,  E.  A.  relates  Lee's  confidence  in 
his  army,  42;  A.  H.  Stephens'  mission 
to  Washington,  54. 

Poolesville,  the  ford  of  the  Potomac  where 
Lee  expected  to  cross,  54. 

Potomac,  Army  of  (see  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac). 

Pomeroy,  Rev.  S.  W.,  bears  an  important 
dispatch  to  Harrisburg,  222. 

Powers'  Hill,  occupied  by  Generals  Meade 
and  Slocum,  372. 

Powell,  Colonel  (Confederate),  describes 
the  desperate  effort  to  capture  Little 
Round  Top,  331. 

RAWLE,  COLONEL  W.  BROOKE,  account  of 
the  great  cavalry  engagement,  406. 

Requisitions  upon  Greencastle,  134;  Cham- 
bersburg, 106,  132, 139,  193;  Gettysburg, 
191;  Mechanicsburg,  183;  York,  184. 


ANALYTICAL  INDEX. 


611 


Reynolds,  General  J.  F.,  Commander  of 
the  First  Corps  and  left  wing,  35;  in 
council  with  Meade,  248;  advances  to- 
wards Gettysburg,  251;  encamps  over 
night  at  Marsh  Creek,  252;  receives 
Buford's  dispatch  and  proceeds  to  the 
front.  262;  killed  by  a  sharp  shooter, 
264;  his  body  conveyed  to  Lancaster 
and  buried,  265;  consideration  of  the 
claim  that  he  first  discovered  Ceme- 
tery Hill,  269. 

Rihl,  Corporal,  killed  in  the  first  engage- 
ment of  the  war  upon  Pennsylvania 
soil,  125. 

Richmond,  threatened  by  way  of  the 
Peninsula  by  General  Dix,  115. 

Richmond  Inquirer's  correspondent's  ac- 
count of  Hill's  failure  to  support  Wil- 
cox,  Perry  and  Wright,  344. 

Robertson,  General,  commands  a  cavalry 
brigade  under  Stewart,  41;  covers  the 
withdrawal  of  Confederate  infantry 
from  the  Cumberland  Valley,  231; 
passes  through  Chambersburg  and 
proceeds  to  Gettysburg,  232. 

Robins,  Thomas,  jr.,  defends  General 
Meade  for  not  ordering  a  counter 
charge  after  Pickett's  repulse,  437;  for 
his  alleged  tardiness  in  pursuing  Lee, 
469. 

Rodes,  General,  commands  a  division  of 
Ewell's  Corps,  40;  drives  Colonel  Mc- 
Reyr.olds  from  Berryville,  86;  occupies 
Martinsburg,  87;  crosses  the  Potomac 
and  encamps  near  Williamsport,  87; 
advances  to  Greencastle,  131;  passes 
through  Chambersburg  and  occupies 
Shirk's  Hill,  160;  passes  through  Car- 
lisle, 173;  marches  across  South  Moun- 
tain via  Mt.  Holly  Pass  and  encamps 
at  Heidlersburg,  227;  proceeds  towards 
Cash  town,  but  turns  towards  Gettys- 
burg upon  hearing  the  guns,  273;  falls 
upon  the  Federal  center,  276;  occupies 
Gettysburg,  339;  entangled  in  the 
street  and  unable  to  co-operate  with 
Early  in  his  assault  of  East  Cemetery 
Hill,  340-347. 

Rosengarten,  Major  J.  G.,  certifies  to  hav- 
ing heard  General  Reynolds  order  the 
occupation  of  Cemetery  Hill,  269;  de- 
scribes the  fall  of  Reynolds,  263. 

Round  Top,  Big,  occupied  by  Colonel 
Fisher,  334. 

Round  Top,  Little,  its  importance  first 
discovered  by  General  Hancock  and 


Geary  sent  to  occupy  it,  281;  Sickles 
ordered  to  take  Geary's  place,  but 
does  not  do  so,  318;  Confederates  per- 
ceive its  importance  and  make  desper- 
ate efforts  to  seize  it,  323-329;  thrilling 
account  of  the  struggle  by  Colonel 
Powell,  331;  its  importance  accidental- 
ly discovered  by  General  Warren,  328; 
strange  oversight  of  Federal  com- 
manders, 350;  manner  of  its  discovery 
stated  by  General  Longstreet,  351; 
Weed,  Vincent,  O'Rourke  and  Hazlett 
killed  upon  it,  329,  330. 

SCHAFF,  REV.  DR.  P.,  description  of  ex- 
citement upon  the  approach  of  the 
Confederates,  95;  capturing  free  ne- 
groes, 96. 

Schenck,  General,  commander  at  Balti- 
more, 79. 

Scotland,  Pennsylvania,  104,  120. 

Scout,  Longstreet's,  statement  of  General 
Longstreet,  56;  harmonizing  conflict- 
ing statements  as  to  the  time  of  his 
arrival,  57;  change  of  Lee's  plans  upon 
the  reception  of  the  information  he 
brought,  56,  218. 

Scouting  Service,  method  of  communicat- 
ing important  information  to  the  au- 
thorities at  Harrisburg,  157;  messages 
carried  by  B.  S.  Huber,  164;  by  Rev.  S. 
W.  Pomeroy,  222. 

Sedgwick,  General,  commander  of  the 
Sixth  Corps,  36;  reconnoiters  the  ene- 
my on  the  south  bank  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  68;  all-night  march  to  Get- 
tysburg, 303;  placed  in  reserve,  304; 
called  to  assist  in  saving  Round  Top, 
334;  pursues  the  retreating  enemy, 
450- 

Seiders,  J.  A.,  captures  George  Hawkins, 
103. 

Seminary  Ridge,  the  Confederate  position 
of  July  2d  and  3d,  299,  260,  298,  539. 

Shirk's  Hill,  occupied  by  Jenkins,  105;  by 
Ewell,  146. 

Shippensburg,  90. 

Sickles,  General,  commander  of  the  Third 
Corps,  350;  charged  with  disobeying 
an  order  from  Reynolds,  272;  this 
charge  considered  at  length,  538;  with 
disobeying  an  order  from  General 
Meade,  319;  this  charge  considered, 
570;  receives  news  of  the  situation  at 
Gettysburg  and  moves  to  that  place, 
272;  his  position  in  the  line,  318;  was 


612 


THE    GREAT   INVASION. 


it  the  right  one,  319,  575;  his  defense 
by  himself,  558,  561,  572;  by  James 
Beal,  563;  wounded  and  superseded  by' 
General  Birney,^24. 

Semmes,  Colonel,  opinion  as  to  the  proba- 
ble result  of  a  charge  upon  the  Con- 
federate right  after  Pickett's  repulse, 
442. 

Slingluff,  F.  C.,  reasons  for  burning 
Chambersburg,  595. 

Slocum,  General,  commander  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  37;  receives  Howard's 
pressing  calls  for  assistance,  but  re- 
fuses to  go  forward,  272,  274;  reaches 
the  field  and  temporarily  assumes 
command,  280;  occupies  Gulp's  Hill, 
301;  opposes  Meade's  plan  of  attack- 
ing the  Confederate  left,  304;  his  lines 
depleted  to  reinforce  the  Federal  left, 
333;  temporary  success  of  the  Confed- 
erates and  occupation  of  his  lines  dur- 
ing the  night,  341 ;  enemy  driven  out 
after  a  terrific  engagement,  358. 

Smith,  General,  commands  a  division  of 
Militia,  or  Emergency  Men,  94;  moves 
from  Harrisbury  to  Carlisle,  254;  re- 
fuses Fitzhugh  Lee's  demand  for  the 
surrender  of  that  place,  254;  advances 
towards  the  enemy,  455. 

Smith,  Lieutenant,  captured  in  Chambers- 
burg,  104. 

Smith,  Rev.  J.  C.,  account  of  the  great 
•wagon  train  of  •wounded,  499. 

Snyder,  Jacob  C.,  account  of  the  •wagon 
train  of  wounded  and  incident  about 
New  Franklin,  493. 

Snyder,  Rev.  J.  Milton,  description  of  the 
•wagon  train,  498. 

South  Mountain,  passes  of,  90. 

Stahl,  General,  commander  of  a  division 
of  Federal  cavalry,  1 18;  joins  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  118;  superseded  in 
command  by  Kilpatrick,  248. 

Stahl,  Rev.  L.  W.,  certifies  to  having 
heard  the  guns  one  hundred  and  fifty 
miles,  512. 

Stannard,  General,  commander  of  a  Ver- 
mont brigade,  35;  gallant  and  heroic 
•  conduct,  333,  374,  387. 

Steeple,  church,  observations,  from,  217. 

Steinwehr,  General,  Commander  of  a  di- 
vision of  Eleventh  Corps,  36;  occupies 
East  Cemetery  Hill,  278;  repulses  an 
attack  of  the  Louisiana  Tigers,  338. 

Stephens,  Hon.  A.  H. ,  extract  from  his  cele- 
brated "Corner  Stone"  address,  553; 


sent  by  Jefferson  Davis  to  Washing- 
ton and  copy  of  his  letter  of  instruc- 
tions, 51,  52;  turned  back  at  Fortress 
Monroe,  53. 

Stevens,  Hon.  Thaddeus,  narrow  escape 
from  capture,  107;  his  iron  works  rob- 
bed by  Jenkins.  107;  burned  by  Early, 
170;  Early's  reasons  for  doing  so,  171. 

Stewart,  General,  commander  of  a  brigade 
of  Rodes'  division,  40;  occupies  Mer- 
cersburg,  147;  crosses  North  Mountain 
and  is  attacked  by  Captain  Wallace, 
147;  occupies  McConnellsburg,  152; 
sends  an  expedition  up  the  valley  and 
crosses  the  mountain,  152;  recrosses 
the  mountain  and  rejoins  Rodes  at 
.  Chambersburg,  152. 

Strile,  Mr.,  a  citizen,  killed,  176. 

Stuart,  General  J.  E.  B.,  Confederate  Cav- 
alry commander,  41;  desperate  en- 
gagement at  Beverly  Ford,  or  Brandy 
Station,  69;  his  headquarters  chest 
containing  Lee's  orders  of  instruc- 
tion captured,  70;  crosses  the  Potomac 
and  moves  northward,  115;  defeated  at 
Aldie,  117;  at  Upperville,  119;  shut  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  117;  emerges 
from  the  valley  and  crosses  the  Poto- 
mac, 239;  breaks  the  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad,  251;  captures  a  wagon 
train,  249;  panic  in  Baltimore  and 
Washington,  249;  encounters  the  Fed- 
erals at  Westminster,  251;  attacked  at 
Hanover  by  Kilpatrick,  253;  heads  for 
York,  Pennsylvania,  where  he  ex- 
pected to  join  Early,  253;  crosses  the 
track  of  Early  and  White,  but  fails  to 
learn  of  it,  253;  hears  of  Early's  de- 
parture for  York,  but  misinformed  as 
to  his  course,  he  turns  toward  Car- 
lisle, 254;  arrives  at  Carlisle  he  finds  it 
occupied  by  Federal  militia,  254;  de- 
mands the  surrender  of  the  place  and 
shells  the  town  and  burns  the  United 
States  Barracks,  254;  heads  for  Gettys- 
burg and  reaches  that  place  in  the 
evening  of  July  2d,  254;  great  cavalry 
engagement  behind  the  Federal  right, 
406;  attacked  by  Kilpatrick  while 
crossing  the  mountain,  452;  his  course 
around  the  Federal  army,  considered 
by  General  Lee,  60;  Longstreet,  60; 
Colonel  W.  H.  Taylor,  60;  his  defense, 
240;  Lee's  ignorance  of  the  Federal 
army  because  of  his  course,  60;  Lee's 
uneasiness  concerning  him,  290. 


ANALYTICAL    INDEX. 


613 


Stockton,  Rtv.  Thomas,  D.  D.,  impressive 
prayer  at  the  dedication  of  the  Soldiers' 
National  Cemetery  at  Gettysburg,  529. 

Strasburg  Pass,  preparations  to  resist 
marauding  parties,  178. 

Steinwehr's  division  occupies  East  Ceme- 
tery Hill,  267. 

Suesserott,  Dr.  J.  L.,  interview  with  Gen- 
eral Lee,  205. 

Susquehanna,  Department  of,  established, 
93;  commanded  by  General  Couch,  93. 

Swallow,  Colonel  W.  H.,  description  of  the 
opening  of  the  first  day's  battle,  265; 
reasons  why  Gulp's  and  East  Cemetery 
Hills  were  not  occupied,  287;  Early's 
unpreparediiess  for  the  assault  upon 
Cemetery  Hill  in  the  evening  of  the 
second  day,  347;  Rodes  entangled  in 
the  streets  of  Gettysburg,  339,  347;  de- 
scribes Pickett's  assaulting  columns. 
372;  Pickett's  charge,  390. 

•Swinton,  opinion  as  to  the  propriety  of  a 
counter  charge  after  Pickett's  repulse, 
440. 

Sykes,  General,  succeeds  General  Meade 
in  command  of  the  Fifth  Corps,  36; 
reaches  Gettysburg,  303;  position  in 
the  line,  321. 

•Sypher,  J.  R.,  opinion  as  to  whether  or 
not  General  Meade  should  have 
ordered  a  counter  charge  after  Pick- 
ett's repulse,  441. 


MARYLAND,  General 
Meade's  headquarters,  270. 

Taylor,  Colonel  W.  H.,  Lee's  Adjutant- 
General,  estimate  of  the  number  of 
Lee's  army,  38;  loss  to  the  Confederates 
by  reason  of  General  Stuart's  course, 
60;  reasons  why  East  Cemetery  Hill 
was  not  occupied,  284;  criticises  Long- 
street's  tardiness,  316;  Longstreet's 
failure  to  carry  out  Lee's  plans  on  the 
third  day,  415;  questions  the  complete- 
ness of  the  Federal  victory  at  Gettys- 
burg, 448;  states  the  amount  of  am- 
munition on  hand  after  the  battle,  462. 

Taylor,  Colonel  F.,  killed,  334. 

Thompson,  Maurice,  poem,  109,  556. 

Thoroughfare  Gap,  117. 

Tigers,  Louisiana,  repulsed  from  East 
Cemetery  Hill,  338. 

Top,  Big  Round,  (see  Round  Top,  Big).  - 

Top,  Little  Round  (see  Round  Top,  Little). 


Train,  Great  Wagon,  description  by  Gen- 
eral Imboden,  485;  J.  C.  Snyder,  493; 
J.  Milton  Snyder,  498;  Rev.  J.  C. 
Smith,  499;  D.  Z.  Shook,  502. 

Tremain,  General,  vindicates  General 
Sickles,  568. 

Trimble,  General,  opinion  of  the  probable 
result  of  a  counter  charge,  429. 

Turner's  Pass,  secured  by  General  French, 
452. 

Two  Taverns,  Twelfth  Corps  at,  270. 

UPPER  VILLE,  cavalry  engagement  at,  118. 

VERMONT  BRIGADE  (Stannard's),  heroic 

conduct,  333,  374,  387. 
Vincent,  General,  killed  on  Little  Round 

Top,  329. 

WARREN,  GENERAL,  Chief  of  the  Engi- 
neer Corps,  35;  opposes  an  attack  upon 
the  Confederate  left,  304;  accidentally 
discovers  the  importance  of  Little 
Round  Top,  328;  strange  oversight  of 
this  important  position,  350. 

Wallace,  Captain,  attacks  Stewart's  bri- 
gade on  North  Mountain,  148. 

Webb,  General,  heroic  conduct  in  repelt 
ing  Pickett's  assault,  375,  376. 

Weed,  General,  killed  upon  Little  Round 
Top,  330. 

Wheat  Field,  327,  328. 

White's  Battalion  (Confederate)  passes 
from  York  to  Gettysburg,  227. 

Willis,  Colonel  (Confederate),  Provost 
Marshal  of  Greencastle,  131;  Cham- 
bersburg,  137;  Williamsport,  Mary- 
land, 90. 

Winchester,  Virginia,  occupied  by  General 
Milroy,  78;  invested  by  Early  and 
Johnson,  81;  evacuated,  83. 

Wilkinson's  account  of  the  great  artillery 
prelude,  364. 

Wrightsville,  Pennsylvania,  occupied  by 
General  Gordon,  185;  bridge  burned, 
186. 

YORK,  PENNSYLVANIA,  Lee's  expected 
point  of  concentration  and  battle,  55, 
190,  242;  occupied  by  Early,  183;  re- 
quisitions upon,  184;  address  to,  184; 
evacuated,  227. 

ZINN,  COLONEL,  147. 
Zook,  General,  killed,  326. 


Ula 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 
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